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Major Professor:  James C. McCann, Professor of History 
ABSTRACT 
This dissertation reconstructs a history of the greater Qacha’s Nek district of 
Lesotho, southern Africa from 1880 when farmers first settled the area, until 1965 
on the eve of independence from Great Britain. This place-based study speaks to 
broader questions. How have people incorporated new and often foreign ideas into 
existing beliefs and practices? How did a person’s social position affect how they 
interacted with new ideas? How have people applied knowledge to make and 
remake environments such as in gardens and fields? This study is based on field 
research in Lesotho, South Africa, and the United Kingdom. The author examined 
archival materials including colonial records, agricultural reports and surveys, 
national council proceedings, and vernacular newspapers. During four months of 
rural fieldwork in Lesotho the author collected oral histories, took photographs, and 
participated in village life.   
The approach focuses on colonial government interventions into agriculture 
and pastoralism. These interventions serve as sites for examining historical changes 
in how Basotho people engaged with the non-human world. In so doing, the study 
makes three main interventions. First, the claims are situated within scholarly 
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conversations about local knowledge, science, and environment under colonialism. 
Second, the stories of chiefs, farmers, and government employees told here extend 
the literature on Lesotho’s political and economic history by highlighting the nuance 
of local politics, ecology, and agency. Finally, to contribute to the environmental 
historiography on Africa and rural places in general, the study probes the interplay 
of culture and nature. To do this, it narrates how people deployed eclectic 
knowledge to build, rebuild, and redefine environments.  
The dissertation argues that the compilation of environmental knowledge 
must be understood as a historical process that encapsulates the meanings that 
people have imbued the landscape with, for example, by building homesteads, along 
with how people have understood the landscape as a system of resources to be used 
economically for subsistence and market purposes. These aspects of knowing are 
part of a single process that has unfolded, and continues to unfold, along a temporal 
trajectory that has varied across different social groups, such as men and women 
and chiefs and commoners. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Origins of the Project 
In January 2008 I arrived in Ha Makhaola village, also known as Auplaas, in 
the mountainous Qacha’s Nek district of Lesotho1 to teach English at Tsoelike 
Secondary School. Like many fellow Peace Corps Volunteers, I settled into a 
temporary home with a host family in this village of some 400 people. In addition to 
my family and my students and colleagues at the school, I met other Basotho, many 
of whom have contributed to this dissertation directly as interviewees and 
indirectly as my friends and teachers. Some taught me the Sesotho language. Others 
taught me how to plow with oxen. Still others shared their stories of the past as well 
as their hopes and fears in the present. These interactions took place in a physical 
setting that drew me in from the beginning. Lesotho’s mountains, rivers, and valleys 
impress the visitor, if far less than they shape the lives of the people who live there.    
My research questions were born from these experiences. During my two 
years as a volunteer, and during subsequent research trips, I have visited with my 
friend Ntate Lebuajoang Lerotholi often. He is in his fifties and lives in a one room 
house that he built himself. His ex-wife and his two sons live elsewhere in Lesotho 
while his mother lives a stone’s throw away. Over the years he has been a soldier, a 
gold miner, a taxi owner and operator, and a farmer. Everyone knows Lebuajoang’s 
place for its tangle of greenery and other objects that surround the house: peach 
                                                          
1 In this dissertation I use Basutoland and Lesotho interchangeably, although the former usually 
refers to the British protectorate before independence in 1966. Basotho are the people from Lesotho, 
Mosotho is singular. Sesotho is the language and culture of the Basotho. 
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trees, spinach, chard, squash, tomatoes, dried out roots and bulbs, beehives, 
chickens, tools, and seemingly random junk.  
Like many of his neighbors, Lebuajoang is poor in the material sense yet he 
possesses a wealth of environmental knowledge. It is the diverse sources and 
applications of his knowledge that have piqued my interest the most. Two examples 
will illustrate the point. On one visit, noticing that he had just pruned his peach 
trees, I asked him where he learned his method. With his typical enthusiasm, my 
friend turned to dig through some belongings before producing an old secondary 
school agriculture book. The pages were dog-eared with hand-written annotations 
surrounding the instructional drawings of the trees. When I asked about the 
beehives that he houses in a stack of boxes, Lebuajoang says that he heard on an 
agricultural radio broadcast that the government was buying honey from local 
beekeepers, especially from people raising bees in the mountains where the nectars 
were supposedly the purest. To start his nests, he says that local shepherds led him 
to hives on a rocky slope below the village. My friend had heard, too, that bee venom 
could ease the pain caused by arthritis. So, he and his bees had been doctoring his 
arthritis-stricken mother by stinging the pain out of her aging joints. 
Lebuajoang is just one person, and as many of his neighbors know, a rather 
eccentric one. But the truth is, even in the small place of Ha Makhaola, people know 
very different things. My host mother had several peach trees, for instance, but 
knew nothing about pruning them, yet she knew all about raising pigs. What 
Lebuajoang knows and what his neighbors know, beg important questions. Who has 
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access to which types of knowledge? How do people apply this knowledge to making 
and remaking the environments within which they live, such as gardens, fields, and 
pastures? To answer these questions, I believe, is to examine an environmental 
historical process by which people compile knowledge. How, then, did knowledge 
circulate in a given historical context and along what channels did it flow? To what 
extent did one’s social and political position dictate the terms by which he 
interacted with new ideas? And not least, how have particular circulations of 
knowledge contributed to collapsing, or to accentuating, social and economic 
inequalities amongst people?  
To understand Lebuajoang and his neighbors as both parts and products of a 
historical process calls for a close study of the places that they call home. As a mesh 
of natural and cultural features these places were also parts and products of this 
process. In this dissertation I reconstruct a cultural and environmental history of the 
greater Qacha’s Nek district from the time it was initially settled by mixed farmers 
around 1880 until the eve of Lesotho’s independence in 1965. In many ways, as I 
will make clear, the changes that occured in this period were linked to historical 
tensions and developments happening not only in other colonial territories in 
Africa, but in rural places more broadly. In this story, older beliefs and practices 
overlapped, and sometimes collided with newer ones. Local and non-local political 
leaders and experts asserted their influence over people, urging them to think or do 
things in certain ways. Not least, what people expected from their governments, 
perhaps as much as what they expected from their environment, shifted over time.   
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I argue that we must understand the compilation of environmental 
knowledge over time as a process that encapsulates the meanings that people imbue 
the landscape with, for example, by building homesteads, along with how people 
understand the landscape as a system of resources to be used economically for 
subsistence and market purposes. In other words, these two aspects of knowing 
cannot be separated from one another. Instead, they are part of a single process that 
has unfolded, and continues to unfold, along non-linear historical trajectories that 
vary across social groups. Some important social distinctions in this history are 
those between female and male, chiefs and commoners, literate and illiterate, 
highlander and lowlander, and between those with different family backgrounds.   
 
Scholarly Contributions  
My work contributes to at least three bodies of literature. I address these 
literatures throughout the dissertation, but a brief outline will help frame the 
project while defining several key terms. First, what is environmental knowledge? 
For the people who permanently settled Qacha’s Nek in the late 1800s and their 
descendants, agriculture and livestock rearing have been at the center of their 
interactions with the non-human world. But people also collected plants for various 
purposes, selected appropriate village sites, quarried stone and clay for erecting 
shelters, and adapted to severe weather. People also named their villages as they did 
landscape features. They established spaces for burying their dead and for 
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educating their children. Therefore, I am concerned with the broader environmental 
knowledge as opposed to, for example, agricultural knowledge more specifically.   
 
 
 
 
I do not claim this study to be an exhaustive archaeology of either Basotho 
knowledge systems or the European-based techniques and technologies that have 
had such profound impact on Lesotho’s people and landscapes. V.Y. Mudimbe, an 
Map 1 
Southern Africa 
Credit: One Stop Map, February 18, 2017 
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important scholar of African philosophy, has argued that we must understand 
scientific knowledge in the context of the political projects in which it circulated.2  
This was true in Lesotho, to varying extents, throughout its colonial history, 
including during the twentieth century when the discourses and programs 
associated with “development” intensified. That is, Europeans sought to develop 
natives through transfers of specific knowledge.3 In this way, I contextualize the 
ways people compiled their stock of knowledge by discussing some of the roots of, 
for example, state soil conservation along with the ways Basotho had worked soil 
prior to the colonial interventions. I have chosen the word “compile” instead of the 
more commonly used “produce” to reflect the historical, expansive, and practical 
aspects of the process.4 Producing new knowledge out of old and new intellectual 
materials, from my perspective, is part of the compilation process by which people 
amass those materials and apply them to pursue various opportunities on the land.   
This part of my argument extends the findings of a rich and growing 
literature. Lesotho’s history offers a focused case for understanding what David 
Gordon and Shepard Krech, borrowing from the earlier work of Richard White, have 
called “the middle ground.” This middle ground is both a theoretical and tangible 
                                                          
2 V.Y. Mudimbe, The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1988), 16. 
3 On this point, see, for example, Elizabeth Croll and David Parkin, eds., Bush Base: Forest Farm: 
Culture, Environment, and Development (New York: Routledge, 1992). 
4 See Fredrik Barth, “An Anthropology of Knowledge,” Current Anthropology 43, no. 1 (2002): 1-18. 
Barth argues that knowledge always has three faces that mutually determine one another: a corpus 
of assertions and ideas about aspects of the world; a range of symbols, gestures, and actions; and a 
series of social relations within which knowledge is employed and transmitted.   
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space where “the boundaries between indigenous and nonindigenous knowledges” 
fall apart and where the origins of “specific ideas become difficult to trace.”5  
 
 
 
                                                          
5 David Gordon and Shepard Krech III, “Introduction: Indigenous Knowledge and the Environment,” 
in Indigenous Knowledge and the Environment in Africa and North America, eds. Gordon and Krech 
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 2012), 13; Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and 
Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); See 
also, Arun Agrawal, “Dismantling the Divide Between Indigenous and Scientific Knowledge,” 
Development and Change 26, no. 3 (1995): 413-39. 
Map 2 
Modern Lesotho – Political 
Credit: Mappery.com, February 18, 2017 
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Furthermore, Gordon and Krech argue that “European conquest and colonialism 
brought together people with distinct ideas of the world and different technical 
expertise to create new forms of knowledge.” Indeed, “even if the landscapes of 
power were highly uneven, exchanges between colonized and colonizers produced 
knowledge.”6 Looking closely at the ways colonial regimes produced knowledge 
about African environments (eg. grassland ecology), as Helen Tilley has shown, can 
also offer a new lens for seeing contributions of Africans in making knowledge that 
was at once scientific and local.7   
The middle ground, as I will show, was the cultural reality for the Basotho 
who first settled the mountains. By probing this middle ground, we gain a fuller 
appreciation of how people remade their environments into places that fit their 
constantly changing cultural, political, and economic aspirations.8 How people 
conceptualized this process within their own terms was evident in a 1947 national 
council debate about soil conservation and irrigation. For one Mosotho councilor it 
boiled down to a Sesotho proverb: bohlale ha bo hahe tlung e le ngoe – wisdom does 
not live in one house. In his view, it made perfect sense to adopt irrigation methods 
that might help Basotho farmers, let alone that the technology in question was 
something to be borrowed from Afrikaner farmers, who had been bitter adversaries 
                                                          
6 Gordon and Krech, “Introduction,” 13. 
7 Helen Tilley, Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Problem of Scientific 
Knowledge, 1870-1950 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).   
8 On culture, environment, and place-making see Clifford Geertz, “The Wet and the Dry: Traditional 
Irrigation in Bali and Morocco,” Human Ecology 1 (1972): 23-39; Keith Basso, Wisdom Sits in Places: 
Landscape and Language among the Western Apache (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 
1996); Maurice Bloch, “People into Places: Zafimaniry Concepts of Clarity,” in The Anthropology of 
Landscape: Perspectives on Place and Space, eds. Eric Hirsch and Michael O’Hanlon (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995), 425-34. 
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of the Basotho in several conflicts, past and present.9 Furthermore, my analysis 
draws on several key works to explain that when people remade environments by 
deploying diverse beliefs, practices, and technologies, they also remade themselves 
as individuals, as Basotho, and as land managers.10    
 
 
 
As a second scholarly intervention, I examine questions of environmental 
knowledge as a way to complicate established narratives of Lesotho’s political and 
economic history. In an article about an important anti-colonial movement in the 
                                                          
9 Proceedings of the Basutoland National Council, 42nd Session, 1946, Vol. I, 49-50; ‘Makali Mokitimi, 
The Voice of the People: Proverbs of the Basotho (Pretoria: UNISA Press, 1997), 22. 
10 For example, Tamara Giles-Vernick, Cutting the Vines of the Past: Environmental Histories of the 
Central African Rain Forest (Charlottesville: The University Press of Virginia, 2002); Marsha Weisiger, 
Dreaming of Sheep in Navajo Country (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009). 
Map 3 
Lesotho – Physical 
Credit: Mappery.com, February 18, 2017 
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twentieth century, Reuben Mekenye has recently affirmed that Lesotho experienced 
imperialism on two overlapping fronts: as a British protectorate and as the object of 
South Africa’s ambitions for land, labor, and water.11 For Mekenye, and other 
scholars of Lesotho before him, all political, agrarian, ecological, economic, and 
cultural changes must be seen first and foremost as resulting from these imperial 
entanglements.12 Mekenye’s work builds on an earlier generation of scholarship that 
explains the roots of regional rural poverty as a function of the southern African 
political economy and the unequal social and spatial relations between capitalist 
cores and peripheries that it fostered, especially those between whites and blacks.13   
Generally speaking, I take these important and persuasive arguments as my 
point of departure. These approaches cannot, however, adequately explain how 
rural social divisions were created and maintained at the local level, and how 
certain types of environmental knowledge featured in these relations. Furthermore, 
these approaches narrow the theoretical space for understanding human agency 
under colonialism. Basotho chiefs and government agricultural employees, for  
                                                          
11 Reuben Mekenye, “Re-Examination of the Lekhotla La Bafo’s Challenge to Imperialism in Lesotho, 
1919-1966,” International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 2, no. 10 (2012): 77-91. 
12 See, for example, L.B.B.J. Machobane, Government and Change in Lesotho, 1800-1966: A Study of 
Political Institutions (London: The Macmillan Press, 1990). 
13 For instance, Colin Bundy, The Rise and Fall of the South African Peasantry (Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1979); Shula Marks and Richard Rathbone, eds., Industrialization and Social 
Change in South Africa: African class formation, culture, and consciousness, 1870-1930 (London: 
Longman, 1982); William Beinart et al., eds. Putting a Plough to the Ground: Accumulation and 
Dispossession in Rural South Africa 1850-1930 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1986). 
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Map 4 
Greater Qacha’s Nek District 
Credit: Created by author using ArcGIS on February 21, 2017 
with assistance from Paulo Arevalo Orduz of the Boston 
University Department of Earth and Environment. 
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instance, were far more active in shaping political ecologies than has been 
previously recognized.14 These were by no means monolithic groups. But their 
perspectives and actions, especially with regard to agricultural and veterinary 
policies, I will argue, mattered significantly for how communities interacted with the 
colonial government.  
Deborah Johnston has explained that the agricultural policies of the newly 
independent government of Lesotho succeeded only in maintaining “the existing 
rural social structure, preserving the power of the chiefs and other rural elites.” This 
is true enough, but Johnston does not acknowledge that inequality in terms of land 
and livestock ownership, and in terms of knowledge, was rooted in a much deeper 
past.15 As I will show, especially in chapters two through five, the years between 
1895 and 1932 were critical for increasing social stratification, and access to 
knowledge was an important part of this process.  
Colin Murray, in his important book on the links between changing family 
structures, poverty, and migrant labor, does not discuss knowledge as an important 
variable. Rather, the focus of Murray and others was to understand how migrant 
earnings circulated within rural households and communities, and how these 
industrial laborers navigated the developmental cycle in which they invested 
earnings in their rural homesteads, especially cattle, as a retirement from industrial 
labor. As a key theoretical point, these scholars showed that rural Africans operated 
                                                          
14 For example, Mahmood Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late 
Colonialism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
15 Deborah Johnston, “The State and Development: An Analysis of Agricultural Policy in Lesotho, 
1970-1993,” Journal of Southern African Studies 22, no. 1 (1996): 119-37. 
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within a single economy, rather than a dual system in which capitalist and so-called 
primitive modes of production remained separate.16 But it was assumed, more or 
less, that people knew the same things about how to produce for markets, how to 
conserve soils, and how to diversify production of subsistence items. In this same 
vein, studies that attempt to pinpoint the drivers of agrarian change in world history 
have largely focused on variations in land regimes (eg. private or common 
property), types of production (eg. capitalist or subsistence), labor inputs, and 
technical inputs. To this list I would add specialized knowledge, which, of course, 
has links to all of the preceding variables.17 
Finally, this dissertation contributes to historical studies of cultural and 
ecological change, especially in mountain areas. Challenging the received wisdom 
about African environments and people, as numerous scholars have shown, is 
crucial to understanding change over the long term and to validating African land 
use practices. Historically embedded misrepresentations and narratives of 
deforestation, soil erosion, and desertification, and the assumed roles of Africans in 
facilitating these processes through so-called primitive practices, have led to failed 
policies and increased marginalization in both colonial and post-colonial contexts.18  
                                                          
16 Colin Murray, Families Divided: the impact of migrant labour in Lesotho (Johannesburg: Ravan 
Press, 1981); Andrew Spiegel, “Rural Differentiation and the Diffusion of Migrant Labour 
Remittances in Lesotho,” in Black Villagers in an Industrial Society: Anthropological Perspectives in 
Labour Migration in South Africa, ed. Philip Mayer (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1980), 109-
68. 
17 For example, Ellen Hillbom and Patrick Svensson, eds. Agricultural Transformation in a Global  
History Perspective (London: Routledge, 2013), 5-7. 
18 For example, Helge Kjekshus,  Ecology Control and Economic Development in East African History 
 (London: James Currey, 1977); David Anderson and Richard Grove, eds., Conservation in Africa: 
People, Policies, and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Melissa Leach and 
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Indeed, the work done by these scholars to deconstruct these narratives has been an 
important intellectual, practical, and political exercise in that it has, among other 
things, helped drive conservation and development policy in new directions.  
But I believe that these challenges to the received wisdom on, for example, 
the observations and prescriptions made by ecologists surveying African landscapes 
in the 1930s, have also distorted valuable historical materials. These sources tell us 
much about the challenges faced by African land users. Furthermore, seeing 
colonialism as the primary disruptor of Basotho relationships with the non-human 
world, I argue, denies these same people historical agency. For instance, people took 
up the ox-drawn plow to open more fields because they believed it was in their 
interests. Pursuing this opportunity, in turn, exposed more soil to erosive forces. 
Indeed, the larger colonial and capitalist structures are important features of this 
process, but we need to better understand the interplay between local action and 
the structural constraints of history if we are to grasp ecological changes and the 
role of humans in facilitating those changes.  
Rather than characterizing human-environment relations in Africa as either 
destructive (declinist) or improving (inclinist), I apply Emmanuel Kreike’s proposal 
for seeing humans as “architects of nature.” As architects, people employed 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Robin Mearns, eds., The Lie of the Land: Challenging Received Wisdom on the African Environment 
(Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1996); James Fairhead and Melissa Leach, Misreading the African 
Landscape: Society and Ecology in a Forest-Savanna Mosaic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996); James Giblin, The Politics of Environmental Control in Northeastern Tanzania, 1840-1940  
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992); James McCann, Green Land, Brown Land, 
Black Land: An Environmental History of Africa, 1800-1990 (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 1999); Kate 
Showers, Imperial Gullies: Soil Erosion and Conservation in Lesotho (Athens, OH: Ohio University 
Press, 2005). 
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knowledge, technology (including animals and plants), and labor to continuously 
build and rebuild “environmental infrastructure,” which people manipulated in 
order to support material and cultural aspirations.19 To develop this framework in 
my writing, I borrow analytical tools from Madhav Gadgil and Ramachandra Guha, 
who have posited that “modes of resource use” encompass not only the hardware of 
markets and government policies, but also the software of social organization, land 
tenure, and numerous other practices and beliefs.20 For example, when analyzing an 
interaction between livestock managers and European veterinarians during an 
1890s cattle plague, I consider how the political purposes of veterinary policy 
interlocked with Basotho conceptions of cattle to shape outcomes.  
In the early 1900s, Qacha’s Nek was a recently settled frontier space, yet it 
was already linked to an international web of technology, politics, culture, markets, 
and not least, knowledge. Being in the mountains has had important effects on 
Qacha’s Nek’s history. Not only has the altitude, ecology, and climate shaped this 
history, but there have also been significant cultural, political, and economic 
dimensions to the ways people in the surrounding lowlands related to mountain 
environments and to the people who have lived there.21  
                                                          
19 Emmanuel Kreike, Environmental Infrastructure in African History: Examining the Myth of Natural 
Resource Management in Namibia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 21. 
20 Madhav Gadgil and Ramachandra Guha, This Fissured Land: An Ecological History of India 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 10-12; See also, Gregory Maddox et al., eds., 
Custodians of the Land: Ecology and Culture in the History of Tanzania (Athens, OH: Ohio University 
Press, 1996). 
21 My inquiries into beliefs and practices by people in mountain areas as well as perspectives about 
mountain areas draw on, among others, Thomas Spear, Mountain Farmers: Moral Economies of Land 
and Agricultural Development in Arusha and Meru (London: James Currey, 1997); James Scott, The Art 
 16 
 
By reconstructing a history that spans nearly 100 years in this mountain 
area, I illustrate the subtle changes in the ways people have shaped the non-human 
world, for instance, by cultivating non-native plants in new types of productive 
spaces like home gardens. Perhaps more importantly, the longer term view conveys 
changes in the institutions – or regulatory communities – that govern the 
relationships between humans and environment.22 In narrating these changes 
across this period, I draw on several key works about other places that have 
experienced these changes under colonialism.23 Whether before, during or after 
colonialism, the ways that regulatory communities have served to create or destroy 
conservation beliefs and practices in the past, speak to current challenges of 
environmental change in the present. 
 
Methodology, Organization, and Sources 
 Just as this project began with me asking my Basotho friends seemingly 
mundane questions, my approach to research and writing has taken a similar path. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2009). 
22 On regulatory communities, see Arun Agrawal, Environmentality: Technologies of Government and 
the Making of Subjects (Durham: Duke University Press, 2005). 
23 For example, Nancy Jacobs, Environment, Power, and Injustice: A South African History (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003); Jacob Tropp, Natures of Colonial Change: Environmental Relations 
in the Making of the Transkei (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006); David Anderson, Eroding the 
Commons: The Politics of Ecology in Baringo, Kenya 1890-1963 (London: James Currey, 2002); 
Christopher Conte,  Highland Sanctuary: Environmental History in Tanzania’s Usambara Mountains 
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 2004); Elias Mandala, Work and Control in a Peasant Economy: A 
history of the lower Tchiri Valley in Malawi, 1859-1960 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 
1990); James Webb, Tropical Pioneers: Human Agency and Ecological Change in the Highlands of  Sri 
Lanka, 1800-1900 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2002). 
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My goal has been to write history as narrative. As Nancy Jacobs and Andrew Bank 
have written in a recent volume about the micro-politics of knowledge production in 
southern African history, to write history as narrative is to include dense historical 
detail, to people the past with personality, and to use the “seemingly obscure, 
whether of sources or characters, as a way of shedding light on broader social and 
political themes.”24 My task, as I see it, has been to find and examine sources and to 
reconstruct stories from those sources that speak to my research questions in ways 
that scientific analysis cannot.   
My questions about how people compile knowledge have multiple 
dimensions. I have made a choice, however, to focus on government interventions 
into rural lives and ecologies with full recognition that other institutions have also 
featured prominently in these processes. Christian missions, for one, facilitated 
cultural and ecological changes. I do discuss this aspect of missionization in 
conjunction with the government programs. I have organized the chapters in a way 
that is chronological and thematic. With the exception of chapter 1, each chapter 
examines a government intervention, or series of interventions, that address issues 
that had implications for changes in environmental knowledge. The intervention – 
its policies, debates, and applications – becomes the historical site for probing my 
questions. The chronologies necessarily overlap and the evidentiary base for each 
                                                          
24 Nancy Jacobs and Andrew Bank, “Introduction: The Micro-Politics of Knowledge Production in 
Southern Africa,” Kronos: Southern African Histories, Special Issue 41 (November 2015): 17. 
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chapter differs substantially, depending on what documents were generated by the 
program and what has been archived for researchers. 
 Government records held by the Lesotho National Archives (LNA), the 
National University of Lesotho Archives (NUL), the National Archives of the United 
Kingdom (TNA), and the South African National Archives in Pretoria (SAB) provide 
rich text from which to extract narratives. There are, however, large gaps in the 
archival record in all places. For example, LNA’s holdings are useful for the period 
between 1890 and 1933, and then contain only scattered records from the 1940s 
and 50s. I have consulted a wide variety of files in these repositories such as 
personal papers, government circulars, telegraph and letter correspondences, drafts 
of veterinary and agricultural reports, and police records. There are, of course, other 
pertinent files that will have to await my next phase of research for this project. 
During one year of research in Lesotho, South Africa, and the United 
Kingdom I collected archival materials in conjunction with rural fieldwork. Some 
important print sources include Sesotho language newspapers, missionary accounts, 
and contemporary ecological and agricultural surveys. Other important published 
sources include annual colonial and agricultural reports. For the period after 1908, 
the minutes of the annual proceedings of the Basutoland National Council (BNC) 
proved to be an exceptional source for understanding the national conversations 
about the practices and policies pertaining to agriculture, livestock, and soil erosion 
among other topics. While considering the Basotho voices in the BNC, in the 
newspapers, and those hidden in agricultural reports and surveys, we are still left 
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with an imbalance of European perspective, even though selected Europeans drew 
on decades of experience in Basutoland in their reporting. 
To add personal stories of cultural change to the archival evidence, I 
conducted over thirty formal interviews. My former host family in Ha Makhaola, and 
I would say, the community as a whole, welcomed me back during a four month 
research stay in the village. I sought interviews from a small cross section of 
Basotho, generally over the age of seventy: men and women, educated and un-
educated, well-off and poor, Catholics and Protestants. Interviewees were friends, 
acquaintances, relatives of friends, grandparents of former students, and others who 
I simply approached to ask if they might speak with me about the past. I obtained 
written consent from interviewees and recorded all but a few of these 
conversations. Eighteen of these were conducted in English, while thirteen were in 
Sesotho. Apart from one Sesotho interview where I had a research assistant present, 
I conducted these on my own, and then later had an assistant help me with 
transcribing them into English. The idea was not to collect objective truths, though 
some interviewees helped to clarify certain historical events or changes. Rather, I 
use these voices to populate my narrative with people’s subjective experiences and 
memories of the past, and not least, with perspectives on places.25  
My own close engagement with the Tsoelike area of Qacha’s Nek as a place 
has informed my writing. As important as the interviews are, my many informal 
                                                          
25 An important model for my thinking on oral histories is David Cohen, Stephan Miescher, and Luise 
White, “Introduction: Voices, Words, and African History,” in African Words, African Voices: Critical 
Practices in Oral History, eds. Luise White et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 1-27. 
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conversations with the Basotho whom I have met in the villages and fields, and at 
the cattle posts or river crossings, and on the bus or on long treks, have provided me 
with insight for thinking through the primary sources. There were those people, too, 
who took me to their fields for plowing and harvesting, or on walks to tell micro-
histories of the village. All the while, I documented these invaluable experiences in 
my field notes and in my photographs, some of which I have presented in this study 
as evidence. In this way, I believe, Lesotho’s cultural landscapes are my best sources.   
My choice to conduct fieldwork in the same village where I lived and taught 
as a Peace Corps Volunteer was not an uncomplicated one. Undoubtedly, my social 
network in Ha Makhaola (which I do believe to be diverse in terms of socio-
economic strata, linguistic abilities, religion, and education) influenced which 
people I interviewed and who I spent time with. But like all of my sources, I have 
tried to understand the full context of people’s recollections, both in terms of where 
a person comes from historically and how their comments are shaped by 
contemporary realities. For example, in answering my questions about earlier 
agricultural programs, some interviewees expressed a broad nostalgia for a past 
when the government provided better services, when young people worked harder, 
and when more men worked in the mines. These are important human expressions 
which I consider when using these sources.26  I recognize, too, that I am also an actor 
in reconstructing these narratives by choosing which questions to ask, which photos 
                                                          
26 See Robert M. Ahearne, “Development and Progress as Historical Phenomena in Tanzania: 
‘Maendeleo? We Had That in the Past,’” African Studies Review 59, no. 1 (2016): 77-96. 
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to take, and which places to visit. As someone who has returned to the village 
several times, I am, on some level, also seen as a community member. Villagers 
associate me with my host family, the Ramatsekas, with my closest friends, and with 
Tsoelike Secondary School.  
As many scholars who have done this type of work know, it is not possible, 
nor desirable in my view, to be just a researcher. My relationship with this 
community, especially with the Ramatseka family, has entailed responsibilities on 
all sides, which can quickly complicate matters. To the best of my ability, I have tried 
to pursue this project as a scholar who honors the integrity of our academic 
endeavor while doing justice to the people and places of whom this history is about. 
Whether in my role as a researcher, teacher, friend, or brother, I am aware of my 
privileged social position and all the powers that it entails. In some small way, I 
hope that my work is an appropriate tribute to this place and to the people who 
have lived there, both now and in the past. 
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1. SETTLING THE MALOTI: ECOLOGY, POLITICS, AND THE MAKING OF QACHA’S 
NEK, 1870s-1895 
 
1.1 - Introduction 
The Sehonghong area of the upper Senqu River Valley offers a hiker a journey 
through the ecological and cultural history of the Maloti Mountains of Lesotho. This 
research project, especially this chapter, is anchored in the sites, smells, sounds, and 
conversations that I experienced on one such journey.1  
The Sehonghong rock shelter sits at the base of the river valley of the same 
name near its junction with the Senqu (Orange) River. Faded paintings in red and 
white adorn the sandstone wall of the deep overhang. The paintings feature scenes 
of people hunting eland with bows and arrows. Another scene shows humans 
driving cattle. These images date from the mid-1800s when the Baroa, as Sesotho 
speakers called these non-farming people inhabited the area.2 Archaeological 
excavations on the Sehonghong shelter’s floor have revealed evidence of human 
activity from 57,000 years ago. Among the material remains, fragments of ostrich 
                                                          
1 I made these observations on 17 December 2014, which I recorded by journal and photographs.   
2 For Europeans, the Baroa were known as ‘Bushmen,’ which in the nineteenth century was a 
classification of economy, more than of race. The term San has been used by scholars to designate a 
cluster of ethno-linguistic groups, rather than economic classifications. See, for example, Sam Challis, 
“Creolisation on the Nineteenth-century Frontiers of Southern Africa: A Case Study of the AmaTola 
‘Bushmen’ in the Maloti-Drakensberg,” Journal of Southern African Studies 38, no. 2 (2012): 268; 
Together these terms have a long history of debate in scholarship and politics in southern Africa. 
Although ‘Bushmen’ carries negative historical connotations, the term remains common amongst 
Basotho. See also, John Wright, Bushman Raiders of the Drakensberg, 1840-1870: A study of their 
conflict with stock-keeping peoples in Natal (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press, 1971), 3-7. I 
use the Sotho term Baroa most often because Sotho speakers are at the center of my narrative. But, I 
will also use Baroa, San, and Bushmen interchangeably.  
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eggshells and ornamental marine shells attest to the complex cultural history of the 
region and to longstanding links between the Maloti and the surrounding lowlands.3  
 
 
 
The last Baroa to occupy this cave were killed or driven off by the agro-
pastoralist Basotho who were themselves seeking new living space in the Maloti in 
the 1870s.4 Adjacent to the paintings, I saw names written in white paint: “Edward 
and Esther Putsoane, July 1913,” and many more Christianized Bantu names too. 
Viewed one way, these name-tags desecrate a heritage site. Viewed another way, the 
                                                          
3 This does not imply that the nineteenth century inhabitants were direct descendants of the ancient 
cave dwellers. The paintings are likely from San groups who sought sanctuary in the mountains as 
both Europeans and Bantu farmers encroached on their living space in surrounding areas in the 
nineteenth century. See Peter Mitchell, “Making History at Sehonghong: Soai and the last Bushman 
occupants of his shelter,” Southern African Humanities 22 (September 2010): 149-70. 
4 A key source for discussing the settlement of the Maloti is Tiisetso Pitso and Stephen Gill of the 
Morija Museum and Archives (Hereafter MMA), a translation of the “1909 Court on Settlement in the 
mountains,” Leselinyana la Lesotho, October 1909. 
Figure 1.1 
Sehonghong Rock Shelter, Thaba-Tseka, Lesotho 
Photo by author, December 2014 
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writing shows people leaving their mark in what various groups across time have 
viewed as an extraordinary place. Sheep droppings covered the floor, and ashes 
from a shepherd’s fire were visible near the wall. Gentle rain began falling outside, 
mixing with cultivated earth and grass to emit an earthy smell. 
 The eland and the Baroa hunters are long gone, but more people and animals 
live in the Maloti now than ever before. From the cave entrance, I looked straight 
down the Sehonghong Valley towards the Senqu. Passing a cluster of non-native 
poplar trees, I greeted a teenage boy who watched his thirty sheep and goats drink 
from the river. The bells around their necks rang softly, echoing off the valley walls.  
It was December 17th and the austral summer had arrived. Farmers had recently 
sown maize in small fields along the boulder strewn valley floor. Some plots had  
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 
Sehonghong River 
Note: The rock shelter is in the background, while the 
junction with the Senqu River is behind the photographer. 
Photo by author, December 2014 
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rows of seedlings three inches high while others, nothing yet. Some fields were 
harrowed smooth. Others had deep, uneven furrows. Grass strips separated fields 
with contour banks built on the slopes. I crossed an iron bridge built for pedestrians 
and livestock that was elevated to withstand the seasonal fluctuations in the river. 
Across the river, I ascended out of the valley along a bridle path that followed 
carefully engineered switchbacks. I chatted with two women who were carrying 
clean laundry up from the river.  
 Once atop the steep bluffs that hem in the river, the Senqu Valley stretches 
wide at Sehonghong. Cultivated fields extend out to the bases of mountains that 
frame the valley. Looking through my binoculars I saw several villages scattered 
along the contour where fields meet steep mountains. Two men who accompanied a 
pair of oxen dragging a tire-as-sledge with a plow on it told me that they had just 
sown maize. They said that although it was late in the year to plow, they hoped that 
the current rains would make it worthwhile. Above distant villages, I spied livestock, 
which appeared as white and brown specs, grazing along the grassy slopes.  
A short walk to the north on the main gravel road brought me to the 
Sehonghong parish of the Lesotho Evangelical Church (LEC). Once at the Church, 
three buildings caught my attention. First, the original church that builders had 
constructed with dressed basalt stones and small sunken windows. Second, I saw a 
fenced-in compound of similar architecture where a young woman came out to 
greet me. She told me that reverend Jobo Moteane had lived there. Moteane was the 
first Mosotho minister of the Paris Evangelical Mission Society (PEMS), and he set 
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up this mission station there in 1893.5 Two peach trees bent in the stiff breeze while 
several types of greens grew in a small garden patch. Across the street from the 
residence, I circled a third building: a newer church built from stucco and sandstone 
with large windows. A lone eucalyptus tree stood beside the church, a giant standing 
on the mostly treeless grassland. It was a short walk back to the small, windswept 
town. I fetched up at the one place I knew I could find accommodation from a 
previous visit there in 2008: the police station.  
 
 
 
My walking tour of Sehonghong highlights historical changes that occurred 
between the 1870s and 1895. The tour also foreshadows the long term shifts in 
                                                          
5 M.N. Moteane, “Nalane ea Moruti Jobo Moteane, 1848-1942,” in Mekolokotoane Kerekeng ea 
Evangeli Lesotho: Jubilee Highlights, 1833-2008, eds. Stephen Gill et al. (Morija: Morija Museum & 
Archives, 2009), 73-82. 
Figure 1.3 
The Old and the New, Sehonghong, Lesotho 
Evangelical Church 
Photo by author, December 2014 
 
 27 
 
culture, politics, and ecology that I examine in this dissertation. In covering this 
initial period, this introductory chapter serves three overlapping purposes. First, I 
reconstruct how over the course of just twenty years, the Sehonghong area went 
from being a mountain grassland inhabited by a few people who hunted and 
gathered most of their food to an area marked by permanent agro-pastoral villages 
with a protestant mission. Members of a military expedition in 1873 reported no 
cultivation in these parts, no villages, no livestock, but only eland, reedbuck, and 
stories of Bushmen and cave paintings.6  
By the time Jobo Moteane established his church in 1893, many chiefs with 
direct lineage links to the expanding Basotho nation and some from non-Sotho 
groups, lived in villages along the Senqu and its tributaries. Wheat, maize, and 
sorghum grew in cultivated fields, signifying the new knowledge being applied to 
the landscape. Cattle, sheep, and goats grazed where eland had recently roamed. 
Meanwhile, the British colonial government of Basutoland established a district 
called Qacha’s Nek in 1888 which encompassed the Sehonghong area. The new 
authority inaugurated new forms of political ecology in the mountains by applying 
new regulations on the relationships between people, animals, and land. This 
period, then, constituted a political, cultural, and not least, an ecological revolution 
in the Maloti. Ecological revolutions, as Carolyn Merchant has described for colonial 
                                                          
6 Joseph M. Orpen, “A glimpse into the mythology of the Maluti Bushmen,” Cape Monthly Magazine 9, 
no. 49 (1874): 1-13; MMA, Ronald S. Webb, transcription, “The Diary of Inspector James Murray 
Grant, Frontier Armed and Mounted Police,” 1873-74; See also, Peter Mitchell and Sam Challis, “A 
‘first’ glimpse into the Maloti Mountains: the Diary of James Murray Grant’s expedition of 1873-74,” 
Southern African Humanities 20 (December 2008): 399-461. 
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New England, arise “from changes, tensions, and contradictions that develop 
between a society’s mode of production and its ecology.”7 New environmental 
knowledge, too, drives these changes. 
Second, I use the available primary materials in conjunction with later 
sources to establish the ecological and geographic context of Qacha’s Nek as it was 
in the late nineteenth century. The plants, animals, soils, weather, and altitude of the 
area form the foundation on which people have made multiple layers of history. 
Moreover, these characteristics, in relation to the surrounding lowland areas, 
distinguish the Maloti in important ways that I will develop throughout this 
dissertation. Viewed from colonial and missionary eyes, the Maloti was an open 
space to be experienced and imagined for its natural beauty and grandeur as well as 
to be used for its economic potential. And not least, it was a frontier to be mapped 
for military and policing purposes. A map of Basutoland from 1868 labeled the area 
around present day Qacha’s Nek only as “Very wild and little known country – 
inhabited by Bushmen.” An 1880 map simplified this label to “very rugged 
country.”8  
On the other hand, agro-pastoral Africans saw this country as seasonal 
grazing and hunting grounds in the 1870s and as a potential refuge in time of war. 
For the Baroa, it was home, and by the late 1800s, a refuge in which to hide. 
                                                          
7 Carolyn Merchant, Ecological Revolutions: Nature, Gender, and Science in New England (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1989), 3.  
8 National Archives of the United Kingdom (Hereafter TNA), MPG 1/934, Sketch of Basutoland, 1868; 
Colonial Office (CO) 700/BASUTOLAND 1, Map of Basutoland and Adjacent Territories, 1880, 
Compiled by Horse guards and the Intelligence Department. 
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Through the 1900s and even today, there has been a strong geographic and cultural 
bias against the highlands –the Maloti – and against the people who have lived there. 
Like many upland regions from Southeast Asia to Central America, people from the 
centers of political power in the valleys and urban areas, and other outsiders have 
viewed mountain areas like the Maloti as the back-o-beyond, a place where people 
lagged behind in education, technology, culture, and politics. In this view, it was 
(and still is) a place where people believed in rumors and superstition, while 
resisting science, reason, and progress.9  
The famous Mosotho writer Thomas Mofolo perpetuated similar cultural and 
ecological discourses in his 1910 Sesotho novel called Pitseng. In his story, Pitseng 
was a place in the Maloti that existed in opposition to Lesotho proper, which was 
then experiencing progress and education; while “in Pitseng it was still a time of 
black darkness of the Sesotho ways of old.” In Mofolo’s novel, Pitseng was both a 
land of comfort and a land of suffering. It was “a land of rain but also a land of fearful 
drought…of abundance of livestock…but also of heart-rending poverty.”10 A blend of 
myth and reality, these discourses still circulate today, if in more subtle ways. When 
I tell urban Basotho and South Africans that I have spent most of my time in Lesotho 
in Qacha’s Nek, they often say: “Wow, how is that?” I aim to dispel these myths, 
                                                          
9 My analysis of this upland region as distinct from surrounding lowlands draws on Scott, The Art of 
Not Being Governed; Jon Mathieu, “Long-Term History of Mountains: Southeast Asia and South 
America Compared,” Environmental History 18 (April 2013): 557-75. For examples of this 
perspective, see Grant’s Diary reproduced in Mitchell and Challis, “First Glimpse,” 419, 432; 
Basutoland Annual Colonial Report 1894-95 (London: HMSO, 1896) (Hereafter CAR), 6; Allan Pim, 
Report on the Financial and Economic Position of Basutoland (London: HMSO, 1935), 20-22; “Eagles 
Peak High School,” Moleletsi oa Basotho, 29 January 1951.   
10 Thomas Mofolo, Pitseng: The Search for True Love, trans. Daniel Kunene (Morija: MMA, 
1910/2013), 10.  
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which are predicated on geographic and cultural essentialism, by situating 
highlanders in a long term history where they interacted with eclectic ideas and 
technologies over the course of a century. 
Lastly, I will briefly describe several key cultural institutions that influenced, 
and were influenced by, the historical process of environmental knowledge 
compilation. For example, the ways local Africans educated their youth, regulated 
grazing spaces, and organized agricultural labor were all in flux in the late-
nineteenth century Maloti as they continued to be throughout the twentieth century. 
Because the cultural practices of Baroa and Bantu (Nguni, Sephuthi, and Sesotho-
speakers) overlapped in complex, and to some extent, unknowable ways during this 
period, it is difficult to parse out any essential practices that might be called Sesotho. 
Reconstructing the settlement process along with its cultural overlapping provides 
place-based historical context for subsequent chapters while setting up my main 
arguments. Sesotho culture, and the Basotho identity associated with it, must be 
seen as a historically fluid body of knowledge and practices that derived from 
various sources and experiences. Furthermore, this cultural field continued to be 
shaped and reshaped by myriad forces of history such as cross-cultural interface 
(eg. intermarrying), conflict, colonial governance, Christian missionaries, ecological 
variables, and regional politics and economy.11  
 
                                                          
11 See Norman Etherington, The Great Treks: The Transformation of Southern Africa, 1815-1854 
(Edinburgh: Pearson Education, 2001), 344-45; Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, Of Revelation and 
Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism, Consciousness in South Africa, Vol. 1 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1991), 28-29. 
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1.2 - An Environmental Overview of the Maloti 
 The mountain region covers approximately three quarters of Lesotho’s total 
area of 11,583 square miles. This fraction encompasses the area from the eastern 
edge of the Drakensberg Escarpment to the western edge of the foothills.12 The 
lowlands, foothills, and mountains comprise the three main ecological zones of 
Lesotho. My research focuses on the southeastern portion of this area, in what 
became modern Qacha’s Nek district, and to some extent, parts of Thaba Tseka and 
Mokhotlong too (See Maps 2-4). The mountain areas can be further divided into at 
least three ecological sub-zones, which are distinguished by characteristics that 
have affected human settlement and land use patterns of the region. The 
characteristics of these zones – temperatures, frost periods, precipitation, soil types, 
and vegetation – did not determine economic and cultural possibilities, but certainly 
modified what humans could achieve, especially in agriculture. The three sub-zones 
with corresponding altitudes are: montane (1500m-2000m), sub-alpine (2000-
3000m), and alpine (over 3000m).13  
Most agro-pastoral people settled in the lower two zones, especially the 
montane which is largely composed of the Senqu River Valley and the lower parts of 
its tributary streams.14 Each zone has geologic history that created local variations 
in topography, hydrography, and soil and rock types. Because my work targets 
                                                          
12 R. Staples and W. Hudson, An Ecological Survey of the Mountain Areas of Basutoland (Maseru: 
Government Printers, 1938), 4. 
13 Stefan Grab and David Nash, “Documentary evidence of climate variability during cold seasons in 
Lesotho, southern Africa, 1833-1900,” Climate Dynamics 34 (2010): 473-99. 
14 TNA, War Office (WO) 33/501, M.C. Dobson, Military Report on Basutoland, Vol. 1 (London, 1910). 
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human environmental knowledge and land uses from the 1870s, I will focus on 
three aspects of the environment that the first agro-pastoralist settlers moved into: 
climate, flora, and fauna.15 The variation and distribution of soils, too, play key roles 
in this history, roles which I will examine in chapter five.  
Mountain climate in temperate Lesotho has generally followed a bi-modal 
schedule of rainy and dry periods while still bringing four distinct seasons: spring, 
summer, autumn, and winter.16 The mountains support numerous micro-
environments between, and within the three ecological sub-zones that affect human 
activities, but some general patterns are sufficient here. The austral spring begins in 
late August when temperatures begin to warm and some light rain may fall. By late 
November, daily thunderstorms drop heavy rain that is often accompanied by 
lightning, and by hail so powerful that it has been known to kill lambs. Cool weather 
fronts from the highveld of South Africa move eastwards and meet with the warmer 
Indian Ocean air near the Drakensberg Escarpment to produce dense mist-belts and 
heavy rainfalls, especially in the higher elevations. The Senqu Valley, however, 
receives comparatively less rain on average.17  
Afternoon rains intensify in December through February and the high 
summer sun brings hotter daytime temperatures. Evening temperatures remain 
cool. Rains slow down while temperatures cool off in the autumn months of March, 
                                                          
15 On geology, see Gordon M. Stockley, Report on the Geology of Basutoland (Morija: Morija Printing, 
1947). 
16 McCann, Green Land, Brown Land, Black Land, 15-17, 147. 
17 B. Sekoli, “Climate and Climate Change,” in State of the Environment in Lesotho, ed. Q. K. Chakela 
(Maseru: National Environment Secretariat, 1999), 117-20; Staples and Hudson, Ecological Survey, 6-
8. 
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April, and May. Frost, especially in the sub-alpine and alpine zones may occur at any 
time during the year, but the chances increase substantially in May. May ushers in 
the cold, dry winter months where temperatures drop well below freezing and the 
wind blows incessantly.18 Winter precipitation, however, does occur sometimes as 
snow, which has ranged from a dusting to extreme weather events when heavy 
snow blanketed the landscape.19 Such was the case in 1902 when two feet of snow 
fell, bringing temperatures to 0° Fahrenheit. Livestock, indigenous trees, and several 
herders perished as a result of this deep winter freeze. Lehloa le Leholo (the Great 
Snow), as the event became known to Basotho, marked the arctic extreme on the 
Maloti climate continuum.20 
 Weather conditions affected the ways people conceptualized the mountains, 
as well as affecting how they permanently settled the region around 1880. Although 
historical climate data are scarce, documentary evidence and recent scholarship 
provide some sense of the aforementioned seasonal patterns, while showing some 
variation in those patterns. King Moshoeshoe, the patriarch of the Basotho nation, 
traveled into the northeastern Maloti with the missionary Thomas Arbousset in 
February of 1840. In his written narrative of the journey, Arbousset noted that on 
one day when cresting a mountain pass “the water was coming from the sky in big 
                                                          
18 Ibid. 
19 For example, snow fell in May of 1877, and abundant snow and severe cold resulted in livestock 
losses in 1881. 1884-1887 brought successive severe winters with snow falling as early as April. See 
Nash and Grab, “Documentray Evidence of Climate Variability,” 480. 
20 CAR 1902-03, p. 44; René Ellenberger, quoted in Robert Germond, Chronicles of Basutoland: A 
Running commentary on the events of the years 1830-1902 by the French protestant missionaries in 
Southern Africa (Morija: Morija Sesuto Book Depot, 1967), 51, 58. 
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drops…producing a noise like drainpipes” when falling on the crops in the valley 
below.21 A trader and traveler in 1864, Thomas Leask complained of slow progress, 
especially at river crossings. Leask wrote in his diary for December 7, 1864: “More 
rain! Rain every day! Rain without end!”22 A British military expedition in December 
1873 to capture the fugitive Hlubi leader Langalibalele, commanded by Joseph 
Orpen and James Grant, took frequent shelter from the downpours yet perspired as 
they rode on horses in the mid-day summer heat.23  
With the warm and well-watered summer having been the preferred travel 
season, we have fewer accounts of winter weather. This fact testifies to the 
conventional wisdom of both Africans and Europeans of the time: the mountains 
were best avoided in the winter. Drought (Sesotho: komello),24 too, has played an 
important part in Lesotho’s environmental history. How much or how little rain fell 
at specific times of the year could hinder seasonal pasture regeneration, which in 
turn affected both wild and domestic animal nutrition. Drought, and fear of drought, 
also shaped crop cycles and the lives of the farmers that depended on grain 
harvests.25 Human knowledge for identifying and manipulating natural resources, 
                                                          
21 Thomas Arbousset, Missionary Excursion into the Blue Mountains: an account of King Moshoeshoe’s 
Expedition from Thaba Bosiu to the sources of the Malibamatšo River in the year 1840, eds., trans. 
David Ambrose and Albert Brutsch (Morija: MMA, 1991), 59. 
22 The University of Witwatersrand Historical Papers (Hereafter WHP), Box A1078, Thomas Leask, 
Leaves from an old diary, South Africa 1862-1880, p. 51. 
23 Grant’s Diary reproduced in Mitchell and Challis, “First Glimpse,”431-36. 
24 Sesotho words will be placed in italics unless used repeatedly. Parentheses following a Sesotho 
word will indicate a translation and a Sesotho word in italics after an English word the same. Unless 
otherwise noted, all Sesotho words and translations have been done by the author in consultation 
with Mabille and Dieterlen, Southern Sotho-English Dictionary. 
25 On the impact of drought in the nineteenth century, see Elizabeth Eldredge, A South African 
Kingdom: The pursuit of security in nineteenth-century Lesotho (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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whether for subsistence production or market purposes, has been intricately linked 
to patterns of rainfall now as in the past. 
 Considering the contemporary agricultural capabilities and the geographic 
inaccessibility of the Maloti, winters proved inhospitable to agro-pastoral people in 
the 1870s. The indigenous staple grain, sorghum, required nine months of frost-free 
growing time. African farmers knew that other than in protected valleys, the 
mountain altitudes and temperatures prevented sorghum production.26 But by 1880 
Basotho farmers’ agricultural repertoire had expanded. People had begun 
cultivating maize in the Mohokare (Caledon) River Valley sometime early in the 
nineteenth century and wheat had also gained some traction since being introduced 
by missionaries in the 1830s.27  
Both of these crops, in addition to domesticated animals, provided farmers 
with new biological resources for sustaining four-season settlements above an 
altitude of 2000 meters. Livestock herders had driven herds of cattle, horses, and 
flocks of sheep and goats into the high pastures during summer as part of seasonal 
transhumance patterns. Boys and young men would leave their villages at lower 
elevations in early summer, driving the animals to remote posts where they would 
graze the rich grasses until the cold arrived in May and the grasses went dormant. It 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Press, 1993), 79-81; For impact of drought in the twentieth century, see Showers, Imperial Gullies, 
80-81.  
26 Edouard Jacottet, quoted in Germond, Chronicles, 429; R. U. Sayce, “An Ethno-Geographical Essay 
on Basutoland,” The Geographical Teacher 12, no. 4 (1924): 270-73; Staples and Hudson, Ecological 
Survey, 19-22. 
27 Arbousset, Missionary Excursion, 59, 75; Marshall Clarke, “Unexplored Basutoland,” Proceedings of 
the Geographical Society X (1888): 519; See also Clarke, quoted in Germond, Chronicles, 421. 
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was then time to return home to help with the harvest and prepare the livestock for 
wintering in the village areas.28 But in the 1870s, evidence suggests that few herders 
had reached the upper Senqu Valley of the Sehonghong area. Apart from fearing the 
harsh and often unpredictable mountain weather, agro-pastoral Africans feared the 
Baroa, who had managed to eke out a year-round living. The Baroa, like sedentary 
people, knew that the weather also affected the vegetation in important ways.29  
Varieties of grasses were many, but several species stand out because they 
have provided forage for the wild and domestic animals on which humans depended 
for food. Land users and observers in Lesotho have debated the extent to which the 
vegetation cover in the mountains has changed since at least the late nineteenth 
century. Historical sources reveal only snapshots of what these grasslands looked 
like in the 1870s, much less their scientific ecological composition. The central 
questions of these debates may be summarized: to what extent have native grasses 
been displaced by small, unpalatable bushes both native and non-native since the 
first agro-pastoral people settled the area? How much soil erosion had already 
occurred by the late nineteenth century and how did this process proceed through 
the twentieth century?30 These debates have shaped myriad agricultural and 
                                                          
28 Eugène Casalis, The Basutos; or, Twenty-Three Years in South Africa (London: James Nisbet, 1861), 
153-54; Azariele Sekese, Mekhoa ea Basotho (Morija: Morija Printing, 1970), 104-05. 
29 Orpen, “A glimpse”; Webb, “Grant’s Diary.” These sources of the 1873 expedition do not indicate 
cattle posts, but only some tracks of cattle, probably from Langalibalele’s party. The first posts seem 
to have been set up from the northern chiefs Jonathan and Joel Molapo between 1868 and 1870. See 
MMA, “Court on Settlement.” 
30 In naming the grasses and trees, I have used their Sesotho names, with the scientific/common 
names in parentheses. Eg. Sesotho (scientific/common). See for example: CAR 1894-94, pp. 11-12; W. 
Willcocks, “Report on Irrigation in South Africa,” South African Pamphlets 2, no. 34 (1901); Nathan 
Sekhesa, “Makhulo a Felile,” Leselinyana, 3 October 1912; South African National Archives, Pretoria 
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livestock policies that have featured in Lesotho’s past. By setting a rough ecological 
baseline, and then examining how humans, ideas, and technology interacted with 
the natural world in this place, I will comment on these ecological changes through 
historical narrative. That is, I reconstruct stories of people and their environments 
rather than quantifying change through scientific analysis.   
Travelers in the Maloti and early settlers circa 1880 probably encountered 
two main grass types. According to the authors of An Ecological Survey of the 
Mountain Areas of Basutoland, in 1936 seboku (Themeda triandra/redgrass) 
occupied 56% of the Maloti. As trained ecologists, the surveyors believed that this 
grass was typical of undisturbed areas, though they also acknowledged that Baroa 
had used fire for managing seasonal grasses to attract game. Livestock preferred 
seboku to other mountain grasses, a fact well-known to African herders. 
Exemplifying the important interaction of topography, latitudinal position, and sun, 
seboku typically grew at altitudes up to 2700m on north facing slopes, but only to 
2100m on south facing slopes. A second type, letsiri (Festuca caprina) occupied 
about 31% of the Maloti in 1936. It was less palatable to livestock, except for the 
new leaves, and was the common grass cover of the higher plateaus above 3000m.31  
Staples and Hudson also identified a third species. Their unnamed Basotho 
guides, who helped lead the two surveyors through the mountains, knew the small 
                                                                                                                                                                             
(Hereafter SAB), Native Affairs Department (NTS) Vol. 10163, Ref. 52/419, Russell Thornton, “Report 
on Pastoral and Agricultural Conditions in Basutoland,” 11 August 1931; Pim, Financial and 
Economic, 45-47; Staples and Hudson, An Ecological Survey, 14-20; For a historical soil analysis, see 
Showers, Imperial Gullies. 
31 Staples and Hudson, Ecological Survey, 11-14; See also, David Ambrose et al., eds., Biological 
Diversity in Lesotho: A Country Study (Maseru: National Environmental Secretariat, 2000), 9-11. 
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shrub as sehalahala (Chrysocoma tenuifolia). The ecologists believed that sehalahala, 
which was native to southern Africa and a member of the aster family, had displaced 
other grasses primarily because of overgrazing. Known to white South African 
farmers as bitter karoo, or bitterbos in Afrikaans, livestock would not touch this 
small bush. The surveyors claimed that it covered 13% of the Maloti in 1936. Staples 
and Hudson completed this work in a period when ecological science adhered to 
notions of equilibrium within ecosystems. Moreover, the pair worked within an 
imperial political apparatus that was then emphasizing the erosive effects of the 
grazing practices of Basotho and other African groups.32  
Basutoland was recovering from a terrible drought in 1932-33, which 
probably affected the vegetative cover of the rangelands in 1936. Sehalahala thrived 
during drought. Still, these findings provide an important historical illustration of 
the ways the grasslands had changed in the previous fifty years. Although the extent 
of these changes was unclear, primary accounts of observations from the 1870s 
through the early 1900s corroborate, more or less, that vegetative cover was less 
bushy in the early years of agro-pastoral settlements. To be sure, climate variation 
across the years of these accounts mattered, as did the colonial political-economy in 
which people farmed and reared livestock, but a general increase in sehalahala 
seems reasonably accurate.33 
                                                          
32 Ibid.; Donald Worster, “The Ecology of Order and Chaos,” Environmental History Review 14, no. 1/2 
(1990): 2-3; On ecology and British imperialism, see Peder Anker, Imperial Ecology: Environmental 
Order in the British Empire, 1895-1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001). 
33 Thomas P. Kennan, “Discovery and Exploration of Basutoland: Notes on a Journey in 1888,” 
Lesotho: Basutoland Notes and Records 4 (1959): 43-45; Dobson noted much good grazing in 1909, 
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Along with grasses, several indigenous tree species grew in the valleys of the 
mostly treeless Maloti landscape. French Protestant missionaries, especially the 
builder François Maeder cursed the dearth of timber in the areas around their first 
mission station at Morija after 1833. He cried that there was “every reason to justify 
the description of this whole area as sterile country, as neither trees nor shrubs are 
anywhere to be seen except on the banks” of the rivers.34 Maeder’s forested home in 
Germany certainly tinted the lens through which he viewed the Maloti. His 
frustration also owed to his daunting task of building a church from timber in 
Lesotho. But he correctly pointed out that most prominent native species of trees in 
Lesotho grew almost exclusively in valleys. Mohloare (Olea africana/wild olive), 
Moluoane (Salix mucronata/Cape willow), Molutu (Celtis africana/stinkwood), and 
Cheche (Leucosidea sericea/oldwood) among other trees, shrubs, and flowering 
plants grew in clusters along watercourses where their roots could tap the 
perennial moisture under the rocky ground.35  
These four species were, and still are, important trees for ecological, 
economic, and cultural reasons in Lesotho. Missionaries prioritized wood as an 
essential natural resource. Baroa had used wood for tools, fuel, and weapons, but 
had made little ecological impact on trees in the Maloti by 1880. Agro-pastoral 
                                                                                                                                                                             
but he also mentions sehalahala being present on the route between the colonial administrative 
camps at Qacha’s Nek and Mokhotlong, Military Report, Vol. II, 116-22;  Sayce, “Ethno-Geographical 
Essay,” 276-79. 
34 François Maeder, quoted in Germond, Chronicles, 54. 
35 On how European landscapes informed missionary perspectives of African environments, see 
Patrick Harries, “Under Alpine Eyes: Constructing Landscape and Society in Late Pre-Colonial South-
East Africa,” Paideuma 43 (1997): 171-91; Ambrose et al., Biological Diversity, 18-24. 
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African practices of the time seem to have conserved these trees, to some extent, to 
be used sparingly as fuelwood, as building material, or as medicine trees. This last 
use was the case with a large molutu that Chief Masupha (Moshoeshoe’s third son) 
revered for its spiritual and symbolic power until his death in 1899. Masupha’s 
molutu tree measured over ten feet in circumference and was sixty feet high.36 
Numerous species of aloe (lekhala), too, thrived especially on northern facing, sun 
drenched mountain slopes. African architecture of the time used mostly grass, reeds, 
clay, stone, and cow dung plaster (molilo). But by the late 1800s, more Basotho 
families were building homes that used wood. Europeans struggled to adapt in the 
tree-poor landscape; and the indigenous pockets of forest suffered under the axe, 
especially around mission stations. Responding to their own destructive practice, 
missionaries engaged in afforestation in the lowlands as early as the 1860s.37 
A similar forest history unfolded in the highlands, if delayed by several 
decades. Crossing the Senqu River near Sehonghong in December 1873, James Grant 
noted that the river was “fringed with willows,” this while reporting no villages or 
even cattle posts.38 Jobo Moteane and Sir Marshall-Clarke both suggested that at 
least some change was under way when they passed through the same area in 
October 1887. Marshall-Clarke noted that upon leaving Lelingoana’s village – which 
was not yet ten years old – there were “willows and reeds in abundance.” He then 
lamented, however, that “formerly all the mountain streams were lined with 
                                                          
36 Germond, Chronicles, 57. 
37 Casalis, The Basutos, 125-28; Jean Preen, quoted in Germond, Chronicles, 56. 
38 Webb, “Grant’s Diary,” 18 December 1873. 
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willows.” In the 1880s some travelers believed, mistakenly, that the Maloti had been 
previously forested. Nonetheless, Clarke would have seen stumps that resulted from 
new settlers cutting firewood and building material for survival in the higher, colder 
mountain environments.39  
In addition to trees, various reeds (mahlaka) played important parts in both 
mountain ecology and African culture. On his journey in 1887 to the source of the 
Senqu near the escarpment, Moteane noted that there were “no trees or even reeds, 
just tall grass.” But upon descending several hundred meters down the watershed 
they “reached an area with beautiful willow trees together with reeds, contrasting 
with the bareness upstream.”40 In addition to their ecological purpose of cradling 
the headwaters of rivers and streams, reed beds had provided tools for Baroa and 
materials for building homes and homestead enclosures for agro-pastoral settlers. 
Reeds had cosmological significance too. Basotho believed that their ancestors had 
emerged from an area of wetland reed beds known as Ntsuana-tsatsi, located to the 
north of modern-day Lesotho. Despite conservation practices, which changed over 
time, within the Maloti many reed beds and wetlands disappeared as new settlers 
established villages, put their animals out to pasture, and tilled dark soils on bottom 
lands where reeds once thrived.41 
                                                          
39 Clarke, “Unexplored Basutoland,” 519.  
40 David Ambrose and Pelesa Sekoli, eds., trans., “Jobo Moteane's account of a journey through the 
Lesotho Highlands 100 years ago,” Mehloli 2, no. 4 (1990): 12-14. 
41 Daniel F. Ellenberger, History of the Basuto: Ancient and Modern, trans. J.C. Macgregor (London: 
Caxton Publishing, 1912), 70-73; Arbousset, Missionary Excursion, 72-73; M. Mokhothu and T.C. 
Ts’ehlo, “Water Resources and Water Use,” in Chakela, ed., State of the Environment, 134-35. 
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New settlers brought new knowledge to bear on trees, reeds, and grasses of 
the Maloti which altered local ecology. These alterations, however, do not 
necessarily imply a historical trajectory of decline where population growth meant 
ecological deterioration. On the contrary, the 1880s and subsequent periods offer 
stories of humans interacting and changing their environments in complex, non-
linear ways.42 For instance, Basotho developed sophisticated rotational grazing 
systems to conserve grass, reeds, and trees as population increased. Also, those 
associated with early missions in the region, began planting new species to mitigate 
the perceived dearth of wood resources in the face of increased settlement after 
1880.43 The non-native poplars and the giant eucalyptus that I observed in 
Sehonghong were propagated by humans who applied their local knowledge of 
place and new cultivars to shape the mountain environment for their own purposes. 
The outcomes, like the knowledge underpinning the actions, were imperfect. 
Eucalyptus, for example, provided fuel wood, shade, and building material, but has 
long since been recognized for its desiccating impact on ground water.44 
Finally, apart from flora, the changes in the animal populations of the Maloti 
and subsequent effects on vegetation may have had the most dramatic ecological 
impact of all. Baroa hunted eland, red hartebeest, and an array of smaller game such 
as the pela (Procavia capensis/rock dassie) before and while the agro-pastoralists 
                                                          
42 See, for example, Melissa Leach and Robin Mearns, “Challenging Received Wisdom in Africa,” in The 
Lie of the Land, 1-33; Spear, Mountain Farmers. 
43 Report and Evidence of Commission on Native Laws and Customs of the Basutos (Cape Town: 
Government Printers, 1873), 51-52; Staples and Hudson, Ecological Survey, 25. 
44 N. Maile, “Indigenous Forests, Trees, Shrubs, and Afforestation,” in Chakela, ed., State of the 
Environment, 82. 
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were encroaching on their mountain homes.45 Lions, hippopotamuses, leopards, and 
crocodiles once lived in the Maloti, but were long gone by 1880. On Thomas 
Arbousset and Moshoeshoe’s journey in 1847, they encountered a frightened lion 
which they tried to kill, unsuccessfully. This was among the last recorded lion 
sightings in the area, though smaller felines such as the caracal were sighted in later 
years. For canines, the phokojoe (Canis mesomelas/black-backed jackal) prowled the 
mountains when the first settlers came and continued to do so into the twentieth 
century, posing a threat to small livestock.46  
Humans asserted power over animals in various ways. Different cultures of 
hunting permeated all three major groupings of people who affected the ecology of 
the Maloti around 1880: Baroa, Agro-Pastoral Africans, and Europeans. Nehemiah 
Moshoeshoe and his fellow scouts, including a San man named Qing, spotted large 
eland spoors (trails) for the Grant-Orpen expedition of late 1873, though the 
expedition struggled to bag significant game.47 In 1888, the British administrator 
T.P. Kennan, relying on the expertise of several Basotho guides, hunted eland, red 
hartebeest and reedbuck.48 Numerous bird species, too, populated the uplands, 
some of which took on important cultural meanings. Baroa fished the deep pools of 
rivers like the Tsoelike and Senqu for aquatic edibles.49 Some hunting continued 
into the twentieth century, indeed Basotho still hunt rock dassies, hares, river otters, 
                                                          
45 Wright, Bushmen Raiders, 4-10. 
46 Arbousset, Missionary Excursion, 113-22, 127-28. 
47 Grant’s Diary, reproduced in Mitchell and Challis, “First Glimpse,” 434-38. 
48 Kennan, “Discovery and Exploration,” 43-45. 
49 Patricia Vinnicombe, “A Fishing-Scene from the Tsoelike River, South-Eastern Basutoland,” The 
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and birds, while also dropping the occasional fishing line in the rivers. But agro-
pastoral communities severely limited the habitat for wild animals by the mid-
1890s when they plowed vast acreages and grazed their animals in remote valleys 
and atop distant peaks. The ecological revolution in the Maloti occurred 
concurrently with, and because of, the interface between diverse human groups. 
 
1.3 - Cultural Interface amongst Baroa, Baphuthi, and ‘Basotho’ 
The life of Qing, the San man who guided Orpen and Grant’s 1873 military 
expedition, illustrates important aspects of the frontier process that lies at the base 
of modern environmental history in Qacha’s Nek. Igor Kopytoff has argued that a 
process where different cultures and polities have interacted with one another 
across a specific landscape, “has been repeated again and again in African culture 
history, giving African societies and their political culture a frontier cast.”50 In this 
section, I focus on the cultural side of this interface. My main concern in this process 
of what Charles Van Onselen has called “cultural osmosis” is how knowledge for 
understanding and using natural resources moved between people from different 
social backgrounds.51 
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The frontier experience in eastern Lesotho bore similarities to other places in 
Africa and beyond. Comparing North America and South Africa, historians have 
defined the frontier as a “zone of interpenetration between two previously distinct 
societies.” One society was “indigenous to the region, or at least had occupied it for 
many generations, the other was intrusive.” The frontier “opened” when the first 
representatives of the intrusive society arrived; it “closed” when a single authority 
had established political control over the zone.52 This holds true, to some extent, for 
eastern Lesotho. Indeed, it holds true for Lesotho as a whole which formed when a 
conglomeration of chieftainships sought protection under the Sotho Chief 
Moshoeshoe (d. 1870) in the wake of the regional instability during the lifiqane of 
the 1820s.53 Although the two societies, Bantu and San, had long been in contact 
prior to meeting in the Maloti, the years between the 1870s and 1895 encompassed 
a rapid process where a frontier opened when Bantu first moved into San-occupied 
highlands, and closed when the political descendants of Moshoeshoe established 
hegemony over the region by designating it a district and placing an official district, 
or ward chief there in 1895.  
So how does Qing fit in? The leader of the 1873 military expedition Joseph 
Orpen needed a guide who knew the Maloti, especially the upper Senqu Valley. 
Orpen also sought someone to educate him on San rock art, a subject in which he 
had become interested. Orpen had heard of Qing, who was a son of Soai. Soai was 
                                                          
52 Howard Lamar and Leonard Thompson, eds., The Frontier in History: North America and Southern 
Africa Compared (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 7. 
53 Peter Sanders, Moshoeshoe: Chief of the Sotho (London: Heinemann, 1975), 32-45. 
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the San leader who was killed by Basotho around 1870 at his stronghold, the 
Sehonghong rock shelter. Soai was thought to have been the last San leader in the 
Maloti, and his son Qing had escaped that same fate. Qing was working as “a hunter 
in the employ of Nqasha [Qacha],” a Mophuthi chief when Orpen hired him. During 
the expedition, according to Orpen, Qing “proved a diligent and useful guide, and 
became a favorite, he and his clever little mare, with which he dashed and doubled 
among the stones like a rabbit when his passion for hunting occasionally led him 
astray.”54   
Qing was a San man living in an increasingly Bantu world in the 1870s, but he 
still possessed the deep environmental knowledge that undergirded Baroa lifeways. 
These same lifeways influenced what Bantu settlers knew and learned about living 
in the Maloti. “The people of the eland,” as these San identified themselves, focused 
their aesthetic, moral, and intellectual speculations on the eland, in addition to using 
this animal for material sustenance. Plants, animals, fish, and the landscape itself, 
especially rock shelters, provided the resource base from which people obtained 
food, clothing, shelter, and medicine.55 Men hunted eland and other game using 
bows and arrows that were tipped with poison from processed tree bark. Often, 
hunters would draft animals into corners of cliffs where they could shoot them, or 
trap them in pits lined with sharpened stakes. Men also harvested honey from bees’ 
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nests, often following the greater honeyguide, a bird that had assisted many African 
groups in this pursuit by signaling a nest’s location through its intricate calls.56 Men 
also fished in the rivers using hooks made of wood or ivory, and baited with meat. 
The fishermen fastened the hooks to thread made from eland sinew. In winter, when 
water levels were low, fishermen speared fish as they gathered in small pools. 
Women, perhaps the bearers of the greatest botanical knowledge, collected locusts, 
gathered fruits and seeds, and dug up roots and bulbs to provide nourishment and 
medicine.57   
The stock of Baroa environmental knowledge, with which Qing was 
intimately familiar, permeated Bantu lifeways far beyond food. In the winter, Baroa 
hunkered into the many sandstone overhangs of the Maloti, like the one at 
Sehonghong. In warmer months they built circular huts made of tree branches, and 
topped with thatch grass.58 Baroa also crafted musical instruments, developed 
techniques for smoking dagga (marijuana), and deployed a sophisticated herbal 
pharmacology. Bushman painting traditions, too, show a refined environmental 
knowledge by which people gathered materials and prepared paint from blood and 
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earth, while simultaneously illustrating their cosmology and leaving artistic 
evidence of their lives.59  
Perhaps language was the most important influence of the San on Sesotho 
culture. It was certainly the most audible. For example, the “Q” sound in Sesotho 
signifies a click and was integrated during a prolonged historical interaction 
between Sotho-speakers and San, which we still know relatively little about. San 
words and names of people mark the Maloti landscape today.60 As the types of 
cultural mixing and environmental knowledge become clearer, it must be stressed 
that the Maloti San’s demise came through tense confrontation in the nineteenth 
century. As encroachment threatened the Baroa’s natural resource base, they 
adapted by raiding horses and cattle from adjacent areas, and hiding in more 
secluded locations. These actions, especially the livestock raiding, drew reprisals 
from both Bantu and European settlers.61 
 But Bantu relations with the San differed across groups. Qacha, Qing’s 
employer prior to the 1873 expedition, and from whom the district would take its 
name, was a son of Moorosi, the great chief of the Baphuthi. The Baphuthi spoke 
Sephuthi, the distinctive language which had derived from their Nguni origins to the 
east of the Drakensberg. The Baphuthi had migrated their way through the 
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nineteenth century, navigating the turbulent political terrain between their 
ancestral home on the banks of the Tugela River and the Caledon Valley to the west. 
By the 1840s, under the leadership of Moorosi, they had become politically 
subordinate, owing allegiance to Moshoeshoe. But Chief Moorosi and his followers 
sought some autonomy by settling to the south of the Senqu River in what became 
Quthing district.62  
The Baphuthi had close links to the Baroa. Some contemporaries believed 
that Moorosi himself had San blood. He married at least two San wives and had 
several children by them. A young son of Moorosi named Mapote later recalled that 
his half-brothers had taught him the art of rock painting. Bushmen who lived under 
Moorosi’s protection were considered equal to Baphuthi with regard to the laws 
against killing. The two groups hunted eland together and traded horses. Certainly, 
they also exchanged the environmental knowledge that came along with traveling 
and hunting in a vernacular landscape: animal behavior, edible plants, weather, and 
orientation. Moorosi’s sons were the first Bantu to establish villages in the sparsely 
populated upper Senqu catchment. Foremost among them, Qacha had arrived 
sometime before December 1873.63   
But migration soon quickened following Moorosi’s War. Moorosi and his 
followers, Baroa among them, fought against the Cape Colonial forces and their 
Basotho auxiliaries in 1879. Cape authorities had threatened to annex Quthing and 
                                                          
62 Ellenberger, History, 21-30, 159-64; George M. Theal, Basutoland Records, quoted in Germond, 
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arrested Doda, Moorosi’s eldest son, for stealing a horse. Moorosi then organized his 
son’s escape, bringing the tensions to a head. The old chief, then in his eighties, 
fought to the death from atop his mountain fortress above the Senqu—a mountain 
which still bears his name. Moorosi’s captors beheaded him and mutilated his body. 
Following this defeat, Baphuthi refugees sought security in remote valleys to the 
east and north of Mt. Moorosi. Small communities of Sephuthi speakers still live in 
these places, where they speak their unfortunately fading language (in addition to 
Sesotho) amid the hegemony of a Basotho polity. Although Moorosi himself had 
been subordinate to Moshoeshoe since 1868, following the war in 1879 Baphuthi 
chiefs lost more autonomy as Basotho chiefs, too, migrated into the mountains, 
extending the political rule of Letsie, Moshoeshoe’s successor and eldest son.64  
The first Basotho to push into, but not settle, the Maloti frontier seemed to 
have been the Molapos (See Figure 1.4). Molapo was the second son of Moshoeshoe 
who controlled the Leribe district in the north of Basutoland until his death in 1880. 
His sons Jonathan and Joel served as his strongest foot soldiers and would succeed 
their father. The Boers of the Orange Free State (OFS), descendants of Dutch settlers, 
had defeated the Basotho militarily in 1868, which pushed some of Molapo’s villages 
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south across the newly hardened border at the Caledon River. In this context, 
Molapo obtained permission from his elder brother Letsie – who would succeed 
Moshoeshoe in 1870 as king – for permission to extend his grazing territory deeper 
into the mountains. Molapo took this to mean that he now had jurisdiction all the 
way into the Senqu Valley to Sehonghong. To survey these interests Jonathan then 
scouted the area for prospective cattle posts.65  
Local Baroa undoubtedly took notice of Jonathan’s reconnaissance 
excursions. By 1871 San groups in the Maloti had been raiding the livestock of 
                                                          
65 MMA, “1909 Court on Settlement in the mountains,” pp. 5-7; Wright, Bushmen Raiders, 167-68. 
Figure 1.4 
Moshoeshoe’s Lineage (selected) with 
paramount chiefs highlighted in gray. 
Source: created by author in consultation with 
Rosenberg et al., Historical Dictionary of Lesotho. 
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owners in Natal, East Griqualand, and Lesotho for many years.66 And so it seems 
probable that they raided down into Molapo’s area. Evidence suggests that Jonathan 
and Joel Molapo led several reprisal missions. On one such mission the Basotho 
killed Soai and several of his followers. There are conflicting stories of the lethal 
raid. One story has it that Soai was shot as he tried to hide underwater while 
breathing through a protruding reed. Another story says that he was killed as he 
gathered honey on a cliff in the Sehonghong Valley.67  
However he met his end, the death of Soai around 1871 was a decisive 
moment. Two years later the Orpen and Grant expedition passed through a 
seemingly uninhabited Senqu Valley near Sehonghong. But by 1878 a Sotho chief 
called Tlhakanelo had established a village there. Remaining Baroa refugees fled or 
were absorbed into Baphuthi or Basotho villages in surrounding areas, often as 
herders, or hunters as in Qing’s case. Some small groups of San were said to be living 
in the precipitous Tsoelike River Gorge as late as 1886, but by then the era of Sotho 
dominance had dawned in the Maloti.68 Both Qing and his master, Qacha, would 
soon find themselves subject to the rule of Moshoeshoe’s Bakoena successors and 
their British colonial counterparts, both of which were headquartered in the 
lowlands to the west.   
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 But what do we really know about this historical interface and how do we 
know it? This knowledge has its own story too, and the story merits comment. 
Although written evidence of the varied interactions between Baroa, Baphuthi, 
Basotho, and Nguni in the Maloti is limited, archaeologists have examined written 
and oral evidence alongside rock art and material remains to shed light on this 
frontier process. Scholars, however, have disagreed on methods and findings. 
Methods in so-called Bushmen Studies have proceeded through several phases. Each 
phase was embedded in contemporary South African politics, in which diverse 
groups’ claims to land and political legitimacy have changed over time. Generally 
speaking, researchers and hobbyists of the antiquarian mold, which dates back to 
the 1800s, peered through a Eurocentric lens to focus on painting techniques, 
classification, and chronology. By the 1960s, an empirical approach captured the 
field. Taking this approach, researchers carefully mapped and quantified sites, often 
tracing the paintings to preserve them and to enable further study.69   
Patricia Vinnicombe, a founding scholar in this field, created meticulous 
stencils for the Maloti rock art sites, which culminated in her landmark book, People 
of the Eland in 1976. Vinnicombe’s work led to a new approach in which scholars 
sought to understand the religious symbolism in the paintings by using 
ethnographic analogy.70 Researchers read the rich ethnographic material gathered 
from San groups in the Kalahari Desert in order to interpret what was happening in 
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the Maloti cave painting scenes. Using this method David Lewis-Williams, among 
others, argued that most painting scenes could not be viewed literally. Rather, the 
paintings represented experiences from ceremonial trance dances where spirit 
animals and ancestors interacted with living people and the natural world, 
especially rain.71 Most recently, Pieter Jolly, Sam Challis, and others have argued that 
the paintings show a more hybrid, or creole culture than has previously been 
recognized in the literature. In this view, elements of Sotho, San, and Nguni beliefs 
and practices reveal a historical cultural overlapping amongst agro-pastoral and 
hunter-gathering peoples.72  
For my study, several postulates from this literature will help us to 
understand how new agro-pastoral settlers in the Maloti compiled and applied 
environmental knowledge from the 1870s onwards. First, to some extent, the 
relationship between Bantu and Baroa was symbiotic. Despite unequal power 
relations and conflict between the groups, paintings show that hybridity, not 
exclusivity, was normative. As Jolly argues, the scenes depicted in the Melikane 
shelter contain elements of Basotho, Baphuthi, and Baroa male initiation rites (See 
Figure 1.5). For example, artists painted therianthropic (part human, part animal) 
figures which probably represented San people who adopted the ceremonial dress 
of Bantu initiation participants. Or, these bent over figures with human legs and 
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arms and antelope heads may represent Bantu speakers wearing masks and 
participating in San ceremonies.73  
 
 
 
Either way, knowledge traveled in multiple directions, if along particular 
social contours. In these social relations Baphuthi exercised some political power 
over Baroa, and Basotho asserted power over both Baphuthi and Baroa. 
Furthermore, as the rock art research has shown, economic categories such as 
hunter-gatherer and agro-pastoral fall apart when considering this historical 
interface. San people rode horses and herded some cattle when wild game became 
scarce. Baphuthi and Basotho collected wild plants and hunted, not only in times of 
want, but alongside their farming and herding practices. In fact, some of the 
“Bushmen raiders,” as John Wright has shown, were composed of both Bantu and 
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Figure 1.5 
Scene from Melikane Shelter, Qacha’s Nek 
Note: Image comes from a tracing made in 1873. 
Source: P. Vinnicombe, People of the Eland, 315. 
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Baroa men.74 These blurred categories, in the economic and cultural senses, form an 
important part of the historical process of environmental knowledge compilation.  
The Basotho also identified with the Baroa’s reverence for rain. Rain 
connected human economic needs to cosmology. Both groups believed in the power 
of the supernatural to bring rain, especially in dry years, which were common in 
southern Africa. Baroa and Basotho beliefs about rain overlapped with one another. 
According to climate research there were at least five years during the 1870s 
considered “very dry” or “relatively dry,” including several summer droughts.75 
Adequate and timely rain was essential for supporting palatable grass, wild game, 
livestock, and crops. These ecological conditions suggest that the 1870s were 
heightened years for people seeking new knowledge about rain and rainmaking. At 
Sehonghong, the paintings show an eland as a “rain animal,” which San people 
believed could bring rain when it was killed. A nearby shelter depicts a snake in a 
similar way. Whether the slaughter typically occurred subconsciously during a 
dream or trance, or during an actual hunt, is uncertain.76  
Among the Basotho, too, animals were important in this regard. Clan lineages 
identified themselves by animal totems. The Bakoena were the people of the 
crocodile. The Bataung were the people of the lion. The Bafokeng, were people of the 
hare, and so on. Basotho believed that certain animals forewarned of certain events. 
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For instance, when the masianoke (Scopus umbretta/hammerkop) appears by a 
stream near the village, lightening was bound to strike. Furthermore, people in 
these clans used several rain-making techniques that intersected with Baroa and 
Nguni practices. Hired by prominent chiefs, Basotho rainmakers (baroka) mixed 
herbs and water to form a broth that was supposed to encourage rain. Another 
method was a rite called molutsoane. On an appointed day parties of men skulked up 
along nearby rivers, killing every wild animal that they came across. They 
disemboweled the animals and tossed the stomachs into the river before dancing 
their way back to their chief’s court. The clouds, participants believed, would open 
up shortly thereafter. Regardless of effectiveness, the work of baroka and the 
molutsoane rite were both rooted in a common environmental concern of Baroa and 
Basotho, and likely emerged from cultural interactions across time.77  
In sum, Baroa and Basotho exchanged extensive knowledge of plants, 
climate, and geography through this interface. Qing’s life exemplified this interface. 
We know too that Basotho and Baphuthi both revered Baroa for their vast 
knowledge of botanical medicines and for their spiritual power.78 Indeed, it is 
difficult to sort through these syncretic cultural tapestries. But this discussion, and 
the archaeological literature that has informed it, has demonstrated that Basotho 
were compiling new environmental knowledge through a dynamic social process. In 
this process they interacted with the remaining Baroa of the Maloti as they tested a 
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different landscape that placed new demands on their livelihood practices. These 
practices, and the fluid nature of the knowledge that underpinned them, also 
intersected with several cultural institutions, which were also in constant flux.  
 
1.4 - Cultural Institutions of the New Highlanders 
In this section I outline several key Basotho institutions as they have related 
to human relationships with natural resources. All of these institutions changed 
from the 1870s to the 1960s and I will address these changes in various parts of this 
dissertation. The following descriptions of borena (chieftainship), mafisa (livestock 
loans), leboella (reserved grazing/spare-veld), letsema (tribute/collective labor), 
and lebollo/bale (male/female initiation) serve as introductions only. Other key 
institutions, such as marriage, land tenure, and law will be touched upon here as 
well and developed more fully in subsequent chapters.   
 The main social distinction in Basotho society in 1880 was between chiefs 
(pl., marena/sing., morena) and commoners, or subjects (pl., bafo/sing., mofo). 
Chiefs derived their power from the support of their followers. For Basotho, a chief 
was a chief by the people – Morena ke morena ka batho. Chiefs had duties to their 
followers such as allocating rights to arable fields to every married man; regulating 
use of pastures and residential sites; administering justice through courts; and not 
least, providing sustenance for destitute villagers. Commoners followed chiefs on 
their own free will, and in theory, could migrate to another village in cases of 
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mistreatment or neglect. Many families did switch allegiance between chiefs 
through a practice known as “turning the door of the hut.” Chiefs used cattle as 
socio-political tools to maintain power over their subjects, to expand their influence, 
and to provide for the poor.79  
Mafisa was a key institution for meeting these objectives. From at least the 
1820s onwards, Moshoeshoe and other Sotho chiefs in the Caledon River Valley 
allocated the cattle that they had captured in war and in raiding parties to attract 
followers.80 Chiefs would loan cattle to destitute men for them to look after. 
Caretakers milked the cows to feed their families, they processed the manure into 
fuel (lisu), they harnessed the oxen for draught and transport power, they earned an 
occasional calf as reward, and they sometimes slaughtered an ailing animal for food. 
In this way, chiefs distributed livestock to many different clients who grazed them 
across more verdant pastures, and thereby fostered biological reproduction of 
cattle. This was achieved while claiming the loyalty of the client. By the late 1800s, 
mafisa was entrenched in Sesotho culture and the lenders (patrons) were no longer 
just chiefs.81  
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Commoners, sometimes former mafisa beneficiaries, had accumulated 
livestock by bartering, breeding, and loaning. This enabled them to establish their 
own clientele. This redistribution practice extended chiefs’ power over people, but 
also enabled some commoners to grow their own herds. As a historical concept, 
mafisa undergirded a variety of arrangements for assuring basic subsistence of rural 
Basotho. In some ways, mafisa became a metaphor for the responsibilities of chiefs 
to their followers, especially in times of hunger. ‘Cattle’ could mean clothing, grain, 
or other necessities.82 The extent to which the system ever harmonized rural social 
relations remains uncertain, but the ways in which these obligations have been 
carried out or neglected over time have had implications for social inequality, 
ecological change, and access to arable fields.83 
By 1880 the colonial government and the Basotho chieftainship were 
working to standardize the Sesotho land tenure system. Because Sesotho tenure was 
based, at least to some extent, on communal rights to land and pasture, the system 
clashed with liberal European beliefs that free-hold tenure was an essential 
prerequisite for capitalist growth. This debate has continued into the twenty-first 
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century.84 Theoretically, the king (a title to be explained further) held all the land in 
Lesotho on behalf of the people. Local chiefs administered arable fields and 
residential sites to commoners on the king’s behalf. Chiefs allocated usufruct rites to 
three fields for each married man to be planted and rotated with, ideally, maize, 
sorghum, and wheat. However, population growth, plowing of steep slopes, soil 
exhaustion and erosion, and not least, the changing political economy all 
contributed to making this ideal increasingly rare by the early twentieth century.85   
From plowing season through harvest, these fields were the exclusive 
property of the owner. Once the harvest was complete, the chief declared the fields 
open for common grazing until farmers began plowing again the following spring. 
Apart from the arable fields and residential sites, Basutoland consisted mostly of 
common pasture that was available for all Basotho to use for grazing as well as for 
gathering food, medicine, and building material. Mission stations and government 
properties received special allocations from local chiefs and from the king. But the 
government and chiefs sought to fix the tenure system during a time of rapid 
economic and demographic change. By the 1880s, an increased national livestock 
herd that grazed extensively had combined with the surge in plowed acreage, and 
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the spread of new villages to place new pressure on pastures and fields, which were 
by then constrained within political boundaries as they had never been before.86 
Basotho chiefs and commoners understood that livestock rearing caused 
ecological changes in the grassland. So, they developed a practice known as leboella 
(reserved grazing) to conserve these resources. Although its origins are not entirely 
clear, Basotho land managers seem to have practiced leboella widely by 1873. 
Leboella integrated political authority with deep knowledge of weather, vegetation, 
human needs, and animal husbandry. Extending from April through August, people 
accessed three distinct types of spare-veld. A designated caretaker called the mobehi 
oa leboella, enforced this custom on the chief’s behalf.87 All spare-veld was marked 
off by stone beacons. The first type was bush, or forest, where people were 
permitted to collect select wood for fuel and building purposes during the first cold 
months of the year. The second type included rocky slopes where thatch grass grew, 
such as mohlomo, used in roofing.88   
The last type consisted of hearty grasses that remained green into the winter. 
These areas contained the richest soil, usually near the cultivated bottom lands. 
Following the maize and sorghum harvests in May or June, and then thatch 
gathering, the winter pasture cycle began when the chief declared the maboella 
open. Milking cows entered first to graze the best grasses, followed by other bovines 
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and equines with the sheep coming last. People gathered silage from the harvest as 
winter livestock feed before animals devoured the remaining stalks. Select pasture 
and fields were then set aflame in August to hasten regeneration and bolster soil 
fertility ahead of the first rains in September or October.89 Reflecting their social 
distinction, chiefs might enjoy year-round privilege to maboella as well as special 
domain over select trees, such as the wild olive, a tree known for its virtually 
smokeless burning properties and numerous other uses.90  
As they shaped the landscape through their animals, people also altered their 
environments through work. Letsema served as a cultural mechanism for amplifying 
these affects by mobilizing and concentrating labor. Like Africa in general, the 
historical human to land ratio in the region that became Basutoland was low.91 
Comparatively well-off people, especially chiefs, had accumulated wealth more in 
terms of people and livestock than in land. Chiefs’ capacity to manipulate the natural 
resources of the mountains, especially the grass and arable lands, relied on their 
ability to accumulate livestock and people, or at least access to people’s labor. 
Breaking open virgin fields was arduous work whether using ox-drawn plows or 
hoes. As part of their duty to their chiefs, all men were required to work the masimo 
a lira of the chiefs. These were fields set aside for village purposes: to provision 
soldiers, to accommodate visitors, and to feed the destitute. Men worked 
collectively, plunging their mattocks into the soil in unison while singing songs. 
                                                          
89 Ibid., 24-26. 
90 Ibid., 24. 
91 McCann, Green Land, Brown Land, 19-20. 
 64 
 
Participants received food and beer for their labor, but the respectful tribute to 
one’s chief was the deeper motivation.92   
By the 1880s, commoners, missionaries, and the colonial government 
criticized letsema, claiming that many chiefs were abusing the practice by calling out 
men to work other fields apart from the masimo a lira. Some chiefs were selling the 
produce rather than using it for the designated community purposes. Farmers who 
aspired to market production complained that the demands of letsema left too little 
time and energy to cultivate their own crops.93 Letsema changed over time, and the 
term came to mean any form of collective labor done for a common good. Of course, 
whether or not the labor served a common good, or whether it exploited certain 
social groups (eg. women), remained contestable. The colonial government 
embraced the general concept of duty to chief and community into the twentieth 
century for eliminating noxious weeds by digging, for building roads, and for 
building soil conservation works. Letsema, as originally defined, was abolished in 
1950, but Basotho have continued to use the term.94 According to several 
interviewees, small work parties for weeding or harvesting on private fields are still 
called matsema (pl.). Government sponsored work gangs, in which people plant 
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trees, dig weeds, or build rural roads for wages, may also be called matsema.95 As a 
means for interacting with the environment, the concept has remained important, 
though the personal motivations for one’s labor have changed immensely. 
Finally, Basotho boys and girls became men and women through the 
initiation experience. At lebollo for boys and bale for girls, young people acquired 
new knowledge that had been passed down for generations. In addition to being 
circumcised (boys), the knowledge learned at initiation had both theoretical and 
practical dimensions. Initiates learned about Basotho culture and history: who the 
ancestors were and what they had endured; where and what Basotho had originated 
from; and how to understand the links between their daily lives, plants and animals, 
the elements, and the supernatural. They also learned how to care for their spouses 
and children, how to build and maintain households, how to ride horses and use 
weapons, and how to raise crops and livestock. Initiates of the same age cohort, 
under the tutelage of professional teachers (mesuoue) would go to the mountains or 
a secluded river gorge where they constructed the initiation lodge (mophato) from 
local materials. Over the course of several months, participants recited praise poems 
that linked them to their ancestors (balimo) and to the secrets of the mophato, 
which supposedly, the uninitiated could never know.96  
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The experience was arduous. The work of building, gathering fuel wood, 
butchering animals for food, and enduring harsh elements formed central 
components of lebollo aimed at strengthening boys into men. In essence, the sine 
qua non of lebollo and bale was to prepare initiates for the hardships of life. Male 
initiation culminated with each boy reciting an originally composed praise poem 
(lengae), in which they chronicled their tribulations and connections to their 
ancestors. Initiates swore to protect the secrets and lessons conferred at lebollo 
from the un-initiated, and they formed bonds within their cohort that endured 
throughout their lives.97 
By the 1870s many Basotho parents were already choosing not to send their 
children to initiation schools. Protestant missionaries, and after their arrival in 
Lesotho in 1862, Catholics too, demonized lebollo along with bohali (bride wealth: 
transfer of cattle from groom’s family to bride’s family), and sethepu (polygamy) as 
the three primary obstacles to civilization for Basotho. For missionaries and many 
converts too, lebollo conflicted with the formal schooling offered by the missions 
and government. Initiates often left school in September or October to go to the 
mophato, not returning until the following year. Others, like Chief Jobo who was a 
Christian and younger brother of Moshoeshoe, argued that lebollo fostered crime 
and disrespect by teaching boys martial skills and encouraging them to acquire 
cattle and wives at all costs to express their true masculinity. Chief Mofoka, among 
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others at an 1873 government commission on Basotho laws and customs, seemed 
indifferent to whether lebollo was abolished or not. Despite its detractors, for many 
Basotho lebollo has remained a powerful institution for reproducing knowledge and 
Basotho identity.98 Christian and government schools appeared in Qacha’s Nek 
around 1893, accelerating only in the 1920s when the Catholics expanded their 
presence in the mountains. These new schools offered opportunities for acquiring 
new knowledge, such as literacy. Sometimes the new knowledge overlapped with 
the old. Such was the case with lessons about agriculture. But mission schools never 
provided an alternative to the specialized knowledge and secrets taught at 
initiation. 
 Lebollo and the other institutions discussed here changed across time and 
space. Initiation practices adapted, to some extent, to accommodate the growing 
desire amongst Basotho to send their children to mission schools. As for leboella, 
local ecological and social realities dictated the extent to which people enforced and 
obeyed grazing regulations, perhaps more than did national government policies. 
Nor was leboella unchanging when chiefs and colonial officials discussed the 
practice in 1873. For example, King Letsie (Moshoeshoe’s eldest son and successor) 
explained that the leboella practices regarding trees only emerged from 
collaborations between Moshoeshoe and his missionary friends at Morija.99 Perhaps 
most importantly for discussing the changes in political-ecology and its impact on 
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environmental knowledge, relations between chiefs and commoners were 
constantly shifting when the first migrants established their villages in the Maloti.      
 
1.5 - The Making of Qacha’s Nek: Pioneers, Politics, and Colonialism 
 Politics in Basutoland from 1872 to 1884 shaped how, when, and where 
people settled in the Maloti. The dynamics of this political process, in turn, affected 
how people interacted with various types of environmental knowledge. This politics 
of settlement depended on individual chiefs’ relationships with the ruling lineage 
and with the Basutoland government as a whole which was then based in the 
lowland district of Thaba Bosiu. During the initial settlement years, and for many 
years to come, Lesotho as a place and polity meant the lowlands, which contrasted 
in many ways to the Maloti. From 1872 to 1884, Basutoland was under Cape 
Colonial Rule. The ways in which the Cape administration differed from the previous 
arrangement where Basutoland was administered as a British territory directly 
from London ultimately fostered resentment on the part of Basotho, especially the 
chiefs. Resentment culminated in the Gun Wars (1880-81), which proved to be a key 
historical event that quickened migration into eastern Lesotho. 
 A broad outline of Lesotho’s early history will help situate the migrations 
around the time of the Gun Wars. Born circa 1786, King Moshoeshoe hailed from the 
Bakoena (crocodile) clan. He came of age in the first decades of the 1800s near 
modern day Butha-Buthe district where he learned from his uncle, a renowned sage 
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called Mohlomi.100 During the upheavals of the lifaqane in the 1820s, when family-
based chieftainships in southern Africa migrated, built alliances, or dissolved 
entirely, Moshoeshoe established his mountain fortress at Thaba Bosiu. It was there 
that various chiefs encountered him. He fought with some and raided livestock from 
others. Still others came in peace to request his protection. The young chief adeptly 
expanded his influence, too, by marrying daughters of various clans, and dispensing 
patronage through mafisa and by allocating rights to land.101 By the time the first 
Paris Evangelical Missionaries (PEMS) visited him in 1833, Moshoeshoe had gained 
substantial influence in the region between the Caledon and Orange Rivers. He 
wielded authority, to varying degrees, in his relations with other chieftainships such 
as the Bataung, Batlokoa, and Baphuthi.102 It was out of this period that the modern 
identity Basotho was born, with Bakoena leadership as the parents. But the Basotho 
chieftainship was concentrated then in the lowland and foothill areas, with very 
limited influence in the mountain areas.103 
 The mid-1800s brought renewed threats to the Basotho, this time from 
Europeans. Moshoeshoe and his followers successfully repelled a military invasion 
by the Orange Free State (OFS) in 1858 in what became known as Senekal’s War. 
The Boers had coveted the rich farmland between modern day Bloemfontein and 
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the Maloti foothills. From 1865 to 1868, the Boers and Basotho fought again in 
Seqiti’s War, and this time Moshoeshoe was forced to sign the Treaty of Thaba Bosiu 
in 1866, or Khotso ea Mabele (Peace of the Sorghum) as the Basotho knew it. Had it 
been implemented entirely, the treaty would have eliminated all but the foothill and 
mountain areas from Moshoeshoe’s control. But the politically savvy chief saw no 
end to conflict with the OFS in sight, so he sought British protection instead. The 
British, too, saw an opportunity: to drive a geographic wedge between their colony 
in Natal and the Boers in the OFS, who resented the British imperial reach.104  
So it was. Basutoland became a British protectorate in March of 1868. 
Moshoeshoe’s statecraft had sharpened during several decades of turbulence and 
had also benefited from his close relationship to the PEMS missionaries who had 
established themselves at Morija in 1833. But his deal with the British at the 
Convention of Aliwal North in 1869 still ceded two-thirds of Lesotho’s most arable 
land to the OFS. The geographic borders of Basutoland, de jure, were fixed by 1870. 
Under British protection the Basotho chiefs retained most of their duties such as 
allocating land, administering justice in courts (lekhotla), and regulating land use. 
But the loss of land and newly constrained borders combined with population 
growth from natural fertility and immigration to put pressure on scarce arable lands 
and grazing pasture. Together, these historical forces began pushing the Basotho 
eastwards, and so too did a new administrative structure.105 
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 The original arrangement struck by Moshoeshoe in 1869 changed when the 
Cape Colony assumed direct fiscal responsibility for Basutoland in November 1871. 
Political power now emanated from Cape Town instead of London. Instead of the 
chiefs holding their own courts, as they had in the past, Cape magistrates took 
command of legal matters. Magistrates adjudicated in each of the five districts in 
1880. A clerk assisted each magistrate, and they were supported by a contingent of 
the Basutoland Native Police Force, which had been established in October 1872. 
The Cape administration also continued collecting the hut-tax, which began in 1870 
to levy a fixed rate on all married men. To collect the tax in rural areas meant 
expanding the colonial bureaucracy. The hut tax financed administrative costs, but 
also facilitated the flow of African labor to South African mines and white-owned 
farms in the Cape, Natal, and the OFS.106  
 The mineral revolutions in southern Africa and the subsequent migrant labor 
system have had profound economic, social, cultural, and environmental effects on 
Lesotho’s history, as is true for much of the region. The effects of this system on 
knowledge, agriculture, and ecological change will be discussed throughout this 
study. But the political economy approach to historical changes has been well 
researched elsewhere and will not form a central part of this study.107 After 
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prospectors discovered diamonds in Kimberley (1867) and gold (1884) on the 
Witwatersrand (modern Johannesburg), Basotho seized opportunities by working at 
the mines, transporting goods, and producing grain for the burgeoning markets. 
Basotho farmers had readily adopted ox-drawn plows from the French missionaries 
along with wheat and other crops, applying these new technologies to reap profits 
by opening up virgin grassland on unprecedented scales. With larger plowed tracts, 
more people sought living space in the uplands. Cheap grain from overseas and high 
duties on Basotho goods, however, had virtually eliminated Basotho exports by 
1890, a shift which further encouraged migrant labor. Over the course of the 
twentieth century, mostly male laborers worked in South Africa on temporary 
contracts. The migrant system began during Cape rule, and complicated the 
relationship between new wage earners, Cape authorities, and chiefs.108 
With their authority severely checked, chiefs resented Cape Colonial rule. In 
contrast, for some commoners Cape rule offered respite from what they viewed as 
the growing abuses by chiefs, some of whom were using letsema labor to extract 
market surpluses from their fields and extorting excessive taxes from migrant wage 
earners. But there was one issue that brought many Basotho together in their 
opposition to Cape Colonial rule: guns. When the Colonial government in Cape Town 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1989); Belinda Bozzoli and Mmantho Nkotsoe, Women of Phokeng: Consciousness, Life Strategy, and 
Migrancy in South Africa, 1900-1983 (London: James Currey, 1991); Eddy Maloka, Basotho and the 
Mines: A Social History of Labour Migrancy in Lesotho and South Africa, c. 1890-1940 (Dakar: 
CODESRIA, 2004); Judy Kimble, ed. by Helen Kimble, Migrant Labour and Colonial Rule in Basutoland, 
1890-1930 (Grahamstown: Rhodes University Institute of Social and Economic Research, 1999); 
Murray, Families Divided.   
108 Eldredege, South African Kingdom, 159-66, 184-89; Showers, Imperial Gullies, 28-29.  
 73 
 
applied the Peace Preservation Act of 1878 to Basutoland, which required all 
Africans to turn in their firearms, many Basotho refused. In the wake of the 
humiliating defeat by the Boers in 1869, Basotho men had been buying up guns with 
their migrant earnings. For opponents of the Act, disarmament threatened not only 
their personal and national security, but their right to own a technology that 
symbolized power, prestige, and masculinity for men of all ethnicities in nineteenth-
century southern Africa.109   
Resentment of Cape rule aside, Basotho still fought on both sides of the 
conflict for personal and political reasons. The rebel forces (Mabelete) fought the 
Cape forces and their Basotho loyalists (Mateketoa) to a standstill. Masupha, 
Moshoeshoe’s third son, was perhaps the most fervent rebel and he fought along 
with regiments led by Letsie, and especially, those led by Letsie’s son Lerotholi (See 
Figure 1.4). But the political fissures between Moshoeshoe’s sons, which had opened 
up after the sovereign’s death in 1870, deepened during the Gun War. Molapo’s son 
Jonathan supported the Cape against his brothers. Like other loyalists, Jonathan 
believed that the outcome was a foregone conclusion and that after the Cape victory 
the administration would bolster his aspirations to expand his own chieftainship in 
northern Lesotho. Apart from Bakoena participants, the Batlokoa chief Lelingoana 
had fought alongside Basotho rebels in a theatre outside of Basutoland just south of 
Qacha’s Nek in Matatiele.110 As a reward, Letsie granted Lelingoana the right to 
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settle near the confluence of the Khubelu and Senqu Rivers in modern day 
Mokhotlong district. Several loyalist chiefs too, seeking security from rebel reprisals 
which had been frequent before and during the war, also migrated to the uplands.111  
Whether begun by loyalists, rebels, or other migrants, most villages in the 
Maloti began as seasonal cattle posts. Travelers called these villages accordingly, for 
example, Tlhakanelo’s Kraal. This designation continued well past a time when 
Maloti villages were composed of multiple households of men, women, and children 
living under one chief.112 Basotho, and indeed many Bantu-speaking Africans 
besides, built their villages around a central cattle kraal. Anthropologist Adam 
Kuper has shown that this pattern has deep historical roots and really only began to 
change in the nineteenth century. Missionary sketches from Thaba Bosiu around 
1840 corroborate this spatial dimension of Basotho villages. Villages, in this way, 
were spatial manifestations of a social and political hierarchy where chiefs presided 
over commoners, and cattle served important economic, cosmological, and social 
purposes. From each village, stockowners or chiefs’ sons established new posts in 
higher pastures. Many of these posts, too, became new villages or hamlets.113  
  People migrated to these new villages from the lowlands or South Africa, or 
from other highland villages to seek fields, pasture, and residential plots. Sometimes 
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people sought to “turn the door of the hut,” by finding a more accommodating and 
equitable chief. In their formative stage, cattle posts were akin to small satellites of a 
chief’s village. Chiefs and larger stock owners, by reason of the number of animals 
that they owned, asserted the most authority over the mountain posts. Eventually, a 
chief would designate a headman (ramotse) to oversee the satellite as more people 
and animals moved permanently to the area. Many of the headmen sought their own 
semi-autonomous villages too, where they could allocate fields and dispense 
patronage (mafisa) of their own.114 
In 1881 Lelingoana and his followers joined the few chiefs who had recently 
established villages in the Maloti. Chief Tlhakanelo, the son of one of Letsie’s 
councilors, had built his village at Sehonghong around 1878, just a short hike from 
where the San leader Soai was killed seven years before. Two sons of Maluke, who 
was a nephew of Moshoeshoe, settled further down the Senqu, near a place called 
Matsaile.115 There were several others too. The most senior and important member 
of the Koena lineage who settled in these years was Chief Sekake. Sekake was a 
descendant of Moshoeshoe’s younger brother Mohale. But age group aside, the exact 
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hierarchy of chiefs – who was subordinate to who – was still being ironed out in the 
early 1900s.116  
The frontier was not only closing politically, but ecologically too. Irrespective 
of clan origins, chiefs intended to reproduce a cultural and social order that was 
based on their authority over commoners and on their control of natural resources. 
This order was based, too, on extensive livestock grazing and grain production. 
From the perspective of the Maloti grasses and soils, these early settlers were 
ecological pioneers who applied knowledge and technology to a landscape that had 
not known these modes before.117 From the settler perspective, the Maloti offered 
both challenges and opportunities. The challenges were in testing the limits of the 
new environments in which they found themselves, and adapting their technological 
toolkits to fit the setting. The opportunity, as many saw it, was to live in peace, and 
to cultivate and graze virgin lands at a time when fields and pasture were scarce in 
the lowlands.118 
But what did Sekake, Lelingoana, Tlhakanelo and other pioneers know about 
the Maloti environment when they established these new villages? What 
technological and cultural materials did they carry that enabled them to identify and 
use natural resources in certain ways? We know that Africans migrated to the Maloti 
for reasons often beyond their control. Furthermore, as Kate Showers as pointed 
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out, we know to some extent that during the nineteenth century Sesotho land use 
systems “had shifted from grassland ecosystem (herding stock, hunting wildlife, and 
gathering wild plants) augmented by small, rotated agricultural fields, to larger, 
more permanently cultivated fields” with more intensive grazing.119 But we need to 
know, too, how people came to adopt certain practices in order to understand 
knowledge systems as unbounded, and constantly in flux.  
Although detailed narratives of individual settlers are scarce in both written 
and oral record, we can probe these questions to illustrate the human-ecological 
dimensions of settlement. For starters, settlers knew their annual lunar cycles 
(likhoeli – moons – months) according to the cultural nuance of agro-ecology in 
Lesotho.120 Sesotho names for months show ways that Basotho marked time: by the 
changes of each season; by birth times of wild and domestic animals; by growth 
cycles of plants and crops; by the position of stars such as the Pleiades; and by the 
phases of the moon.  A brief sampling of these names will illustrate this point.121 
The Basotho calendar began with Phato (August). According to an early 
twentieth century Mosotho scholar, the meager waters of dams, rivulets, and rivers 
of Phato were “dashed and bestrewn all over with dust…these waters are quite foul 
from the black soot of the late burnt up grass,” blown from the surrounding fields 
and pastures, which has been burnt to promote new grass. Phato was still a dark, 
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chilly, and dry month “when the shepherds pined for new grass” so that they could 
take the animals out to graze. The ploughmen started to prepare their seeds as the 
ground began to warm. The warming and rains prepared the soils and grasses. 
Pulungoana (November, 4th moon) translates as “young gnu” and marks the month 
when these animals are born. This was also the second month for plowing maize, 
and especially sorghum.122 
Specific moons signified the ways settlers understood the intersections of 
seasonality, agro-ecology, and human labor. Thlakola (February, 7th moon), like 
some other months, got its name from a specific phase of the sorghum (mabele) 
growth cycle. The verb hlakola means to wipe off. Hlakola referred to when the husk 
of the sorghum head peeled back, or wiped off, exposing the tender, immature 
grains. Farmers responded by sending young boys and girls to the fields to scare off 
the numerous birds who eagerly devoured the sumptuous grains. The batsosi (bird 
scarers) lit fires to deter the birds with smoke, they shouted at the birds by their 
Sesotho names, and they pelted them with clay pellets and slingshots.123 Later in the 
sorghum cycle, Motseanong (May, 10th moon) translates roughly as “bird laugher” 
and signified a time where the sorghum grains have ripened and hardened enough 
where birds were unable to eat them. The laugher, in this case, was the sorghum 
head that now displayed shiny white grains that resembled the human teeth of a 
person laughing. Safe from the predations of birds, the crop laughed at the 
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frustrated birds. In Motseanong people reaped the hardened white grains and 
proceeded with a flurry of cutting, hauling, sorting, processing, and not least, eating 
food and drinking beer that marked the harvest season.124 
These lunar names reveal what people knew about seasonality, but they also 
suggest some ecological variations that people encountered at the higher elevations 
of the Maloti. People understood seasonal changes by shifts in temperature and 
precipitation, by emergence of new plants and by the behaviors of animals. They 
also identified time-specific anthropogenic landscape characteristics such as the 
settling of fire residues on water and on fields. But the Sesotho lunar calendar still 
rotated primarily around the agro-ecology of sorghum, which itself required nine 
months of frost-free weather, whereas maize required only six months.125  
Early migrants to the upper Senqu Valley and surrounding uplands quickly 
found that their agricultural cycles needed tweaking. Even at the upper limits of the 
montane ecological zone (2000m), which included most of the Senqu Valley where 
early settlements began, frost threatened in most months.126 This was especially 
true in 1881 and again between 1884 and 1887 when frosts and snowfall occurred 
in April: a pivotal month for sorghum to mature. Also, much of the upper Senqu, 
including the Sehonghong area received less rain on average than did some of the 
surrounding areas from which the settlers came.127  
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Fortunately for these pioneers, their agricultural toolkits held much more 
than sorghum. When Marshall Clarke and Jobo Moteane visited Lelingoana in 
December 1887 Clarke asked the Batlokoa chief how his crops were doing. 
Lelingoana’s reply is instructive: “wheat is very good, together with maize, sweet-
reed, potatoes, beans and pumpkins.” But, the chief said, “there is no sorghum, 
because as soon as May comes, it is damaged by frost. As for oats, they do well. 
Barley is the one we haven’t planted yet.”128 There are several key points here. First, 
the Batlokoa were later cited as being among the most “traditional people” in 
Basutoland, resisting political and cultural change.129 Far from backward, 
Lelingoana seems here to have been eager to engage new possibilities in his new 
home. He knew that sorghum could no longer be the reliable staple that it had been 
in lower areas, and so did other settlers. New environments required, and 
stimulated, new knowledge production. Farmers had grown sweet reed and 
pumpkins for many years, but not as staple foods. Maize and beans had been widely 
cultivated since at least the early 1800s. But wheat and potatoes, especially the 
priority that Lelingoana gave to wheat, represent a historical compilation of 
knowledge that made permanent mountain settlement possible in 1880.130   
The Basotho’s acquisition of new crops facilitated long term cultural and 
ecological changes. Among the first missionaries to Lesotho in 1833, Eugene Casalis 
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played an important role in circulating biological, technological, and intellectual 
resources between northwestern Europe and southern Africa. Wheat agriculture 
had a deep history in Europe that was closely tethered to the plow. Prior to the 
PEMS missionaries, Basotho cultivated mostly with a hand-held hoes that resembled 
digging mattocks.131 Women performed much of the labor from tilling to weeding, as 
well as all food processing and preparation, while both sexes and children too, 
harvested. But use of the single share ox-drawn plow, once it spread widely in the 
1860s, inaugurated male control over the initial parts of the annual agricultural 
cycle. In addition to the shift in the gender of production, plows enabled highlanders 
to open up larger fields with less labor; a capability that reduced grazing lands 
substantially and exposed more soils to the erosive forces of wind, water, gravity, 
and hooves.132  
Although figures are scarce for how many people used plows in the 
mountains in 1880, census data for 1875 and 1911 strongly suggest that all of the 
settler chiefs and some of their followers had access to ox-drawn plows. Other 
farmers used hand-held hoes well into the 1900s. But whether using plows or hoes, 
sowers broadcasted seed before tilling it into the soil until row planting became 
more common in the 1920s. In other words, settlers already had the knowledge, 
technology, and draught power to open up new grasslands in 1880.133 And they did 
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just that. Quicker to mature than sorghum and more tolerant of frost too, wheat 
could also grow into the winter. By 1906, Captain Dobson, on his military 
reconnaissance of the mountains, reported that the broad valley at Matebeng just 
south of Sehonghong was so thickly sown in wheat, that for troops, “it would 
probably be necessary to camp on cultivated land.”134  
In addition to wheat and potatoes, Basotho had learned to cultivate other 
ecologically appropriate crops and to process them in new ways. Lelingoana’s 
people also grew lentils and peas, which thrived even above 7000ft. He also asked 
Moteane and Clarke where he could get some barley seed because he had heard that 
it too did well in the mountains.135 Thomas Kennan, seeking a site for a new 
administrative post in September 1888, visited Sekake’s village. Sekake’s mother 
served the visitor “a loaf of bread which she had made after the English fashion,” 
probably of locally grown wheat. Kennan also noted that she spoke English well.136 
At Matebeng, in addition to intense cultivation, Dobson found peach trees growing 
there in 1904. People adopted fruit trees slowly in the mountains, especially peach 
trees, but they eventually became a staple feature of highland landscapes and 
seasonal diets.137   
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It is difficult to know exactly how these new cultivars made their way into 
the agricultural repertoires of highland settlers, but much can be inferred from 
evidence. Lelingoana had lived below the Drakensberg in East Griqualand where he 
interacted with farmers of varying backgrounds, African and European. As a war 
veteran, he understood his natural environment well, and he likely gathered any 
resources that he could get his hands on before moving into the Maloti. Curiously, a 
white man called George Thamahanyane, so-named for his reddish skin color, was 
living with his Motlokoa wife among Lelingoana’s people in 1887. He wore clothing 
made of skins, chain-smoked marijuana, and hunted wild game for his chief.138 In 
addition to puzzling contemporary travelers, Thamahanyane’s presence, and social 
position as a hunter, yet a subject of an African chief, shows the surprising ways in 
which environmental knowledge circulated. Chief Sekake’s mother had likely 
learned her English language and bread baking skills as an early student of PEMS 
schools while still living in the lowlands, yet she had not converted to Christianity. 
With regard to peach trees, Casalis and his PEMS colleagues believed they would 
thrive in Lesotho, and Basotho had planted them since the 1840s.139  
Migrants arrived in the Maloti with livestock too. Historically, Basotho 
settlement fitted within what some scholars have termed “the central cattle 
pattern.” In this pattern, settlers situated the kraal at the center of the village which 
indicated the importance of cattle for conferring social status, kinship, and 
                                                          
138 Moteane in Ambrose and Brutsch, trans., Part IV, Mehloli 2, No. 4 (1990): 12. 
139 Casalis, The Basutos, 110-11. 
 84 
 
cosmology.140 In marriage customs, a man transferred cattle to his wife’s family as 
bride wealth (bohali), a gesture that cemented the bond between the families, 
including future offspring. In a different part of the life cycle, families of the 
deceased slaughtered black oxen at funerary feasts. At these feasts, male relatives of 
the deceased butchered and roasted the beast in specific ways. For example, the 
grave diggers enjoyed a hind leg, while the elderly got dibs on the pancreas which 
could be swallowed without much chewing.141 Eating beef, then and now, was a core 
part of Sesotho feasts but beef was not typically consumed regularly. Fresh milk and 
sour milk (mafi) provided important protein, especially for children, in the absence 
of consistent meat. In using bovine resources, medicine and cosmology overlapped. 
Basotho doctors (lingaka) prescribed various concoctions from cow tissue and 
diviners (makhekhe) threw specific combinations of bones to diagnose and 
prescribe treatments for human and animal ailments.142  
Of course, cattle also served important material purposes. Oxen pulled plows 
and threshed crops. They transported products locally and over longer distances 
too. Craftspeople fashioned clothes, blankets, tools, and cosmetics from all parts of 
the animal. Accumulating cattle symbolized a man’s social status and enabled him to 
marry multiple wives, or to loan animals out to people in need (mafisa), thus 
acquiring clients and political influence. Women, however, had little control over 
cattle due to a cultural taboo that forbade them from interacting with bovines. Apart 
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from being deprived of the right to own cattle (other than in exceptional 
circumstances) people believed that women should not pass in front of the kraal 
where cattle lay down because their mixing could cause abortions in pregnant 
cows.143 As mentioned, people migrated to the mountains for, among other reasons, 
to expand their cattle herds by exploiting open grazing space.144  
With due diligence to the importance of cattle, bovines still represented a 
relatively small percentage of the domestic animal population that moved to the 
Maloti permanently after 1878. Sheep and goats were easily the most numerous 
according to the 1875 census data.145 Several types of local sheep, including Cape 
fat-tail and Afrikaner breeds, were already being displaced by woolen merinos in 
the 1880s, which arrived via South Africa and with government encouragement. 
Angora goats, too, were making biological advances into the local breeds of goats. 
Whereas cattle typically needed close protection from the Maloti winter, sheep and 
goats, especially the local breeds, could withstand the elements and thus, could stay 
at mountain posts throughout the year. By 1875, Basotho also looked after 15,000 
pigs. Pigs did not graze the open veld with the other stock. But pigs did demand new 
ways of managing productive spaces within villages. Pigs, which carried no gender 
taboo, also led to new opportunities for women to own and manage livestock.146 
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Mountain settlers relied on horses as much as any other animal for traveling 
to their new homes and for adapting their lifestyles once they arrived. Tlhakanelo, 
Lelingoana, Sekake, and others would have hauled and dragged plows, tools, guns, 
blankets, grain stores, and baskets of other belongings to their new homes using 
horses and oxen. Basotho had successfully bred the squat and sure-footed Basuto 
Pony to traverse the rocky Maloti paths. Like other southern African groups, 
including the Baroa, Zulu, and the mixed-blooded Griqua and Kora, the Basotho had 
developed excellent riding skills which they fine-tuned during prolonged conflicts 
that spanned some thirty years between the 1850s and 1880s. Strong horses, like 
cattle, symbolized a person’s social standing. As migrants journeyed into the Maloti, 
chiefs and other men of standing most likely rode atop the finest horses. Small 
children and elderly men and women probably rode as well. Equines were 
important for missionaries too, whose advance into the mountains affected the ways 
Basotho understood the resources discussed above. Horses enabled missionaries to 
travel widely and to preach to potential converts from an elevated position: elevated 
in both the physical and social sense.147 
Jobo Moteane was among the first Basotho ministers ordained by PEMS at 
Morija in September 1891. Along with Moteane, the PEMS leadership ordained 
Carlisle Motebang in August 1891. Motebang later established his own mission 
station called Molumong near Lelingoana’s village. But Moteane was the first to the 
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mountains. He established his mission at Sehonghong in 1892 where he played an 
important role in expanding the environmental knowledge of Maloti settlers. 
Moteane had studied under Edouard Jacottet at Morija. Jacottet perpetuated the 
notion that the highlands were a world apart. On his 1893 travels, he noted that the 
Maloti were “a world diverse, sometimes charming, often wild, more rarely 
imposing, but always interesting, picturesque.”148 His observations led him to 
believe that the mountains represented fertile ground for converting heathen souls, 
yet he also believed that the physical hardships and isolation would be too much for 
European ministers to bear. So, Jacottet planned for ordained Basotho ministers to 
extend PEMS’s reach into the Maloti via Mafube Mission Station (est. 1885), which 
was located below the Drakensberg near Matatiele. From Sehonghong, Moteane 
traveled the region on horseback where he established thirteen outstations, each 
with its own church and primary school.149  
Early PEMS schools and churches in the Maloti emphasized the gospel and 
literacy but did not offer formal lessons in agriculture. This changed later in the 
1900s. But in the 1890s Basotho farmers, doctors, builders, and housekeepers still 
compiled much environmental knowledge by participating or simply by observing 
activities at these stations. Mafube set the example for the mission stations in the 
mountains (See Map 4). It was situated in a fertile valley with excellent farm land 
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and pastures. At Mafube, African converts sowed their own crops, grazed livestock, 
and planted peach, apricot, cherry, and quince orchards.150  
Up at Sehonghong and at its new outstations ministers, teachers, and 
converts began similar activities, if on a smaller scale. As Jean and John Comaroff 
have shown, missionaries bundled horticulture, plow agriculture, animal husbandry, 
and specific ways or organizing productive space into a single civilizing package. 
Indeed, Eugene Casalis had believed that cultivating wheat and propagating fruit 
trees, indicated “the dwellings of those of the inhabitants who have taken the first 
step towards civilization.” The same package included literacy, the Gospel, and a 
Protestant work ethic. For Protestant missionaries like Moteane and Jacottet, and 
others like Henri Junod in Mozambique, full-time field husbandry was the ideal 
expression of this work ethic rather than migrant work in the burgeoning industrial 
centers of South Africa.151  
Most Basotho did not buy the whole package. Instead, people compiled 
knowledge, integrated it into what they already knew, and applied it to achieve their 
own aims. The agricultural contents of this package differed from older knowledge 
in many ways, but did not always conflict with the settlers’ intentions. Lelingoana’s 
fields of new and old crops, as Moteane observed them in 1887, showed that settlers 
were already intensifying their farming practices through diversified production 
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with ox-drawn plows. The old chief sowed wheat and oats because they grew well in 
his new environment, not because he sought to conform to any Protestant ethic. 
Tlhakanelo, and other people who had direct contact with Moteane and his 
colleagues in the 1890s, adopted new environmental knowledge more readily than 
they adopted the Gospel. During his travels in 1887 Moteane reported that 
mountain dwellers had “no access to education and that there was not a single 
Christian among them.” Converts were few in the 1890s, but other visible changes 
were well underway.152     
Moteane and his colleagues facilitated profound changes in architecture in 
the Maloti. Most of the settlers probably built mehlongoafatse as their first 
dwellings. As the meaning of the word indicates, builders constructed these small 
huts close to the ground in the form of a large oval oven. People entered the hut 
along a narrow passage. Builders mixed mud, clay and cow dung to make plaster 
(molilo), which provided the base, while they pulled reeds and grass together into 
tight bundles to form the roofs over a few wooden poles. This style worked well for 
keeping cold and wet out, but poorly for ventilation.153  
By extension of these changes, the ways people used grassland resources to 
construct their homes shifted too. As discussed above, missionaries eagerly 
harvested trees and planted more to satiate their building needs. Basotho began to 
quarry and shape stone in new ways as they learned to build walls, like the ones that 
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enclosed the first Sehonghong church. Roofers began to demand long wooden poles 
and more thatching grass to build higher and more permanent roofs. Windows, 
bought at distant trading outlets, became more common by 1900. People adapted 
their carpentry skills to build a variety of homes. Some huts stayed relatively squat 
to the ground. Some stayed round as the old mehlongoafatse had been and some 
rectangle, which was a new style after the missionaries. The people who quarried, 
shaped, and hauled stone, and the people who performed the many tasks of building 
– perhaps more than did missionary ideas about civilization – drove the changes in 
Sesotho architecture. These changes placed new demands on natural resources too. 
New knowledge meant excavating new stone quarries, cutting more willow and 
olive trees, and harvesting more grass and reeds.154 
Of course, none of these cultural and ecological shifts occurred 
independently of the dramatic developments in the regional economy.155 For many 
Africans who migrated into Qacha’s Nek after 1878, working as farm hands or 
sharecroppers on white-owned farms in the Orange Free State or East Griqualand 
seems to have been the most common experience. Settlers who had had these 
experiences gained invaluable knowledge of the changing world around them both 
before migrating to the mountains and during their lives as Maloti residents because 
oscillating labor migrancy became common, but not yet dominant, even from the 
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mountains by around 1892.156 They conducted commerce across ethnic and racial 
lines. They plowed, harvested, and stored grain. They learned about new cultivars, 
animal breeds, and wool growing. They experienced the racial politics of South 
Africa. Others learned to read and converted to Christianity.157 All of these 
experiences contributed to the historical swirl of ideas about economy, politics, 
religion, and not least, ecological resources.  
 It was these same economic shifts that led the Basutoland colonial 
administration to establish Qacha’s Nek as an administrative post and as a formal 
district. In September 1888 people at Chief Mpiti’s village greeted the British officer 
Thomas Kennan excitedly. This was surprising, Kennan thought, especially as one of 
the objects of his “journey was to establish a station in the mountains to facilitate 
the means of their paying taxes and obtaining passes to visit territories beyond the 
borders of Basutoland.” Mpiti and forty others accompanied Kennan up the 
Sejabatho River to where a nek (Afrikaans for pass) afforded a grand look down 
towards the South African town of Matatiele twenty miles distant below the 
Drakensberg Escarpment, connected then by only a rough bridle track. There were 
few trees on the site, but that would change in the coming decades. The site also sat 
on the continental divide where streams falling south led to the Indian Ocean, while 
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water flowing to the north journeyed to the Atlantic via the Senqu. The villagers 
then led Kennan to a spring nearby and also pointed out a prominent sandstone 
ridge overlooking the site of the future town of Qacha’s Nek. They called the ridge 
letloepe, the cobra’s hood. And so it was there that Kennan found his government 
camp under the shadow of letloepe, near where Qing had once hunted in the employ 
of Chief Qacha, a son of the slain Mophuthi Chief Moorosi.158 
In November 1892 John Griffith, a sub-inspector in the Basutoland Mounted 
Police, established the first colonial residence at Qacha’s Nek. As the “officer in 
charge,” he took the lead of what became Basutoland’s seventh administrative 
district. In addition to extending the reach of the colonial state through tax 
collection and regulating travel, Griffith built a police force to patrol the borders for 
stock theft.159 When Griffith compiled the first official report for the district in 1894, 
twenty-seven policemen (mostly Basotho) travelled 1,650 miles on patrols making 
eight arrests. Stockowners from Natal and East Griqualand had long complained of 
thieves coming over the porous border. According to Griffith, it was foreigners like 
the Xhosa-speaking Bathepu more than Basotho, who stole livestock. The new post 
established new authority over borders between territories as well as over those 
boundaries between common grazing spaces and private property. But despite 
exponential increases in police patrols during the 1890s and 1900s, human and 
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livestock traffic across the border, regulated or not, continued for social, economic, 
and ecological reasons.160  
By 1898 the camp town, which was then linked to Matatiele by a rough, but 
improved wagon track, included a colonial residence and offices, police stables, and 
a prison. Also, the administration permitted James Cole, a European from Matatiele, 
to open one of the first two general trader stations in the district. Cole bought 
agricultural commodities from Basotho producers and sold (or traded) consumer 
items to them. By licensing foreign traders, the government advanced the British 
imperial project by integrating the highlands into the regional economy. Together, 
these developments in governance and infrastructure aimed to make highland 
people, as James Scott has argued for upland regions in Southeast Asia, more 
“auditable contributors to the GNP” as farmers, wool growers, migrant laborers, and 
tax payers.161  
As a perceived threat to economic integration, theft seemed to be under 
control. But the resident commissioner (RC) of Basutoland Godfrey Lagden knew 
that colonial power could be extended most effectively through chiefs. Perhaps 
more than theft, officials in Qacha’s Nek also noticed that African immigrants from 
Natal and the Cape Colony constituted the bulk of new settlers, as opposed to 
Basotho from the lowlands. Griffith acknowledged that this was due in part to the 
Glen Grey Act of 1894 which dispossessed many Africans from their farms in South 
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Africa, and sent them looking for new homes. Officials believed that chiefs in the 
Maloti failed to report these new immigrants as colonial law dictated. This assertion 
was probably correct, given that many of these chiefs had social ties to African 
communities in Natal and the Cape, be they Sotho, Zulu, or Xhosa-speaking.162  
In seeking to consolidate Bakoena authority through the lineage of his late 
father Letsie (d. 1891), the new paramount chief Lerotholi agreed to formally place 
a Koena chief at Qacha’s Nek (See Figure 1.6).163 Of course, there were already 
Bakoena chiefs in the mountains: Tlhakanelo, Rafolatsane, Mpiti, Sekake, and others. 
But apparently Lerotholi and Lagden, with eyes on the future, thought that it was 
time for a younger, stronger chief to take the helm at Qacha’s Nek to oversee African 
police operations, to arbitrate disputes between chiefs, and to regulate what, by 
1895, had become a rather tense and ethnically diverse settlement of the 
mountains.164 They found their man in Makhaola Lerotholi, the third and some said 
favorite son of Lerotholi (See Figure 1.4). The confident twenty-five year old chief 
first arrived in the district sometime in 1893 to build his own village and to take up 
his role as chief constable. He was not officially placed as district chief until 1904.165  
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165 Ibid., TNA, DO 119/181, RC Lagden to High Commissioner (HC), 17 March 1897; Z.D. Mangoaela, 
“Makhaola Lerotholi,” in Lithoko tsa Marena a Basotho- Praise Poems of the Basotho Chiefs, special 
trans. by Patrick Bereng May 2016 (Morija: Morija Sesuto Book Depot, 1921), 199-201; LNA, 
S3/5/9/1, Assistant Commissioner (AC) to Government Sec. (GS), 16 November 1904. 
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Arriving in Qacha’s Nek, Makhaola saw that the Senqu Valley “was full of 
villages” all the way to Lelingoana’s place in the north. This was near the same 
crossing where Orpen and Qing had passed in 1873, when there was not a single 
village there. Makhaola would have noticed too that the Tsoelike River (named for 
its winding course) near where he built his village, was “inhabited almost to its 
sources” near Sehlabathebe at the southeastern edge of Basutoland. As Jacottet 
noted in 1893, “there were hundreds of these villages and their number was 
Figure 1.6 
Paramount Chief Lerotholi (sitting) with 
Chief Tlhakanelo (far left) and others. 
Credit: Morija Museum & Archives, La 
Mission du Lessouto Illustres 
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increasing every day.”166 Population growth, together with the chieftain and colonial 
authorities being present, and not least, a police force, signaled the closing of the 
frontier and the beginning of modern Qacha’s Nek district. 
 
1.6 - Conclusion 
The ways in which Basotho settled the Maloti between the 1870s and 1895 
exemplifies an important historical process for understanding the ways humans 
shape frontier environments. They compile knowledge and apply it in their 
livelihood pursuits. Followers of Chiefs Lelingoana, Tlhakanelo, and Sekake plowed 
both new and old crops, reared biologically diverse livestock, and built appropriate 
housing while pioneering mountain environments that were higher, colder, wetter, 
and more remote than were the places from which they came. Not coincidentally, 
their new homes were also farther from the lowland centers of political and 
economic power; that is, farther from Lesotho proper. They learned as they lived, 
applying many practices that had developed from experiences on the land, from 
Baroa (San) knowledge, from missionaries in the lowlands, and from migratory 
experiences. Through this process, cultural and ecological changes were 
interconnected with one another.  
This settlement process has to a great extent shaped the identity of 
highlanders in Lesotho, and the perspective of the Maloti in the eyes of others, 
                                                          
166 Jacottet, quoted in Germond, Chronicles, 427. 
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Africans and outsiders alike. Considering the role of verticality – which I define as 
the cultural and ecological differences of places separated by altitude more than by 
distance – provides fresh perspective for understanding how rural people have 
interacted with new ideas, technologies, and political regimes in the past. Examining 
verticality as a historical process, rather than as an axiom, helps to explode myths 
which perpetuate the notion that mountain people are essentially stubborn: 
resisting science, government authority, and market participation among other 
things. In the following chapter I use the Basotho experience with rinderpest to 
show that politics, which were underpinned by geographical, cultural, and ecological 
factors, conditioned how rural people interacted with new knowledge and with 
government initiatives to circulate that knowledge. 
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2. FIGHTING RINDERPEST: CHIEFS, BORDER FENCES, AND SHIFTING 
VETERINARY KNOWLEDGE, 1896-1902 
 
2.1 - Introduction 
 Human and animal epidemics continue to shape, and be shaped by, political, 
social, and ecological currents. One such historical experience in Africa began in 
1889 when Italians imported cattle from India to feed imperial troops in their 
military campaign in Ethiopia. Unbeknownst to the hungry soldiers, their bovine 
meals carried rinderpest, a highly contagious livestock disease that was caused by a 
deadly morbillivirus. Rinderpest had afflicted cattle, wild ungulate populations, and 
to a lesser extent, sheep and goats from East Asia to Europe for more than 2000 
years. It, however, only affected humans indirectly. Despite key advances in 
veterinary science in the 1890s, rinderpest continued to threaten animals in some 
places until the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and the World 
Organization for Animal Health declared it eradicated in 2011. Rinderpest was the 
first livestock disease to be eradicated. After smallpox in 1980, it was only the 
second disease in general to be eradicated. Scientists hailed it as "the greatest 
veterinary achievement of our time," the culmination of a heroic effort that 
incorporated science, political power, international cooperation, and monitoring 
technology.1  
                                                          
1 Peter Roeder et al., "Rinderpest: the veterinary perspective on eradication," Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society B 3 (2013): 1-12. 'Rinderpest' is German for 'Cattle Plague,' comes 
from the family of viruses Paramyxoviridae. Although rinderpest affected cattle and large wild 
ungulates, this virus family also has variations that infect small ruminants (peste de petits ruminants), 
and humans (measles) among others. 
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 The African experience in the 1890s was a pivotal moment in the history of 
rinderpest. From Ethiopia in 1889, the plague cut a swath of death and misery 
southwards, destroying domestic herds in South Africa and adjacent territories from 
1896-1898. Community and government responses varied depending on an array of 
local circumstances such as politics, geography, and culturally tempered 
understandings of cattle. The characteristics of the disease and limited knowledge of 
these characteristics shaped the responses.2  
 Cattle contracted rinderpest through contact with infected animals or animal 
products, or through contact with infected bodily fluid such as saliva left on a grazed 
field. The virus could incubate for up to fifteen days. Infected animals suffered from 
fever, internal ulcers, external lesions, dysentery, and nasal discharges. In the end 
African and European settler herds alike suffered losses upwards of 90%. Dead 
cattle meant lost wealth, draught power, transport, food stores, fuel, blankets, and 
for many African groups, a loss of the central cultural resource used in marriage and 
funeral transactions, and for numerous other purposes.3 Extensive scholarship on 
rinderpest has tried to identify the fundamental changes in African societies 
stemming from this traumatic experience, and the extent of these changes.  
 In this chapter I probe new questions in the context of Qacha's Nek district to 
better understand these changes, while also providing a historical anecdote to 
current epidemiological challenges for both people and animals. Scholars have 
                                                          
2 Ibid., Clive Spinage, Cattle Plague: A History (New York: Springer Science, 2003), introduction. 
3 For a global overview of rinderpest, including a detailed section on Africa in the 1890s, see Spinage, 
Cattle Plague. 
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examined how rinderpest heightened political tensions in 1890s southern Africa, a 
period that had already been marked by turbulent industrial transformation, 
colonial military excursions, drought, and locust invasions. According to Charles Van 
Onselen, rinderpest did not foment revolution, but it did create political 
opportunities for resistance, and Lesotho was no exception.4 Charles Ballard argues 
that in the Natal Colony the sudden loss of draught power and stored wealth 
quickened the fall of the Zulu-speaking peasantry by forcing more men into labor 
contracts in the mines and farms of European-dominated South Africa. Through this 
process of proletarianization rural homesteads became impoverished on the 
periphery of the burgeoning capitalist economy.5  
Further north in German East Africa, in his classic study of ecology and 
history, Helge Kjekshus asserts that when rinderpest destroyed cattle herds and 
wild ungulate populations, it also destroyed Africans' system for controlling 
vegetation growth. In this system, cattle and wild animals grazed grasses and 
browsed shrubs, which when left unchecked, provided ideal habitat for the 
trypanosomiasis-carrying tsetse fly. This ecological change, he insists, allowed the 
return of the tsetse fly and the disease that it transmitted to areas which human and 
                                                          
4 Charles Van Onselen, "Reactions to Rinderpest in Southern Africa, 1896-97," Journal of African 
History 13, no. 3 (1972): 473-88; See also Pule Phoofolo, “Epidemics and Revolutions: The Rinderpest 
Epidemic in Late Nineteenth-Century Southern Africa," Past & Present 138, no. 1 (1993): 112-43. 
5 Charles Ballard, "The Repercussions of Rinderpest: Plague and Peasant Decline in Colonial Natal," 
International Journal of African Historical Studies 19, no. 3 (1986): 421-50. 
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animal agency had previously kept disease free. As his argument goes, rural poverty 
and political vulnerability increased as a result of these ecological changes.6  
 A new generation of historians of science and medicine has examined 
veterinary knowledge in a socially and politically charged context where imperial 
powers like Germany and Great Britain competed for influence. Daniel Gilfoyle has 
taken the Cape Colony as a case to explore the professional rivalries amongst 
veterinary experts from Britain, South Africa, and Germany, and how these rivalries 
shaped the way policy played out in rural communities. In the Cape, state 
implementation of stamping-out (slaughter), cordoning off by fencing and 
veterinary policing, and finally, inoculation, hinged on trust between stock owners 
and officials – a factor that changed during the course of the campaigns.7 
 With respect to Lesotho as a specific case, Pule Phoofolo has revisited 
questions about the extent to which rinderpest hastened the collapse of the Basotho 
peasantry. He finds that although Lesotho suffered great losses of cattle and 
contingent low-production of crops (eg. from lost draught power), and experienced 
political tensions too, it is unlikely that the plague began any new economic, 
political, or social trends in the country, but only accelerated processes already 
underway. This, he argues, owes in part to the extent that people accepted the 
inoculation campaigns, which limited mortality more than some locales in the 
                                                          
6 Kjekshus, Ecology Control, 126-32. 
7 Daniel Gilfoyle, "Veterinary Research and the African Rinderpest Epizootic: the Cape Colony, 1896-
1898," Journal of Southern African Studies 29, no.1 (2003): 133-54; For a further development of the 
competition in veterinary establishments and its effects on policy, see Thadeus Sunseri, "The 
Entangled History of Sadoka (Rinderpest) and Veterinary Science in Tanzania and the Wider World, 
1891-1901," Bulletin of the History of Medicine 89, no. 1 (2015): 92-121. 
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region.8 My primary focus here is on this last issue, the changes in veterinary 
knowledge and the changes in how Basotho understood government interventions. 
The series of government interventions during rinderpest were important arenas 
for knowledge circulation, social action, and local politics. 
 While scholars have explored the etiological pathways of rinderpest – its 
social, economic, and ecological dimensions – and the ways it opened political 
possibilities, we know little about how this traumatic experience changed what 
people knew about livestock and disease. The aforementioned social histories offer 
insights about how the plague destroyed cattle, which carry great cultural and 
economic importance, and exacerbated existing political tensions and hastened 
rural impoverishment. I take this position as my starting point to link the social and 
political dimensions of the epidemic to the scientific and cultural aspects of the 
campaigns to fight rinderpest. We must understand veterinary knowledge, with its 
many facets and fault lines, as a historical process for all social actors: herders, 
livestock owners, chiefs, colonial administrators, and European veterinary experts. 
By reconstructing stories of Basotho engagement with the process, I show how 
people in varied social positions acquired, or did not acquire, new knowledge 
through a tense political and cultural interaction.   
                                                          
8 Pule Phoofolo, “Face to Face with Famine: The BaSotho and the Rinderpest, 1897-1899,” Journal of 
Southern African Studies 29, no. 2 (2003): 503-27; In a later work, Phoofolo emphasizes the 
entanglements of political relationships in the months before rinderpest breaks out in Lesotho in 
“Ambiguous Interactions: BaSotho-Colonial Relations on the Eve of the Rinderpest Outbreak, 1896,” 
in African Agency and European Colonialism: Latitudes of Negotiation and Containment, eds. Femi 
Kolapo and Kwabena Akurang-Parry (New York: University Press of America, 2007), 83-104. 
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 Veterinary knowledge in 1897 Lesotho was both locally situated and globally 
constituted. Within two years during the 1890s rinderpest in southern Africa 
treatment evolved from stamping-out and cordoning to inoculation. Colonial 
veterinarians drew on historical experiences in Europe, especially the British 
Rinderpest of 1865-66 where knowledge and its limitations depended on 
professional rivalries and contemporary debates about germ theory as much as any 
other factors.9 Veterinarians then applied this partial expertise to a specific political, 
cultural, and ecological situation in southern Africa, producing varied outcomes. But 
when the epidemic initially petered out in 1898 (before a brief resurgence in 1901), 
it had been the southern African field experience that helped facilitate the successful 
development and implementation of inoculations as a biomedical response. 
 
2.2 - The Politics of Prevention on the Eve of Rinderpest 
 In August 1896, the Cape Colonial government convened a rinderpest 
conference. Government authorities and veterinary officials representing all 
southern African territories gathered to discuss the urgent situation where cattle 
plague had already infected areas in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State and 
was advancing south towards the Orange River and Basutoland.10 The acting 
resident commissioner (RC) Godfrey Lagden of Basutoland listened carefully to the 
                                                          
9 Michael Worboys, Spreading Germs: Disease Theories and Medical Practice in Britain, 1865-1900 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 43-51. 
10 Attendees represented the Cape Colony, Natal, the South African Republic (Transvaal), the Orange 
Free State (OFS), German West Africa, Basutoland, and the Bechuanaland Protectorate. 
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policy issues that the veterinarians discussed. Other officials spoke of their previous 
experiences in the infected areas of Bechuanaland and the Transvaal.11 Through 
these dialogs, Lagden increased his own knowledge of rinderpest, which he then 
applied to policy in Basutoland. 
 Conference participants focused on how the disease had spread and how to 
stop it. Duncan Hutcheon, the colonial veterinary surgeon for the Cape Colony and 
the conference’s leading expert on rinderpest, believed that the murrain12 had 
moved south via major trade routes on which livestock and animal products, grain, 
and people constantly traveled. Others believed that certain Africans willfully 
transmitted the disease by carrying tainted meat to infect the herds of rival chiefs. 
Attendees devoted less attention, however, to livestock and people moving along 
un-mapped routes that crossed political and ecological zones, a key feature of rural 
lifeways and a prime channel for disease transmission. In the arid areas of the 
western Transvaal and Bechuanaland Africans and Boers both moved animals 
between pastures and watering holes in coordinated seasonal transhumance 
patterns.13 Despite their relative ignorance of these patterns, officials proposed 
broad solutions to control all animal movements.  
                                                          
11 LNA, S3/1/5/10, Cape of Good Hope (CoGH), Rinderpest Conference Minutes (Cape Town: 
Government Printers, 1896), 3-4. 
12 The Oxford English Dictionary defines murrain as a historical term that indicates “any virulent 
infectious disease of cattle or other livestock, such as anthrax, rinderpest, or redwater.” It was 
commonly used in the late nineteenth century in this way, but could also refer to pestilence or plague 
affecting humans. I use it in this chapter to echo some of the historical lexicon. 
13 Ibid., 7; See also, Gary Marquardt, "Water, Wood, and Wild Animal Populations: Seeing the Spread 
of Rinderpest through the Physical Environment in Bechuanaland, 1896," South African Historical 
Journal 53, no. 1 (2005): 73-98. 
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But officials also realized that human migration presented another set of 
challenges. The conference chairman remarked that the "free and promiscuous 
movement of people" needed to be regulated. He included whites in his assessment, 
but the chairman claimed that "the natives are more reckless than white people, 
carrying about articles liable to spread the contagion," such as meat and hides. 
African doctors, in the chairman’s view, posed “a fruitful source of danger” because 
they carried horns, bones, and skins in their medicine kits.14 In blaming rinderpest’s 
spread on human ignorance, racial and ethnic divisions in southern Africa featured 
prominently.  
Mr. Crosbie, an English-speaking representative from the Cape Colony 
pointed out that Boers flocked quickly to neighbors’ infected kraals to apply local 
remedies of carbolic dip and garlic, then returned home to unknowingly infect their 
own herds.15 Governments regulated human movements based on these biases, but 
black Africans bore the most blame. Africans moving from designated infected areas, 
for example, encountered fumigation stations where inspectors forced them to strip 
naked and scrub with soap, water, and Jeyes fluid, a potent disinfectant generally 
used for household cleaning. Inspectors dipped the clothes in a carbolic acid 
solution for thirty minutes, while the dehumanized people waited, likely shivering in 
                                                          
14 Ibid., 22. 
15 Ibid., 18; For contemporary evidence showing English-speakers’ widespread assumptions of the 
inherent cultural ignorance of Africans and Boers, with regards to animal disease, ecology, and 
medicine, see the Cape of Good Hope, Report of the Scab Disease Commission (Cape Town: Government 
Printers, 1894); See also, Mordechai Tamarkin, Volk and Flock: Ecology, Identity, and Politics among 
Cape Afrikaners in the Late Nineteenth Century (Pretoria: UNISA Press, 2009). 
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the cold. Whites also underwent disinfection, although they typically had access to 
state-provided special rooms and clean, dry clothes.16  
Surprisingly, Hutcheon spoke little at this conference about another key 
feature of veterinary practice: stamping-out. In fact, the policy did not appear on the 
conference’s list of recommendations for southern African governments despite 
having been tried already. In July 1896 veterinarians in Bechuanaland, with 
assistance from Cape colonial police, enforced a stamping-out policy in Setlagole 
Reserve by slaughtering 400 cattle.17 Officials reluctantly continued slaughtering 
into August despite local resistance. Hutcheon, nonetheless continued to believe 
that if “we had the money and the courage to stamp the disease out the moment the 
infection appeared in a herd of cattle by destroying those animals, there would be 
no infection to be carried.”18 But other conference participants, like Godfrey Lagden, 
recognized the political problems of slaughter and helped steer policy in 1896 in 
another direction, at least temporarily. At the end of the conference, participants 
unanimously agreed that "the best and most effective mode of stopping the spread 
of rinderpest" was to erect double wire fences not less than 500 yards apart.19 
 This fencing policy and the knowledge that underpinned it had developed 
thirty years earlier during the British Rinderpest of 1865-66. The late 1800s were 
                                                          
16 CoGH Rinderpest Conference, 22; TNA, Dominions Office (DO) 119/178, telegram, Secretary, Cape 
Town to RC, Basutoland, October 1896. 
17 Ibid.; Gilfoyle, “Veterinary Research,” 137. 
18 CoGH Rinderpest Conference, 17. 
19 Ibid., 6. In theory, the 500 yards would prevent any contact between animals. At the time, it was 
still unclear how far the virus could spread through the air; See also, Marquardt, "Water, Wood, and 
Wild Animal Populations.” 
 107 
 
heady times for medical research in Europe, but veterinary theory and practice in 
England lagged behind, perhaps owing to it being overshadowed by research on 
human diseases. As prominent examples the French scientist Louis Pasteur and the 
German bacteriologist Robert Koch, made important discoveries that formed the 
basis for modern germ theory. These discoveries had profound implications for 
veterinary science and immunology more broadly. Despite the British government 
having established the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons in 1844, vets had 
focused mostly on horses instead of cattle and small stock until the 1860s. 20  
Trained vets in the 1860s were sensitive about their lower professional 
standing in relation to medical doctors, and they attempted at every chance, to 
distinguish themselves from "farriers, cow leeches, knowledgeable farmers, and 
veterinary quacks." This sensitivity, according to Michael Worboys, hardened into 
stubbornness in 1865-66 when they insisted that strong government enforcement 
of quarantines and stamping-out of infected cattle were the only effective defenses 
against rinderpest.21  
Although veterinarians showed interest in the emerging ideas about the 
pathology of contagion, they still viewed rinderpest in terms of importation theory. 
In this theory vets viewed the host animal, not the germ itself, as the carrier and the 
prime focus of policy to be contained or destroyed. When the cattle plague ended in 
                                                          
20 Koch had publicly demonstrated the bacterial cause of anthrax in 1877. Pasteur had developed a 
vaccine against anthrax by heating cultures of Bacillus anthracis, which conferred immunity when 
inoculated into susceptible animals. Along with a similar vaccine against the bacterial disease 
quarter-evil (both diseases were present in contemporary Lesotho), was used extensively in several 
western European countries by 1890. See Gilfoyle, “Veterinary Research,” 139. 
21 Worboys, Spreading Germs, 44-57. 
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England in 1866, the veterinary establishment celebrated victory. Among other 
attributes, a strong central government had enforced quarantine regulations in a 
countryside where fenced paddocks and private land holdings were standard—two 
characteristics of land tenure that were not standard in southern Africa.22 
Experience, the British veterinarians claimed, had shown that this state-led policy 
was the only effective approach. This same approach went on to inform colonial 
policy in southern Africa even as Dr. Koch and others made breakthroughs in 
immunology in European laboratories during the interlude. Duncan Hutcheon, the 
chief veterinarian at the 1896 rinderpest conference, openly boasted of his 
knowledge from direct experience in England thirty years before.23 
 Following the conference in August, the Cape Government published several 
proclamations beginning in October 1896 from which the Basutoland Colonial 
administration built its policy. These laws prohibited cross-border animal 
movements and regulated human travel too. Proclamation No. 10 from the high 
commissioner in Cape Town predated the conference, and had granted the RC in 
Basutoland (Lagden) extensive powers to create laws restricting grazing or 
segregating animals to control the plague, whether or not it breached the territory’s 
borders. Furthermore, according to colonial authority, Lagden could demand that 
stockowners manage or dispose of all liable animals however he saw fit. “Liable” 
animals meant any bull, ox, cow, heifer, calf, sheep, or goat. Government ordered 
                                                          
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid.; Gilfoyle, "Veterinary Research," 135-37; CoGH Rinderpest Conference, 14-15. 
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violators of Proclamation No. 10 to pay £100 in fines or serve up to twelve months 
in prison.24  
Two more proclamations in October and November 1896 added regulations. 
International travelers would have to pass through one of seven certified border 
posts where fumigation facilities could be prepared by authorities. But only one 
such post was planned for Qacha’s Nek district in Lesotho. Residents, traders, and 
herders commonly used at least four other crossings in Qacha’s Nek. Forcing traffic 
through one crossing would make rural life difficult where transport was always an 
arduous task. Enforcing these regulations along the mountain border areas required 
increased policing. Strict veterinary policing, as Hutcheon insisted, had served 
England well in the 1860s and would do likewise in southern Africa, an assumption 
that proved misguided.25 
The British colonial presence in Basutoland was minimal on the eve of 
rinderpest. In 1884, the Crown had begun administering the territory after Lesotho 
rebelled against Cape colonial rule in the Gun Wars (1880-81). The Cape had ruled 
directly through magistrates to enforce laws (1871-1884), an approach that most 
Basotho deeply resented. To avoid the same mistake, the British high commissioner 
in Cape Town placed a resident commissioner in Maseru to oversee a system of 
parallel administration in which the hierarchy of Basotho chiefs, headed by the 
paramount chief (PC), conducted the day-to-day business of courts, tax collecting, 
                                                          
24 LNA, S3/1/5/10, Basutoland Proclamation No. 10, 14 May 1896. 
25 LNA, S3/1/5/10, Proclamation No. 16, 13 October 1896; Proc. No. 24, 7 November 1896. 
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and land regulations.26  The British presence limited itself to securing the borders 
and maintaining internal security. The RC worked to achieve these aims with "seven 
district commissioners, a government secretary, an accountant, and a police officer 
commanding a Basotho police force numbering 259 men."27 A new veterinary 
bureaucracy that included increased policing grew during the rinderpest 
experience.  
Basutoland’s national boundaries in 1896, especially in the mountains, were 
still poorly understood by all parties. The border followed the topographical 
contour that formed the continental divide along the Drakensberg Escarpment.28 
Rinderpest and government veterinary policies in the late 1890s played important 
roles in fixing these borders in the political and physical sense. Perhaps more 
importantly, the boundaries hardened symbolically for Basotho when fences 
became a key technology used for implementing veterinary policy. Lagden wrote a 
memorandum to chiefs, which was translated into Sesotho, to explain that if 
rinderpest approached the territory, the restrictions laid out in the proclamations 
                                                          
26 Machobane, Government and Change, 70-75; Sanders, Throwing Down, 44-51. 
27 Phoofolo, "Ambiguous Interactions," 84. 
28 TNA, CO 700/BASUTOLAND1-2, Marshall Clarke, The British War Office Map of Basutoland for 
1888 shows five border crossings and includes rough contour intervals for topography. This map 
improved markedly from 1880, when Undersecretary for Native Affairs in the Cape Colony Richard 
Bright labeled eastern Lesotho simply “Mountain Country.” TNA, Foreign Office (FO) 925/7323, Map 
of Basutoland, 1911. Dobson made the first detailed topographical map based on his extensive 
surveys for military purposes in 1904-05. This cartographic progression illustrates the colonial effort 
to enhance policing for veterinary and political reasons. Maps helped make the mountains legible, 
and thus, more governable. See James Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the 
Human Condition Have Failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 44-45. 
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would go into full effect, but “only after consultation with chiefs and councilors in 
Basutoland.”29   
Chiefs from around the country joined Paramount Chief Lerotholi, Godfrey 
Lagden, and other officials at a national pitso (public meeting of all adult males) on 
October 1, 1896. After public discussion, Lerotholi and Lagden seemed to agree on 
several principles. First, rinderpest posed a serious danger and would likely affect 
Basutoland soon. Second, protecting Basotho herds from the murrain necessitated 
fencing and cordons. For Basutoland, this meant creating a five-mile wide stock-free 
zone from the border to the interior. Implementing these measures required careful 
policing with help from all chiefs. Third, the Basutoland government should not use 
foreign guards or police to secure its borders.30  
These principles, especially the last two, provoked varied responses in 1896 
and 1897. Analyzing these responses will illuminate the politics of veterinary 
knowledge, and how that knowledge circulated amongst and between new 
regulatory communities, common people, and animals.31 The powerful Chief 
Masupha of Berea district protested loudest by articulating two concerns about the 
cordon. With plowing season approaching in November-December, he asked: “if we 
remove all animals then how will we plough our fields, how will we live?” The 
Caledon River formed the boundary between much of northern and western 
Lesotho and the Orange Free State. Masupha claimed that the river formed a 
                                                          
29 LNA, S3/1/5/1, Godfrey Lagden, Suggestions by RC about Rinderpest, September 1896. 
30 TNA, DO 119/178, Lagden to HC in Cape Town, 24 September 1896; Lerotholi to Lagden, 21 
September 1896; Rinderpest Agenda Paper, 24 September 1896. 
31 On regulatory communities, see Agrawal, Environmentality, 20-24. 
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sufficient natural barrier against rinderpest, and that apart from closing specific 
crossings, creating cordons constituted a territorial threat to Lesotho.32  
 
 
 
 
Masupha’s concerns grew from the ecological and labor realities of the 
agricultural cycle, and from his understanding of Lesotho’s political history. In this 
history, a series of conflicts and treaties from 1843-1872 with the Orange Free State 
and the British had collapsed Lesotho’s northern and western borders 
incrementally.33 Masupha was Moshoeshoe’s third son (See Figure 2.1), and had 
fought courageously against Boer incursions in the 1860s and again against the 
                                                          
32 TNA, DO 119/179, Masupha to PC Lerotholi, 12 October 1896; LNA, S3/1/5/3, Lagden to Lerotholi, 
17 October 1896. 
33 Martin Lelimo, The Question of Lesotho’s Conquered Territory: It’s time for an answer (Morija: MMA, 
1998); Eldredge, South African Kingdom, 50-53. 
Figure 2.1 
Moshoeshoe’s Lineage (selected) 
Paramount Chiefs highlighted in gray 
Source: created by author in consultation with 
Rosenberg et al., Historical Dictionary of Lesotho. 
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Cape Colony in the Gun Wars (1880-82). Basotho, especially in Masupha’s home 
district Berea, saw him as a great chief and a fierce defender of Basotho institutions 
such as initiation and the chieftainship. He often disagreed with his older brother 
the Paramount Chief Letsie (d. 1891) on policy matters, and urged his subjects to do 
the same. So when Masupha’s nephew Lerotholi took the helm as paramount chief in 
1892, the passionate war veteran Masupha hardened his defiant stance.34 
Nonetheless, by the end of October in 1896, most Basotho around the country, if 
reluctantly, had effectively created five-mile cordons free of livestock, apart from a 
few donkeys and horses.35 
Rinderpest broke out in Leribe district in October 1896. The cordons and 
strict quarantining helped localize this outbreak and capped the mortalities at 
around 300 cattle. There were no reports of rinderpest in Lesotho again until March 
1897. But this first outbreak stimulated debate about slaughtering as policy while 
highlighting Basutoland’s political fissures.36 Paramount Chief Lerotholi wrote 
Lagden in response to the news of the October 1896 cattle disease, boldly saying 
that “all these cattle should be killed even though they are a great number, what do 
you say?” Lagden stood adamantly against this, stressing that slaughtering Basotho 
stock was politically impossible, “unless you wish to support it with an army.” He 
also believed that slaughtering would encourage people to disperse with infected 
meat, skins, and other products. Mass slaughter might also cause people to hide 
                                                          
34 On the rivalries between Moshoeshoe’s three oldest sons in his first house (Letsie, Molapo, 
Masupha), see Sanders, Throwing Down, 20-25. 
35 TNA, DO 119/179, Lagden to HC, October 1896. 
36 TNA, DO 119/180, RC to PC, 23 November 1896; CO, 119/181, Lagden to HC, 29 March 1897. 
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their animals in the mountains or elsewhere to avoid government stamping-out 
measures.37 Not least, Lagden understood that cattle were the “medium of discipline 
employed by chiefs in the management of tribal affairs entrusted to them by 
[colonial] authority.” By this, he meant that chiefs’ control over cattle, which people 
used to pay fines exacted by chiefs’ courts or borrowed in times of need (mafisa), 
bolstered their political power and prestige amongst commoners. Through this 
leverage, chiefs also exercised power over what people knew and did not know 
about cattle, disease, and possible treatments.38  
The resident commissioner admonished Lerotholi for not forcing Chief 
Jonathan to enforce the cordon because it was in Jonathan’s area that rinderpest had 
broken out in October 1896. Chief Jonathan was a son of Molapo. Molapo was a son 
of Moshoeshoe (d.1870), and had established his chieftainship in the Leribe district. 
Following his father’s death, Molapo (like his younger brother Masupha) had sought 
more autonomy from Letsie, who succeeded their father as king (paramount chief). 
The two junior brothers often resisted colonial policies that Letsie had supported. 
Molapo had enjoyed great popularity in Leribe and owned substantial cattle herds, 
which he loaned out to commoners according to the mafisa system. Mafisa was an 
institution in which people-in-need could borrow stock to use for draught power 
                                                          
37 CAR 1896-97, p. 8; TNA, DO 119/180, RC to PC, 23 November 1896; Lagden had expressed the 
“futility of slaughter” several months earlier as well as at the CoGH Rinderpest Conference. See for 
example, DO 119/178, Lagden to HC in Cape Town, 24 September 1896. Some observers suspected 
that Lerotholi’s encouragement of slaughter could have been a deliberate effort to pit Lagden against 
his political opponents in the northern districts, or a deliberate effort by Lerotholi to gain favor with 
Lagden by demonstrating his resolve to fight rinderpest at all costs. See Sanders, Throwing Down. 
38 TNA, CO 119/181, Lagden to HC, 29 March 1897. 
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and milking. Molapo bequeathed this great legacy to his sons when he died in 1880, 
especially to Jonathan.39  
Politics and epidemiology overlapped. Lerotholi responded to Lagden’s 
reprimand by lamenting that Jonathan did not recognize him as the nation’s 
legitimate chief. Jonathan had downplayed the rinderpest threat and called 
Lerotholi a “white blackman” for his perceived alignment with British colonial 
policies.40 These chiefly rivalries, especially those between the royal house 
descended from Letsie on the one hand, and the lineages from the junior sons 
Molapo and Masupha on the other hand, continued to play out in matters of 
agricultural and veterinary policy well into the twentieth century – a theme which I 
will revisit in subsequent chapters.  
In November 1896 rinderpest reached the Free State town of Rouxville, near 
Basutoland’s southwestern border. Lagden urged chiefs to be vigilant in protecting 
the cordons. Meanwhile, the Cape Government had already begun erecting fences 
along Basutoland’s southern border. Lagden told the chiefs that all neighboring 
governments had “a full right to put up fences if they like” in order “to prevent the 
removal of cattle from Basutoland.”41 The resident commissioner knew that 
enforcing veterinary policy in the uplands, perhaps more so than elsewhere in the 
territory, required support from important chiefs. Working within the parallel 
administrative system, Paramount Chief Lerotholi had sent his son Makhaola to 
                                                          
39 TNA, DO 119/180, PC to RC, 22 November 1896; RC to PC, 23 November 1896; Sanders, Throwing 
Down, 20-25. 
40 Ibid. 
41 TNA, DO 119/180, RC to PC, 28 November 1896. 
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Qacha’s Nek to bolster the district’s police unit sometime in late 1893. Makhaola 
served first as a constable to control stock theft and illicit liquor traffic while 
maintaining the rinderpest cordon, but perhaps more importantly, his presence also 
consolidated political power for Lerotholi and his colonial allies in the mountains.42  
When Makhaola arrived in Qacha’s Nek, residents were reconfiguring 
environmental knowledge to meet the demands of ecological and social changes. By 
the mid-1890s permanent villages, livestock herds, and cattle posts dotted Lesotho's 
eastern mountains. In 1894 the resident commissioner reported that the 
"mountains, formerly common pasture, were being largely occupied and cultivated 
and contain practically no un-allotted spheres."43 The settlement process produced 
political and ecological stress that affected the pathways from which people might 
compile knowledge about rinderpest. Chiefs from various lineages had established 
villages across the region, generally welcoming Sotho, Zulu, and Xhosa-speaking 
immigrants from lower, more crowded areas. Immigrants desired grazing space for 
their livestock, or sought security during and after the Gun Wars (1880-82). 
Furthermore, land policy in South Africa had dispossessed many Africans, especially 
after the Glen Grey Act took effect in East Griqualand in 1894. But social relations 
across ethno-linguistic lines were often fraught within Lesotho too. Basotho and 
                                                          
42 LNA, S3/5/9/1, PC to RC, 8 August 1903; S3/1/5/7, PC to RC, 4 December 1896; Interview with 
Mokhafisi Kena, 10 December 2014. 
43 CAR 1894-95, p. 6. 
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colonial authorities, for example, frequently accused the Xhosa-speaking Thembu 
people of theft and insisted that they were less civilized than the ‘native’ Basotho.44  
With respect to ecological changes, farmers of all backgrounds – new arrivals 
and older families – plowed-up vast acreages of grassland in the 1890s. Cattle herds, 
along with flocks of merino sheep and angora goats, grazed the mountains in 
unprecedented numbers.45 Plow cultivation and year-round grazing intensified 
ecological pressures in the uplands. Increased human and animal agency in the 
1890s coincided with several drought seasons (1894-95, 1896-97) and a destructive 
locust plague (1895-96), to create ecological conditions that heightened boundary 
disputes between chiefs.46 Chiefs, as a primary political duty, sought to provide the 
best fields, building sites, and grazing space for their subjects. To carry out this duty, 
chiefs often tried to expand their jurisdictions. Apart from these political duties, 
chiefs were important arbiters of knowledge for many rural Basotho in the 1890s.47  
Each chief had a specific relationship to the royal Koena lineage. The nature 
of each relationship was significant for the ways an individual chief brokered 
knowledge between government and veterinarians on the one hand, and the stock 
                                                          
44 On the likely effects of the Glen Grey Act, see CAR 1894-95, p. 38; On Nguni-speakers in Lesotho, 
see, for example, LNA, S7/1/6/1, Sub-Inspector of Basotho Mounted Police to GS, 23 November 1893; 
CAR 1895-96, pp. 34-35; Sanders uses an 1877 letter from the missionary Rolland to show that 
Basotho had negative attitudes towards Nguni speakers since earlier in the 1800s, see Throwing 
Down, 27-28.   
45 Grant’s Diary, reproduced in Mitchell and Challis, “A first glimpse;” Clarke, “Unexplored 
Basutoland;” CAR 1894-95, p. 6.  
46 CAR 1895-96, pp. 3, 8; CAR 1897-98, p.47. 
47 For example, a dispute between two of the earliest Bakoena chiefs in Qacha’s Nek, Sekake and 
Mpiti, simmered between 1894 and 1905. The chiefs disputed the boundaries of their respective 
authority over field allocations, grazing rights, and access to building materials such as thatch grass, 
this in addition to issues about rights of inheritance for their sons. See CAR 1894-95, p.38; CAR 1899-
1900, pp. 66-68; LNA, S7/1/6/13, Correspondence between AC Qacha’s Nek and PC, May 1905. 
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keepers under his jurisdiction on the other. In theory, all chiefs residing 
permanently in the territory in the 1880s, regardless of their lineage and linguistic 
background, owed allegiance to Letsie, the first son of Moshoeshoe. But each chief’s 
political position also drew on specific history, clan relationships, and his age 
relative to other chiefs. For example, Letsie had granted space deep in the 
mountains to the Batlokoa chief Lelingoana as a reward for his military support 
against the Cape Colony during the Gun Wars.48  
Other groups had sought living space earlier to reproduce livelihoods based 
on grazing livestock extensively and farming sorghum, maize, and wheat. Chief 
Sekake’s story presents a contrasting example to that of Lelingoana. He was a 
descendant of Moshoeshoe’s younger brother Mohale and had established one of the 
earliest Koena villages in Qacha’s Nek sometime around 1880. For reasons of both 
lineage and seniority, Sekake enjoyed a degree of autonomy from the paramount 
chief that would not have been familiar to Lelingoana and other non-Koena chiefs.49  
 The nuances of chieftainship made for a swirling confluence of rinderpest 
and local politics in late-nineteenth century Lesotho. Settlement of the mountains 
occurred during a period when the political supremacy of Moshoeshoe's eldest son 
Letsie was still in question. In the 1880s and 1890s, opposing factions within 
Basutoland jostled to configure the political organization of the mountain areas. 
Paramount Chief Lerotholi and his allies in the colonial government believed that 
                                                          
48 MMA, “1909 Court on Settlement in the mountains.”   
49 LNA, S3/5/9/1, PC Lerotholi to RC, 8 August 1903; Interview with Mokhafisi Kena, 10 December 
2014; Jones, “Chiefly Succession in Basutoland,” 74-76. 
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the rugged terrain with its deep hidden valleys and well-watered pastures 
constituted a frontier that required new governance. Prior to 1895, there was no 
direct descendant of Moshoeshoe's first house permanently residing in the 
mountains.50 The absence of a direct descendant created administrative ambiguity 
with regards to who was responsible for determining appropriate village sites, 
regulating immigration, allocating fields, and not least, policing against cattle theft 
and illicit traffic in guns and liquor. Policing began when the government etablished 
Qacha's Nek in 1888, a post where Basotho could also obtain passes for working in 
South Africa. Authorities deemed security “satisfactory” in 1895. But in late-1896 
the British, working closely with Lerotholi, believed that enforcing the rinderpest 
regulations called for direct involvement from the royal house.51  
The historical arch of Makhaola Lerotholi’s political life (c.1893-1932) 
reveals important aspects of political-ecology in Qacha’s Nek. A seemingly 
passionate anti-colonial warrior in his early days, Makhaola had become an ardent 
supporter of government veterinary and agricultural initiatives after his father 
formally placed him as district chief in 1904.52 He also became a popular chief 
among his subjects locally, and played a prominent role in national governing 
bodies. As a prince, Makhaola was known as molele (the wanderer). His age mates 
from initiation school and his subjects too, took this general name for themselves: 
melele (the wanderers), still the nickname of people from Qacha’s Nek. He was a  
                                                          
50 MMA, “Court on Settlement in the mountains;” See also, Adolph Mabille, quoted in Germond, 
Chronicles, 416-17; Kennan, "Discovery and Exploration,” 38-48. 
51 CAR 1895-96, p. 4. 
52 LNA, S3/5/9/1, AC Qacha’s Nek to GS, 16 November 1904. 
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fierce defender of the chieftaincy. Chief Makhaola married eighteen wives, which he 
housed in his multi-building sandstone compound in the village that still bears his 
name. When builders completed it in 1912, commoners, chiefs, and colonial officers 
all recognized Makhaola’s compound as a substantial architectural achievement for 
the time, a fitting project where a great chief had assembled labor, skill, and local 
and non-local building materials. He named the main building after the most 
important historical site for Basotho: Thaba Bosiu.53  
Makhaola lived in a time of rapid political and cultural change. Following his 
death in 1932, his pallbearers carried his casket, draped in a Union Jack, to the top of 
                                                          
53 “Makhaola Lerotholi,” in Mangoaela, Lithoko, 199-201; Interview with Mokhafisi Kena, 10 
December 2014. The name of the village is Ha Makhaola, meaning “place of Makhaola.”  
Figure 2.2 
“Thaba Bosiu”: Chief Makhaola’s Main House, 
built in 1912. 
Photo by author, January 2015 
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Thaba Bosiu for a royal burial.54 To some extent, this funerary episode symbolized 
his affinity for British culture and ideas about progress, a concept to be discussed in 
coming chapters. Makhaola’s actions in late-1896 and 1897, and those of other 
chiefs, illustrate the ways in which politics and veterinary knowledge entangled 
with one another. These entanglements show that chiefly politics could both 
facilitate and occlude the flow of veterinary knowledge to and from common people.   
 Makhaola was the oldest son from Lerotholi’s third house and was just 
twenty-five years old when he arrived in Qacha’s Nek in 1893. According to the 
author of his praise poem he was a favorite son: a “darling of his father.”55 When he 
arrived in Qacha’s Nek he was undoubtedly eager to earn respect from chiefs and 
commoners in the highlands, and from his father too. In the first days of December 
1896 Makhaola, with support from several area chiefs, gathered men along the 
border to stop all traffic going to, and coming from, the Cape Colony. He believed 
mistakenly that all travelers needed to undergo fumigation at Qacha’s Nek. In fact, 
no fumigation facilities existed yet and people (though not animals) could still move 
about freely at that time because neither area was infected yet. John Griffith, a sub-
inspector in the Basutoland Mounted Police and the head constable in Qacha’s Nek, 
told Makhaola to cease his activities and follow official orders. Makhaola insisted 
                                                          
54 British Pathé, "To sleep with his Forefathers on the summit of Thaba Bosigo- royal funeral of 
Makhaola Lerotholi," Accessed on 6 March 2016. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LIJX-SCf_5U. 
55 “Makhaola Lerotholi,” in Mangoaela, Lithoko, 199-201. 
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that he would follow orders from the paramount chief only, and would continue to 
enforce the regulations as he understood them.56 
 Although the Cape government lagged behind on the fumigation facilities at 
Qacha’s Nek, they had already begun the fencing project. Men from the Cape had 
recently installed poles to mark the fence line. Aurthur Bovill, a white South African 
farmer whose property abutted the Basutoland border, had helped set the poles. 
Bovill also served as a border guard who was responsible for monitoring the Cape 
side of the border from Qacha’s Nek to Natal. While marking the fence line a few 
days earlier, Bovill had met Chief Ramatšeliso near the border twenty miles east of 
town. Ramatšeliso had twenty armed men with him, and firmly told Bovill that he 
had no right to set pickets on the border.57  
On December 5th a confrontation developed when work crews from the 
nearby South African town of Matatiele arrived at the Qacha’s Nek border to 
commence building the fence under orders from the Cape Government (See Figure 
2.3). It is unclear exactly who joined Makhaola near the main border post at Qacha’s 
Nek, or elsewhere in the district. But Lagden collected several affidavits a few days 
after the incidents, all of which indicate broad participation by chiefs in the district. 
The affidavits tell us that armed Basotho taunted the workers, insulted them, and 
intimidated them physically. The fencing crew had used ox-carts to haul wagons full  
                                                          
56 TNA, DO 119/180, RC to PC, 4 December 1896; LNA, S3/1/5/7, PC to RC, 4 December 1896. 
57 TNA, DO 119/180, A. Bovill affidavit given to Lagden, 14 December 1896. 
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of poles and wires, picks, spades, and mauls up to the border to tackle the job.58 
Workers like John Garbutt, a farmer from the nearby Mt. Currie district, probably 
understood little of the political repercussions of the fence project. Just as the 
workers began unloading the wagon, a group of mounted, armed men led by 
Makhaola approached. The Basotho angrily shouted that the workers were 
trespassing, pointing out precisely where the workers had illegally crossed the 
Basutoland border, and warning them to back away.59  
                                                          
58 TNA, DO 119/179, Telegram Correspondence No. 34, 5 December -7 Dec., 1896; LNA, S3/1/5/10, 
AC to RC, 7 December 1896; WHP, A951, Box C3-D1, File D1, RC to HC, 15 December 1896.  
59 Ibid; See also, TNA, DO 119/180, Affidavit from Garbutt, 15 December 1896; CAR 1896-97, pp. 5-7; 
Godfrey Lagden, The Basutos: The Mountaineers & their Country, Vol.2 (London: Hutchinson & Co., 
1909), 590-93. Several secondary sources have discussed this incident in varying detail, see, for 
Figure 2.3 
Looking southwards into South Africa from the 
original Qacha’s Nek border gate. 
Photo by author, December 2014 
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 Tension mounted over the next few days as fencing crews camped just below 
the border under the protection of a few Cape border guards. Griffith, the British 
policeman, rode out towards the camp to assess the situation. When Griffith arrived 
at the border some men stopped him and seized his horse. They eventually let him 
pass on foot. When Griffith reached the camp he sounded the alarm by dispatching a 
messenger down to Matatiele to telegraph the capital of Basutoland in Maseru. Many 
workers broke camp and turned back to Matatiele to avoid further confrontation 
with the angry highlanders. Despite the remote location, news of the incident spread 
quickly. In Maseru Lagden read the telegram from the Cape Magistrate at Matatiele 
that said: “bodies of armed Basuto have occupied the border and threatened the 
fencing parties in a disrespectful way.”60 
 Lagden immediately ordered the paramount chief to “dispatch influential 
people to ride night and day directly through the mountains to recall the bodies of 
men on the border.” Three brothers of Lerotholi assembled a substantial following 
of men as they “crossed the mountains with extraordinary speed by changing horses 
from kraal to kraal.” Arriving at Qacha’s Nek, they diffused the situation at the 
border and arranged for a meeting to be held on December 16th. The meeting pitted 
the detachment from Lerotholi, which was aligned with the Basutoland Colonial 
Government and the Cape Colony against one of the paramount’s favorite sons. In 
                                                                                                                                                                             
example, Van Onselen, “Reactions to Rinderpest;” Phoofolo, “Epidemics and Revolutions;” Phoofolo, 
“Ambiguous Interactions.” 
60 CAR 1896-97, pp. 5-7; TNA, DO 119/180, Lagden to HC in Cape Town, 16 January 1897; Affidavits 
given to Lagden from: J. T. Griffith, 15 December 1896; A. Bovill, 14 December 1896; Lesuta, 15 
December 1896; RooiJan, 9 December 1896; J. Garbutt, 15 December 1896. Additional affidavits are 
too faded to read. 
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addition to hindering the fencing work, Griffith alleged that Makhaola had 
threatened violence on a government officer, an act deemed by Lagden as an “attack 
on Her Majesty’s government.” Although tensions remained high until a national 
pitso took place the following month, the meeting at Qacha’s Nek had eased the 
border confrontation and the fence crew returned to work. The government sought 
to overcome all resistance to the rinderpest controls.61  
 Basutoland’s major chiefs gathered at the pitso in Maseru on January 11, 
1897 to address the Makhaola incident. Lerotholi and the resident commissioner 
headed the meeting while other major chiefs including Masupha and Jonathan 
Molapo also weighed in. Young Makhaola sat in the hot seat as all elder chiefs – 
especially his uncles and his father – roundly condemned his actions. In their view 
he had selfishly imperiled the peace of Basutoland and her neighbors. With regards 
to punishment, Lerotholi argued that imprisoning the young man would only 
threaten peace further. Lagden acknowledged this danger and proposed instead to 
employ Makhaola on his native staff in Maseru where “he should endeavor to learn 
the essentials of discipline and order.” As for the “mountain people who had 
engaged in riotous proceedings,” Lagden ordered them “to pay 100 head of cattle, 
though not while the rinderpest regulations prohibited cattle movement.” As 
Lerotholi was thanking the RC for this decision, Makhaola stood up defiantly with 
his brothers Letsienyane and Griffith, and with “some wild followers who indulged 
in a war cry,” mounted horses and rode into the dusk. It was an anxious night in 
                                                          
61 WHP, A951 Box C3 File D1, Lagden to HC, 15 December 1896. 
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Maseru for everyone. “Jonathan [Molapo] and Masupha slept in their saddles on 
guard,” uncertain of what the young chiefs planned next.62   
 The young “miscreants,” as Lagden called them, had gathered a sizeable 
following that supposedly included a known fugitive Mpondomise chief from East 
Griqualand, and camped in Mafeteng district.63 They threatened any messenger 
from Lerotholi over the next few days, refusing to acknowledge the PC and the 
colonial government as legitimate authorities. But apparently, Makhaola and the 
others quickly lost their nerve and turned themselves in, perhaps having weighed 
the daunting realities of open rebellion in 1897. Rather than serving time under 
Lagden, Makhaola lived for a brief stint under his father’s supervision at the royal 
compound in Matsieng. Later in 1897 Lerotholi sent Makhaola back to Qacha’s Nek 
to resume his role as constable, a role which included enforcing rinderpest 
regulations.64 
There are several possible readings here. One, Makhaola sought autonomy 
from the political constraints of British colonialism by whatever means possible. 
Viewed another way, a young chief with little experience sought to carve out his 
own political space, and was perhaps emboldened by the possibility of one day 
                                                          
62 Ibid; CAR 1896-97, pp. 5-7; Lagden, The Basutos, 590-93. 
63 Ibid. The fugitive was Nhlonhlo, who had been accused of murdering a Cape Magistrate in 1880, 
and had allegedly been hiding in Lesotho’s uplands since then. 
64 Makhaola increased police patrols in Qacha’s Nek by December 1897 in response to government 
fears that the Griqua rebel Le Fleur had infiltrated Basutoland and was seeking support for his fight 
against the Cape Colony. Makhaola insisted that he had no relationship with Le Fleur. See CAR 1897-
98, p. 42. The ceremony at which Makhaola was formally “placed” happened on 9 November 1904. 
LNA, S3/5/9/1, E. Blythe, AC at Qacha’s Nek to GS, 16 November 1904. See also William Beinart, "The 
Anatomy of a Rural Scare: East Griqualand in the 1890s," in Hidden Struggles in Rural South Africa: 
politics and popular movements in the Transkei and Eastern Cape, 1890-1930, eds. William Beinart and 
Colin Bundy  (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987), 46-77. 
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becoming paramount chief himself. It is possible, too, that he simply did not 
understand the rinderpest regulations or his role in enforcing them.65  By looking at 
the intersections of these readings, especially by exploring the roots of Makhaola’s 
motivations, we gain a sense of how these events affected what people knew about 
rinderpest, and what they knew about the political and ecological context within 
which rinderpest might threaten their cattle.  
At the original meeting in Qacha’s Nek in December 1896 Makhaola had, at 
first, explained that he was simply upholding his father’s orders for enforcing 
rinderpest regulations. But he expressed several deeper motivations too. He claimed 
that people in Qacha’s Nek viewed the border fence as a precursor of Basutoland’s 
annexation to the Cape Colony, just as had happened in nearby Pondoland a few 
years earlier. Furthermore, people had heard news that an armed column of Cape 
soldiers was organizing in Matatiele, preparing to enter Basutoland to begin 
annexation. The young chief also voiced fears that the Cape Colony and Basutoland 
governments aimed to open up the mountain areas to mineral prospecting.66 Lagden 
dismissed all of these fears as groundless, saying such perspectives were “typical of 
the native mind which thrived on rumors and superstitions.” Indeed, rumor had 
played an important part in how people acquired knowledge, but these fears were 
grounded in important realities.67  
                                                          
65 TNA, DO 119/179, RC to HC, 7 December 1896; DO 119/180, Lagden to HC and Griffith to Lagden, 
15 December 1896; CAR 1896-97, pp. 5-7. 
66 CAR 1896-97, pp. 5-7; TNA, DO 119/179, Telegram Correspondence No. 34, December 1896.   
67 TNA, DO 119/180, Lagden to HC, 16 December 1897. 
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Basotho knew that Cape colonial authorities had built fences just before 
annexing Pondoland in 1894. Qacha’s Nek in 1896 had a growing population of non-
Basotho immigrants who brought livestock and consumer goods, as well as news, 
back and forth across the border from places like Matatiele, Mt. Fletcher, and 
Pondoland.68 Fences were foreign to Basotho pastoral practice, apart from reed 
enclosures at the fronts of family homes and stone livestock kraals. Basotho closely 
controlled grazing across seasons, in village areas, and at mountain cattle posts, but 
shepherds (balisana), not fences, regulated these practices. Basotho resistance to 
various state-mandated enclosures whether fencing national borders or altering the 
communal land tenure system through paddocking, echoed similar reactions across 
time and space.69  
Resistance to fences in Lesotho extended beyond Qacha’s Nek. In February 
1897, a border guard in the Herschel district of the Cape Colony reported that 650 
armed Basotho from Quthing district threatened to destroy the border fence there 
when workers sunk the first posts. Local Basotho chiefs claimed that the report of 
650 men was grossly exaggerated and denied that they intended to harm the fences. 
This response in Quthing, a district that had been temporarily confiscated by the 
Cape in 1880 following Moorosi’s War, suggests that Basotho sought to prevent any 
                                                          
68 TNA, DO 119/179, RC to HC, 7 December 1896; LNA, S3/1/5/10, Telegraph Correspondence 
between Griffith, RC, and Magistrate at Matatiele, 11 December – 12 December 1896. 
69 See Casalis, The Basutos, 125, 153, 158; TNA, WO 33/501, Dobson, Military Report, Vol. 1, 111-15; 
On other reactions to enclosure, see Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed; Fences had previously been 
erected along the northern border with the Orange Free State to prevent “trespass disputes” and 
illicit liquor traffic. See CAR 1889-90, p.5.  
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further territorial encroachment.70 In both places, men rallied to protect the 
historical patterns of human and animal migration that linked Lesotho’s southern 
mountains with the territories below the escarpment. For Africans, fences formed 
physical and symbolic barriers to engaging ecological opportunities as well as 
preventing other cultural pursuits, such as visiting sites of religious significance, a 
problem which persists into the twenty-first century.71  
Fences did, however, offer a possible technical solution for segregating 
healthy animals from those that were infected with rinderpest, or other 
communicable diseases. Considering that rinderpest had not infected the area 
before, few people in Qacha’s Nek would have understood its epidemiological 
characteristics in 1896, much less the English state-based veterinary model being 
deployed by southern African governments. It was not that this knowledge was 
necessarily beyond comprehension, but more about a problem of circulation. New 
agricultural and veterinary information, both about public policy and technical 
knowledge, typically reached rural people through word of mouth. Travelers and 
migrant laborers transferred knowledge acquired from experiences in schools, 
                                                          
70 TNA, DO 119/180, Civil Commissioner at Herschel to HC, 5 February 1897. 
71 See, for example, BNC, 43rd Session, 1947, Vol. 2, 546-50; Anne Mager, “‘The People Get Fenced’: 
Gender, Rehabilitation and African Nationalism in the Ciskei and Border region, 1945-1955,” Journal 
of Southern African Studies 18, no. 4 (1992): 761-82. On religious sites, see David Coplan, “Land from 
the Ancestors: Popular Religious Pilgrimage along the South Africa-Lesotho Border,” Journal of 
Southern African Studies 29, no. 4 (2003): 977-93. 
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mines, and farms. But more than these migrants, it was chiefs like Makhaola and 
their political clout that asserted the most control over knowledge flow.72  
In December 1896 Lesotho’s most prominent Christian organization and 
leader in formal education, the Paris Evangelical Mission (PEMS) had only minimal 
presence in the region. Two main missions, one at Sehonghong in the upper Senqu 
Valley and one at Mafube near Matatiele, South Africa, influenced local communities 
while also operating several nascent outstations.73 Apart from preaching the gospel 
and converting souls, these PEMS missions taught reading and writing to Basotho 
youth. The Catholic Church opened numerous schools in Qacha’s Nek only after the 
1920s. But in 1896, in addition to the two PEMS missions, there were just two 
government primary schools in the district. Most highlanders were illiterate in the 
1890s.74 Thus, it is highly unlikely that many people learned from the Sesotho 
language article published in Leselinyana la Lesotho on December 15, 1896 that 
discussed rinderpest’s regional impact, official veterinary policies, and the ongoing 
efforts to produce an inoculation. As the official newspaper of PEMS, and among the 
first African language newspapers on the continent, Leselinyana circulated widely in 
the lowlands but scarcely in the mountains in 1896.75  
                                                          
72 Interview with Seleso Tsoako, 19 January 2015; Interview with Mokhafisi Kena, 10 December 
2014; CAR 1895-96, pp. 34-35; Moteane, reproduced in Ambrose and Brutsch, trans., Part V, Mehloli 
3, no. 1 (1991): 4-7. 
73 Malahleha, “Mafube PEMS,” 129-34. 
74 CAR 1895-96, pp. 34-35; By 1936, with more than 15 schools open in Qacha’s Nek, census data 
shows that 26% of females and 19% of males could read. See Basutoland Census for 1936, pp. 8-9. 
75 “Lefu la Likhomo,” Leselinyana, 15 December 1896. 
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Given the state of formal education, limited roads, and relative isolation, 
rumor remained an important channel for knowledge circulation in Qacha’s Nek in 
the 1890s. Rumor, however, usually reflected lived realities.76 Many Basotho 
believed that the British had intentionally introduced rinderpest to destroy their 
herds. Other groups of Africans in the region and many rural Afrikaners too, 
suspected a British conspiracy. Some Zulu, Xhosa, and Batswana stockowners 
understood the epidemic as a “white man’s disease,” introduced to further subdue 
Africans. In fact, Afrikaners living near Lesotho's borders had told Basotho farmers 
that the Cape prime minister and mining mogul Cecil Rhodes had intentionally 
infected herds in Rhodesia, the Transvaal and the OFS, and that Lesotho was next. In 
this view, Rhodes and the British intended to destroy Africans’ primary means of 
subsistence in order to force them to work in the mines. Indeed, solving the so-
called labor problem was a central feature of 1890s politics in South Africa, 
especially through taxation, but there is little evidence to substantiate claims of a 
biological conspiracy on such a scale.77 
These sentiments, which Makhaola seems to have understood well, did 
reflect a general African reverence for European technology and ingenuity as well as 
African resistance to incessant colonial political and military incursions. In other 
words, the same people who had brought railroads and firearm technology could 
surely devise a biological scheme to destroy African livestock. There were many 
                                                          
76 On the role of rumor in transmitting knowledge, see Luise White, Speaking with Vampires: Rumor 
and History in Colonial Africa (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). 
77 TNA, DO 119/180, Lagden to HC, 16 December 1897; See also, Phoofolo, “Ambiguous Interactions;” 
Ballard, “Repercussions of Rinderpest.” 
 132 
 
sources and variations of this belief, some of which circulated widely in rural 
Lesotho to explain the looming plague. When situated in the context of 1890s 
southern Africa, these claims seem completely rational.78 The Basotho experience 
over the preceding decades – marked by two wars with the Cape Colony, internal 
succession conflicts, repeated drought, locusts, and increased colonial taxation – 
typifies the crisis context in which these beliefs flourished.79  
Colonial plans to further consolidate control over African lands, and to open 
them up to white settlement and mineral prospecting were very real in December 
1896. Makhaola and his followers had expressed particular fears about 
prospecting.80 After lucrative diamond and gold findings in South Africa in recent 
decades, prospectors and their government allies sought access to Basutoland. In 
1895 the high commissioner in Cape Town wrote to Lagden, urging him to convince 
the chiefs to reconsider the laws that prohibited foreign prospecting in the territory. 
The HC believed mining would offer advantages to “the natives and to the 
surrounding states…offering a home market for labor and agricultural produce and 
would bring them into contact with Europeans under more favorable conditions 
than those conditions obtained” in the South African mines. He suggested that the 
government could issue limited licenses to European applicants. The resident 
                                                          
78 See, for example, Sean Redding, Sorcery and Sovereignty: Taxation, Power, and Rebellion in South 
Africa, 1880-1963 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2006), 60-64; Jacobs, Environment, Power, and 
InJustice, 104.  
79 CAR 1894-95, p. 6; CAR 1895-96, p. 3, 34-35; Eldredge, South African Kingdom, 80-81; Germond, 
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Cattle-Killing Movement of 1856-7 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1989). 
80 TNA, DO 119/179, Lagden Telegram to HC, 7 December 1896; CAR 1896-97, pp. 5-7.   
 133 
 
commissioner of Basutoland met with the chiefs to discuss the matter.  The Basotho 
chiefs essentially said thanks, but no thanks.81  
Lagden explained to the high commissioner that although prospecting 
seemed like a good idea for economic development in principle, it would provoke 
conflict between chiefs and prospectors, and surely end in failure. Basotho chiefs 
knew well of how South African governments had dispossessed the Xhosa, Zulu, and 
other groups, and viewed themselves as an “exceptional tribe,” and would jealously 
“protect their semi-autonomy.” Furthermore, European prospectors had long been 
gathering along the borders, anxiously awaiting the legal right to dig in 
Basutoland.82  
Prospectors’ presence, whether licensed or not, would interfere with an 
internally fraught situation governing land use. In this situation, chiefs and 
commoners worked to conserve maboella between Christmas and June for their 
subsistence. Lagden explained that maboella already irritated “strangers and 
transport riders passing through the country whose cattle stray into it.” 
Additionally, Basotho chiefs carefully regulated, and sometimes disputed land use 
by European traders and missionaries. These conditions, Lagden argued, were 
“exceptional and deserved mature consideration.”83 Chiefs discussed these matters 
and the prohibitions against foreign mineral prospecting remained in place. But 
                                                          
81 WHP, A951 Box C3-D1, Folder D1, H. Lock to Lagden, 12 January 1896; Lagden to Lock, 3 February 
1895. 
82 Ibid., Lagden to Lock, 3 February 1895. 
83 Ibid; For a description of maboella/leboella, see Chapter 1 and Report and Evidence of the 
Commission on Native Laws and Customs, 51-52. 
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given a long history of colonial deceit, Makhaola and others had good reason to 
doubt that European prospecting ambitions simply died in 1895.84 
 Apart from external threats, we must understand Makhaola’s actions in 
1896-97 and the senior chiefs’ responses to his actions as a generational conflict 
within the Basotho chieftainship. In this instance, evidence suggests that Makhaola’s 
personal ambitions shaped the ways Qacha’s Nek residents experienced rinderpest 
from December 1896 until the murrain had run its course in the district by late 
1897; and then during its resurgence in Lesotho in 1901.85 Basotho social 
organization was patriarchal, which meant that male seniority largely determined 
succession rights within families and chieftainship. A man’s eldest son enjoyed 
special rights to his fields, livestock, and other property when the father died.86  
 A chief’s eldest son from his first house (senior wife, if he had multiple wives) 
succeeded his father as chief of a given village or ward (district or sub-district). But 
succession was often complicated by sudden deaths of heirs, favoritism for specific 
sons, differing capabilities of each son (eg. education), and personal aspirations of 
chiefs’ sons. For example, some contemporaries believed that Makhaola, who had no 
formal education, had received Qacha’s Nek, which was the largest district by area at 
that time, because his father Lerotholi favored him over his brothers. Furthermore, 
as land became scarce in the face of population growth and hardened borders, ward 
                                                          
84 See Sanders, Throwing Down, 92-93, 264-65. 
85 CAR 1897-98, pp. 42-44. 
86 Duncan, Sotho Laws and Customs, 11-15. 
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chiefs in Lesotho struggled to place their sons in areas with adequate lands; a 
process that brought chiefs into direct conflict with one another.87  
Conflict amongst chiefs in the 1890s grew at the intersection of Basotho 
cultural practice and colonial politics. Both cultural practice and respective political 
position conditioned each chief’s view of the specter of rinderpest. Young men 
typically respected elders, but it was also common for them to aspire to prove 
themselves, if not in battle, than in a comparable show of courage and strength. 
Basotho boys like Makhaola became men through lebollo, circumcision school. 
Lebollo instructors taught aspects of agriculture and family life, but historically, they 
also taught martial skills like stick fighting, horse riding, and shooting to the teenage 
boys. Initiates in the late-nineteenth century emerged from the school eager to 
engage Sesotho male lifeways: to acquire cattle, to marry and have children, and not 
least, to experience battle. For these reasons, missionaries and colonial authorities 
had tried, with mixed success, to eliminate lebollo in Lesotho. By the 1870s the 
institution had waned in some areas, but during times of crisis, such as the 1890s, 
Basotho men showed renewed interest in the rite. Initiates held their cohort, or age 
set, in high regard throughout their lives—perhaps even higher than their elders.88  
                                                          
87 MMA, Basutoland Native Laws of Lerotholi, 3 October 1922; Duncan, Sotho Laws and Customs, 48-
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88 Report and Evidence of Commission on Native Laws and Customs, 49-51; Ashton, The Basuto, 46-56; 
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By the 1890s, all of the senior chiefs had fought in previous wars against the 
Cape Colony and against the Orange Free State. For Makhaola, molele as he was 
known, and his two brothers who fled the pitso in January 1897, the rinderpest 
regulations represented a threat to territorial sovereignty. But more importantly it 
offered them a political opportunity to assert themselves as the next generation of 
Basotho leaders. Like their fathers and grandfathers before them, they tested the 
resolve of the colonial political dispensation, which included the senior chiefs. But 
age groups, like lineages, often developed political fissures. 89 For rural people who 
had limited access to knowledge of the pathology, policy, and potential treatments 
of rinderpest, these political fissures mattered.  
Makhaola’s Qacha’s Nek subjects and fellow chiefs followed his lead by 
rejecting the notion that fences could protect them from rinderpest, rallying to the 
stand-off at the border. But once Makhaola changed his perspective on government 
interventions following his short-lived insurgency, and carried out the next phases 
of the campaign against rinderpest, his subjects seemed to take interest in the new 
veterinary knowledge being deployed in 1897. In so doing, people eventually 
welcomed inoculation, saving the lives of many cattle. As we will see in a contrasting 
example, this was not the case with Makhaola’s great uncle Masupha, who, in his 
                                                          
89 Special reference here to Jonathan Molapo, Masupha, and Lerotholi’s experiences during the Gun 
War (1880-81) and earlier wars against Europeans. See Sanders, Throwing Down, 22-26, 130-32. 
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politics, urged his subjects to reject inoculations. This political stance resulted in 
catastrophic losses in cattle.90   
 
2.3 - Confronting Rinderpest and the Messiness of Knowledge Circulation 
 Stories about Lesotho’s experience with rinderpest show us how different 
people responded to government veterinary interventions. These stories improve 
our understanding of the political and social reasons behind these responses. Each 
response produced different outcomes. These outcomes, and the processes behind 
them, speak to the ways Basotho changed how they perceived the colonial state and 
the state’s role in modifying human-environment relations after the 1890s. To 
understand these processes beyond the political dynamics discussed above we must 
connect the experiences of local Basotho to the ideas and technologies behind these 
state-led campaigns.    
The German bacteriologist Robert Koch left a deep veterinary imprint on 
southern Africa. But southern Africa’s experience with rinderpest also deeply 
affected him by pushing his research to the front lines of international veterinary 
science. Basotho, as I have shown, despised the 1860s British model for containing 
rinderpest. Basutoland in the 1890s had very different political conditions and 
cultural conceptions of cattle than those in 1860s Britain, which had enabled the 
British government to successfully stamp out rinderpest there. These differences 
                                                          
90 The official report from Qacha’s Nek showed that 10,600 cattle had been inoculated between 
September and November 1897, with “very satisfactory results.” See CAR 1897-98, pp. 42-44; 
Phoofolo, "Ambiguous Interactions," 87.   
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paved the way for Koch and his associates to develop effective inoculations by field 
experiment, and deploy them in southern Africa.91 Fencing presented challenges 
that the southern African veterinary establishment could not entirely grasp. Even 
when the government erected fences and policed borders, the murrain found its 
way through to new bovine populations.  
Slaughtering cattle posed even greater obstacles for the proponents of the 
outmoded British veterinary policy. When rinderpest appeared in Lesotho’s 
Mohale’s Hoek district in March 1897, the high commissioner asked local officials 
once again about the possibilities of slaughtering infected animals. District 
administrators reinforced Lagden’s earlier opposition to slaughtering. The 
commissioner from Leribe believed slaughtering was “absurd given the nature of 
cattle keeping in Basutoland.” Another officer probed further into local 
circumstances, saying that the chiefs’ control over the mafisa system meant that the 
chiefs would be the most ferocious opponents of stamping out policies; and 
furthermore, chiefs would easily persuade commoners who needed livestock loans 
for sustenance that they should resist such measures, which would surely kill 
healthy livestock and reduce the pool of mafisa animals.92 In other words, Basotho 
from across the social spectrum would probably protest.  
The assistant commissioner in Qacha’s Nek insisted that slaughtering was 
“altogether impossible and impracticable amongst a native tribe like the Basuto.” He 
                                                          
91 Spinage, Cattle Plague, 425-31; Gilfoyle, “Veterinary Research,” 142-43. 
92 LNA, S3/1/5/8, HC to GS, Maseru, 5 February 1897; GS to DC Leribe, 14 March 1897; AC Berea to 
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added that “apart from any active resistance which would inevitably be offered, 
such a measure would spread the disease all over the territory” because people 
would hide animals at remote posts and disperse with infected materials. The 
commissioner argued that it would be better to continue maintaining the five-mile 
cordon.93 These local administrators knew full well that people would not offer 
seemingly healthy animals up for slaughter, regardless of how much veterinary 
authorities tried to convince them that killing infected animals could save healthy 
herds. In sum, the social realities of rinderpest on the ground in Basutoland 
contradicted what officials in Cape Town and London believed. With these 
constraints in mind, the Cape had already begun research and development for 
alternative approaches. 
In the 1890s Robert Koch’s work was renown in international health circles. 
He had developed a serum for inoculating against diphtheria in humans through his 
intensive laboratory research in Berlin. The Cape government commissioned Koch 
in January 1897 to join Alexander Edington, the director of the Cape’s 
Bacteriological Institute, who had been conducting research in Bechuanaland. The 
team set up controlled experiments at the Kimberley scientific compound to find a 
prophylactic for rinderpest by following the established research methods from 
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European laboratories. Koch’s research drew on his vast knowledge of 
bacteriology.94 
But Koch also incorporated local knowledge. For example, he learned of an 
older practice used by South African farmers to inoculate sick cattle. To protect 
cattle from lung-sickness and pleuropneumonia, both of which had infected herds in 
the recent past, some farmers would soak some sort of fiber in infected bile (gall) 
and then insert it under a healthy animal’s skin. Although the precise origins of the 
practice were not known, nor the extent of its efficacy, it probably emerged from 
farmers’ perspectives that animal diseases were closely linked to tainted bile; and it 
may have also been linked to earlier inoculation practices in Europe to treat other 
livestock diseases. Koch used this knowledge to produce his findings, which he 
shared publicly on March 22, 1897. He claimed that “by injection of gall taken from 
rinderpest animals, sound animals may be protected against rinderpest.” He 
considered the inoculation “absolutely proved,” at that time.95 
Knowledge of Koch’s bile inoculation traveled fast. On March 23rd Lagden 
proceeded to Mohale’s Hoek district where rinderpest had killed 400 cattle. Two 
veterinary surgeons from the Cape Colony accompanied Lagden. One surgeon, 
William Robertson had trained at the Pasteur Institute in Paris before coming to the 
Cape. The other, Harry Armstrong, had qualified at the Royal College of Veterinary 
Surgeons in London before arriving at the Cape in October 1896. Both men had 
                                                          
94 Frank Verney, “The Rinderpest in South Africa,” Journal of Comparative Pathology and Therapeutics 
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worked with Koch at the Kimberley station, and then traveled directly to Basutoland 
to assist the government there. The trio, escorted by several chiefs including 
Lerotholi, arrived in Mohale's Hoek armed with new knowledge and technology 
which they aimed to impart – and to some extent test – on Basotho cattle.96  
Lerotholi appointed his son Letsienyane (who had partnered with Makhaola 
in resistance just two months earlier) and another chief to organize a camp along 
the OFS border about twelve miles long. The chiefs marked twelve head of healthy 
cattle in the camp to be tightly quarantined. Then, “considerable numbers of 
representative people assembled” near the quarantine camp. Onlookers probably 
included male stockowners and non-stockowners alike, missionary educated and 
uneducated, along with women and children who also watched the spectacle. Many 
more Basotho watched and listened in the nearby infected area where Armstrong 
and Robertson, working with the chiefs, performed post-mortems on a dozen dead 
cattle.97 They explained the pathology of the infection, most likely through a 
Mosotho translator, which they believed was produced through the respiratory 
organs, before it became more generalized and later caused lesions on the digestive 
organs. The virus existed in all bodily secretions, and could incubate for nearly two 
weeks before manifesting in symptoms. Contamination, the veterinary surgeons 
emphasized, could take place by direct contact with diseased animals, or indirectly 
                                                          
96 Basutoland hired its own government veterinary surgeon following the rinderpest epidemic. 
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through contact with dung, spittle, bedding, hay, hides, wagons, etc. And finally, the 
vets said that the virus could only be communicated across relatively short 
distances.98  
The surgeons then showed the difference between good and bad gall, and 
demonstrated their method for extracting the fluid. Following the demonstration, 
the team of chiefs, vets, and colonial officers returned to the quarantine area with a 
supply of good gall. Subsequently, the team inoculated six of the twelve picketed 
cattle with the gall and they left the other six alone. The chiefs and surgeons 
explained this process by demonstrating to the public. Watching with interest, many 
stockowners from neighboring pastures – some undoubtedly more suspicious of the 
government officials than others – clamored for the bile inoculation. The vets 
explained that the inoculation could only work if the animal had not yet been 
exposed to the virus. Within a couple of days, roughly 1000 cattle had received 
inoculations. Everyone anxiously awaited the results.99   
Lagden wrote the high commissioner in Cape Town in May to share the 
findings. Three of the inoculated cattle had died while still in the quarantine area. 
The vets insisted that these animals had been exposed prior to being picketed and 
inoculated, which was possible given the incubation period. After ten days in the 
quarantine, the remaining three inoculated cattle, and the six untreated cattle had 
been placed in “an infected kraal reeking with deadly infective excreta and remains 
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of defunct animals.” The six un-inoculated animals promptly died, while the other 
three survived and were still flourishing fifty-eight days after being subjected to the 
virulent conditions. 100  
With support from the veterinary surgeons, Basotho in the infected area 
around Mafeteng and Mohale’s Hoek had inoculated 9000 cattle between March 29th 
and mid-May. Some 800 of those had died, having likely been exposed prior to 
inoculation. During the same time frame 7000 un-inoculated cattle succumbed to 
the plague.101 Through several months of experience the Cape veterinary 
department learned that “certain galls although physically correct in character and 
appearance, do still communicate rinderpest to certain cattle.” Duncan Hutcheon 
then issued revised instructions to Basutoland and other officials for improving 
methods of gall extraction and inoculation, which refined the process further.102 
These initial results convinced many Basotho stockowners that the new gall 
inoculation could save their animals from rinderpest. Reportedly, Basotho had 
marveled at seeing “salted” (immunized) oxen in infected areas plowing for winter 
wheat, a task that people knew required great strength to break up crusty soil 
during the dry months.103 But this bio-medical solution and the knowledge that 
underpinned it were not simply heaped onto a blank slate. Rather, Basotho had 
beliefs and practices regarding livestock and disease, some of which overlapped 
with the new veterinary science emanating from the government. But some of these 
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beliefs and practices rubbed up against the new government mechanisms for 
transferring this knowledge. These components, and the friction between them, 
constitute the process by which people compile knowledge. What, then, did Basotho 
think as they watched government authorities perform this experiment that 
integrated quarantine, gall extraction, and inoculation?  
Onlookers viewed these procedures and the resulting effective treatment 
through a culturally and historically appropriate lens, but this lens also looked 
different across African social groups. The available primary sources provide only 
glimpses of how people reacted, let alone what they thought. But by reading this 
empirical evidence in the ecological and political context of 1890s Lesotho, and 
reading it alongside ethnographic and secondary material, we can understand these 
elements as parts of the larger process.104   
Ideas about the supernatural blended with knowledge about bovine anatomy 
and ecology to inform Basotho understandings of disease, and of crisis more 
broadly. Basotho farmers regularly performed postmortems on deceased animals to 
examine the stomach contents, to see the color of bile and other fluids, and to look 
for any organ irregularities. In May 1896 a farmer in Mohale’s Hoek conducted a 
postmortem on an ox that had been inoculated. He found a blanket pin (oversized 
safety pin) and a sixpence coin in the ox’s stomach. Local lingakas (doctors) 
                                                          
104 This analysis draws on William Beinart and Karen Brown, African Local Knowledge & Livestock 
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interpreted this as evidence of witchcraft that had been deployed on behalf of the 
government, whose malicious intent was to kill Basotho cattle.105  
The following month officials reported more allegations of witchcraft, this 
time in the Quthing district and the adjacent Herschel district of South Africa. In a 
very different scenario, several cattle belonging to a white farmer who had had his 
stock inoculated, died suddenly. Again, local doctors understood this as a malicious 
individual’s sorcery deployed through inoculations to settle a score with this farmer. 
Many people in both places followed the advice of the lingakas and refused to 
inoculate their animals, temporarily bringing the inoculation campaign to a virtual 
standstill.106  
Postmortem results could indicate supernatural causation, but farmers often 
read the results in terms of environmental and nutritional factors. In their recent 
study, William Beinart and Karen Brown have found that although some South 
African stockowners attributed tick-borne cattle diseases to supernatural causes, it 
was far more common for people to understand animal health in terms of 
seasonality, vegetation, water availability, and other visible phenomena. Basotho in 
the 1890s had recently undergone several seasons of drought, a locust plague, and 
poor harvests, all of which negatively affected livestock health.107  
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More animals vied for the finite grazing space in the mountains than ever 
before. According to some reports, hlabahlabane (Xanthium spinosum/burweed) 
and other noxious plants were displacing nutritious grasses like seboku (Themeda 
triandra/redgrass), an ecological change that probably affected cattle nutrition 
adversely.108 Chiefs and commoners guarded maboella jealously to preserve 
sustenance for the human and animal populations under their charge. Basotho 
sought healthy environments and pasture for animals by using maboella and 
through seasonal transhumance systems, systems which were harder to operate 
with increasingly constrained borders.109 These ecological changes and the 
accusations of witchcraft that were derived from the contents of the animal’s 
stomach tell us – at least to some extent – that stockowners viewed rinderpest 
through a multi-focal lens which blended environmental, supernatural, and political 
factors to explain rinderpest. 
Basotho stockowners typically did not, however, believe that diseases passed 
from one animal to the other. Germ theory, that is, contagion through microbes in 
both human and animal bodies, was a new concept for Basotho as it was for most 
people throughout the world in the 1890s.110 Most Basotho veterinary treatments 
used combinations of medicinal plants to induce vomiting or diarrhea as a way to 
purge impurities that had been ingested while grazing, whether from noxious 
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110 Worboys, Spreading Germs, 2-19. 
 147 
 
plants, decaying animal matter (eg. bones), or inedible objects like blanket pins. For 
example, people diagnosed gall sickness (nyoko) through “dry nose, lassitude and 
loss of appetite.” Caretakers treated nyoko using a medicine blended from herbs and 
roots such as hloenya (Dicoma anomala), seboka (Scilla rigidifolia), and lebate 
(Cymbopogon validus), which induced purging.111  
These approaches underscore the emphasis that stockowners placed on 
environmental and nutritional diagnosis and treatment. There is little evidence, 
however, to suggest that any more than a few Basotho understood pathology in the 
biological sense, but nor were Basotho particularly stubborn in acquiring new 
knowledge. Despite Lagden’s assertion that Basotho, especially mountain people, 
were “naturally suspicious of all innovations,” the 1890s proved to be a critical 
period for rethinking disease causation and treatment possibilities.112 
  In addition to veterinary treatments, Basotho also engaged new medical 
knowledge about human health in the 1890s when smallpox appeared in the 
territory. Smallpox had claimed many lives in Lesotho at least since 1889 when the 
disease infected areas along the upper Senqu River Valley. Smallpox broke out again 
in 1895 and 1896. Government medical officers and their trained staff vaccinated 
more than 32,000 Basotho at mission stations and at government medical 
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dispensaries. In Qacha’s Nek medical staff vaccinated 900 people in 1896. According 
to the government medical officer Radford Savage, Basotho had “learned the 
benefits conferred by successful vaccination” and were “quite willing, if not anxious, 
to be vaccinated in order to avoid the disease.”113 The fact that the number of 
vaccinations remained relatively small speaks to the localization of the outbreaks, to 
the tiny number of medical personnel, and to the limited availability of the lymph 
needed to produce the vaccine locally. Dispensaries and mission stations, moreover, 
were inaccessible to many people, especially in the highlands.114 In other words, 
who benefitted from vaccination in Qacha’s Nek probably had more to do with 
geographic proximity to dispensaries and missions than to any culturally embedded 
resistance to new medical knowledge.   
This is not to say that many Basotho understood the biological pathology of 
either rinderpest or smallpox in the 1890s. But evidence of broad voluntary 
participation suggests that people did understand that both maladies posed major 
threats to animal and human health, and furthermore, that the government may 
have successfully intervened. The interventions, as described in Mohales’ Hoek in 
1897, had shown people about a specific process for diagnosis, treatment, and 
monitoring. Parts of this process would have been familiar to skilled stock keepers 
who had distinguished between good and bad gall long ago. When inoculated 
                                                          
113 CAR 1889-90, p.6; CAR 1892-93, p.31; CAR 1894-95, p.8; CAR 1895-96, pp. 34-35. 
114 A small station was set up in Qacha’s Nek town to produce the inoculation because the RC 
“considered it inadvisable to rely on supplies from elsewhere owing to the difficulty and distance of 
transport.” This would have been a similar case with respect to smallpox. See CAR 1897-98, pp. 42-
44. 
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animals continued to thrive amid the diseased and dying herds, previously skeptical 
people developed trust in new environmental knowledge, and to some extent, they 
also developed trust in the government as a service provider. 
Veterinary knowledge, however efficacious it might have seemed to some 
people, did not flow free of political obstructions. Berea district’s Chief Masupha 
vehemently opposed government inoculation efforts and asserted his authority by 
pressuring his subjects to do likewise. His own herds and those of his followers 
suffered, with cattle fatalities reaching over 100,000 in Berea.115 While it became 
clear that the initial method for gall inoculation only temporarily immunized cattle 
for three to four months, it was also clear that in areas where chiefs urged people to 
accept gall inoculation, and where inoculation services were available, survival rates 
were much higher.116  
Qacha’s Nek experienced severe devastation too, but it also offers a 
geographical contrast to Masupha’s district. Rinderpest arrived at Chief Sekake’s 
village in July 1897. It then spread up the Senqu Valley to Chief Lelingoana’s place 
where it eventually died out sometime in November 1897. Cattle mortality was 
heavy in the many communities that were perched along the rim of the river gorge 
between Sekake’s and Lelingoana’s villages.117 In his annual health report for 1897, 
the Qacha’s Nek medical officer wrote that “the pollution of the fountains (springs) 
by decomposing cattle carcasses which succumbed to rinderpest, the contamination 
                                                          
115 CAR 1896-97, p.8.  
116 Ibid.; TNA, DO 119/181, Lagden to HC, 12 July 1897; Phoofolo, “Face to Face,” 522-25.  
117 CAR 1897-98, pp. 42-44. 
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of the air from the same cause, and the restricted food supply” had all combined to 
make for an exceptionally unhealthy year.118 The officer’s reference to the foul air 
reflected a historically prevalent idea of miasmas (polluted air from swamps, decay, 
etc.) causing disease rather than pathogens. Indeed, germ theory was relatively new 
for everyone in the 1890s, not just Makhaola and the Basotho. 
Yet the devastation in Makhaola’s district would likely have been worse had 
there been less government intervention. Many farmers across southern Africa 
argued later that the government had done too little to convince people that 
inoculations could actually save cattle.119 Some Africans even questioned why the 
inoculation campaigns had not been made compulsory rather than voluntary. In 
Qacha’s Nek, trained Basotho worked under the auspices of the district 
commissioner to inoculate 10,600 cattle with bile, a relatively modest number to be 
sure. There were no reports of people resisting, as people had in Masupha’s district. 
The nascent veterinary apparatus in Qacha’s Nek had limited capacity, which 
restricted the reach of the campaigns. District Commissioner Moony admitted that 
obtaining accurate results of inoculations proved difficult, but he estimated survival 
rates of “salted” animals at about 70%.120  
 Unfortunately, Lesotho and southern Africa’s experience with rinderpest did 
not end in 1897. After four years of absence the murrain returned in a less virulent 
form in August 1901 during the height of the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902). The 
                                                          
118 Ibid., p. 45. 
119 Redding, Sorcery and Sovereignty, 65-67; Sunseri, “Entangled History,” 94-96; Phoofolo, 
“Ambiguous Interactions,” 100-03. 
120 CAR 1897-98, pp. 42-44. 
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Basutoland veterinary establishment, now under the leadership of Otto Henning, 
employed Koch’s method for bile inoculation once again as its primary weapon 
against the cattle plague. Henning believed the method was appropriate because 
Basotho “were acquainted with it [the bile method], had confidence in it,” and could 
carry it out themselves. In addition to the bile method, veterinarians had also 
developed a blood serum that could be obtained from healthy cattle.121  
Although the more expensive blood serum did not contain virulent material 
and thus, did not threaten healthy animals’ lives, it featured little in Lesotho’s anti-
rinderpest campaign of 1901-02 until the very end. Henning believed that the 
serum, which offered an even shorter immunity period than did the bile injection, 
could only work where state veterinary policing was highly developed and where 
transhumance had been curtailed by state regulation or had fallen out of practice. 
Or, as Henning put it, serum was appropriate only where “trek oxen had already 
made room for the engine.” Despite Henning’s apparent frustration with “the 
careless and indolent natives,” some of whom still refused to inoculate their stock, 
cattle losses were held to a small fraction of those lost in 1897.122  
Basotho inoculators had in fact played a key role in disseminating this 
knowledge and convincing people of its efficacy. Perhaps owing to its geographic 
position in the mountains, or perhaps owing to a shift on matters of policy on the 
                                                          
121 CAR 1901-02, pp. 27-31. 
122 Ibid. 
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part of their new chief, Makhaola, Qacha’s Nek was the only district where 
rinderpest did not reappear in 1901.123  
 
2.4 - Conclusion 
 Lesotho’s experience with rinderpest from 1896 to 1902 shows how 
veterinary knowledge has ebbed and flowed in sometimes unexpected ways. The 
ways people produce and acquire knowledge unfolds along a non-linear historical 
trajectory that shifts across diverse social and geographic spaces. As the second 
wave of rinderpest faded, an exchange occurred between Afrikaner war refugees 
staying in Basutoland and their African hosts. The war had generated a vibrant trade 
in cattle across borders—a trade that helped spread lung-sickness (pleuro-
pneumonia) to Basotho cattle. Boer refugees, who had been well acquainted with 
the disease from previous experiences, demonstrated their procedure for 
inoculation using only “a thick packing needle and small pocket knife.” Reportedly, 
many Basotho took up the practice.124  
This subtle example of sharing between historical adversaries demonstrates 
the social dynamism of knowledge circulation. Compiling knowledge is not about, 
and cannot be about plotting one system of beliefs against another. Instead, I have 
tried to highlight the spaces in between by reconstructing stories that show the 
surprising ways in which knowledge systems rub up against, and overlap with one 
                                                          
123 Ibid. 
124 CAR 1901-02, pp. 56-57. 
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another. This approach also deepens our understanding of how people related to 
the colonial state in Africa. Politics and personality at the local level can profoundly 
shape the ways rural people understand new ideas, and the government’s role in 
circulating those ideas.  
For most people residing in Qacha’s Nek prior to 1896, veterinary knowledge 
had come from experiences of living and working with animals. It had been passed 
down from elders, or it had been learned in initiation schools. For a few people, it 
had been acquired from experiences in South Africa. The encounter with a 
previously unknown plague – rinderpest – extended this rich pool of knowledge to 
incorporate new ideas and technologies that emerged as much from a uniquely 
southern African field experience as it did from European laboratories. Finally, the 
rinderpest experience exposed mountain dwellers to the colonial state in new ways, 
complete with its problems and its possibilities for delivering rural services. In the 
early 1900s, state interventions into rural people’s lives and environments would 
increase, and so too would people’s exposure to various streams of knowledge. 
Chapter 3 examines another veterinary intervention, this time focusing on sheep, to 
follow this process forward through time. 
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 3. URGING THE PEOPLE TO CLEAN UP THEIR COUNTRY: PEOPLE, SHEEP, AND 
PSOROPTES, C. 1900-1930s 
 
3.1 - Introduction  
  Hoaba, a Mosotho man in his twenties, began work on a February morning in 
1918. As the dip supervisor at Ramatseliso’s Gate, a small border village in the 
Qacha’s Nek district, Hoaba dipped sheep and goats that herders brought to the 
station each day. To prepare the eight-foot wide dip-tank, he filled it with water 
piped from a stream before stirring in seven packets of Cooper’s Dip, a powder of 
sulfur and arsenic concocted to treat the mite-born skin condition known locally as 
lekhoekhoe, sheep scab. When animals arrived, Hoaba drafted them into an 
enclosure before dropping them into the tank several at a time.1 
The sheep stewed in the toxic brew for two minutes, submerged up to their 
throats. The dipper then dunked their heads under twice using a long pole before 
the sheep scampered up an exit ramp. They stood for some minutes in the dripping 
yard, passing through another gate to the drying pen. Finally, the supervisor forced 
them upslope of the station to graze before they trekked home several miles distant. 
Hoaba worked this station under the auspices of Mr. Hill, a European trader in the 
district who owned the store. Hoaba was a local man and illiterate, but he knew his 
job from repeating the drill in varied conditions.2   
                                                          
1 LNA, S3/1/6/3, J. Smith to AC, Qacha’s Nek, 5 March 1918; J. Willis to Frank Verney, Principal 
Veterinary Surgeon (PVS), 7 May 1918; Chaka to AC, 25 February 1918. 
2 LNA, S3/1/6/3, Statement by Hoaba, 26 February 1918. 
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 But this day was different. At noon two herders wearing blankets and 
gumboots, accompanied by three scrawny dogs arrived with 260 sheep belonging to 
Chaka, a local stockowner. Hoaba pointed to the dark clouds approaching as he told 
the two herders, Kabelo and Azariele, that the sheep must not get wet immediately 
after dipping. The boys shrugged and urged the dipper to get on with the task. 
Following the procedure, the boys drove the flock five miles back to their grazing 
post. The next morning they found thirty-one dead sheep scattered about. Casualties 
among dipped animals in 1918 typically reached one per hundred head, making this 
case extraordinary.3  
What had gone wrong and who was to blame? Chaka and his boys performed 
postmortems and found enflamed tissues. The poison did not discriminate by age, 
killing lambs, ewes, and wethers (emasculated males). Chaka wrote to the British 
district commissioner in Qacha’s Nek to demand compensation, explaining the story 
as his herders had told it. He blamed Hoaba, the dipper, for mixing too much 
Coopers into the tank, saying that the young Mosotho was "incompetent." But the 
real onus was on Hoaba’s boss, the store manager Wilfred, who oversaw dipping at 
Ramatseliso’s Gate. The commissioner sent an inspector to examine the dead sheep 
and to question all people involved.4  
When the inspector arrived at Chaka’s place three days later, the boys had 
already butchered the sheep and feasted with others. But the inspector did record 
                                                          
3 LNA, S3/1/6/3, Chaka to AC, 25 February 1918; Wilfred to Chaka, 24 February 1918. 
4 Ibid. 
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testimonies from the herders, and from Hoaba, Chaka, and the store manager. Not 
surprisingly, Wilfred told a different story. He claimed that the herders hurried the 
sheep back to the post after dipping, ignoring the warning that when dipped sheep 
overheated, their pores opened, exposing their organs to the toxic treatment. Rain 
posed a similar threat. In his own testimony, Hoaba said that it must have rained on 
the animals as they trekked home. The herders, however, insisted that it did not 
rain. Although Chaka received compensation, it remained unclear which human 
errors had caused the deaths and to what extent the treatment itself was to blame.5  
Regardless of the possible combinations of mistakes that killed the sheep, 
this collection of testimony provides a glimpse of a government veterinary 
intervention as it played out in rural Lesotho in 1918. To understand how people 
interact with new veterinary knowledge we must understand the social and 
ecological context in which such interactions took place. The anti-scab campaign in 
Lesotho (1904-1930s) produced stories that show us how knowledge circulated, 
and equally important, how knowledge was obstructed. Lesotho’s participation in 
the colonial political economy of wool had accelerated following the rinderpest. The 
grasslands, people, and animals of Qacha’s Nek played key roles in this commercial 
growth. In the Maloti and in Lesotho as a whole, the growth of the wool industry 
accentuated socio-economic inequalities that shaped who knew what about scab. 
But local circumstances beg additional questions too. We must understand who the 
actors at Ramatseliso's were and how these diverse actors understood sheep, 
                                                          
5 LNA, S3/1/6/3, Wilfred to Chaka, 24 February 1918. 
 157 
 
disease, and treatment. Furthermore, we must know how these divergent ideas 
shaped the planning and implementation of anti-scab campaigns in order to 
improve our grasp of local responses to new knowledge.6 
Government interventions, and the underlying environmental and economic 
knowledge that underpinned them, also demanded intensive human labor to 
engineer the mountain landscape in both technical and ecological ways. In addition 
to the anti-scab campaigns that involved building a new infrastructure of dipping 
stations, wool boosters sought to control grassland ecology by terminating certain 
plants. Hlabahlabane (Xanthium spinosum/burweed), as it was known in Sesotho, 
was floral enemy number one because its burs entangled in wool and mohair, 
reducing its quality and market value. An eradication campaign began before the 
turn of the century and remained deeply unpopular with those who performed the 
work well beyond the timeframe covered in this chapter. In this campaign, older 
ways of motivating and organizing labor clashed with new meanings of plants and 
new demands upon mountain grasslands. Chiefs, acting as government agents, 
called people to dig collectively in matsema (work parties).7 The regulatory work of 
chiefs and the labor of commoners speak to the ways Basotho compiled 
environmental knowledge by constructing a landscape with new meanings.   
                                                          
6 My inquiries into shifting knowledge about livestock and parasites draw especially on Weisiger, 
Dreaming of Sheep in Navajo Country; Beinart and Brown, African Local Knowledge & Livestock Health. 
7 TNA, CO 646, Proceedings of the Basutoland National Council, Sessional Papers (Hereafter BNC 
Sessional Papers), 1912, pp. 75-80; On noxious weeds, see Lance Van Sittert, “The Seed Blows about 
in Every Breeze: Noxious Weed Eradication in the Cape Colony, 1860-1909,” Journal of Southern 
African Studies 26, no. 4 (2000): 655-74. 
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The Basutoland Chamber of Commerce hoped that the anti-scab and 
burweed campaigns would help "clean up the country" by engineering the 
landscape to serve the wool industry.8 By distinguishing between clean sheep, 
pastures, and people on the one hand, and the unclean animals and people of the 
mountain regions on the other, the chamber perpetuated existing myths of cultural 
and economic backwardness in the Maloti. The anti-scab campaign dovetailed too 
with government programs to encourage large flocks of woolen merino sheep at the 
expense of fewer, more ecologically appropriate local sheep. Merino sheep, to some 
extent, hastened grassland degradation while attracting new parasites. This 
intervention also formed an early chapter in Lesotho’s long history of development 
programs that have prioritized technical approaches and capitalist interests, often 
at the expense of common Basotho.9   
 
3.2 - Sheep, Culture, and History 
 Wool production in Lesotho expanded when people settled the eastern 
mountains after 1880, and alongside a biological transition from indigenous fat-tail 
(kalpense) to non-native merino sheep (faralane).10 Concurrent with this transition, 
                                                          
8 LNA, S3/1/9/2, Basutoland Chamber of Commerce Secretary to Government Secretary (GS), 20 
December 1920. 
9 For example, Sandra Wallman, Take Out Hunger: Two Case Studies of Rural Development in 
Basutoland (London: Athlone Press, 1969); James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine:"Development," 
Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); 
Showers, Imperial Gullies; John Aerni-Flessner, “Development, Politics, and the Centralization of State 
Power in Lesotho, 1960-1975,” Journal of African History 55, no. 3 (2014): 401-21. 
10 There was also a shift from older goat breeds to angoras to grow mohair. Goats developed scab 
from a different mite, Symbiotes caprae. The historical record often uses “sheep” to refer to both 
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the sheep population expanded rapidly in the 1890s, contributing to vegetation 
change and soil erosion. Not coincidentally, the rise of sheep accelerated after 1897 
when rinderpest had devastated cattle. Cattle had been the primary economic and 
cultural resource for Basotho, but the cattle plague created new space for sheep.11 
The less hearty merino were more susceptible to parasites and sensitive to 
mountain conditions of high altitude and cold, dry winters. Scab supposedly crossed 
the border from South Africa to Lesotho via surplus military sheep during the Anglo-
Boer War and the Basutoland government first reported lekhoekhoe in 1903.12  
The biological characteristics of scab, and scab’s effects on sheep’s health and 
economic value, called for a specific type of intervention. Barely obscured from the 
naked eye, sheep scab mites (Psoroptes ovis) reproduce quickly, colonizing a sheep’s 
body and migrating easily between sheep when in close quarters. Psoroptes prick 
the skin using long sharp mandibles, but do not burrow. They live at the roots of the 
wool where they cause extreme itching. Topical remedies and scrubbing did not kill 
psoroptes, as was the case too with their larger cousins, ticks. Afflicted animals 
rubbed vigorously against rocks, posts, and each other. Eventually, wool peeled off 
in loose patches.13 In economic terms, scab destroyed sheep's wool, but could also 
                                                                                                                                                                             
sheep and goats. I use “sheep” in this way. Along with ticks, mites are members of the scientific 
subclass acari. In Sesotho kalpense, to my knowledge, refers to all indigenous breeds: Afrikaner, Zulu, 
Persian, etc. I use fat-tail/kalpense in this general sense. 
11 Nathan Sekhesa, “Makhulo a Felile,” Leselinyana, 3 October 1912; SAB, NTS Vol. 10163, 52/419, 
Thornton, “Report on Pastoral and Agricultural Conditions;” For a comparative context where sheep 
facilitated vegetation change, see Elinor Melville, A Plague of Sheep: Environmental Consequences of 
the Conquest of Mexico (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). 
12 G. Henderson, A Survey of Our Sheep and Wool Industry (Morija: Morija Printing, 1936), 1-5; 
Interview with Mokhafisi Kena, 7 January 2015; CAR 1903, p. 36. 
13 CoGH Report of the Scab Disease Commission, v-vii. 
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kill sheep if left untreated. Winter in the Maloti (May-August), when scab was most 
prevalent, meant frigid temperatures, scarce water, and dormant forage—a 
potentially deadly constellation of ecological factors. Sheep grew full fleeces during 
winter and huddled together for warmth, making ideal breeding grounds for 
psoroptes.14 As scab proliferated, it prompted three decades of debate, policy-
making, and interventions, which have marked Lesotho’s landscapes with physical 
sites that hold cultural and historical significance.  
A person can see the Tsoelike Store in Qacha’s Nek from miles away in any 
direction. The largely treeless Maloti landscape affords superb views up to pointed 
vistas, down into deep valleys, and across plateaus like the one where the store sits. 
It includes a grain mill, storage barns, and a dipping station, which together evoke 
layers of cultural and environmental history.15 In conjunction with the limited 
documentary evidence, visiting historic sites like Tsoelike enrich our sense of place. 
In this case, the place helps us understand the physical spaces where diverse human 
actors interacted with animals, with a specific landscape, with new knowledge and 
technology, and with new insects. 
Inside the store the shelves were sparsely stocked, the gasoline-powered mill 
has rusted over, and the dipping station began crumbling long ago. Located 150 
meters downslope from the shop above a small creek, two dip tanks sat side by side 
with the ruins of the supervisor’s quarters just a few paces from the tanks, which 
                                                          
14 LNA, S3/1/6/1, Otto Henning, Basutoland PVS to GS, 20 April 1905; J.D. Bezuidenhout, “A Short 
History of Sheep Scab,” Journal of the South African Veterinary Association 82 (2011): 188-89. 
15 I made these observations on 29 November 2014, recorded in my journal and photographs. 
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date from c. 1920 (See Figure 3.1). Low stone walls, wire fencing, and cobblestone 
yards, made of locally quarried sandstone surrounded each tank. Wandering 
through the site, several women greeted me as they washed clothes and blankets in 
the creek below where the operators used to drain the wastewater from the dips. 
When I asked the women how long it had been since people dipped sheep there to 
treat scab, they looked at each other quizzically, then turned to me saying 
“hele…khale ntate…khale” – a long time ago. 
 
 
  
Over 200 dipping stations like the ones at Tsoelike and Ramatseliso’s Gate 
dot the rural landscape of Lesotho today. Some serve as meeting places where 
government veterinary workers inoculate livestock against anthrax, redwater, and 
other diseases. Others operate as baths during shearing to clean the sheep before 
Figure 3.1 
Tsoelike Dipping Station, Qacha’s Nek 
Photo by author, November 2014 
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they scurry into woolsheds for “the clip,” as the shearing process is known. Still 
others lay idle, melding back into the landscape from which they came. In 1932 
officials declared that Basutoland was “practically clear of scab.”16 This stood in 
stark contrast to 1908 when psoroptes affected more than half of all flocks, and 
colonial officials and chiefs doubted if dipping could succeed. Contemporary and 
later observers called it a “heroic effort against all odds” and cited it as proof that 
European veterinary science could triumph over geographic and cultural obstacles, 
both of which were believed to be formidable in Qacha’s Nek.17 How, then, did the 
campaign to eradicate lekhoekhoe in Lesotho unfold over these thirty years?  
Scab was new in Lesotho in 1903, but sheep had a deeper history. Although 
difficult to quantify the shift from fat-tail to merino in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, the subject is important because kalpense did not contract scab. These 
local sheep grew a kind of hair as opposed to thick merino wool that psoroptes 
preferred. Prior to permanent settlements in Qacha's Nek which began around 
1880, the Basotho had used sheep in varied ways. The fluid movements of people in 
the 1800s contributed to breed mixing, as did missionaries who reared European 
livestock, including merino sheep. The Batšueneng chieftainship, as an example of 
1800s migrations, fled to the Cape Colony in the 1820s to search for wage-work 
following defeat in battle. Many Batšueneng, among other people, received pay in 
                                                          
16 CAR 1932, p. 11; See also Pim, Financial and Economic, 117-18. Alan Pim reviewed the anti-scab 
campaign in his 1935 report, but he mistakenly believed that the campaign only began in 1923.  
17 LNA, S3/1/6/1, AC, Maseru to GS, 11 April 1908; S3/1/6/4, PVS to GS, 29 November 1923; Robert 
Germond, “The Quest: the Population Problem in Basutoland,” Unpublished Manuscript, LNA, 1952. 
 163 
 
the form of sheep and goats of various breeds, with which they returned to settle in 
Basutoland in 1836, complicating the territory's breeding-stock.18  
 Travelers in Basutoland observed sheep during early journeys. Thomas 
Arbousset, one of the first three missionaries from the Paris Evangelical Missionary 
Society (PEMS), saw sheep browsing shrubs in the northeastern Maluti in 1847. 
When the first Mosotho PEMS minister Jobo Moteane visited the upper Senqu River 
Valley in late 1887 to find new sites for mission stations in Qacha’s Nek, chiefs 
slaughtered sheep to welcome the esteemed minister.19  
Apart from hospitality and the more obvious uses as food and clothing, sheep 
featured in cultural practices that developed from numerous Sotho and Nguni-
speaking groups that had settled the mountains. Indeed, the extent of these 
practices shifted over time in Lesotho, but a brief sample illustrates sheep’s 
meanings and uses prior to, and overlapping with, commercial wool production. 
Basotho used sheep as currency to pay for grain, blankets, and tools since before 
1900. Under Sesotho law a man accused of injuring another would offer a sheep as 
payment for damages. In this way, Basotho understood sheep and goats as a smaller 
unit of currency compared with the larger, more valued cattle.20  
Sheep were used at weddings, funerals, and other feasts too. When a bride 
arrived at the village of her betrothed, the groom’s father would kill a sheep to 
symbolize her being welcomed into her new family. During the ceremony, the bride 
                                                          
18 Ellenberger, History, 156. 
19 Germond, Chronicles, 37; Moteane, reproduced in Ambrose and Brutsch, trans., Part V, Mehloli 3, 
no. 1 (1991): 4-7. 
20 Ellenberger, History, 269. 
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and groom sprinkled gall from the sheep’s bladder for cleansing. The man would 
wear the bladder around his wrist to represent his marital commitments. For 
funerary feasts, a black ox was most important. But people also slaughtered sheep, 
for example, to symbolize the deceased being welcomed home if he had died away 
from his village. Families also killed sheep to honor newborn children and nourish 
nursing mothers. To treat certain illnesses, Basotho doctors (lingaka) used sheep 
liver to make medicines. For warding off evil spirits doctors might order their client 
to sacrifice a black sheep or goat, which were more common amongst fat-tails than 
merinos. These beliefs often conflicted with dipping because people feared that the 
toxic brew could kill or weaken the animals, or pollute them both chemically and 
spiritually.21  
Whether people preferred kalpense to merino, or vice versa, depended on 
how the stockowner intended to use the sheep and on how many they owned. 
Kalpense, as mentioned, had adapted to the mountain environments over time. 
People with fewer sheep generally preferred fat-tails, which required less care and 
labor, and typically yielded more meat and fat. As one elderly man recalled, “people 
knew that a handful of merino yielded small wool, so they guarded their kalpense 
carefully.” By “guarding,” he referred to how people hid their kalpense rams from 
government inspectors during emasculation campaigns to purify sheep for 
maximum wool growing, a campaign that accelerated in the 1930s. Basotho did 
                                                          
21 Sechefo, Customs and Superstitions, 28-29; Ellenberger, History, 248; Ashton, The Basuto, 30, 74, 
134-35. 
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aspire to own large flocks prior to merino for both cultural and economic purposes, 
but the possibilities for cash earnings from merino wool represented something 
new for all people involved and for the ecology of sheep, parasites, and pastures.22  
 
 
 
Basotho herding practices highlight key features of the social order within 
which people were exposed to knowledge in different ways. Stockowners like Chaka 
employed their sons, nephews, or sons of debtors as shepherds. Accepting pigs and 
fowls, women had little control over livestock. Hired shepherds like Kabelo and 
Azariele maintained flocks at remote mountain posts, earning food and perhaps a 
beast at year’s end. Adventures in herding featured prominently in Basotho 
boyhood. Herders acquired knowledge about the environments in which they 
                                                          
22 Henderson, Survey, 1-4; Interview with Mochinti Jane, 18 May 2015.  
Figure 3.2 
Merino Sheep, near Morija, Lesotho 
Note: the dried shrub is sehalahala. 
Photo by author, April 2015 
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worked: weather, animals, wild foods and medicinal plants. Many shepherds 
underwent the Sesotho initiation rite (lebollo) to learn about manhood, agriculture, 
and soldiering. But most balisana knew little about government veterinary policy 
and procedure. Most did not attend schools and were illiterate. According to several 
men who grew up herding in Qacha’s Nek, the Sesotho language government 
propaganda and newspaper articles on veterinary matters that circulated by 1918, 
would have been inaccessible to herders. While low in social status in one respect, 
Basotho also saw balisana as “very important people for the country.” 23  
Stockowners trusted herders to maintain their livestock by keeping the 
animals fed, watered, healthy, and shorn. These were not easy tasks in 1900s 
Qacha’s Nek. Until the 1940s when the government built a national network of 
shearing sheds, herders sheared sheep at their mountain posts, which consisted of 
squat stone huts surrounded by stone kraals, and were usually perched among crags 
and peaks to conserve pasture. Whereas fat-tail sheep required little care, merinos 
had to be shorn whether the wool was to be sold or not because merino wool grew 
continuously and could overheat, and even suffocate the animals if overgrown to the 
extreme. Balisana then transported the packed wool bales by donkey or horseback 
to trading stations. For herders, the transition to woolen merinos meant more 
exhaustive labor.24   
                                                          
23 Mofolo, Pitseng, 5-7; Thabo Makoa and Anne-Laure Zwilling, Shepherd Boy of the Maloti (Morija: 
MMA, 2005), 67-80; J. Ratau, Molisana oa Mosotho (Morija: Morija Sesuto Book Depot, 1988), 5; 
Interview with Seleso Tsoako, 19 January 2015; Interview with Mokhafisi Kena, 10 December 2014. 
24 SAB, Governor General (GG) Vol. 1856, 54/681, PVS Report on Basutoland, September 1923; 
Henderson, Survey, 2-5. 
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In addition to moving sheep between pastures, Basotho herders and 
stockowners had treated scabby animals by hand with a mixture of carbolic powder 
and water before the government built dipping facilities. Sometimes they smeared 
fat or grease over the sores. Alternatively, caretakers used tobacco-based extracts to 
scrub the sheep. As an environmental control, herders sanitized kraals by burning 
the manure and thatch. But the biological characteristics of psoroptes necessitated a 
full-body treatment. The invisible mites puzzled sheep farmers, not least, because 
psoroptes could survive for two weeks without their woolen hosts.25  
Although these topical remedies failed to destroy psoroptes, these efforts 
demonstrated knowledge of scab that compared with sheep cultures elsewhere. 
Basotho understood lekhoekhoe as an environmental problem which threatened 
sheep’s health. In other words, verdant pasture and plentiful water would sustain 
healthy flocks, whereas drought brought scab. They treated sheep using available 
resources. Basotho doctors, the local authorities on human and animal health, 
struggled to understand lekhoekhoe in the 1900s. Herders bore the most 
responsibility. Topical smearing echoed other scab treatments across time and 
space. Sheep scab had wreaked havoc since biblical times in Europe and the Middle 
East where herders carried various fats to dress animals. In Britain, the English first 
introduced legislation in 1798 to control scab by restricting stock movements: a 
state-led measure that foreshadowed the British experience with rinderpest in 
                                                          
25 LNA, S3/1/6/1, Otto Henning to GS, 26 June 1905; S3/1/6, Extracts from Basutoland National 
Council’s (BNC) discussion on compulsory dipping of sheep, 1909. 
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1865-66. More recently in Australia, farmers had soothed animals with tobacco 
extracts and animal fats until Cooper’s Dip and essential dipping facilities became 
available in the 1860s, which helped Australians nearly eliminate psoroptes by 
1870.26  
Despite a wealth of accumulated veterinary knowledge, Basotho did not 
understand lekhoekhoe in the early 1900s any more than their counterparts in 
South Africa and Australia did when scab first arrived in those places earlier in the 
nineteenth century. Positively diagnosing scab remains a challenge in modern 
times—a fact that testifies to the importance of specialized knowledge then and 
now.27 According to documentary evidence, psoroptes had just arrived in Lesotho, 
and like with the rinderpest virus in 1896, Basotho had little chance to adapt.  
 
3.3 - The Political Ecology of Wool in Lesotho 
 In 1905 the British high commissioner in Cape Town governed Lesotho 
through a resident commissioner (RC) in the capital Maseru. The RC presided over a 
parallel administration in which the hierarchy of Basotho chiefs, headed by the 
paramount chief (PC), conducted the daily business of courts, tax collecting, and 
veterinary regulations.28 Since rinderpest had arrived in 1896, the British had 
asserted veterinary authority through a principal veterinary Surgeon (PVS) and a 
small staff of stock inspectors. The RC also utilized nine district commissioners, a 
                                                          
26 CoGH Report of Scab Commission, v.  
27 Sustainable Control of Parasites in Sheep, www.scops.org.uk. Accessed on 29 December 2015. 
28 Machobane, Government and Change, 70-75; Sanders, Throwing Down, 44-51. 
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government secretary, and a mostly Basotho police force of 290 men. The police had 
expanded during rinderpest to maintain cattle-free cordons on Lesotho’s borders.29 
Basotho chiefs had influenced colonial veterinary policy in the 1890s, but 
their influence grew substantially when the RC Herbert Sloley formed the 
Basutoland National Council (BNC) in 1903 to advise on matters of law, education, 
and agriculture. In this advisory body the paramount chief, as the highest Mosotho 
member of the council, nominated ninety-four members, mostly chiefs. The RC also 
nominated five special members who represented groups such as the Chamber of 
Commerce.30 Paramount Chief Lerotholi (d.1905) had wanted the body to legislate, 
but instead, the RC retained the authority to revoke membership and dismiss 
motions. But the RC still took BNC opinions seriously. He knew that programs like 
dipping and eradicating noxious weeds needed support from the chiefs to succeed. 
The BNC discussions on these campaigns provide a key primary source for 
understanding varying perspectives, although market approaches to development 
usually shaped the BNC’s views on sheep policy.31  
In 1919 Lesotho exported ten million lbs. of wool with 25% of it coming from 
Qacha’s Nek. After the 1870s and 1880s, when some farmers profited by exporting 
grain to South Africa, Lesotho’s food exports fell sharply.32 Some farmers still 
exported wheat, but wool and mohair offered the best opportunity for exploiting the 
mountain grasslands. To encourage wool production, the government introduced 
                                                          
29 Phoofolo, "Ambiguous Interactions,” 84. 
30 MMA, Basutoland Council Proclamation 1910, 31 March 1910. 
31 LNA, S3/1/6, BNC discussion on dipping, 1909; CAR 1924, pp.11-13; CAR 1930, p. 10. 
32 CAR 1920-21, p. 3; Basutoland Census for 1911, p. 47; Eldredge, South African Kingdom, 150-63. 
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stud rams in 1905, and again in 1910 when the small veterinary staff distributed 
286 merino and 140 angora rams to the districts and to traders. In 1912, drought 
conditions dried out pastures so the government only placed rams in Leribe and 
Qacha's Nek districts, where rains had enabled good summer grazing. Traders and 
wealthier stockowners purchased these rams at discounted rates, or paid for ram 
services, which most Basotho could not afford.33  
The distribution of livestock in the mountains, the primary means for storing 
wealth, was highly unequal by 1920. This reality conditioned the experiences of all 
actors involved in the anti-scab campaigns. According to one traveler in 1921, "a 
poor man might have 20-30 sheep, an average man 300-500, and a wealthy man as 
many as 3000."34 This scale would make Chaka, whose sheep died near 
Ramatseliso's dip in 1918, an average stockowner, but his employment as an 
interpreter for the government enhanced his socio-economic status. Other well-off 
people had accumulated stock through exporting agricultural goods, or from 
migrant labor earnings, and were often among the first families to settle a given 
village, and thus enjoyed fertile arable lands, which were already scarce in the 
mountains by 1910. People at the low end, and those without animals were widows, 
childless women, disabled people, elderly men, or families who were among the 
                                                          
33 CAR 1905-06, p. 6; CAR 1910-1911, p. 6; CAR 1912-13, p.8; LNA, Qacha’s Nek Native Letters 
Received, M. Posholi to AC, March 1907. 
34 Sayce, "Ethno-Geographical Essay,” 276-78. 
 171 
 
latest settlers in a village. This last group often had marginal arable lands (if any) 
and few animals with which to produce commodities such as wool.35 
Traders in Qacha’s Nek linked the montane grasslands, sheep, and herders of 
Lesotho to coastal ports such as Durban and East London, and they maintained close 
ties at both ends. Although there were few passable roads that went far beyond 
Qacha’s Nek town, several mountain passes served as border posts where livestock 
moved back and forth.36 Herders like Kabelo and Azariele hauled wool from their 
posts to the traders. In the early 1900s a handful of European-owned traders bought 
most Basotho wool. Along with Mr. Cole, the first licensed trader in Qacha’s Nek, R.E. 
Hill, the owner of Ramatseliso’s store, was the most prominent trader. Hill came 
from Matatiele, a South African town beneath the Drakensberg Escarpment to the 
south. Matatiele was linked to Qacha's Nek town by a rough track and to the coast by 
rail. In 1918 Hill ran six stores in the district.37 Hill and other traders socialized with 
colonial officials and missionaries, but sometimes had close relationships with 
Basotho from the communities in which they operated. Many traders spoke Sesotho, 
developed friendships with local chiefs and stockowners, and even married 
Basotho.38  
                                                          
35 LNA, S3/1/6/5, Lawrence Wacher to PVS, 16 December 1914; Eldredge, South African Kingdom, 
191-94. 
36 LNA, S7/1/6/20, Sehlabathebe Police Report, 25 March 1912; SAB, Secretary of Justice (JUS), Vol. 
425, 4/424/26, Application for wool trade facilities, 1926-27; “Wool Markets,” Naledi Ea Lesotho, 25 
January 1929. 
37 LNA, S3/26/10/4, Hill to AC, 13 March 1918. 
38 Interview with Mokhabi Lesoli, Ha Matlali, 13 January 2015; Interview with Anatolia Peters, 
Qacha’s Nek, 29 May 2015.  
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The few Basotho with trading licenses, like Caleb Sebatane of Qacha’s Nek, 
faced discriminatory laws that prevented them from buying and selling wool. 
Sebatane’s store operated from 1912 to 1930 when he sold everything including his 
trading license to pay his debts, which he had accrued by allowing local Basotho to 
buy goods on credit.39 Sebatane, like other Basotho traders and hawkers, especially 
in the mountains, lacked the political voice that white traders exercised through the 
Basutoland Chamber of Commerce.  
The chamber, composed mostly of white traders, espoused a double 
standard. It denigrated Basotho for not working hard enough to eradicate scab for 
"their economic well-being.” This while ignoring the inequality of stock ownership, 
and thus, the low incentive for small stockowners to dip their sheep. This 
commercial sentiment rang clear in 1920 when the chamber’s secretary prodded 
the BNC to escalate efforts to eradicate scab and burweed. He pushed for a 
compulsory law “urging the people to clean up their country.”40 Despite heavy wool 
clips in Qacha’s Nek, relatively few people benefited from the wool industry. 
Perhaps the chamber underestimated the extent to which common Basotho 
understood that their time and labor ought to be compensated monetarily, or in 
kind, when contributing to market production. 
In rural areas, neither traders, nor producers worked in solidarity as interest 
groups. General traders competed with each other for Basotho business in both 
                                                          
39 LNA, S3/26/10/1, Caleb Sebatane to AC, 10 January 1918; PC to AC, 27 May 1931. 
40 LNA, S3/1/9/2, Chairman BCC to GS, 7 December 1920. 
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commodity sales, such as wool, but also by selling plows, blankets, and other goods. 
Basotho tried to play the competition by patronizing the store with the best prices. 
A stockowner might haul his wool past one trader to get to another that was paying 
a better price. But the constraints of mountain terrain and transport usually 
narrowed the producer’s choice to the nearest trading outlet. Basotho settled for 
low prices despite the high quality of the raw product. Traders justified low prices 
because wool bales were unsorted (long, short, dirty) and transport from the 
mountains was expensive. Knowledge of wool classing and breed purity, both of 
which increased the selling price, was thin in the early 1900s. Programs to improve 
breeding and wool classing began slowly in 1905, but only developed in the uplands 
in the 1940s.41  
Domestic and South African wool buyers liked Lesotho's fine wool, but 
complained about the mixed bales. This fact hardly mattered when demand for wool 
boomed during WW I. National wool revenues grew, if erratically, until a drought in 
1928, and then the global crash in 1929.42 After 1912 the government suspended its 
stud program amid concerns by British officials, and by members of the BNC, that 
the grasslands could not sustain additional small stock without hastening soil 
erosion. This period coincided with three drought years in 1914, 1919, and 1922, 
the last of which officials cited as the worst on record. The South African Drought 
Commission, surveying in the wake of the 1919 drought, found that European and 
                                                          
41 Sayce, “Ethno-Geographical Essay,” 285-86; D.S. Uys, The Lesotho Mohair Industry: History and 
Evaluation (Port Elizabeth: Mohair Board, 1971), 57-69. 
42 CAR 1914-15, p.7; CAR 1924, p.7; CAR 1930, p.11. 
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African practices of extensive grazing and kraaling animals at night, and 
overstocking had accentuated the drought’s economic impact and quickened soil 
erosion. These findings, which extended to Lesotho, were ironic given the 
government’s promotion of wool, which had intensified ecological pressure on the 
grasslands by expanding flocks of merino sheep.43  
The Drought Commission’s recommendations hardly slowed Lesotho’s wool 
boosters. In 1928 the national treasury, with support from the BNC, provided £500 
to supply traders with merino rams on credit. Traders then offered stud services to 
stockowners in the area for a fee. At the end of the year the program had only used 
£329 because traders found that although many people wanted the services, they 
had no cash with which to pay for the rams. Furthermore, many rams that were sent 
to mountain traders died quickly because they were poorly acclimatized to the 
higher altitudes and weather conditions.44 This government-led initiative to 
improve stock for wool production catered to those who already had cash to pay for 
the stud services, while hinting at the approach to rural development that would 
characterize the twentieth century in Lesotho.    
The British never believed that Basutoland could earn high profits for 
colonial coffers, as was the case, for example, with cocoa in the Gold Coast. But they 
did hope that a wool export duty, along with wheat sales and the hut-tax on married 
men, could finance small development projects. But to sustain development, colonial 
                                                          
43 Heinrich S. DuToit, South Africa Drought Investigation Commission Interim Report (Cape Town: 
Government Printers, 1922), 4-7; CAR 1914-15, p.7; CAR 1919-20, p.7; CAR 1922-23, p.12. 
44 CAR 1928, p.21; Henderson, Survey, 1-2. 
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administrators and chiefs both asserted the importance of a robust wool industry. 
With these revenues they hoped to slowly strengthen local governance, build 
schools and medical facilities, and construct roads and bridle paths. To carry out 
these initiatives in the 1900s meant promoting merino sheep production in the 
mountains, and creating an infrastructure to sustain them—to cleanse them of their 
parasitic filth, psoroptes.45  
 
3.4 - Eliminating Psoroptes in South Africa and Lesotho 
In 1874, the Cape Colony government passed a Scab Act that emulated the 
approach used in Australia, especially dipping with Coopers Dip and restricting 
stock movements. William Cooper & Nephews, from which the dip gets its name, 
had established a retail outfit in England in 1843 and marketed the product in 
southern Africa through its branch in East London. Cooper’s Dip was an early 
example of an industrially produced agro-chemical compound, whose full ecological 
and historical impact has yet to be explored. Although the 1874 Scab Act in the Cape 
was not compulsory, black and white sheep owners resented the potential toxicity 
of Cooper’s Dip as well as the act’s provisions to curtail the transhumant patterns 
that were typical in the Cape where animals rubbed up against, and even crossed, 
the Basutoland border to graze the upland pastures in the summer.46  
                                                          
45 CAR 1904-05, pp. 6-8; CAR 1914-15, p.4; CAR 1926, p. 5. 
46 William Beinart, The Rise of Conservation in South Africa: Settlers, Livestock, and the Environment 
1770-1950 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 130-34, 153-54; LNA, S3/1/6/5, W. Cooper to 
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 To advance these regulations the Cape Colony hired Duncan Hutcheon as 
their new principal veterinary surgeon in 1880 (the same Hutcheon who went on to 
shape rinderpest policy in the 1890s). Hutcheon, a graduate of the Royal Veterinary 
College in Edinburgh, took his microscope to the field to show farmers psoroptes in 
action as a way to justify dipping. Farmers observed skeptically, but for many, 
seeing meant believing. The Scab Commission (1892-94) leveraged two years of 
field research and farmer testimonies to pass the 1894 Cape Scab Act that made 
dipping sheep compulsory. As was the case with Australian stockowners, dipping 
remained unpopular. This was especially true among Afrikaner sheep farmers who 
were deeply suspicious of bio-medical approaches to scab and of underlying British 
political motives. By 1900, however, compulsory dipping had largely eliminated 
scab in the Cape; and South African stockowners, traders, and veterinarians hoped 
to keep it that way.47 
 Lesotho's first veterinary surgeon, Otto Henning, responded to fears of 
scabby sheep crossing into South Africa. South African farmers, and especially after 
1910, the Union of South Africa government, pressured Basutoland to accelerate 
dipping. According to this perspective, the Basotho in the mountains needed to dip 
their flocks to prevent them from mixing with the supposedly clean sheep of the 
Union. Henning surveyed the national flock in 1905 and found several thousand 
cases of scab. He realized, however, that local ecological and cultural realities may 
                                                          
47 CoGH Report of Scab Commission; LNA, S3/1/6/1, RC to Imperial Secretary, 29 September 1908; 
See also, Tamarkin, Volk and Flock, 17-25. 
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have skewed his results. Henning reported that stockowners and traders had not yet 
complained of scabby sheep. He had surveyed in March, near the end of the rainy 
summer when pasture was still plentiful, which helped animals to put on weight and 
grow wool: a factor that made the condition less visible. Furthermore, Basotho 
grazed livestock across open commonage with no paddocks or fences. In stark 
contrast to later periods when theft became more prevalent, Basotho did not always 
kraal sheep. Scab flourished when animals were penned closely because psoroptes 
spread via direct contact between animals or from rubbing against the same rocks.48  
Henning recognized that transhumance worked as a cultural preventative 
against parasites. As in much of South Africa, people moved animals according to 
vegetation and weather patterns. Keeping animals fed and watered, and away from 
warm environments where ticks, mites, and flies lurked, was done by grazing 
animals extensively in open spaces, and at various altitudes. But as political 
boundaries hardened and the population expanded in the twentieth century, 
transhumance became more localized in Lesotho and in the South African reserves, 
exposing livestock to more health threats and sometimes, new threats.49 Although 
Henning believed Lesotho’s highlands offered salubrious grazing and ample water, 
he failed to understand that stock theft was actually increasing by 1905. To protect 
flocks, owners had begun kraaling animals at mountain posts, especially at night.50  
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 LNA, S3/1/6/1, Henning to GS, 20 April 1905. 
49 Tim Quinlan, “Grassland Degradation and Livestock Rearing in Lesotho,” Journal of Southern 
African Studies 21, no. 3 (1995): 491-507. 
50 LNA, S3/1/6/1, Henning to GS, 26 June 1905. 
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Despite Henning’s seemingly broad knowledge, he focused foremost on the 
biological and technical aspects of the scab problem when he explained the 
characteristics of psoroptes in a 1905 pamphlet. The Sesotho version informed 
readers how sheep contracted it, how to diagnose it, and how to destroy it by 
dipping. But most mountain dwellers, especially herders and poorer stockowners, 
could not read it. Furthermore, dipping facilities did not yet exist within reasonable 
distances from stock posts. The first dip in Qacha’s Nek town opened in late 1908, 
situated many mountain-miles from some of Lesotho’s largest flocks. But BNC 
members did learn from Henning’s pamphlet, and they discussed the details of 
dipping in their 1908 meeting.51  
Presiding over all councilors, Paramount Chief Letsie II (r. 1905-1913) 
argued to expand the dipping infrastructure, which in 1908 consisted of forty-seven 
stations clustered in the lowlands, around administrative border posts. This nascent 
infrastructure failed to reach most flocks in the interior. Letsie urged his 
subordinate chiefs “to take interest not just because of pressure from South 
Africa…but also to increase your wealth.” He continued, “if quality of wool improves 
so your wealth will grow.” His words appealed to the growing sentiment among 
chiefs, large stockowners, and a small group of commercial farmers that the regional 
capitalist economy offered opportunities beyond migrant labor on South African 
farms and mines.52  
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The BNC’s discussion in 1908 underscored several interrelated challenges 
for the anti-scab campaign: ecological, cultural, economic, and political. Examining 
the intersections between these challenges helps explain how people compiled 
veterinary knowledge in different ways through this experience. Although most BNC 
members believed that wool exports could broaden prosperity in Lesotho, and that 
scab posed a fundamental threat to this opportunity, members disagreed on how to 
implement the scheme.  
Local ecology mattered. Dipping stations required reliable and convenient 
water supplies, especially during the dry winters. Sheep became weak during the 
winter when grass was scarce, having gone dormant or been eaten down. In 
contrast to milking cows, which resided in villages year round and were favored in 
the leboella grazing system, small stock spent the winter months at the mountain 
posts in 1918. Temperatures at high altitudes regularly plunged below freezing, 
causing sheep to huddle for warmth. Their weak bodies and close quarters provided 
psoroptes with an ideal environment. At least to some extent, the practice of keeping 
small stock at mountain posts year-round was new in the early 1900s when the 
small-stock population grew exponentially. Formerly, local village pastures and crop 
residues could sustain smaller flocks during the winter months. Other than major 
rivers and drainages, most mountain streams dried up in winter. The Maloti boasted 
many perennial springs, but people used these same springs for drinking and 
washing. Any of the recommended dips such as Coopers, or concoctions of sulfur 
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and arsenic would contaminate water, raising both human and veterinary health 
issues.53  
To find suitable sites, the government asked local residents. Tanks would 
have to be no more than seven miles apart to afford flocks reasonable access. More 
dips sprung up near border posts where shepherds could clean the sheep before 
driving them into South Africa for sale. Existing trading stations like the one at 
Ramatseliso’s Gate made appropriate sites for the dips. But as the campaign 
progressed through the 1920s more remote sites were needed too. For these, 
villagers identified the best springs in addition to where people drew water, and 
where people washed in order to mark an appropriate location for what Basotho 
called, in the locative form, diping, place of the dip.54  
Government planners called together local labor to quarry sandstone, paying 
them small wages to erect the tanks. Stonemasons applied their skills to 
constructing dip tanks, drying yards, and supervisors' quarters. Although older 
Basotho architecture used stone, various grasses, and molilo (dung plaster), new 
knowledge of quarrying, cutting, and building spread with the dipping 
infrastructure. Other materials necessary for the dips like fencing, cement, and pipes 
arrived by donkey transport. Officials adapted a dip model after 1913, which had 
been developed on the Potchefstroom Experimental Farm in South Africa (See 
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Figure 3.3).55 Selecting the sites, importing the materials, and erecting the dips 
brought together technical expertise learned from the South African experience 
with scab, local knowledge of place, and Basotho labor and building skills to 
construct an infrastructure that, weather permitting, could function year round.  
By 1915 five stations operated in Qachas Nek district, dipping sixty thousand 
sheep annually. These returns were low compared to the overall district population 
of near 250,000 sheep. Still, only two of the five stations served areas that were not 
at the border.56 BNC members, Chief Makhaola foremost among them, had decided 
in 1909 that erecting stations in the interior would encourage more people to dip 
their sheep, but building progressed slowly. The scab problem deepened, especially 
in drought years. Apart from the inconvenience of trekking the animals to the tanks, 
poverty made people reluctant to patronize dips. Although not compulsory yet, the 
one-pence per head fee, though reasonable for large stockowners, burdened many 
people. Some stockowners paid a sheep to a trader in return for the dipping: 
evidence that suggests a growing desire amongst some stockowners to dip.57   
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Other stockowners feared that the prescribed twice-dipping over two weeks 
would kill their sheep. Chaka’s case is instructive here. Although his loss of thirty-
one sheep was exceptional, fatalities were standard. This fact highlighted the 
dangers of the treatment as well as the need to follow procedures carefully. The 
procedure brought diverse agents together: sheep, psoroptes, stockowners, 
shepherds, dip supervisors, store managers, veterinary experts, and not least, 
weather and water. Not unlike the initial distrust of government initiatives to treat 
cattle during the rinderpest epidemic (1896-1902), news of a few dead animals 
among the dipped could morph into rumors that dipping killed livestock 
Figure 3.3 
Model Dipping Tank, Experimental Farm, Potchefstroom 
Source: B. Enslin, “Sheep Dipping Tanks: An Improved 
Design,” Agricultural Journal for the Union of South Africa, 
March 1914. 
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intentionally. Complaints of dead animals circulated in Sesotho newspapers and at 
community meetings while claims for compensation were common across the 
country.58 Even after compulsory legislation was passed in 1923, owners could only 
claim compensation for deaths exceeding two animals per 100-head.59  
Low turnout at Qacha’s Nek’s dipping stations was not necessarily about 
resisting a government scheme, but more about stockowners having poor access 
and protecting scarce resources. This meant not exhausting sick animals by driving 
them long distances, especially in the winter. But those who owned large flocks had 
the cash to dip their sheep and thus, generally learned more about lekhoekhoe. 
These stockowners, many of them chiefs, prospered from wool sales and prioritized 
their interests through the political process that steered the anti-scab campaigns. 
Similar to the Basotho experience with rinderpest, political relationships at the 
local, national, and international levels conditioned how rural people interacted 
with the campaign in important ways. Whether or not people heeded government 
advice on veterinary matters often depended as much on one’s relationship to the 
person who introduced them to the measure as it did on any underlying knowledge. 
Chiefs were central to brokering policy and knowledge between government and 
commoners, and the characteristics of individual chiefs shaped how government 
veterinary interventions unfolded.60  
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In Qacha's Nek, Chief Makhaola seemed to have gathered broad support for 
dipping by the 1910s. By 1910 colonial officials believed Makhaola was among the 
most agriculturally progressive and popular chiefs in Lesotho. As the younger 
brother of Paramount Chief Letsie II, he exercised substantial influence in the BNC. 
Subordinate chiefs and commoners knew Makhaola as a great chief, one who 
provided his people with residential sites, arable fields, common resources (pasture, 
building materials, fuelwood), and in lean times, food.61 Molele, as Makhaola was 
known, believed that eliminating scab fit within these duties so he pushed the 
resident commissioner at the BNC for more dip tanks. Makhaola argued that people 
in the remote areas of Qacha's Nek wanted to destroy psoroptes, and would dip their 
sheep if they could access a tank in half of a day's trek and dip them for free.62 In 
fact, returns from the dip stations increased as the government built more tanks.63  
But Lesotho's chiefs were a varied lot in terms of their orientations towards 
the paramount chief, towards their subordinate chiefs and subjects, and towards 
government veterinary interventions. In the northern districts of Leribe and Berea 
the most influential chiefs hailed from the houses of Molapo and Masupha, who 
were Moshoeshoe’s second and third sons respectively and thus, not heirs to the 
paramountcy (See Chaps. 1-2). Friction between Molapo, Masupha, and the house of 
Letsie (and their descendants) mounted through disputes over succession and land 
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jurisdiction since before Moshoeshoe died in 1870. This friction often manifested as 
resistance to paramount-approved measures such as dipping in the first decades of 
the 1900s. Dip returns in these districts remained comparatively low throughout 
most of the anti-scab campaigns.64  
In addition to chieftainship politics, two Basotho political organizations 
developed in the early 1900s that had important effects on agricultural and 
veterinary policy into mid-century. First, a group of educated, mostly Protestant 
Basotho formed the Basutoland Progressive Association (BPA) in 1907, which 
aimed to advance “important matters relating to the prosperity and progress of all 
Basotho.” The BPA supported the dipping schemes as they did most government 
initiatives to promote market production in Lesotho.65 The ideas and actions of the 
BPA will be discussed further in chapter four. With respect to dipping, it was the 
perspectives and actions of a second group, Lekhotla la Bafo (Council of the 
Commoners/LLB), that illuminate a political dimension of dipping beyond, yet not 
unrelated to, the chieftainship.  
Josiel Lefela and his brother Maphutseng formed LLB in 1919. Their politics 
had several objectives: to achieve sovereignty from British governance; to restore 
the traditional chieftainship; and to promote schemes that were designed to protect 
Basotho political, economic, and cultural institutions from colonial subjugation. LLB 
criticized the British, and Basotho chiefs too, who as salaried employees enforced 
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government policies.66 Still, from his seat in the BNC which he had held since 1916, 
Josiel generally supported programs for veterinary and agricultural improvement, 
including dipping. It was only when Resident Commissioner Edward Garraway, with 
support from the BNC passed the Prevention of Scab Act in 1923, which made 
dipping compulsory throughout Lesotho, that LLB actively opposed dipping. For 
Lekhotla la Bafo, the act compounded economic stress which grew from erratic wool 
prices and tax increases while placing unreasonable demands on scarce labor at 
rural homesteads.67  
The Lefela brothers believed that compulsory dipping unnecessarily meddled 
in rural lives and ecologies. LLB used explicit, politically-charged language to 
convince common Basotho of insidious British motives. Speaking to followers in 
1928, Josiel Lefela explained that, "of great affliction to the people is the poisonous 
dip, which kills the sheep and goats of the nation by the thousands."68 These words 
echoed an earlier period of Afrikaner resistance to the South African Scab Act 
(1894) in the Cape. He drew on realistic hazards, represented by a hefty backlog of 
compensation claims for deceased livestock.69 But Lefela also exploited the average 
Mosotho's limited knowledge of scab as a biological phenomenon, its potential 
treatments, and the role of human error in dipping mishaps. Taking it further, 
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Maphutseng Lefela claimed that South African imperialists sought to "exterminate, 
through the agency of poisonous dip, the flocks of the nation." His words motivated 
a small boycott of dips in 1930, despite the steep fines leveled against violators of 
the Scab Act.70  
Although strongly political in nature, LLB’s concerns were not theirs alone. 
Frank Verney, the veterinary surgeon in Lesotho from 1908-1934, knew that too 
many animals died from dipping in 1925. He knew that if it continued, "it would 
break the Native’s confidence in the campaign."71 Verney's perspective, however, 
clashed with LLB's views in ways that speak to the importance of political contexts 
in understanding how knowledge circulates. The BNC, since 1909, had insisted that 
Basotho men undergo training to supervise the dips themselves. Verney, on the 
other hand, claimed that Europeans who possessed “higher faculties for such 
technical work,” had better perform the task. They split the difference in that pre-
trained Basotho men operated the dips, supervised by a British livestock inspector 
or a white trader who hosted the dipping facilities.72 As the scheme progressed it 
became clear to officials, chiefs, and especially stockowners like Chaka, that dipping 
required not a European or Mosotho dipper, but a competent one.   
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Well-trained dippers became especially important in October 1923 when the 
government passed the Prevention of Scab Act, making the dipping of all sheep 
compulsory in Lesotho. In 1922 386,000 sheep and goats were dipped in Lesotho. 
During the year following the passage of the Scab Act, dippers dunked one million 
animals. The services and the expansion of tanks under the Scab Act were funded by 
the wool export tax, not a dipping fee. As workers erected more tanks in mountain 
areas, and government dip inspectors came to monitor more flocks, dip returns 
reached 2.5 million animals in 1930 when the last of the 219 tanks were completed. 
By 1932 the government staff inspected nearly 4 million head and found only a few 
instances of scab, whereas some 50% of flocks were infected in 1923. Fatalities 
among the dipped remained at about 0.02% in 1932.73  
Despite low rates, dead sheep remained a flash point that highlighted the 
messy interplay of human error, social order, and ecology in the dipping campaigns. 
In Mohale's Hoek district, Verney investigated a case in which a British inspector 
named Gardiner had dipped 460 sheep in August 1923. Under Gardiner’s 
supervision, a Mosotho man dipped the same flock again eight days later. Ninety 
animals died from arsenical poisoning according to Verney’s report. He lambasted 
Gardiner for mixing the dip at full strength each time to treat a visibly weak and 
scabby flock that had been struggling through a cold, dry winter.74 Whereas 
Lekhotla la Bafo manipulated the anti-scab campaigns and its imperfect veterinary 
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knowledge to advance its political ideals, Verney saw it first as a technical solution 
with which trained human labor could solve an epidemiological problem for 
primarily economic purposes. Both perspectives were grounded in realities, but also 
slighted the important roles played by ecology and transnational movements of 
animals and parasites.     
Border politics, too, shaped human interactions with psoroptes and 
eradication policies. In Qacha's Nek and Quthing districts most sheep and wool 
crossed into South Africa through remote mountain passes. Governments on both 
sides had struggled to regulate trans-frontier human and livestock movement since 
the mid-nineteenth century. Rinderpest (1896-1902) had marked a new era when 
officials began monitoring livestock disease as much, or more than stock theft.75  
In 1907 Basutoland police patrolled the southern border to prevent South 
African cattle infected with the tick-borne East Coast Fever from entering the 
territory. Scab was a new addition to Lesotho’s police agenda. On the South African 
side, farmers and the Union’s Department of Agriculture feared that if existing 
patterns of transnational sheep movements continued, without adequate dipping 
regulations, Cape flocks would again be afflicted with scab.76 Veterinary policies in 
East Griqualand in 1914 focused too on cattle dipping to control the tick-borne East 
Coast Fever. Some African stockowners resisted these compulsory measures, which 
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also restricted stock movements.77 Protests grew into attacks on dip tanks and 
veterinary staff. With regards to Basotho and dipping sheep, no resistance on such a 
scale took place. This difference owed, perhaps, to a lesser cultural reverence for 
sheep compared to cattle, and to a less visible colonial presence in Lesotho where 
chiefs had replaced European magistrates in local courts since 1884.78 Nonetheless, 
officials in South Africa and Lesotho sought to update veterinary regulations and 
reinforce them through tighter border controls and more dipping.  
In addition to European agricultural interests, Africans pushed the 
transnational anti-scab agenda. Many families in Quthing and Qacha’s Nek had 
originally migrated from Herschel, Mount Fletcher, and Matatiele in South Africa 
after 1880, a process that continued in the early twentieth century.79 Coming from 
Xhosa and Zulu-speaking groups, families maintained transnational social links, 
which involved moving livestock between lower, more crowded areas in South 
Africa and Lesotho’s mountains where summer grass grew high and water ran 
plentiful. These transhumance patterns served the dietary and health needs of the 
animals while facilitating resource-sharing within families. To protect this historical 
link, chiefs in Mt. Fletcher and Herschel had petitioned against a 1906 proclamation 
which prohibited all sheep and goats from entering the Cape Colony from 
Basutoland. John Merriman, the Cape’s prime minister, pressured the Basutoland 
government to create a dipping and inspection infrastructure so that the 1906 
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proclamation could be relaxed to prevent “harming people with deep social 
relations and grazing needs that both transcend the border.”80 
These concerns worked alongside those of white farmers and stockowners 
whose properties abutted the Qacha’s Nek border. In 1911, the East Griqualand 
Farmer’s Association insisted that the Basutoland Government escalate dipping 
efforts, especially at the border crossings.81 Verney and his veterinary department 
took these requests seriously, but they also found that South African border farmers 
greatly exaggerated their accusations of scabby Basotho sheep infecting their 
“clean” flocks. Verney cited the fine wool quality and prosperity in the South African 
border areas as evidence of the farmers’ exaggeration.82 This debate spoke to the 
common perspective held by South African farmers, and indeed, by many lowland 
Basotho, that the mountains of Lesotho were unclean, underdeveloped, and 
backward. In the end, the Basutoland government had bundled evolving 
transnational veterinary science together with local labor, natural resources, and 
knowledge to eliminate sheep scab, if temporarily, in a national flock that had grown 
from 2.3 million in 1911 to over 3.8 million animals in 1931.83 Scab, however, was 
but one biological threat to woolen sheep in southern Africa. 
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3.5 - Knowledge and Work in Eradicating Burweed 
 The story of burweed (Xanthium spinosum) eradication efforts in early 1900s 
Lesotho proceeded alongside the anti-scab campaign. But the burweed case also 
helps explain different factors in the historical context in which knowledge was 
circulated, understood, and applied. Whereas sheep dipping, especially after 1923, 
never provoked large-scale resistance among Basotho of any social strata, people 
routinely protested orders to dig hlabahlabane (burweed). To protest, people 
simply refused to work under the local chief’s orders. Sometimes it was the chiefs 
themselves who refused to pass down the order. While this form of resistance 
shows clear political expression, a weapon of the weak as James Scott puts it, more 
germane for my work, these actions speak to the ways people linked their labor, 
ecological resources, and knowledge in their everyday lives.84 
Scholars have studied the social and ecological history of weeds in southern 
Africa and beyond. In the context of the turn of the century Cape Colony, Lance Van 
Sittert examines the ways in which both non-native plants such as burweed, as well 
as some native species took on new meaning to land users and policy makers in 
terms of their ecological impact, but more importantly, on how they affected 
commodity values.85 Often it was the same expanding market networks that 
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assigned economic value to products such as wool that facilitated the spread of non-
native organisms in the first place, such as plants like burweed, or parasites like 
psoroptes. The etiology of rinderpest too, which was rooted in colonial trade and 
conquest, makes a fine example of biological dispersion across global spaces. 
Originally a native of Mexico, prickly pear, Van Sittert points out as another example, 
may have arrived in South Africa with a shipment of maize from Morocco or as an 
intentional import from India.86  
This was indeed the case with burweed which experts believed had 
originated in the Americas before spreading across the wool producing world to 
Africa, Australia, and elsewhere either traveling on living sheep or in wool, 
machinery, or packing materials. The first record of the species on the subcontinent 
appears in 1849 near Cape Town when observers noted it as a botanical curiosity.87 
Taking this framework where plants become weeds within a shifting cultural and 
economic order as my starting point, and maintaining my focus on environmental 
knowledge, new questions emerge. First, how and why did people make specific 
decisions about whether or not to participate in the burweed eradication scheme? 
Furthermore, what does this tell us about what people in different social positions 
knew about this plant and its relevance in their lives? 
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Burweed, like scab and all other non-native flora and fauna in Lesotho, had 
immigrated via South Africa. It is inadequate to attribute its spread solely to market 
forces, which have driven animals, plants, and other organisms across geographic 
and political frontiers. Instead, stock and human movements over time between 
Lesotho and South Africa stemmed from ecological and social realities as much as 
economic forces. A member of the aster family of flowering plants and known as 
spiny cocklebur in the United States and Bathurst bur in Australia, burweed thrives 
on disturbed ground such as roadsides, agricultural fields, and urban waste areas. In 
addition to its tangling in wool and mohair, ingesting seedlings and seeds at 1% of 
Figure 3.4 
Xanthium spinosum; Hlabahlabane; Burweed  
Ha Makhaola, Qacha’s Nek 
Photo by author, January 2015 
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bodyweight could fatally poison livestock, although this appears to have been rare. 
A summer annual, Xanthium spinosum can grow to three feet tall and germinates 
from seeds which drop in mid-summer (February in Lesotho). The spiny burs 
contain two seeds each that can survive for up to three years under field conditions, 
and also float well in water, making streams key channels for distribution.88 In early 
twentieth century Lesotho, no chemical or biological remedies existed. Although 
Basotho had long used fire to manage pasture, this cultural preventative proved 
ineffective against hlabahlabane. Instead, human labor, coordinated and applied in 
December and January before seeding seemed the only possible preventative. 
  With this in mind, the Basutoland government began modest efforts to 
eradicate the plant in 1891 to assist its nascent wool industry amid complaints from 
domestic and international merchants that burweed was ruining wool from 
Basutoland.89 At this early stage, government officials simply told chiefs that if 
burweed continued to spread, it would hurt wool profits. Chiefs then called 
matsema to dig burweed on a given day. Additionally, the resident commissioner 
ordered road-building crews to eliminate the plant on sight, even as they created 
new habitat for it by disturbing vegetation. Brief reports on these efforts for the 
1890s show optimistic language where “chiefs and people were being gradually 
brought to see the necessity of taking active measures for the extirpation of 
burweed.” But by 1900, a pessimistic tone prevailed, as in, “nothing apparently will 
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induce the natives to take proper steps for the destruction of these plants, in spite of 
the injury they cause to the wool.”90 This same misconception, or, what Syed Alatas 
has termed “the myth of the lazy native,” underpinned British policy on noxious 
weeds into the 1930s when the focus of the agricultural and veterinary departments 
shifted towards other matters.91 
From the start, the government eradication efforts erroneously assumed that 
would-be Basotho laborers thought of burweed in the same ways as the 
government: as a nuisance to be destroyed. This misunderstanding fueled continued 
apathy on the part of Basotho commoners and frustration for both government 
officials, and those chiefs who generally supported the campaigns.92 For colonial 
officials, traders, some chiefs and stockowners, and the missionary-educated 
minority, wool exports could yield individual profits, promote employment, and 
fund development projects through export duties. Achieving these goals, so the 
philosophy went, would lead to broader prosperity where people could afford to 
buy food, material items, education, and health care. In short, proponents of this 
capitalist approach to development believed that a rising tide of wool returns would 
lift all boats. Embarking down this path meant adhering to the evolving sciences 
relating to wool production; including veterinary treatments as discussed above, 
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and economic botany, whose practitioners strived to understand how to propagate 
or destroy plant species according to their value, monetary or otherwise. Most 
adherents to this development approach, perhaps not coincidentally, also had direct 
financial stakes in sheep and wool, but all believed that hlabahlabane was an “evil” 
that fouled the productive landscape and needed to be exterminated.93  
Like with sheep scab, South African agricultural policy set the regional bar 
for controlling specific plants. Sheep and goats had grazed extensively on South 
African rangelands in the Karoo, East Griqualand, and the Transvaal – long before 
Lesotho’s Maloti hosted large flocks – offering burweed plentiful habitat throughout 
the rangelands. Efforts to destroy it there, beginning with an attempt to legislate 
compulsory eradication in 1861, met with moderate success, though not without 
difficulty in terms of motivating labor or monitoring the progress of the 
campaigns.94 South African farmers complained that burweed spread downstream 
from Basutoland, frustrating their efforts to eradicate it. Petitioners argued that 
Basotho land managers and their government needed to do more to clean up the 
mountains to prevent seeds from spreading down the many watercourses, including 
the Orange River system. Basutoland officials consistently refuted these complaints, 
insisting the claimants had no evidence of this dispersion.95 Although burweed had 
                                                          
93 See, for example, Litaba Tsa Lekhotla, 1925 and TNA, CO 646, BNC Sessional Papers, 1912. Both 
discussions show support from chiefs in destroying these plants; LNA, S3/1/9/2, Wright to GS, 
December 1920.  
94 Beinart, Rise of Conservation, 82-83; Van Sittert, “The Seed Blows,” 666-68. 
95 SAB, GG 935/17/447, Governor General to HC in Pretoria, 27 September 1912; LNA, S3/1/9/2, 
Cape Province Sec. to GS in Basutoland, 15 October 1923; “The Eradication of Noxious Weeds: 
Washed Down by Rivers,” Cape Times, 9 December 1927. 
 198 
 
an older presence in the Cape Colony (Cape Province after 1910), by the time 
Basutoland officials seriously took up noxious weed policy, it was the Transvaal 
Province to the north that provided the most scientific knowledge on the subject. 
Building on legislation dating back to 1861 in the Cape Colony, the Transvaal passed 
a Noxious Weeds Act in 1909 that required property owners to clear their lands of 
specific plants deemed evils.96  
The Noxious Weeds Act, which targeted burweed along with cocklebur 
(Xanthium strumarium) and Mexican poppy (Argemone mexicana) among others, 
drew on contemporary scientific research into the biology and ecology of plants. 
South African government Botanist Joseph Burtt-Davy documented this culturally 
and economically specific knowledge in his Descriptions and Illustrations of Noxious 
Weeds – a key document for the Basutoland officials who framed the policy 
discussion. The pamphlet contained illustrations, various nomenclatures for the 
plants (though no African names), and detailed descriptions of the plants and 
specific instructions on how to eradicate them. These instructions went far beyond 
digging to discuss the seasonality, seed characteristics, and how to bundle and burn 
the uprooted plants to prevent reproduction.97 From the legal standpoint, the Weed 
Acts gave broad powers to the government to inspect private lands and to level fines 
against those violating the law.98 Although no such law existed in Lesotho at that 
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time, this knowledge, which linked biology, legislation, and labor to eliminate weeds 
designated noxious resonated with those promoting wool production. It resonated 
much less amongst the poor, mostly illiterate Basotho who were called out to take 
up hoe and spade to dig the weeds.99    
In a different political and cultural context, Lesotho faced a similar set of 
problems as policy makers in the Transvaal and Cape Colony had before them. Who 
was responsible for weeding which lands? And how exactly, would people be 
convinced that such arduous labor was worth their effort? These posed difficult 
questions to which there were no clear answers. When the resident commissioner 
raised the issue of burweed and scab eradication at the 1908 BNC proceedings, 
Paramount Chief Letsie II, Chief Makhaola of Qacha’s Nek, and most other chiefs 
agreed that campaigns must accelerate. But they disagreed about whether or not 
legislation should be enacted to compel chiefs and people to do the work. Several 
chiefs, along with traders and large stock owners, thought that only law could force 
lesser chiefs and commoners to comply. Others quickly pointed out that without any 
enforcement mechanism, laws were useless.100  
Basutoland’s anti-burweed campaigns show a set of fluid relationships 
between law, custom, ecology, and work. In 1903, a Mosotho councilor who had 
been appointed by the resident commissioner, and an appointee of Paramount Chief 
Lerotholi, formed a committee in the BNC to write down the “old laws of Moshesh 
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[Moshoeshoe].”101 Twenty-four men, some of whom claimed acquaintance with 
Moshoeshoe, convened for just two days to write down eighteen laws. The idea, as 
many Basotho and colonials saw it, was to transform spoken, non-binding customs 
into written laws. Known as the Laws of Lerotholi, this document attempted to 
strengthen the authority of the paramount chief, to formalize rules for succession in 
the chieftainship and personal inheritances, and not least, to define the jurisdiction 
of the British colonial administrators.102  
But the Laws of Lerotholi were ambiguous in both content and legitimacy 
and its foundations were shaky from the start. First, the colonial influence was clear 
at least as much as any Sesotho custom. Also, Chief Jonathan Molapo, the influential 
chief of Leribe district refused to participate and vowed to ignore the laws for the 
rest of his days. On top of that, the creators of the laws, the BNC, remained an 
advisory body until 1960. As the historian L.B.B.J Machobane has pointed out, the 
Laws of Lerotholi must be understood, at least in part, as a colonial effort to 
formalize political authority in Lesotho following the Anglo-Boer War, a time when 
it was becoming clear that a new Union of South Africa would be formed largely on 
British terms.103  
Seen in this context, the Laws of Lerotholi, which did have some indigenous 
purchase, could help prepare Basutoland for eventual incorporation into the Union. 
Political incorporation, as will become even clearer in later chapters, had ecological 
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dimensions too. In 1922, the BNC amended the laws for the first time to add 
regulations for, among other things, eradicating burweed. The basic regulation 
stated that it was “lawful for any chief strongly to order all people in his ward to 
eradicate burweed.” Furthermore, any person or headman refusing this obligation 
would be fined one goat, or £5 respectively. Although chiefs were also subject to 
fines for non-enforcement, fines were payable to the local chief, or in the case of a 
chief in violation, to his superior. This arrangement created a financial incentive for 
chiefs to regulate the collective efforts for weed destruction inconsistently.104  
Letsema had been an important cultural, social, and economic institution 
throughout Lesotho’s history. It was an institution of collective labor that continues 
to play an important part in human relations with the non-human world in rural 
Lesotho, despite having provoked heated political debate across time. Its meanings 
and practices changed dramatically over the course of the twentieth century, 
echoing shifts in the regional economy, politics, and technology. In its most basic 
form, a village chief called upon men under his jurisdiction to perform various tasks 
on the chief’s agricultural holdings such as plowing, cultivating, or harvesting. The 
chief, under Sesotho custom, was obliged to provide food and beer to the workers. A 
chief could call letsema for other tasks too, such as gathering materials for a 
building; and, after burweed spread in the 1890s, to dig weeds.105 
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Under Sesotho land tenure systems, a chief allocated usufruct rights to 
married men to three arable fields for him to plant crops (See Chap. 1). Apart from 
these fields and residential sites, mission and trading stations, and government 
reserves, all other lands served as commons. Arable lands, however, typically 
reverted to commonage after the harvest.106 In contrast to the arrangements in 
South Africa with regard to eradication responsibilities, even the ‘owners’ of 
usufruct rights questioned whether or not it was their duty to dig weeds from their 
fields. By the 1910s, many Basotho men were earning wages on farms and mines in 
South Africa and were either absent during letsema, or felt little need to work for 
food. In a departure from older letsema practices, women and elderly men were 
called to dig weeds in the absence of migrant workers. Some commoners, 
emboldened by both the BPA and LLB, criticized chiefs for abusing the letsema 
system by not providing food and beer, or, simply profiting by selling produce 
rather than storing it for village needs. Still others understood that burweed, though 
not a useful plant, only posed a threat to large wool producers and traders, and thus 
felt little need to expend their labor to bolster others people’s economic interests 
without direct compensation.107 Although diggers’ voices are only murmurs in the 
archival record, evidence strongly suggests that this understanding of labor was 
widespread in the early 1900s. 
                                                          
106 Casalis, The Basutos, 159; Sheddick, Land Tenure, 73; Mohapi, Temo ea Boholo, 17-19. 
107 Basutoland Census for 1911, 12-13; S3/1/9/2, AC Leribe to GS, 17 March 1923; AC Qacha’s Nek to 
GS, 29 May 1923; Interview with Emmanuel Ntsekhe, Roma, 1 November 2014; Epprecht, This 
Matter, 53; Machobane, Government and Change, 76-84.   
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The people who refused to dig hlabahlabane in those years compiled 
knowledge through these campaigns, while simultaneously being denied access to 
other important lessons. Unlike with prickly pear, or any number of other useful 
plants deemed “weeds” by officials, hlabahlabane had no practical use.108 Its Sesotho 
name comes from the verb ho hlaba, meaning to stab or slaughter; an etymology 
that suggests that people understood the plant as something that could harm, or 
even kill.109 Rural men and women also knew their own agricultural cycle, its 
nuance of weather and labor requirements. December and January in rural Lesotho 
are not only the months when burweed needed to be uprooted, but also labor 
intensive months on the agricultural calendar.110  
In years when spring rains fell late, as in the drought years of 1912, 1914, 
1919, 1922, and 1932, December became an important plowing month in the 
mountains once the fields were softened by consistent rain. Shortly after the new 
year, women, children, and some men would have weeded up and down the rows 
when the crops reached knee-high.111 Given the heat and bodily exhaustion typical 
during this part of the cycle, it is little wonder that people were reluctant to dig 
weeds near roads or out in the commonage, chiefs orders or not. When people did 
participate, they learned the basic biology and ecology of the plant, how it thrived 
and how to destroy it. On another level, most laborers seemed to have little 
                                                          
108 Beinart and Wotshela, Prickly Pear; Interview with Mochinti Jane, 18 May 2015; Interview with 
Mokhafisi Kena, 7 January 2015. 
109 Mabille and Dieterlen, Southern Sotho-English Dictionary, 86. 
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knowledge of its origin, or why burweed was designated “evil” by the government. 
Given the recent spread of burweed, farmers could not have understood the full 
potential for invasive plants to displace native grasses that had nourished flocks in 
the mountains for several generations.112 Furthermore, poverty, gender, and 
educational background, especially literacy, marginalized most commoners and 
even some chiefs. To some extent, these social conditions prevented them from 
knowing how the changing ecology in highland Lesotho, which now included 
burweed, merino sheep, and scab, linked them to wealthy stockowners, traders, and 
the international economy.113  
Although the BNC wrote regulations on noxious weeds into the Laws of 
Lerotholi in 1922, the Basutoland Government did not issue a formal proclamation. 
Despite a general loathing for digging weeds, perhaps the work parties had checked 
the spread enough for the authorities to deem it under control. By the mid-1920s, 
reports from Qacha’s Nek showed little burweed. On the other hand, a 1930 report 
from the paramount chief’s own area around the royal village at Matsieng showed 
burweed thriving.114 Whatever the case, from 1926 to 1934 the annual colonial 
reports make no mention of noxious weeds. Following the catastrophic drought of 
1932-33, attention turned more to bitter karoo (Chrysocoma tenuifolia), called 
sehalahala in Sesotho. Officials feared that sehalahala would displace nutritious 
livestock grasses for generations to come, rather than as a direct threat to wool 
                                                          
112 LNA, S3/1/9/2, AC Qacha’s Nek to GS, 9 March 1928. 
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quality. To ecologists of the 1930s, sehalahala – although native to southern African 
semi-arid areas like the karoo – signified land degradation, which began a prolonged 
debate about overgrazing in Lesotho and elsewhere (See Chapter 5).115   
 
3.6 - Conclusion 
Not unlike the herders and the young dip supervisor at Ramatseliso’s Gate in 
1918, those people called to dig weeds experienced knowledge in fundamentally 
different ways than did those in higher social positions. The Basutoland 
government’s intervention into rural lives and ecologies on behalf of the wool 
industry compares, in subtle yet important ways, to the history of irrigation in the 
American West. While the American deployment of government authority, private 
capital, engineering expertise, and human labor to irrigate the West dwarfs 
Lesotho’s infrastructure of sheep dips—the anti-scab and burweed eradication 
campaigns still led to important “communal reorganization, to new patterns of 
human interaction, and to new forms of discipline and authority,” along with 
uncertain ecological effects.116  
To kill psoroptes Basotho reconstituted their corpus of environmental 
knowledge by adopting new scientific remedies while working within a changing 
political ecology. Wool production, and the mountain climate and vegetation, 
affected one another. The colonial administration sought to control these effects by 
                                                          
115 CAR 1935, p.8. 
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expanding its system of regulatory communities by breeding merino sheep, by 
encouraging new grazing practices, by building an infrastructure for chemically 
destroying psoroptes, by mobilizing labor to dig unwanted plants, and not least, by 
employing Basotho chiefs to enforce these policies.117 Ironically, psoroptes had 
proliferated because of merino sheep, and because of greater limits on available 
land. In terms of knowledge and social mobility, these schemes rarely opened up 
new economic opportunities for the poorest Basotho.  
New knowledge about sheep, veterinary science, and plant ecology, which 
was disproportionately acquired by wealthier people, served more than market 
needs. Those who could access this knowledge reconfigured their perceptions of the 
mountain grasslands to see it as a system of economic resources to be used to 
advance personal and national agendas. But, this reconfiguration also incorporated 
older practices even while building new infrastructure and imbuing new landscape 
features with fresh meaning. Basotho enacted these agendas by facilitating a process 
in which non-native sheep largely displaced the more ecologically appropriate and 
calorie-rich fat-tail breeds. Lastly, this transition intensified the labor of herders, 
encouraged further accumulation of livestock, and precipitated ecological change in 
Lesotho’s uplands.  
As rural Basotho of all social strata interacted with the changing 
environment of 1920s Qacha’s Nek, they struggled to understand how to approach 
the new possibilities for farming, grazing, and work; and how to balance those 
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approaches in ways that would serve their changing cultural, economic, and political 
aspirations. In response to this struggle, in its many dimensions, Basotho and British 
leaders attempted a new initiative to expand agricultural knowledge through rural 
outreach beginning in 1924, an initiative that is the subject of Chapter 4. 
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4. ORIGINS AND PATHWAYS OF LESOTHO’S AGRICULTURAL DEMONSTRATION 
PROGRAMS, C. 1924-1960 
 
4.1 – Introduction 
On a September morning in 1952, twenty men wearing traditional blankets 
sat chatting in the chief’s courtyard at Mashai village in the Qacha’s Nek district. The 
chief had called a meeting to introduce Mokhafisi Kena, the new agricultural 
demonstrator in the area. Kena dismounted from his horse and stood tall. The 
twenty-seven year old wore a pressed uniform as he spoke about vegetable 
gardening, explaining in clear Sesotho: “You can plant peach trees and grow spinach 
and carrots in front of your house.” He continued, “your wife won’t spend long days 
searching for wild greens anymore…schools across Lesotho already cultivate 
gardens where children learn from practical work, and eat fresh produce.” 
Demonstrators like Kena believed that progressive farming, which included 
gardening, could offer an improved diet where fruits, vegetables, and wheat 
enriched the staples of papa (stiff maize porridge), sorghum porridge and beer, 
greens, milk, and occasional meat.1 
The discussion then turned directly to nutrition, a topic that highlighted 
some of the cultural and social issues at play in this interaction. Kena explained that 
people, especially children, needed to eat more meat, beans, and eggs for protein to 
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stave off nutritional diseases.2 Suddenly a man stood up, shouting in protest. As the 
chief intervened, Kena insisted that the man speak his mind. “It’s not about wanting 
meat, it’s because there is no meat these days…we Basotho ate meat long before the 
whites came…you are a madman!”3  
Kena apologized to the man, and rephrased his point: “True, poverty is deep 
and food is short, but it is also true in our custom that children don’t eat eggs, that 
elders eat meat before we feed our children, and we focus on quantity of cattle, not 
quality. I am asking you to change this.” The meeting continued until early afternoon 
with Kena addressing concerns about the upcoming plowing season and soil 
conservation work. That afternoon and the following day Kena visited people in 
their fields and kraals, also speaking to school children. He spent the night in 
Mashai, talking and drinking with the men, which he knew was essential to establish 
rapport. Build rapport he did. On a subsequent visit to Mashai he proposed marriage 
to Bernice Letsie, a teacher in the village, now his wife of sixty years. After two days 
at Mashai, Kena rode his horse to other villages, completing a circuit. He carried 
seeds, light implements, and veterinary medicine to show farmers new techniques, 
                                                          
2 For example, the niacin deficiency disease called pellagra was first reported in 1907. Its incidence 
increased after 1933 continuing to get worse into the 1960s. CAR 1935, p. 6; Basutoland Annual 
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South Africa (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 2001); See also, Chapter 6. 
3 Mokhafisi Kena, 7 January 2015.  
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but also to discuss cultural practices of work, eating, and managing resources such 
as livestock, pasture, croplands, and household compounds.4   
Kena’s predecessors began demonstration work in Basutoland in 1924. The 
colonial government had launched the program in response to local circumstances, 
also drawing on transnational ideas about agriculture, poverty, progress, and race.  
Each demonstrator reported to an officer under the colonial Department of 
Agriculture. Officers were exclusively European, some British and some white South 
African, until the mid-1950s when Basotho moved into officer positions. 
Basutoland’s agricultural policies, like its political economy, were closely 
intertwined with South Africa.5 Recent scholarship has shown that agricultural 
education and demonstration in South Africa must be understood as part of the 
segregationist political project with which the state sought to keep Africans resident 
in rural areas and out of cities, at least when they were not working labor contracts.6  
On the one hand, narrating the historical trajectory of agricultural 
demonstration in colonial Basutoland shows how these programs failed to effect 
agrarian change on a large scale. The Department of Agriculture promoted technical 
and cultural changes while leaving in place the political, economic, and social 
structures of colonialism and white supremacy in southern Africa. By the 1930s, 
Lesotho was heavily dependent on remittances from migrant labor to South African 
                                                          
4 Ibid; Interview with Maleseko Kena, Ha Makhaola, 19 May 2015; LNA, S3/1/1/8, Lawrence Wacher 
to GS, 4 April 1929. 
5 Basutoland Report of the Department of Agriculture for 1936 (Hereafter RDA), pp. 6-12. 
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mines; a system which Basotho and colonial officials alike knew had adverse social, 
economic, and agricultural consequences for Basotho families.7  
In this way, the story is similar to that of the Negro Cooperative 
Demonstration Service in the American South of the early 1900s. As scholars have 
pointed out for southern Africa and the United States, these structures essentially 
created the very conditions of poverty that agricultural demonstration supposedly 
sought to mitigate.8 But tracing the origins of Lesotho’s demonstration program and 
the pathways that it followed also shows how Basotho demonstrators, chiefs, and 
farmers grappled with the limited political and economic opportunities that lay 
before them, often by embracing, or trying to embrace, new farming methods.  
In similar histories of colonial Africa and India, and in the American South, a 
key question arises: could farmers afford to adopt new practices given their political 
and economic predicaments? In all cases, local variables of social order, culture, 
politics, and ecology conditioned the answers to this question.9 The Basutoland 
                                                          
7 See, for example, Sheddick, Land Tenure, 75; RDA 1952, pp. 15-16; “Ho Sebetsa Merafong,” 
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forthcoming; For the American South, see Ferguson, “In No Man’s Land;” Jeannie Whayne, “Black 
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Department of Agriculture typically chose Basotho that already owned land, 
animals, and equipment to receive material and educational support, a policy which 
failed to serve the poorest farmers and accentuated rural social inequality. It was 
also official policy to exclude women from the main farming demonstrations until 
the later 1950s. In addition to understanding how knowledge circulated, exclusion 
becomes a central theme: exclusion by gender, by education, by poverty, or by 
geographic location. We must grasp, too, how it was that some marginalized 
Basotho, especially women, the landless, and the uneducated, expanded their stock 
of knowledge both directly and indirectly from demonstration services.10  
This story played out across an institutional landscape that encompassed 
Sesotho land management systems, South African agricultural colleges, American 
ideas about industrial education, colonial governments, and not least, Lesotho’s 
churches. Protestant and Catholic missions expanded their influence in the 
mountain areas in this period by establishing new churches, schools, and social 
programs that often coincided with government agricultural initiatives. Scholars 
have rightfully criticized colonial and post-colonial government agricultural 
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interventions for implementing top-down schemes that ignored local realities.11 
Indeed, Basotho did make political claims by resisting certain agricultural policies at 
certain times. But this focus occludes our understanding of the important cultural 
changes that did take place as well as the dynamic context in which these changes 
occurred.12 People of various social distinctions aspired to agricultural knowledge 
as a way of remaking themselves as self-sufficient Basotho farmers, an act that was 
itself political. As a concept with many manifestations and meanings, progress 
(Sesotho: tsoelopele) had deep historical roots in Lesotho. Knowledge of crop 
varieties, veterinary health, soil conservation, and technology had been in flux at 
least since the Basotho nation formed in the mid-1800s. The period from 1924-
1960, with all of its tensions and contradictions, proved to be an important time for 
the evolution of agricultural policy and practices in Lesotho.  
 
4.2 - Lesotho, South Africa, and Agricultural Knowledge in the Early 1900s     
Formed in 1910, the Union of South Africa government sought to modernize 
its agricultural sector under a white-dominated system of land ownership. The Land 
Act (1913) undergirded this effort by prohibiting Africans from owning land outside 
reserves or sharecropping with white farmers, a system that had previously 
dominated production in the areas surrounding Lesotho. In this system, many 
                                                          
11 For the colonial period, see Showers, Imperial Gullies; Wallman, Take out Hunger; For the post-
independence period, see Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine; Aerni-Flessner, “Development, 
Politics, and the Centralization of State Power.” 
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Basotho, had negotiated sharing agreements or worked for wages. The Union 
government also subsidized irrigation equipment and land for white farmers. 
Mechanization and segregationist policies made life on white-owned farms more 
precarious for African tenants, forcing many families onto reserves within the Union 
or into Basutoland. As the population in Lesotho swelled, many of these migrants 
established new homes in the Maloti.13  
In addition to rearing small livestock and producing wool, highland Basotho 
sowed maize, beans, and sorghum. Less commonly, people cultivated wheat and 
peas. Pumpkins grew in the fields with crops and women collected numerous types 
of wild greens.14 Basotho designated land in three main categories: village, 
cultivated fields, and commonage. In the 1920s, people produced food using fields 
and commonage mostly. There were few trees then, especially in the mountains, and 
home gardens were virtually unknown. In an important cultural change, people 
incorporated village spaces into production systems more after the 1920s.15  
  In contrast to African farmers in some settings, highlanders could not claim a 
deep historical presence in the high Maloti during which they had built agro-
ecological knowledge over many generations.16 This is a crucial point because 
government interventions in Lesotho, like demonstration work, did not pose the 
                                                          
13 Van Onselen, The Seed is Mine; Keegan, Rural Transformations; CAR 1903, p. 15; CAR 1907, pp. 9, 
41. 
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same level of cultural rupture that was true in other cases. People had accumulated 
a corpus of environmental knowledge, but as I have shown, that corpus was in flux 
as new settlers populated the Maloti. Not local chief or farmer, nor colonial official 
could fully understand the agro-ecological changes occurring in the Maloti in the 
early 1900s.   
In 1911, 37,000 people lived in Qacha's Nek. According to census data, one 
third of the district’s 5000 families owned a single-share plow that could be hitched 
to oxen. With heavy, irreversible shares that could only push the soil to one side, the 
idea was to plow deep in the early 1900s. A common plow was the Ames Eagle #25, 
made in Worcester, Massachusetts, and the German made Rud-Sack plow. Other 
families cultivated small plots with hoes. Farmers broadcasted seed by hand before 
turning it into the earth. Planting in rows was uncommon.17 Sesotho agriculture 
linked family members, relatives, friends, and chiefs in a complex web of productive 
relationships where everyone contributed resources. Someone brought the oxen, 
another person owned the plow, while still others offered labor. Another person, 
perhaps an elderly man or widow, offered his fields. All participants earned a 
negotiated share of the harvest. Who was available to work at what point in the 
cycle, who owned the implements, and who owned the land depended on a variety 
of factors, all of which changed during the course of the demonstration programs.18  
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The ways in which population growth and the evolving political economy of 
migrant labor affected farming put new stress on the Sesotho land tenure system. In 
this system, local chiefs allocated usufruct rites for three fields to each man upon 
marriage. From plowing season through harvest, these fields were the exclusive 
property of the owner. Once the harvest was complete, the fields were then opened 
for common grazing upon the chief’s orders.19 In the 1920s nearly all married men 
owned fields in their villages of residence, but this changed during the course of the 
demonstration programs. In addition to crop farming and wool production for 
market, people raised cattle for meat, milk, skins, and manure. As a central cultural 
and economic resource, Basotho exchanged cattle in marriage rites, slaughtered 
them at funerals, and harnessed them for draft power. Horses and donkeys, too, 
traversed bridle paths, transporting wool from grazing posts to European traders. 
These trading posts connected Basotho with international markets as well as wider 
circulations of agricultural and veterinary knowledge.20 
The South African government constructed and disseminated agricultural 
knowledge, mostly to support white farmers. Agricultural colleges for whites, such 
as Elsenburg in Stellenbosch and Glenn in the Orange Free State, began conducting 
experiments and publishing results in the first years of the 1900s. Working through 
the Transkei Native Council, the Union government also established several “Native” 
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agricultural colleges. Tsolo, located near the city of Umtata, began in 1908 as an 
“agricultural institution” where Europeans trained male African apprentices in 
addition to conducting on-site demonstrations in, for example, plowing techniques 
and row planting. In 1913, under pressure from Transkei Council members to 
expand the role of these institutions, Tsolo launched a program to train African 
students in what many, including mission-educated Africans and government 
agriculturalists, understood to be scientific agriculture. The hope was that graduates 
could set positive examples for their neighbors when they returned home to farm, 
or, work as demonstrators themselves. The school formally began training African 
men to work as rural demonstrators in 1920.21   
White agricultural colleges trained students for capitalist industrial farming, 
while the native colleges aimed to create a class of self-sufficient yeomen farmers. 
By learning and applying scientific farming techniques, so the logic went, these 
farmers would develop in reserved homelands for Africans. For segregationists and 
the later architects of apartheid, Africans were essentially rural people who could 
best improve themselves through agriculture and small-scale industry like 
carpentry and masonry, rather than in the alien spaces of European cities. The fact 
that land was scarce in the overpopulated reserves served the needs of industrial 
capital because most farmers, no matter how skilled, would still be partially 
dependent on wage labor to meet basic needs. In this way the agricultural colleges 
                                                          
21 TTGC 1909-1910, pp. 5-7; TTGC 1912-13, pp. v-x; TTGC 1921-22, pp. xxiii-xvi; See also, Tischler, 
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supported the Union agenda by maintaining a political economy in which blacks 
remained subordinate to white capital.22 
But for many Basotho and for Africans in the Union too, the concept of 
improvement, or progress, had deeper historical roots. To consider these roots is to 
complicate how we understand people’s perspectives on education, work, and 
farming within the larger colonial political economy. For Lesotho’s missionaries, 
progress was a blend of Enlightenment ideals and biblical teachings about morality 
and piety. That is, a person should adhere to new ideas about science and reason, 
and then apply these ideas in daily activities such as agriculture to advance towards 
civilization. The farther a person advanced down this teleological path, the closer he 
or she came to salvation in the eyes of God. In this view, progress existed against its 
opposites: conservatism, superstition, and arbitrariness, which supposedly 
characterized Africans.23   
For Basotho, life had always been about progressing in the broad sense; that 
is, moving through time by navigating the full range of historical challenges while 
adapting to political, cultural, and ecological changes along the way. King 
Moshoeshoe, for example, had moved into modern day Lesotho from the north, 
finding new environments to raise his family and expand his influence. During the 
                                                          
22 “The Agricultural Industry of the Orange Free State: The Rise and Growth of the Glenn School of 
Agriculture and Experiment Station,” The Agricultural Journal of South Africa 16 (1925): 1169-71; 
William Beinart, “Soil Erosion, Conservationism and Ideas about Development: a southern African 
exploration, 1900-1960,” Journal of Southern African Studies 11, no. 1 (1984): 75-77; Tischler, 
“Education and the Agrarian Question,” 266. 
23 Mudimbe, The Invention of Africa, 14-16; Epprecht, This Matter, 30-33; On the subject of progress 
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tumultuous 1800s Moshoeshoe and his followers used older forms of social 
organization in conjunction with new technologies. They rode on non-native horses 
and used European-made firearms to defend themselves. Both Christian and pagan 
farmers tethered plows to oxen to sow maize and wheat in a process that bound 
non-native technologies and crops to African cultures and ecologies. To some, 
progress meant making cash by exporting agricultural commodities or by working 
for wages.24 In the conceptual sense, then, missionaries and their converts could not 
claim ownership over progress, but Christian missions did have big hands in 
sculpting the meaning of progress, especially as it applied to the agricultural world 
in which demonstrators worked from the 1920s to the 1960s.  
In the first decades of the 1900s, agricultural education had been mostly 
informal in villages. Boys learned to drive plows by following behind fathers, uncles, 
and older brothers, whipping and shouting at the oxen by name.25 Women brought 
food out to plow teams in November and December. In the most laborious part of 
the cycle, girls weeded fields alongside older women under the hot January sun, 
learning the task as they chatted and sang to break the monotony. Increasingly, as 
more men worked in the mines, some women plowed the family fields. Women also 
performed all food processing such as threshing, winnowing, and stone grinding 
grain into flour; and of course, women cooked too. Harvest duties, however, crossed 
gender boundaries by employing men, women, and children who often worked in 
                                                          
24 Sanders, Moshoeshoe, 125-31. 
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groups based on reciprocal responsibilities. Apart from direct mentoring, adolescent 
boys and girls learned cultivation, animal husbandry, homemaking, and gathering 
food and medicine through Sesotho initiation schools. But by 1920 a growing 
number of Basotho sent their children to mission schools instead, where they 
studied agriculture among other subjects.26 
Jobo Moteane taught Christian converts at his mountain mission station at 
Sehonghong that achieving material prosperity would please God. This manifested 
in new architectural styles and market enterprise such as wool production. Through 
their many schools, PEMS had also emphasized literacy since their beginnings in 
Lesotho, with the primary aim being on reading scripture which missionaries had 
translated into Sesotho by the 1860s. PEMS did establish an industrial school at 
Leloaleng in the 1880s where students learned carpentry, stone-cutting, and 
blacksmithing. But PEMS did little in terms of formal agricultural education.27 The 
result of their literary approach to education was that by the 1920s, even in the 
mountain communities where Moteane proselytized, a small but influential class of 
educated people had emerged, called batsoelopele (the progressive/civilized ones). 
This group was well positioned to seize opportunities in commerce, agriculture, and 
politics at the local and national levels. PEMS was the only church in the mountains 
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before the Roman Catholic’s established Hermitage Mission near Qacha’s Nek town 
in 1921.28   
The Catholic Church, which today claims the largest Christian following in 
Lesotho, has been an important educational institution, especially in the mountain 
areas. French priests from the Oblates of Mary Immaculate (OMI) established the 
first Catholic mission at Roma in 1862. Although the OMI was much slower to 
Africanize its leadership, the Catholics had asserted a larger presence in the 
mountains by the 1930s. The Catholic emphasis on vocational skills, including 
agriculture, as opposed to the more literary education espoused by PEMS, may have 
gained them more favor with poorer, uneducated highlanders.29  
The French turned over control of the Lesotho mission to the Canadian OMI 
in 1930. In 1933, a spirited Quebecois named Joseph Bonhomme became bishop of 
Lesotho and aggressively expanded Catholic missions in the mountains. Strongly 
patriarchal in their approach, Catholics provided agricultural education for men and 
homemaking skills like sewing, cooking, and gardening for women and girls. 
Bonhomme’s initiative was part of a larger program of social action which had been 
developed in South Africa at Marianhill Mission by Father Bernard Huss.30 As an 
educator, Huss engaged the racist political economy by promoting a type of self-help 
                                                          
28 Moteane, reproduced in Ambrose and Brutsch, trans., Part V, Mehloli 3, no. 1 (1991): 7; Reginald 
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in which agriculture formed a central vehicle on the path to social uplift.  Huss had 
taught Africans on mission farms and in rural villages since the 1910s. He wrote 
books on agriculture, one of them in Sesotho, and he lectured in Basutoland too. In 
1926 Huss helped create the Catholic African Union (CAU) to spread the doctrine of 
social action.31 
These Christian institutions, and the ideas about progress resonating from 
their clergies and congregations, informed the perspectives of political leaders who 
advocated agricultural demonstration as a partial response to regional ecological 
changes. Following a catastrophic drought in 1919, a South African government 
commission declared that “deterioration of the veld and soil erosion were national 
dangers.” Therefore, the state needed to build fences, develop irrigation works, 
afforest eroded areas, and promote agricultural education and demonstration 
services.32 The report included Lesotho, where the Maloti cradled the headwaters of 
the Orange River, a vital water source for South Africa. South Africa had sought, both 
before and after Union in 1910, to prepare Basutoland for incorporation into the 
Union, especially by controlling soil erosion.33 Small-scale efforts to conserve soil, 
mostly through tree planting, began when the British appointed Lawrence Wacher, a 
graduate of the Agricultural College at Wye, England, as Basutoland’s first 
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agricultural officer in 1911.34 But the Drought Commission’s findings for Lesotho 
and its recommendations triggered more state interventions in rural areas. 
Agricultural demonstration formed a key part of this intervention.35  
Rural agricultural outreach in the British Empire was well established in 
some territories by the early 1920s, but Lesotho’s demonstration programs 
proceeded differently. Colonial agricultural departments had sent trained officers 
into rural areas since before 1900 in territories from Borneo to the Gold Coast. But 
British officers, not local agriculturalists, trekked to villages to lecture peasants in 
most places until the 1930s. Many colonial officers had trained at the Imperial 
College of Tropical Agriculture (ICTA) in Trinidad after it opened in 1922. Some 
extension officers gained local experience through long careers in one place, while 
others came and went. Colonial extension officers lectured, mostly through 
translators, about production techniques based on findings from British research 
institutions located on several continents. The focus of extension work, then, was to 
extend the research findings, the basis for scientific agriculture, to people who were 
supposedly ignorant of such knowledge.36  
Early British extension efforts aimed to boost cash crop production such as 
cocoa and cotton in West Africa, but by the 1920s these programs shifted to 
incorporate, at least to some extent, farmers’ needs and food production. Perhaps 
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Lesotho’s experience differed, in part, because of its proximity to European farming 
communities in South Africa and because of its relatively small potential for 
commodity production (wool and wheat). Lesotho’s agricultural priorities and the 
program’s use of African demonstrators from its inception set it apart from many 
tropical British territories. Basutoland was situated outside of the tropics where 
much of the Empire’s tropical-centric research held less empirical weight. Also, the 
structure of the Basutoland government, where the chiefs still held substantial 
political authority and the territory was administered by the high commission, and 
technically a protectorate not a colony, gave the resident commissioner pause at 
investing in any form of agricultural research. It was not until the 1950s that the 
colonial administration of Lesotho invested substantially in agricultural research 
which included a college and experiment station. In part, this accounts for the word 
demonstration having been used more often than extension.37   
While the Union of South Africa government and its British partners in the 
Basutoland colonial administration urged conservation work and agrarian reform 
for their own purposes, Basotho political leaders asserted themselves too. The 
national council’s (BNC) powers were limited, but its members had advocated, with 
some dissent, for state support of agriculture, soil conservation, and education.38 By 
1924, the BNC had already become an important forum for discussing 
environmental interventions in Lesotho.39 The BNC was not alone. Members of the 
                                                          
37 Ibid. 
38 For example, TNA, CO 646, BNC Sessional Papers, 1916, pp. 11-16.  
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Progressive Association (BPA), several of whom served in the BNC, argued that 
improving smallholder agriculture through formal education could alleviate 
poverty.40 Scientific knowledge, in the words of one Mosotho progressive, “could 
blaze a trail out of poverty” if applied appropriately to a modest resource base. 
Backing this view, BPA member Labane Chokobane spoke at a large public meeting 
in 1924 to insist on agricultural education, including rural outreach.41  
The social and political philosophy of the BPA, with its language of 
progressivism, had important transatlantic dimensions. The links between southern 
Africa and the southern United States with respect to progress, racial uplift, and 
industrial and agricultural education have yet to be fully explored.42 My comments 
here are suggestive and aim to open up new questions about these links. Booker T. 
Washington of the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama espoused the notion that 
improved knowledge of industry, home economics, and agriculture could deliver 
southern black people from poverty. When George Washington Carver arrived at 
Tuskegee in 1896 to develop the school’s agricultural department, he sought to 
transform black sharecroppers into a self-sufficient yeomanry by imparting agro-
ecological knowledge about soils, manures, and crop varieties. This transformation, 
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Carver believed, could improve the lives of black farmers even in the face of white 
supremacy and consequent land dispossession.43  
To bring this knowledge to black farmers, Carver developed a “farmer’s 
college on wheels.” The Jesup Agricultural Wagon, named after its sponsor, Morris 
Jesup of New York, became the physical manifestation of the Negro Cooperative 
Demonstration Service in the early 1900s. The mule-drawn wagon carried a one-
horse plow and harrow, garden tools, and a butter churn. Thomas Campbell, the first 
black demonstrator in the US Department of Agriculture and among the first to 
operate the wagon in 1906, recalled that many things were inappropriate for the 
poorest farmers, most of who sharecropped on white-owned cotton lands, and had 
little choice in what crops they sowed. The butter churn, for example, found little 
use because so few people owned cows. Furthermore, as Karen Ferguson has 
pointed out, to create an independent yeomanry through self-sufficiency in a region 
where white prosperity depended on cotton monoculture and the subjugation of 
black labor was subversive, and often brought harsh reprisals from the planter 
class.44 Indeed, Carver’s demonstration model did not directly address the social 
and political problems that kept black farmers’ in poverty. But as the historian Mark 
Hersey has shown, in the early 1900s Carver did develop elaborate systems of low-
tech knowledge for – what we might call today – sustainable agriculture.45 In 
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addition to the actual knowledge, Carver’s approach to rural demonstration was an 
innovation that was taken up far from Alabama.46   
Evidence suggests that this demonstration model traveled to South Africa, 
though not exclusively, with the Baptist missionary James East. East had grown up 
in rural Alabama as the son of former slaves and may have learned directly from 
Tuskegee’s movable school. Accompanied by his wife, he arrived at Middledrift, 
South Africa in 1909. He expressed frustration at racial inequality, especially the 
inadequate farmland in the reserves, but like his missionary colleagues he also felt 
great dismay that “the natives did not seem to possess even the most elementary 
knowledge of farming or homemaking.”47  
In tandem with his preaching, East carried implements into rural areas by 
wagon to conduct impromptu demonstrations on, for example, how to plow with 
horses. His wife would accompany him, teaching rural women about horticulture, 
vegetable and fruit canning, nutrition and cooking. He eventually linked up with the 
newly established Fort Hare Native College in 1918 to create an agricultural training 
program along with a local farmers association. At Fort Hare, East collaborated with 
D.D.T Jabavu, the son of a prominent African newspaper editor. Jabavu had recently 
visited Tuskegee to study their agricultural curriculum for possible use in South 
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Africa.48 In 1918 the South African Department of Agriculture hired James East as 
the first government demonstrator in the Ciskei Territories. By East’s own account, 
he was an “agricultural missionary,” and evidence suggests that people generally 
welcomed him, despite his blindness to local farming practices, particularly the 
centrality of cattle.49 In contrast to the two Tuskegee men who had traveled to Togo 
in 1902 under German auspices to help Africans ‘improve’ commercial cotton 
production, at the expense of growing food, East was most concerned with food. 
“The only way I can meet our Lord’s injunction ‘Give ye them to eat,’” he reported 
from the field, was “to show them how to plow so as to get food.”50   
While Basutoland’s resident commissioner Edward Garraway (1917-1926) 
generally embraced the prospect of demonstration work and its potential for 
transforming Lesotho’s agriculture, he favored a balanced budget above other 
priorities. The meager agricultural purse in the 1920s was derived primarily from a 
hut tax and the wool export duty, which went mostly to fund the campaign to 
eradicate sheep scab. But the colonial agricultural officer Laurie Wacher, with 
support from the BNC, pushed hard for the program. Wacher had toured 
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agricultural colleges and observed demonstration work in the Transkei and Ciskei in 
March 1924, and from this experience, he devised his plan for the program.51  
At Tsolo Agricultural College Wacher saw Afrikander cattle and 
thoroughbred stallions grazing on 3400 acres of pasture. Maize, groundnuts, and 
sorghum covered another 250 acres. Students received three days of lectures and 
three days of practical work every week. The faculty aimed to “teach natives to be 
better farmers on their own land” and to train demonstrators for government work 
in rural areas. He was particularly impressed after his visit to Fort Hare, where 
James East had worked recently. Wacher applauded the rigorous agricultural 
curriculum in which students spent the last year in practical work by growing 
beans, maize, and potatoes. He also applauded Fort Hare’s mission for rural 
demonstration.52 Wacher returned to Basutoland and wrote a report of his tour to 
share with the BNC.53  
It is important to note that Basotho leaders had long been interested in 
industrial education modeled, at least in part, after Tuskegee. In 1898, Paramount 
Chief Lerotholi had initiated the establishment of an industrial school in Maseru. 
The school finally opened its doors to its first thirty students in 1906. Students took 
two year courses in carpentry, stone cutting, or blacksmithing.54 Oswin Bull, a 
principal of the school in the 1930s, but then employed in South Africa’s native 
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education system, visited Lesotho in 1910 to advise the government. Bull had 
toured black colleges in Canada and the American South in 1905-1907, and then 
again in 1935 under the auspices of a Carnegie Visitor’s Grant. Echoing the Tuskegee 
philosophy, Bull believed in industrial and agricultural education as a means for 
racial progress and he undoubtedly shared his findings from his tours with his 
colleagues in Basutoland.55  
Following Wacher’s recommendations, in late 1924 the resident 
commissioner granted a small budget to start the program, barely enough to hire 
the first demonstrators. The BNC insisted that qualified Basotho be hired as soon as 
they could be trained. Councilors recognized that farmers were more likely to 
respect men who understood the cultural, ecological, and social experience of 
farming in Lesotho in addition to what they learned at the colleges.56 Edwin 
Moletsane, a recent graduate of Tsolo and originally from Thaba Nchu (just outside 
of Lesotho), began work at Roma, Lesotho in September 1924 as the territory’s first 
demonstrator. Brimming with excitement, Moletsane highlighted his Sesotho 
language as his most valuable skill because by “explaining the work to people in 
their mother tongue they understand it quicker.” In January 1925 there were three 
demonstrators stationed in Lesotho, a modest start which reflected the shoestring 
budget. But in 1960, at the height of the agricultural department’s drive to improve 
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Lesotho’s agriculture, forty-three Basotho demonstrators worked across nine 
districts with help from 205 assistant demonstrators.57  
 
4.3 - Priorities and Approaches in Demonstration Work  
As a new recruit in 1952 Mokhafisi Kena had learned from prior generations 
of demonstrators who used different approaches in their work. An important 
mentor was Elias Magadlela, a native of Qacha’s Nek and the district’s first 
demonstrator in 1926. In Magadlela’s time, there was just one demonstrator per 
district. Methods resembled the older institute model from the Transkei, in which 
demonstrators delivered large lectures to farmers from bases at administrative 
centers, missions, or large villages rather than working in smaller settlements. 
Demonstrators recorded how many lectures they gave and to how many people in 
order to calculate the program’s success. At these bases, demonstrators also 
cultivated plots to show new methods.58  
In the first decades of the program, the Department of Agriculture 
emphasized low-tech cultural changes as a means to enhance market production, 
but also to diversify household food supplies given the local ecological and political 
contexts. For example, Magadlela began work in 1926, when crops suffered from 
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cutworm, drought, and frost damage.59 Magadlela and his colleagues explained that 
cutworm could be controlled by plowing winter soil to kill the larvae by exposing 
them directly to frost.60  
In conjunction with new cropping strategies, demonstrators attempted to 
show farmers the benefits of a husbandry based on animals, trees, soils, and 
manure. To be sure, this body of knowledge overlapped with older practices in 
many ways. Strict proponents believed that it was the new practices that could 
produce stronger crops while preserving soil fertility and stability. Not unlike 
Carver’s emphasis on soil in early 1900s Alabama, this program was largely based 
on agro-ecological knowledge yet few people could afford to adopt it.61 Life in the 
mountains required plentiful heating and cooking fuel, especially in the winter. With 
few trees, people had historically dried cattle dung for fuel. By afforesting the 
grassland, so the logic went, people would eventually use firewood exclusively, 
which would free up manure for use in household gardens and in fields. People also 
used dung to build and insulate houses. For some, manuring fields simply required 
too much labor. For others, they owned no cattle, so they typically gathered that 
which was left around the village.62  
If few Basotho readily adopted manuring as a basic practice, more people 
embraced vegetable gardens. In fact, gardening initiatives remained a popular part 
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of demonstration services throughout the program. As Kena did in 1952, his 
predecessors too, taught people how to construct garden spaces with peach trees 
framing plots of cabbage, spinach, carrots, and other vegetables. Whereas home 
gardens were unknown in the early 1920s, in 1936 three demonstrators supervised 
110 household and school gardens across Qacha’s Nek, up 40% from the previous 
year.63 By 1961, Basutoland government surveys found 21,000 home gardens 
spread across the territory. Communal gardens also became popular through 
demonstrators’ efforts. These were plots operated cooperatively by between ten 
and thirty women to share materials, tools, seeds, and knowledge. Qacha’s Nek, for 
its part, reported 104 communal gardens in 1961, more than any other district. 
Today, household gardens are a standard part of the village landscape, the style and 
elaboration of each one reflects the varied knowledge and capabilities of its owners 
(See Figure 4.1). Certainly, the efforts of non-government groups contributed to the 
growth of home gardens too, especially for those living around mission stations.64  
Gardens, however, were not universally embraced because they conflicted 
with parts of the Sesotho land tenure system. During summer months most 
livestock lived at mountain grazing posts. But in the winter and early spring animals 
roamed about, grazing in and around the village on local grass and field silage. 
Animals also devoured unfenced gardens and tree saplings. Demonstrators also  
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encouraged winter crops such as peas and wheat, which, at first, fit uneasily into 
local land laws. When people finished the traditional harvest of maize, beans, and 
sorghum in late autumn, the chief announced that all fields were open to common 
grazing until plowing the following spring. Those who planted winter crops or 
cultivated gardens often found themselves in conflict with stockowners who 
expected to graze their animals on winter fields for the remaining silage. In 1947 the 
BNC debated the matter, and eventually passed a law making the gardener 
responsible for adequate fencing. As for the winter crops, stockowners were 
required to keep their animals away.65 The BNC debates on these matters show that 
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Figure 4.1 
Home Garden, Ha Makhaola, Qacha’s Nek 
Photo by author, December 2014 
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while livestock rearing remained important, officials and villagers alike validated 
new practices, and new calendars for using village and field spaces.66 
Although demonstrators circulated knowledge of low-tech cultural methods, 
new technological and biological resources, commercial fertilizers and market 
production did feature in the early years of demonstration work. As early as the 
mid-1920s the Department of Agriculture, working mostly through traders, sold 
imported seed varieties to farmers. It was the demonstrators’ job to explain to 
farmers how to select and sow, for example, drought resistant maize seed like 
Wisconsin Dent. The department also promoted North American wheat varieties. In 
an experiment in Maseru district in 1926, a demonstrator planted one-half acre in 
potatoes, to which he gave “a liberal dressing of kraal manure, and 200 lbs. of 
superphosphates.” Perhaps owing to local ecology, or to human error, the crop 
became infected with eel worm and the experiment failed. 67 If early demonstrators 
urged people to plant diverse crops and to rotate them, they also promoted wool 
production which complicated local land use systems further. The department had 
placed merino stud rams at district administrative camps since the early 1900s to 
service as many ewes as possible for a small fee per animal. Sheep scab, too, 
continued to infect flocks in the late 1920s, as it had since it was first detected in 
                                                          
66 Sayce, “Ethno-Geographical Essay,” 270-73; Staples and Hudson, Ecological Survey, 22-30. 
67 LNA, S3/1/1/6, Wacher to GS, 25 November 1927. 
 236 
 
1903. Demonstrators worked with veterinary staff to enforce government 
regulations for both sheep dipping and breeding programs (See Chap. 6).68  
Like with the effort to eliminate fat-tail sheep, most farmers could not afford 
to meet the technical and economic demands of progressive agriculture even in this 
early phase. Intensive plowing in the winter, for wheat or to combat cutworm, 
proved difficult because many male household heads worked in South Africa for 
most of the year. From the 1920s into the 1960s absentee rates from migrant labor 
were high. In any village in Lesotho, on any given day, 40-50% of men were working 
in South Africa. Nor was it simply a problem of human muscle. In winter months, 
some oxen would be too weak to break the crusty soil to destroy cutworm.69  
As was the case with the stud ram services, improved seeds cost money. The 
same was true of phosphate fertilizers recommended for optimal yields of hybrid 
seeds like Wisconsin Dent.70 Government census figures, drawn from traders’ 
reports, showed increased sales of harrows, planters, plows, and fertilizers as 
evidence of progress in demonstration work. Agrarian planners, however, never 
addressed the economic reasons why so few Basotho purchased them. Mining, the 
main wage employment for prospective buyers of these items, paid an average of £3 
per thirty shifts in 1936, a pittance that prevented most families from purchasing 
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these progressive tools. Given this predicament, people short on animals, land, or 
equipment viewed demonstrators’ work skeptically when they promoted 
implements, seed, or fertilizers, or sought to eliminate fat-tail sheep.71   
Shifts in agricultural policy and demonstration services came from an 
intersection of ecological change, transnational scientific trends, and colonial 
politics. In 1932-33, a severe drought desiccated crops, killed stock, and dried up 
springs. Many people starved.72 In subsequent government reports, colonial 
economists and ecologists argued that soil erosion posed the greatest threat to 
Lesotho’s people and environment. In a broader context, world economic 
depression and the American Dustbowl stimulated international research on 
erosion, spawning engineering works to mitigate it.73 For the British and South 
African governments, erosion formed the primary obstacle to economic 
development in Basutoland, as well as in African reserves and overseas colonies. 
With new financial support from a British grant in 1936, the Basutoland 
government established a soil erosion office whose agenda shaped agricultural 
policy until independence in 1966. The office had its own staff who, with legions of 
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Basotho laborers, constructed the contour furrows and grass strips that mark the 
landscape today.74   
But government bureaucrats, soil experts, and laborers did not act alone. 
Demonstrators played a significant role in these conservation schemes by 
continuing to encourage cultural and technical changes such as plowing on the 
contour, as opposed to plowing up and down the slope, which had been a common-
labor saving technique. In this practice, oxen would pull the plow down slope, taking 
advantage of gravity, and then drag the plow back up to start the next furrow. For 
people who could afford new implements, and who had to work with steep fields, 
demonstrators taught how to use new plows with reversible shares that were 
designed to push soil to the low side of each furrow regardless of which direction 
the team was plowing along the contour. Demonstrators also urged rotational 
grazing, manuring, gardening, and tree planting.75 This body of knowledge, although 
far from impeccable, aimed to preserve soil fertility and stability.  
Despite relatively poor funding, the demonstrators continued to work in the 
shadow of the engineering component of the anti-erosion campaign by interacting 
with land-users in various capacities. In addition to their work of transferring 
knowledge, demonstrators worked along with district and national agricultural 
officers to police farming practices. For instance, they inspected illegal plowing of 
                                                          
74 TNA, DO 35/1187, Colonial Development Fund, Application for Grant, 16 May 1946; RDA 1938, pp. 
62-70; RDA 1946, pp. 24-27; RDA 1955, pp. 22-24; RDA 1962, pp. 36-40; Showers, Imperial Gullies, 
177-84. 
75 RDA 1936, pp. 11-14; RDA 1950, p. 7; Mokhabi Lesoli, 13 January 2015; Mokhafisi Kena, 23 January 
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virgin lands (thite) on steep slopes and reprimanded people for not maintaining 
conservation structures. These policing actions, to be explained further in chapters 
five and six, drew some rebukes from farmers. But demonstrators also worked with 
commoners and chiefs to improve food production and conserve ecological 
resources in new ways.76  
Just as the content of demonstrators’ work changed, so too did the ways they 
attempted to transfer this knowledge. In 1946, the Basutoland government obtained 
another grant from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund (CDWF) to advance 
a ten year development plan in which agricultural improvement was central. Apart 
from the continuance of the soil conservation schemes, investment in technology 
like tractors and irrigation equipment was still minimal. Instead, funds went to 
support small experiment stations for testing new crop varieties and to expand 
demonstration work via new approaches. By 1950, the Department of Agriculture 
had concluded that calling large groups together based on a chief’s order included a 
“high percentage of unwilling listeners,” and that smaller focus groups might yield 
better results.77 Like Kena’s visit to Mashai in 1952, demonstrators used 
introductory meetings to seek out men with certain knowledge to help share 
progressive methods with their neighbors while showcasing their work on 
demonstration plots. Selected farmers cultivated “check plots” beside a plot worked 
by the demonstrator. The owner of the check plot might, for example, employ 
                                                          
76 National University of Lesotho Archives (Hereafter NUL), Leribe Collection (LC) Box 37/1, Folder 
1037, Chief of Leribe to GS, November 1954; Chief Joang Molapo to DC, October 1957; Tseliso 
Ramakhula, 14 November 2014. 
77 RDA 1950, p. 7; RDA 1955, pp. 26-27. 
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broadcast planting versus row planting and fertilizing with manure and 
phosphates.78  
Kena spoke of one instance where farmers prepared maize seeds for sowing 
by mixing them with soil that had come from the grave of Father Gerard, the 
founding Catholic missionary in Lesotho. Farmers had commonly mixed seeds with 
various herbs or earth to protect them from evil spirits and pests. This instance, of 
what Basotho and colonials typically referred to as doctoring, made for an 
interesting blend of older beliefs with a special reverence for the Catholic 
patriarch.79 In the end, farmers and demonstrators would measure the harvests in 
terms of quality and weight to prove the efficacy of the new techniques. Results 
varied of course, but farmers, at least those included in the process, were generally 
impressed with the benefits of the new techniques and inputs. The objective here 
was clear: to demonstrate, or show people how things could be done. In Sesotho, the 
term for demonstrator is mosupisi oa temo, literally, one who shows agriculture. 
Mosupisi comes from the verb ho supisa meaning to show to, or to point to. As the 
program progressed, more emphasis was placed on showing rather than telling.80 
Whether showing or telling, the outcomes of demonstration work depended 
heavily on who each demonstrator was in relation to the communities in which he 
worked. His family, his education and experience, and his politics all mattered. Born 
in 1925, Mokhafisi Kena grew up at Makhaola village, just a single day’s horse trek 
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south of Mashai, where he met his wife. He attended a local school at the Tsoelike 
Evangelical Mission (PEMS) while tending his father’s livestock on weekends, living 
with the animals at mountain posts during summer months. His father enjoyed a 
close relationship with Chief Makhaola Lerotholi, the popular district chief who had 
advocated on behalf of agricultural demonstration until his death in 1932. In 
addition to enjoying some of the most fertile field allocations in the village, the elder 
Kena worked as a tax collector, which was a paid position supervised by chiefs 
under the system of indirect rule. When the younger Kena turned seventeen he 
enlisted in the army and served with the Pioneer Corps, landing in Sicily with the 
Allies in 1943. This experience, he recalls, endowed him with powerful social capital 
that earned him respect beyond his young age when he returned home.81   
In 1950 Kena accepted a government bursary to attend Fort Cox Agricultural 
College in South Africa. Fort Cox had opened in 1930 in the Ciskei Territory to 
supplement existing colleges. Built specifically to train Africans, Fort Cox trained 
agriculturalists for farming and demonstration work in South Africa, Lesotho, and 
elsewhere in Africa. For two years Kena trained in practical agriculture alongside 
other students from as far away as Kenya. The curriculum included courses in what 
he considered the foundations of scientific, progressive agriculture of the time: field 
                                                          
81 Interview with Mokhafisi Kena, Ha Makhaola, 24 September 2008; See also Brian Gray, Basuto 
Soldiers in Hitler’s War (Morija: Morija Printing, 1953). 
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and animal husbandry, soil conservation, horticulture, sheep and wool, 
bookkeeping, and veterinary science.82  
Just two years after the National Party had initiated Apartheid in South 
Africa, politics was pervasive at Fort Cox. Afrikaner lecturers taught in English, and 
according to Kena teacher-student relations were cordial and productive. But for 
Kena and many other Fort Cox students, this was their first exposure to the work of 
the African National Congress (ANC). Kena attended political meetings at nearby 
Fort Hare College. Some students, Kena recalls, questioned their instructors’ 
legitimacy as a form of protest. While some activists saw the agricultural colleges 
and the associated demonstration programs as institutional tools for fixing Africans 
as rural people, and as a subordinate laboring class, others like Kena saw 
progressive agriculture as a potential vehicle for upward mobility through self-
sufficiency. Similar to the ideologies of Booker T. Washington and Carver at 
Tuskegee, and James East and Bernard Huss too, Kena thought that self-sufficiency 
could also foster political power. He believed that for men willing to engage 
progressive ideas, small-scale commercial farming offered an alternative to mine 
labor, and could thus undermine the colonial political economy that many scholars 
argue marginalized Lesotho as a labor reserve.83 Kena, who became a founding 
member of the Lesotho Communist Party after 1963, credits his Fort Cox years for 
enlightening him both politically and agriculturally. Even today, he remains 
                                                          
82 SAB, NTS 7329, Fort Cox Principal to Secretary of Native Education, 12 January 1948; Native 
Commissioner to HC, 30 March 1943; Mokhafisi Kena, 7 January 2015. 
83 See Murray, Families Divided; Bundy, The Rise and Fall. 
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steadfast that modernizing agriculture with technology and knowledge can foster 
radical political change. Kena received his first-class diploma in 1951, capping an 
experience that he says showed him that “professional farming could be profitable, 
yielding more food and money if done properly, even in the mountains.”84  
The Basutoland Department of Agriculture hired Kena immediately, posting 
him at Sehonghong, not far from Mashai. Villagers at Mashai, according to Kena, 
were impressed with him as a local WW II veteran. He spoke in a familiar Sesotho 
accent. They knew his family roots and his connections to the house of the late 
district Chief Makhaola. He was a fellow molele, and more or less, a child of their 
place.85 But despite Kena’s charisma, and his efforts to bridge local and global 
worlds by drawing on his education and experiences, he also acknowledged that his 
work failed to reach those that might benefit the most.86 
Kena worked within a rural social order defined by gender, age, work 
experience, birthplace, and education. The old man who contested Kena at the 
meeting addressed the nutrition issue on his own terms. Challenging the young 
demonstrator, he reminded Kena that animal husbandry and eating meat had deep 
cultural roots. From the man’s perspective, these roots had been dislodged in a 
colonial political economy where stock ownership became more unequal, and where 
the government had prioritized wool-producing rather than mutton-producing 
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sheep. Kena’s points about accumulating cattle and about children not eating eggs 
posed important questions, but in this context, they probably sounded 
condescending. Perhaps more importantly, the man wanted his social rank 
recognized, especially in a public space like the chief’s courtyard. Age and social 
standing in the village context mattered greatly in demonstration work. This story 
strongly suggests that in 1952 – as in earlier and later periods – farmers wanted 
their own knowledge validated before considering new ideas. Kena’s veteran status, 
local origins, and education only endowed him with so much authority over 
knowledge and people.87  
 
4.4 – Participants and Pathways in Knowledge Circulation 
Seleso Tsoako was born in the remote Lesobeng area of Qacha’s Nek in 1919. 
Tsoako grew up there tending his grandfather’s sheep, but eventually moved closer 
to the district capital when his father became ill. He attended school there, 
eventually becoming a primary school teacher himself and a devoted Catholic. Like 
many people in the district, he speaks fondly of Catholic education, especially the 
                                                          
87 Basotho men had historically held military service in high regard as they did the common 
experience of male migration to and from South Africa. See, for example, David Coplan, In the Time of 
Cannibals, The Word Music of South Africa’s Basotho Migrants (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1994). 
 245 
 
Canadian duo of Father Jean-Baptiste Rousseau and his brother Paul who lived and 
worked at the nearby St. Francis Mission from the 1940s into the 1980s.88  
Tsoako had contributed to the Church’s growth as both teacher and student. 
He says that his gardens, animals, and fields gave him all he needed. He never had to 
buy food until he lost most of his sight a few years ago. He attended many 
demonstrations throughout the district in the 1950s and 60s, sometimes taking his 
primary school students with him. At one such demonstration he recalled that the 
audience quickly became frustrated with a young demonstrator from Semongkong 
(outside of Qacha’s Nek) who used technical English terms like crop rotation and 
leguminous within his Sesotho explanations.89   
Being a teacher, and fluent in Sesotho and English, Tsoako prompted the 
demonstrator to repeat and explain in basic Sesotho. Nonetheless, many people sat 
confused or strolled off back home. This suggests that for many people present that 
day, access to this knowledge was limited. The demonstrator’s credibility began on a 
low note because he was young and from outside the area. He then exacerbated the 
problem by using technically specific, sometimes foreign language. Language, as in 
all colonial interactions, created a filter through which knowledge flowed, 
sometimes very slowly or not at all. Technical terms were translated into Sesotho, 
but the literal translation took many years of use before it conveyed the intended 
meaning. For example, crop rotation became phetolo ea lijalo, literally, change of 
                                                          
88 Basutoland Census for 1956, 99; Interview with Seleso Tsoako, 19 January 2015; Interview with 
George Mohlapiso, 29 May 2015; Interview with Father Clement Motloapa, St. Francis, 20 January 
2015; Epprecht, This Matter, 180-82. 
89 Seleso Tsoako, 19 January 2015. 
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crops. Some people had rotated what they planted in their three fields, especially 
maize, sorghum, and wheat for many years. But this term could carry any number of 
meanings when heard for the first time.90 For his part, Tsoako tapped his own 
educational background and linguistic abilities to learn about legumes, nitrogen 
fixing, and crop rotation—knowledge which he applied in his productive activities 
until recently. Ntate Tsoako remembers explaining things to his students on their 
trek back home. Now ninety-five years old, Tsoako lives modestly from a pension 
and by selling fresh eggs to neighbors. In concluding our interview, we shared some 
boiled eggs as he lamented the lack of what he called tsoelopele, progress.91  
The 1960 Basutoland agricultural census defined a progressive farmer as 
someone willing “to improve himself” and possessing “sufficient land, livestock, 
labour and implements to farm properly.”92 From the mid-1950s, demonstrators 
focused their energies on the people who met these criteria. By 1960 many Basotho 
had no land, no livestock, or for the poorest, no stock or land.  In the 1920s nearly all 
married men owned fields in their villages of residence, but this had changed by the 
1950s for several reasons. First, as more people migrated to the mountains, chiefs in 
villages with little arable land welcomed new settlers to build homes, but could not 
offer fields. Second, a localized migration was occurring as people moved to villages 
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that were closer to the growing infrastructure of roads, schools, mission stations, 
mine recruiting centers, and traders. During this process, a chief might offer a new 
arrival a residential building site but no fields.93 
 Lastly, some families accumulated fields across generations despite that 
under Sesotho custom and under the Laws of Lerotholi, chiefs had the responsibility 
to reallocate fields from wealthier to poorer residents. But chiefs seem to have been 
reluctant to enact this authority. Accumulation was especially true of families who 
were among the original settlers of a particular village. Widows, for their part, 
retained access to their late husbands’ fields. But a son often worked his mother’s 
fields and became de facto owner of his deceased father’s fields, while remaining 
eligible for his own allocation upon marriage.94  
From an ecological perspective, not all fields in the Maloti were created equal 
in terms of soil, drainage, and slope. The older families typically had the more fertile 
fields, and by the 1950s, more of them. In Makhaola village, for example, the area 
known locally as sekoting (the hollow) contains dark, well drained soils with 
northern exposure to the sun, characteristics that local farmers identify as desirable 
in an area dominated by lighter, sandier soils (See Figure 4.2). Farmers, however, 
needed to maintain soil fertility over time, which necessitated applications of 
specific knowledge and adequate access to labor. Micro-environments like sekoting 
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dotted the mountain landscape of Lesotho.95 Concentration of quality fields has 
played an important, yet understudied role in creating rural social differentiation. 
Not only could this material base yield better produce, it also provided an advantage 
for villagers across generations to acquire farming knowledge when field ownership 
became a prerequisite for achieving progressive farmer status in the eyes of the 
agricultural department: a designation which carried privileges (See Chap. 6).96 
 
 
 
By the mid-1950s, the Department of Agriculture had begun several 
mechanization projects in the lowlands where tractors played a central role. This 
                                                          
95 Clement Shata, 13 December 2014; See Gerard Schmitz and Firouz Rooyani, Lesotho: Geology, 
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Figure 4.2 
Sekoting, Ha Makhaola, Qacha’s Nek 
Photo by author, November 11, 2015 
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was not so in the mountains. Demonstrators working in the Maloti did, however, 
encourage farmers to purchase, borrow, and share new ox-drawn implements to 
improve yields and to enhance one’s professional and social status. Although many 
farmers owned plows, few people owned other implements such as harrows, 
cultivators, and planters like the one advertised in a 1949 Sesotho language 
newspaper (See Figure 4.3). For all but a few, planters like this one were out of  
 
reach. But the image in the ad spoke volumes about how a masculine professional 
farmer could improve his traditional lifestyle and perhaps strengthen his social 
standing by using this planter. Even to those unable to read the message, much less 
afford the planter, the manufacturer’s message appealed to, and reinforced, what 
Figure 4.3 
“You can plant all of your crops 
with this planter – maize, beans, 
monkey fruit, sorghum and 
others. Be sure that your planter 
has this symbol on it.” 
Source: Mochochonono, October 
1, 1949. National University of 
Lesotho Archives 
Translation Credit: Madira 
Thetso, National University of 
Lesotho 
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were common aspirations for many Basotho farmers at that time: to improve one’s 
livelihood through a blend of new technology and knowledge, applied in a particular 
physical and cultural setting. As one anthropologist has shown, everyone possesses 
a “will to improve.” Or, as several interviewees assured me: everyone is progressive 
when they have access to appropriate knowledge and adequate resources.97  
If men were at the forefront of demonstration work on all sides, at least until 
around 1960, women and girls still interacted with new agricultural knowledge in 
important ways. Women, after all, were more consistently present in the village 
setting than men. ‘Me Mamahlomola Makhaola’s experience illustrates how gender 
and family background conditioned the ways people compiled environmental 
knowledge. Born in 1932, she grew up in Lebakeng, a remote area located north of 
Tsoelike. She completed three years of primary school at a tiny Catholic mission 
outstation. She says that there were “no government demonstrations there in those 
days, but we learned some things at school about nutrition and building the body 
with vegetables…before that we just collected greens in the mountains without 
thinking much about it.” But it was only sometime in the 1950s when she moved to 
Makhaola Village, which was much closer to the Qacha’s Nek administrative capital, 
                                                          
97 Tania Li, The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development, and the Practice of Politics (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2007), 5-6, 270; Interview with Marapeli Raselepe, 25 December 2014; 
Interview with Mokhabi Lesoli, 13 January 2015; Interview with Mpolokeng Putsoane, Ha Makhaola, 
20 January 2015. Farmers used the planter to save labor, and to space seeds consistently and at 
uniform depth. Most farmers in Qacha’s Nek, then and now, plant by hand-dropping seeds in furrows 
and then plowing in the seeds with generally erratic spacing. Typically, yields from fields where 
mechanical planters were used exceed those which were sown by hand.   
 251 
 
to stay at her husband’s place, as was the patrilocal custom, that she remembers 
seeing home gardens and fruit trees.98  
Mamahlomola’s husband worked in the mines much of the year. So, like most 
women in her position she sought ways to feed herself and her young son. Until 
about 1960, she and other women were not invited to the farming demonstrations, 
but still learned about new aspects of gardening, nutrition, poultry, and pigs by 
word of mouth and through the increasing influence of women’s cooperative 
groups, especially the Homemakers Association. The Homemakers Association was 
founded in the 1930s in the Transkei. Among its founders, Bernice Mohapeloa 
established a Basutoland Homemakers Association (BHA) in Lesotho in 1945. In this 
gendered and westernized domestic model, which became popular in rural Lesotho 
especially amongst Protestants, women learned new gardening techniques, fruit 
canning, sewing, and cooking.99  
As part of its social action programs, the Catholic mission at nearby St. 
Francis promoted similar activities through the Catholic Economic Association 
(CEA), an institution which also sought to offer alternatives to buying and selling 
with white traders by providing discount rates on agricultural equipment and 
inputs. Several women in Makhaola village, ‘Me Mamahlomola among them, spoke 
fondly of the knowledge they had learned not only from BHA demonstrations, but in 
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primary school classrooms and in Catholic cooperatives. My interviewees took pride 
in producing canned and dried fruits, and maintaining tidy garden spaces of 
vegetables, fruit trees, and medicinal herbs.100 Mamahlomola’s village of origin and 
abbreviated education had limited her exposure to progressive agricultural ideas, 
and her gender had excluded her from attending demonstrations, at least 
temporarily.101 Despite these limitations, she did compile a wealth of knowledge, 
capitalizing on her new geographic setting and shifts in demonstration methods. 
Due in part to their roles as homestead managers in the absence of so many 
men, women seem to have embraced available demonstration services perhaps 
more than did men. Household gardens, largely seen as female spaces in those days, 
grew through the 1940s and 50s as discussed above. In addition to gardening, 
women took part in cooperatives and agricultural shows. Sesotho agriculture had 
relied on informal cooperatives for many years, including various arrangements for 
sharing land, labor, and equipment.102 Few men joined government sanctioned 
cooperatives, whereas women embraced groups such as the BHA, church 
associations, and communal gardening groups. The Department of Agriculture 
hosted district shows where people entered produce in competitive categories (eg. 
maize, poultry, handicrafts) and winners earned prizes, or a trip to the national 
show in the capital Maseru. Demonstrators selected participants from villages to 
compete at the shows. Women who participated in these activities applied the 
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knowledge to remaking their domestic spaces, their gardens and kitchens, as well as 
to developing new ways to provide for their families.103  
Access to cooperatives, agricultural shows, and other such networks for 
knowledge transmission for Basotho men and women did not come from human 
interaction alone. Literacy both opened up possibilities for some people and 
presented obstacles for others in compiling environmental knowledge. Farmers in 
Lesotho, as in most places, probably learned most from practical experiences like 
those discussed above. But agricultural literature still played a significant role, and 
increasingly so by the mid-twentieth century. To ignore the importance of printed 
material would be to reinforce the trope of Africans as oral people, not amenable to 
writing and reading. Furthermore, this literature was the precursor to subsequent 
agricultural information systems, which from the mid-1960s, involved radio 
broadcasts and today includes internet communications about crop prices, weather, 
and government services.104  
Basotho began their experience with writing and reading when the PEMS 
arrived at Morija in 1833. Moshoeshoe quickly recognized the value in this new 
medium of communication, co-writing voluminous letters to colonial authorities. 
The PEMS missionaries prioritized reading, and had translated the Bible into 
Sesotho by the 1860s. They printed and distributed it from the Morija Printing 
Works, which they established in 1861 at the headquarters of the Protestant 
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mission at Morija. The printers at Morija went on to publish an array of materials in 
numerous African languages, distributing them throughout southern Africa.105  
A culture of literacy that incorporated elements of both pre-existing oral 
medium and vernacular idiom spread slowly in Lesotho by the late 1800s. Several 
Basotho authors wrote prolifically in Sesotho, Thomas Mofolo and Azariel Sekese 
chief among them. Along with the missionaries who transcribed the Sesotho 
language into dictionaries, these early authors helped standardize Sesotho, 
distinguishing it from other related languages in the Sotho-Tswana and Nguni 
linguistic families. The Basotho experience with literacy ran deeper in time than did 
the experiences of many other African ethno-linguistic groups yet in the nineteenth 
century literate Basotho represented a tiny fraction of the population.106 But this 
group eventually ascended to political and economic prominence through the 
Basutoland Progressive Association (BPA), through commercial farming, and 
through the chieftaincy. Literacy rates rose slowly in the mountain areas, quickening 
when the Catholic Church launched its aggressive expansion in the 1930s. As most 
Basotho were engaged to some extent in agriculture (Sesotho: temo), it became an 
important topic for published writings.107 
Agricultural literature took on a variety of forms. Basutoland’s Sesotho 
language newspapers, and the institutions that published them, provided the most 
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widespread material. By the 1930s several newspapers printed weekly letters, 
articles, and advertisements relating to agriculture. Leselinyana la Lesotho (the Little 
Light of Lesotho), the official paper of PEMS included an annual Farmer’s Almanac 
along with Sesotho folk tales and serial novels, in which Basotho contributors 
commented on agriculture using Sesotho cultural idioms. It was in Leselinyana that 
Mofolo first published his Sesotho language novels in the 1890s. Established in 1863 
and among the oldest African language newspapers on the continent, Leselinyana 
also printed excerpts from the BNC Proceedings, where councilors discussed a range 
of issues from controlled grazing to weed eradication campaigns.108 The overall 
perspective of Leselinyana dovetailed, too, with the Tuskegee model for social uplift, 
a perspective expressed most vividly when a Mosotho editor serially published 
Booker T. Washington’s Up from Slavery, which he translated into Sesotho across 
several volumes of the paper in 1960.109  
Recognizing the growth in literary communication in Lesotho, the Catholic 
Church began publishing their own weekly in 1933 called Moeletsi oa Basotho (the 
Basotho Advisor). Moeletsi’s circulation increased in the mountains during the 
1930s when Bishop Bonhomme established new outstations in remote areas. In 
Qacha’s Nek at St. Francis, Father Rousseau distributed bundles of back issues for 
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free over the course of his forty years at the mission. Moeletsi preached self-
sufficiency and moral piety through agriculture and education, sometimes carrying 
ads for Fort Cox scholarships as well as ads for the latest farm implements. Although 
the OMI and PEMS clashed on other matters, they tended to embrace similar notions 
of progress through a specific type of work ethic (See Chap. 6). In the wake of the 
Great Depression which included the 1932-33 droughts in Lesotho, agriculture took 
center stage in this vision. Both the Protestant and Catholic newspapers 
complimented Lesotho’s demonstration efforts in addition to printing scripture, 
critical opinions of Sesotho institutions like polygyny and initiation, world and local 
news, and especially from the 1950s, opinion on national politics.110  
A final newspaper was Mochochonono (the Comet), the official paper of the 
Basutoland Progressive Association (BPA). Like the others, Mocho carried 
government propaganda on progressive agriculture, translating it into Sesotho 
when necessary. But the government propaganda appeared in conversation with, 
and sometimes debated, the opinions and other writings of Basotho contributors. 
Mocho spared its readers the overt Christian messages, but clearly espoused a “low-
modernist” approach where agricultural improvement that blended subsistence 
with small-scale commercial production could alleviate rural poverty, an approach 
that the missions underscored in their own publications (See Chap. 6).111   
                                                          
110 Mochinti Jane, 18 May 2015; C. Mokorotlo, “Litholoana,” Moeletsi oa Basotho, 22 July 1947; See 
also, Epprecht, This Matter, 178-79. 
111 “Improved Farming,” Mochochonono, 23 February 1927; See Jess Gilbert, “Low Modernism and the 
New Deal: A Different Kind of State,” in Fighting for the Farm: Rural America Transformed, ed. Jane 
Adams (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002), 129-46.  I adapt the term “low-
 257 
 
All of the papers encouraged a type of progressivism in which certain 
agricultural practices and technologies complimented literacy and worldly 
knowledge. Although literacy rates are difficult to gauge from the 1920s to the 
1960s in rural Lesotho, census data for 1936 shows that 26% of females in Qacha’s 
Nek could read while just 19% of males were literate. By 1946, the number was 
32% for females and 24% for males.112 But far fewer people could read Sesotho or 
English at levels adequate for understanding these newspapers. Nonetheless, 
literacy did increase through the 1940s and 50s, and printed knowledge also flowed 
from literate to non-literate people via church sermons, in school classrooms, at 
public meetings, and through daily social interactions. For literate farmers, 
advertisements and the accompanying agricultural columns in the papers offered 
educational opportunities while simultaneously creating aspirations for mechanical 
implements and a new type of farming that was often unrealistic for them, let alone 
the poorest Basotho.113  
Apart from the newspapers, readers read government literature that 
addressed veterinary health, crop production, and gardening. Government officers 
produced Sesotho language pamphlets to spread knowledge about sheep scab, its 
consequences and treatments, beginning in 1906. The head agricultural officer 
                                                                                                                                                                             
modernism” to emphasize that demonstrators, at least until the later 1950s, worked with farmers on 
small projects in contrast with ‘high-modern’ approaches as in Scott, Seeing Like a State.  
112 Basutoland Census for 1936, 8-9; Census for 1946, 13. The higher literacy rate for females is 
reflected in both PEMS and Catholic mission school enrollments. More female students resulted from 
both expectations of male work in mines and from mission efforts to educate girls. 
113 In Mochochonono: “Women’s Farmer’s Assoc.,”23 December 1939; J. Sehloho, ‘Development of 
Agriculture in Basutoland,” 8 June 1940. 
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Laurie Wacher wrote guides on maize, wheat, and sorghum cultivation, including 
control of such prominent pests as stalk-borer and cut-worm by chemical and 
cultural means; such as winter plowing to kill the worm larvae.114 These 
government efforts complimented demonstration services, developing into 
intensive propaganda campaigns by the 1950s. Along these lines, the Department of 
Agriculture began publishing the quarterly Pampiri ea Balemi ba Lesotho (The 
Basutoland Farmer’s Journal). Paramount Chieftainess Mantšebo Seeiso wrote the 
foreword for the inaugural volume in 1955, citing it as a symbol of a modernizing 
nation. She believed the journal provided a forum for farmers to “discuss and obtain 
advice for solving their day-to-day problems…the journal is a milestone in our 
progress.” Pampiri ea Balemi ran for five years, circulating 6000 copies of each 
volume, which carried submissions from demonstrators, officers, and farmers in 
both Sesotho and English.115  
 By 1960, Africanization of the Department of Agriculture was well under way 
at all levels. A key moment came when Cliff Morojele, who grew up in Lesotho and 
trained as a statistician, managed and authored the Basutoland portion of the 1960 
Global Census of Agriculture. He insisted that Basotho demonstrators, who knew the 
people and places to be enumerated, could collect the most accurate data. That year 
                                                          
114 For example, Henning, Lekhuekhue la Liphoofolo; Lawrence Wacher, Tsa Temo Lesotho (Morija: 
Morija Sesuto Book Depot, 1925). Excerpts from government publications were often reprinted in 
the Sesotho language newspapers discussed above. For example, “Winter Work in Vegetable 
Gardens,” Mochochonono, 14 August 1937. 
115 Mantsebo Seeiso, “Foreword,” Basutoland Farmers Journal 1, no. 1 (1955). 
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demonstrators gathered an array of data as they performed their usual duties.116 A 
few years earlier Lesotho had opened its own agricultural college, staffed with 
Basotho instructors among the British. Apart from training the next generation of 
demonstrators, the college also held farmers’ days and workshops open to the 
public, providing intellectual resources and some material assistance too.117  
Like the farmer’s journal and the 1960 census, and like the expansion of 
agricultural demonstration services as a whole, the college marked an important 
moment for all Basotho. Considering Basutoland’s formidable economic and 
agricultural challenges in the early 1960s, and the social inequality that 
characterized the later years of demonstration programs, it is tempting to see these 
developments as purely symbolic.118 Indeed, as Paramount Chief Mantsebo’s 
comments indicate, for those wishing to make at least part of their living from the 
land, these developments did represent their aspirations to participate in the new 
cultural and political world of the time. If these programs failed to achieve large 
agrarian transformations, and left the regional political economy in place, 
demonstrators still contributed to a growing pool of knowledge and to important 
cultural changes such as the ways people managed their agricultural calendar to the 
ways people reorganized village spaces.   
 
                                                          
116 Morojele, 1960 Agricultural Census. 
117 RDA 1962, pp.19-25. 
118 CAR 1965, pp. 24-27. In 1965 a drought triggered failed harvests and acute food shortages. 
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4.5 - Conclusion 
Agricultural demonstration and extension, in varied forms, remains a central 
component of agricultural development policy in many countries across the world. 
International and local experts, politicians, and farmers continue to debate the 
concepts and methods behind this work.119 This chapter has reconstructed localized 
historical contexts in which debates about demonstration evolved during the 
decades before Lesotho’s independence in 1966. People in disparate social 
positions, including the demonstrators themselves, sought opportunities by 
attaining and applying agricultural knowledge using the resources available to them.  
Knowledge and practice conflicted and overlapped through the process of 
compilation— a process that was imperfect, complex, and pluralist. By probing 
questions about the localized social dimensions, and the links to transnational ideas 
about agricultural education, ecological change, and rural development, we deepen 
our understanding of the pathways and barriers to knowledge more broadly. 
Whereas demonstrators dealt mostly with low-tech methods, the anti-soil erosion 
campaigns came to rely, to some extent, on highly technical and labor intensive 
approaches. Chapter 5 will examine these campaigns. 
                                                          
119 See J. K. Mutimba, “Reflections on Agricultural Extension and Extension Policy in Africa,” South 
African Journal of Agricultural Extension 42, no. 1 (2014): 15-26. 
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5. RETHINKING SOIL CONSERVATION IN COLONIAL LESOTHO, C. 1903-1956 
 
5.1 - Introduction 
 Human, animal, and plant communities shape how water, wind, and gravity 
manipulate soil in the process of erosion. Humans have a prominent yet partial role 
in this process. It is our ability to develop cultural and technological mechanisms 
and to apply these in our activities that distinguishes us from other agents of soil 
change. To understand the physical changes in soils we must also grasp the ways 
diverse human actors have engaged with the constantly shifting knowledge about 
soil: how to grow food in it, how to maintain it for specific uses, how to use it to 
build things, and how to control its motion.1  
Lesotho’s experience with soil erosion and conservation schemes has 
produced stories that tell us about this circulation of knowledge in the past—its 
origins, pathways, and filters. As a specific case, Lesotho offers a sense of how global 
ideas informed local knowledge and action during the colonial period. We need to 
better understand how knowledge flowed within and between various social 
networks. For instance, how did ideas about soil conservation develop and circulate 
                                                          
1 For an overview of soil erosion and conservation, see Benno Warkentin, ed., Footprints in the Soil: 
People and Ideas in Soil History (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 2006).  
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amongst American soil experts, South African agriculturalists, British colonial 
officials, and Basotho chiefs and farmers?2   
The 1930s proved to be a pivotal decade for constructing knowledge about 
soil erosion and for applying this knowledge through state-led conservation 
programs. The Great Depression in the 1930s worsened when drought visited 
places as geographically separated as the American plains and Lesotho’s highlands.3 
As a crisis with ecological, economic, and cultural dimensions, the Dustbowl drove 
American research and policy on soil in new directions which had global 
ramifications. Population growth in Africa too, and its relationship to environmental 
change also contributed to new ideas and policies.4  
But Lesotho’s experience with conservation, state-led and otherwise, did not 
begin with this surge of concern about the world’s soils. Historical sources mention 
eroded areas from the mid-1800s, but government-led conservation work in 
Lesotho began around 1903.5 Veterinary Department staff planted trees, cordoned 
off eroded areas, and explained erosion to people based on contemporary scientific 
knowledge. From the beginning, soil conservation intertwined with political 
changes in South Africa, a connection that influenced Lesotho in important ways. 
But like in the US, only an extreme event could raise national interest in erosion.  
                                                          
2 On circulation of scientific knowledge amongst social networks see Bruno Latour, Science in Action: 
How to follow scientists and engineers through society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 
179-83; Jacobs, Birders of Africa, 8-9, 102-03. 
3 Donald Worster, Dust Bowl: the Southern Plains in the 1930s (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1979); CAR 1933, pp. 8-9, 34-35. 
4 See Paul Sutter, Let Us Now Praise Famous Gullies: Providence Canyon and the Soils of the South 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2015); Anderson, “Depression, Dust Bowl,” 322-24. 
5 See especially, Germond, Chronicles of Basutoland. 
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It was Lesotho’s own dustbowl in 1932-33, known locally as Lerole (the 
Dust), that prompted new government research and intervention. Beginning as 
localized experiments in late 1935, Basutoland’s anti-erosion programs grew larger 
in the 1940s during the “second colonial occupation” when colonial administrations 
amplified efforts to modernize African agriculture.6 Combining physical and cultural 
approaches to combat erosion, the Europeans and Basotho who carried out these 
schemes transformed the ecological, cultural, and aesthetic characteristics of 
Lesotho’s landscape. The most visible manifestation of the schemes was the 
extensive network of terraces, grass strips, diversion furrows, and other structures. 
In Qacha’s Nek, erosion was less pronounced in the early 1900s, yet highlanders still 
faced ecological changes affecting the soil, especially vegetation change. The 
government dedicated few resources to conservation in Qacha’s Nek until the 
1940s. Although engineering structures were part of the program, the mountain 
approach focused more on cultural changes; namely, by reforming agricultural and 
pastoral practices as ways to regenerate vegetation.7  
In her well-known work, soil scientist and environmental historian Kate 
Showers evaluates Lesotho’s soil conservation schemes. She argues that the science 
behind the schemes was ill-conceived, purely imported from elsewhere, and 
implemented with no input from Basotho. For Showers, the physical structures 
                                                          
6 See John Lonsdale and D. Low, “Introduction: Towards the New Order 1945-1963,” in The Oxford 
History of East Africa, Vol. III, eds. D. Low and Alison Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 
12-16. 
7 Government efforts at cultural reforms aimed, in part, to cultivate biological materials like trees and 
grasses to conserve soil. The contrast with the physical/engineering approach will become clear. 
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exacerbated donga (gully) erosion by concentrating water in areas that had 
previously distributed runoff across wider spaces. I am primarily concerned with 
the social, cultural, and political parts of this argument rather than with the soil 
science evaluation. Contrary to Showers’ argument, the schemes in Lesotho never 
entirely abandoned the cultural, or holistic approach, and this was especially true in 
Qacha’s Nek.8  
The extent to which science becomes ideology in specific political contexts, 
such as under British colonialism where racially based assumptions of superiority 
underpinned most policies, is also part of my analysis. But assigning too much 
agency to an ideology like conservationism can mute important African voices. In 
Basutoland from 1903 until the 1950s, chiefs, agricultural demonstrators, writers, 
teachers, farmers, herders, laborers, both women and men, engaged in different 
ways, in a dynamic cultural and environmental process. People debated matters of 
land use and law, and worked to build new structures, implement new practices, 
and maintain older ones.9 
Other scholars have reconstructed stories of African resistance to soil 
conservation schemes, linking these episodes to anti-colonial politics. These 
                                                          
8 Showers, Imperial Gullies; See also, Kate Showers, “Soil Erosion in the Kingdom of Lesotho: Origins 
and Colonial Responses, 1830s-1950s,” Journal of Southern African Studies 15, no. 2 (1989): 263-86; 
Showers and Gwendolyn Malahleha, “Oral Evidence in Historical Environmental Impact Assessment: 
Soil Conservation in Lesotho in the 1930s and 1940s,” Journal of Southern African Studies 18, no. 2 
(1992): 276-96.  
9 Beinart, “Soil Erosion, Conservationism;” On agency, see Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 44-46. 
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sentiments did emerge in Lesotho, if far less so than in Tanganyika or Nyasaland.10 
Resistance in Lesotho was minimal in comparison, and seemed to have had more to 
do with local chieftain politics, control over one’s labor, and livelihood pursuits than 
anti-colonialism. The tensions between chiefs and commoners, amongst chiefs 
themselves, and between highlanders and lowlanders, illustrate how differing views 
on science, agriculture, and development emerged during these years.  
Looking at these tensions by focusing on how knowledge circulated also 
complicates our picture of what Mahmood Mamdani has called “decentralized 
despotism” in rural colonial Africa.11 Far from being pawns of the colonial state, 
Basotho leaders, in conversation with British officials, identified erosion as a serious 
ecological and economic problem. They discussed it in the Basutoland National 
Council (BNC) nearly thirty years before the national schemes began. Other Basotho 
read about erosion in Sesotho publications, wrote editorials in newspapers, worked 
on conservation gangs, or simply talked to demonstrators, chiefs, and neighbors.  
The wave of technical knowledge about soil and conservation emerging in 
the 1900s constituted a major expansion in what rural Basotho knew. This 
expansion, I argue, was an important historical process. Science, like all knowledge, 
is defined by the language and symbols of the network in which it circulates. The 
knowledge deployed in Basutoland had developed within specific standards of 
                                                          
10 On resistance, see Feierman, Peasant Intellectuals, 181-88; Pamela Maack, “’We Don’t Want 
Terraces!’: Protest & Identity under the Uluguru Land Usage Scheme,” in Custodians of the Land, 
Maddox et al., eds., 152-70; Mandala, Work and Control in a Peasant Economy; Wapulumuka Mulwafu, 
Conservation Song: A History of Peasant-State relations and the Environment in Malawi, 1860-2000 
(Cambridge: The White Horse Press, 2011). 
11 Mamdani, Citizen and Subject, 37-50. 
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observation, experiment, and documentation, but many Basotho participated in this 
network as both knowledge makers and as learners. European soil experts, at least 
some of them, were more responsive to African ecological and cultural conditions 
than has previously been acknowledged.12  
For Basotho, earlier experiences with rinderpest, sheep scab, and agricultural 
demonstration shaped how they understood science as well as what they came to 
expect from government interventions. The cultural approaches to soil 
conservation, too, such as rotational grazing opened up dialogs, often tense dialogs, 
about how to maintain what Emmanuel Kreike has called “environmental 
infrastructure.” By rethinking Lesotho’s experience with conservation in a global 
context, and examining how these schemes unfolded on the ground, not only do we 
improve our understanding of the ways older ideas about land management clashed 
and overlapped with new ideas, we also recognize the limits of transnational 
currents in science to effect change in local environments.13  
 
5.2 - Soil Science and Conservation: An International Overview 
Modern soil science emerged in the late nineteenth century. Of course, this 
field incorporated older knowledge and experiences. This was true of both soil 
classifications and the centrality of ecological relationships to soil formation and 
conservation. From ancient Mesoamerican and Chinese civilizations to West Africa 
                                                          
12 Latour, Science and Action, 179-83; Tilley, Africa as a Living Laboratory, 21-27. 
13 See Kreike, Environmental Infrastructure in African History. For a model of this more inclusive 
approach about overlapping knowledge in soil conservation, see Carswell, Cultivating Success, 49-68. 
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of more contemporary times, we know that humans have thought about and 
experimented with soil in myriad ways. But a specific modern soil science, which 
had close ties to market-based agricultural production, makes for a logical point of 
departure. It was because of its position within dominant networks of global 
political and economic power, especially colonial capitalism, that this science 
shaped Lesotho’s experience with government-led conservation the most.14  
Crucial developments came out of the United States. As chief of the US 
Department of Agriculture’s Bureau of Soils, Milton Whitney led the first national 
soil survey which was published in 1909. Whitney believed that the texture of soil 
mattered most in agriculture. Soil exhaustion, in Whitney’s view, was a myth. In 
contrast to Whitney, Franklin Hiram King showed how East Asian farmers used 
organic fertilizers to sustain agricultural production over time. In what became an 
influential book called Farmers of Forty Centuries (1911), King argued for intensive 
use of manures and legumes to fix nitrogen. Whitney’s retirement in 1927 and the 
Dustbowl in the 1930s stimulated new thinking about erosion and created new 
political space for a larger, more interventionist soil conservation bureaucracy.15 
Hugh Hammond Bennett embodied this interventionist approach, and 
became the most influential American on the transnational soil conservation scene. 
As an inspector for the southern portion of Whitney’s national survey Bennett 
                                                          
14 Jonathan Sandor et al., “The Heritage of Soil Knowledge Amongst the World’s Cultures,” in 
Warkentin, ed., Footprints, 43-80; Verena Winiwarter, “Soil Scientists in Ancient Rome,” in Footprints, 
2-4; Barbara Williams, “Aztec Soil Knowledge: Classes, Management, Ecology,” in Footprints, 18-20; 
Judith Carney, “Indigenous soil and water management in Senegambian rice farming systems,” 
Agriculture and Human Values 8, no. 1 (1991): 37-48. 
15 Sutter, Let Us Now Praise, 40-44. 
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worked in Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia. Through this work, he began to see 
erosion as a conjuncture of natural processes and human activity. Bennett argued 
that preventing erosion could only be done by educating land users, regulating land 
use through legislation, and building engineering works.16 A passionate speaker, 
Bennett studied soils across the United States as well as in Central America, South 
America, and Cuba. Bennett pushed soil towards the forefront of American 
conservation policy when he co-wrote Soil Erosion, A National Menace (1928).17  
In Soil Erosion, the authors explained how removing vegetation, crop 
residues, and trees exposed soil to wind and water. Farming, mining, grazing, and 
road building posed the greatest cultural threats. Bennett laid out the framework for 
the US Soil Conservation Service (SCS), formed during the New Deal in 1935. Soil 
Erosion also recommended rotational grazing and revegetation. Regarding 
engineering works, the authors acknowledged that dams, diversion furrows, and 
other structures would likely play prominent roles in future schemes, but stressed 
that revegetation was more important. It was later, during the ecological and 
economic uncertainty of the 1930s, that Bennett prioritized engineering. This 
methodological tension, between building physical structures to control water 
movement versus encouraging practices that would support trees and grasses to 
                                                          
16 Ibid., 49-51, 54-61; Beinart, "Soil Erosion, Conservationism," 56-57; Sarah Phillips, This Land, This 
Nation: Conservation, Rural America, and the New Deal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 136-40. 
17 Sutter, Let Us Now Praise, 59, 85; Hugh Bennett and W.R. Chapline, Soil Erosion, A National Menace 
(Washington: USDA, April 1928). 
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absorb water, would play out in conservation schemes in the US, Africa, and 
elsewhere.18 
South Africa, too, had a long experience with state conservation that 
influenced Lesotho. Ideas about conserving pasture, water, forests, and soils 
circulated within an expanding commercial agriculture. The nineteenth-century 
conservationist John Croumbie Brown believed that the severe drought periods of 
1820-23, 1845-47, and 1862-63 were linked to the loss of vegetative cover that had 
resulted from European and Africans extensively grazing livestock.19 Understanding 
the relationship between drought, vegetation change, water sheds, and pastoral 
practices became a dominant thread in southern African discourse in the early years 
of the twentieth century. Following Brown’s writings, scientists, farmers, and 
officials believed that South Africa would eventually become an uninhabitable 
desert. Their concerns about vegetation change and drought intensified while 
market agriculture grew after 1870, a time when the state sought to improve 
irrigation, especially as a way to support white farmers.20  
References to erosion in Basutoland first appeared in official publications 
within the context of irrigation that had important transnational dimensions. As the 
                                                          
18 Bennett and Chapline, Soil Erosion, 2-3, 23, 31-34; Phillips, This Land, This Nation, 45; Carswell, 
Cultivating Success, 55-61; Anderson, Eroding the Commons, 157-67; TNA, DO 35/916/16, Russell 
Thornton, "A review of 7 years work in the High Commission Territories," 23 February 1942.  
19 Richard Grove, “Scottish Missionaries, Evangelical Discourses and the Origins of Conservation 
Thinking in Southern Africa 1820-1900,” Journal of Southern African Studies 15, no. 2 (1989): 163-87; 
See also, Saul Dubow, ed., Science and Society in southern Africa (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2000), 1-10; Beinart, Rise of Conservation, 99-105. 
20 For example, Francis Kanthack, "Irrigation Development in the Cape Colony: Past, Present, and 
Future," Agricultural Journal of the Cape of Good Hope 24, no. 6 (1909): 645-57; Smith Cormack, 
"Settlement in South Africa," The Sun & Agricultural Journal of South Africa 15 (January, 1924): 54-58; 
Keegan; Rural Transformations, 198-99; Beinart, Rise of Conservation, 158-59, 175-82. 
 270 
 
Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) ended, Cape Colony government officials sought ways 
to reconstruct the country and to assure that poor whites had economic 
opportunities in agriculture. State-sponsored irrigation schemes, planners argued, 
could alleviate this political problem by appropriating African lands and reclaiming 
it for white settlement.21 To research the potential for irrigation in 1901, the Cape 
government commissioned the British civil engineer William Willcocks, who had 
recently overseen the first Aswan Dam on the Nile River in Egypt. Willcocks argued 
that irrigation needed to be a core part of development plans in South Africa, and he 
believed that the government ought to play a central role. 22 
During his tour of southern Africa Willcocks visited Basutoland where he 
became more concerned with soil erosion than with irrigation. Willcocks claimed 
that the friable soils were eroding away, especially where “numerous roads, paths, 
and cattle tracks scour away the ground, and cut the country into deep ravines.” He 
believed that if the “very serious erosion” continued as it had over the preceding 
thirty years, “the loss to the country would be incalculable.” Willcocks prescribed a 
blend of physical and biological fixes to mitigate the problem. He recommended 
building stone weirs across the gullies while planting willow and poplar trees in the 
wet ravines, and wattles and aloes in the dry ones.23 
                                                          
21 Sir Alfred Milner to Mr. Chamberlin, 29 September 1902, cited in Cecil Headlam, The Milner Papers: 
South Africa, 1899-1905, Vol. 2 (London: Cassell & Co., 1933), 278-80; Beinart, Rise of Conservation, 
176-77. 
22 “Sir W. Willcocks, Engineer, Is Dead" New York Times, 29 July 1932, Accessed 1 August 2016. 
http://search.proquest.com.   
23 Willcocks, “Report on Irrigation in South Africa,” 30-34. 
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As another key figure who publicized irrigation and soil conservation, the 
engineer Francis Kanthack applied his knowledge of water sheds in the Punjab 
region of India to his studies of southern Africa. The Cape colonial government 
appointed Kanthack as Director of Irrigation in 1906. From this position he argued 
for increased state intervention. Apart from his experience in India, Kanthack 
followed developments in forestry and irrigation in France, Germany, and the 
United States.24 In the “destruction of forests,” which Kanthack took to mean 
grasslands too, “man is everywhere the trouble…with the resources of Nature he has 
by burning [sic], felling, lopping, barking, over-grazing, or other maltreatment.” He 
insisted that afforestation, in part, could prevent the erosion in highlands that had 
caused flooding and destruction of agricultural lands in the past on nearly every 
continent. Although Kanthack focused on the Cape and scarcely mentioned 
Basutoland, his ideas about watersheds and the human role in destroying or 
conserving them, intersected with powerful political forces as officials forged the 
Union of South Africa.25  
The question of incorporating Basutoland into the Union was neither new in 
1910 nor would it disappear when the Union was established. Basotho leaders 
feared that incorporation would damage their political and cultural institutions such 
as the chieftainship, and most of all, threaten their territorial integrity by opening 
Basutoland to foreign settlers and mineral prospectors. The British High 
                                                          
24 C. Plug, “Kanthack, Mr. Francis Edgar,” Biographical Database of Southern African Science,” 
Accessed on 1 August 2016. http://www.s2a3.org.za/bio; Beinart, Rise of Conservation, 180-82. 
25 Francis Kanthack, “The Destruction of Mountain Vegetation: Its Effects upon the Agricultural 
Conditions in the Valleys,” Agricultural Journal of the Cape of Good Hope 33, no. 2 (1908): 194-204. 
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Commissioner (HC) Lord Selborne assured Basotho that their mountain kingdom 
would not be incorporated into the Union, at least not in 1910.26 Speaking at a 
national pitso (public meeting) in March 1909, Selborne announced that there was 
“no thought of that [incorporation] whatever.” But he followed with the caveat: “but 
I also think that this plan cannot last forever… the time must come, and it will be 
good for South Africa and good for Basutoland if the whole is looked after by one 
Governor-General.”27 Scholars have confirmed that South African and British 
officials sought to bolster the flow of cheap labor from Basutoland to the mines, but 
the ecological dimensions of the relationship must not be overlooked. For irrigation 
to play a prominent role in the Union’s future, Willcocks and Kanthack argued, the 
Basutoland government must intervene to control erosion which the engineers 
believed increased silt loads in the river catchments.28   
The 1919 drought caused economic and ecological damage in South Africa 
that stimulated state-sponsored research and subsequent shifts in conservation 
policy. Like Kanthack and Willcocks, the chairman of the Drought Commission 
Heinrich Du Toit admired American conservation research and policy.29 Following 
his service to the Boer cause in the Anglo-Boer War, Du Toit became concerned 
                                                          
26 TNA, CO 646, “Speech delivered by His Excellency the High Commissioner at the Pitso held at 
Maseru on the 2nd March, 1909,” in BNC Sessional Papers, 1909. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Kimble, Migrant Labour, 1-7; Eldredge, South African Kingdom, 187-92; Thabane, "Aspects of 
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about the future of Afrikaner agriculture. He traveled to the US in 1902 where he 
learned about the latest in farming machinery and irrigation. He empathized with 
Teddy Roosevelt and his perspectives on organized conservation. Du Toit also 
visited Mexico and Panama before returning home. In 1920 the Union government 
appointed him chairman of the Drought Commission.30  
The Commission compiled their findings from interviews, mostly with white 
land users, and from field surveys and reports by a regional cast of scientists and 
administrators. According to the report, parts of South Africa had always been dry, 
but “since the white man has been in South Africa enormous tracts of country have 
been entirely or partially denuded of their original vegetation, with the result that 
rivers, vleis [marsh] and water holes described by old travelers have dried up or 
disappeared.” Scientists found that mean annual rainfall had not changed in recent 
times, but they did identify shifts in the nature and incidence of rainfall: changes 
that they believed humans and animals had effected by removing vegetation. The 
Commission believed, too, that vegetation loss led to sheet and donga erosion. 
Erosion, they claimed, was extending rapidly over much of the Union, and so, 
“prompt action was therefore imperative.”31  
At the heart of the report, authors argued that small stock farmers, who had 
experienced the greatest economic losses in 1919, served as the main cultural 
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Bowl: Dryland Agriculture and Soil Erosion in the United States and South Africa, 1900-1950,” 
Environmental History 4, no. 2 (1999): 245-66. 
31 Final Report of the Drought Investigation Commission (Cape Town: Cape Times Limited, 
Government Printers, 1923), 3-4, 14-15; See also, DuToit, Drought Investigation Interim Report, 7-10, 
17-26. 
 274 
 
catalyst for accelerating erosion. Commissioners acknowledged that erosion 
occurred on cultivated land too, but they focused their data collection on veld 
(pasture) erosion.32 Most farmers corralled (kraaled) their sheep and goats in order 
to protect them from predatory jackals. Shepherds, by necessity, had to drive the 
animals from the kraal daily in order to reach adequate grass and water. From this 
perspective, the animals required more energy and feed than was necessary. They 
also trampled grass along the way and destroyed vegetation in and around kraals. 
During drought years, where some water holes dried up and grazing was scarcer, 
livestock struggled to maintain health on long treks to eat and drink, leaving 
themselves vulnerable to illness, parasites, and pre-mature death. Apart from losing 
stock, this constellation of factors exposed more soil to the erosive power of water 
and wind.33        
To mitigate this cycle of vegetation change, erosion, drought, and livestock 
losses, the commission recommended that farming communities work cooperatively 
to exterminate the jackal to remove the said impetus for kraaling. The government 
would provide cheap materials and favorable loans for European farmers to erect 
fences along property boundaries and to divide their lands into paddocks where 
they could rotate their stock in calculated ways. Farmers needed to develop their 
water resources too. Not least, the commission recommended that the Union 
government create a Department of Reclamation to control soil erosion. Farmers 
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from affected areas who were interviewed said that they believed it was time that 
an official be appointed who could advise them on soil erosion. The government 
would also create tree nurseries to encourage tree planting as a central part of 
erosion prevention and reclamation efforts.34  
Similar to the United States prior to the Dust Bowl, the state was still limited 
in terms of investing in filling-in dongas and building conservation works. The 
emphasis here was on encouraging practical reforms. To promote cultural changes 
in this regard, the commission recommended more state support for agricultural 
education and demonstration work (See Chap. 4), an initiative which extended into 
Lesotho in addition to African reserves and white farm areas.35 The commission, 
however, gathered limited data on Basutoland. But the few references to Basutoland 
underscored that Union officials believed that the territory’s ecological and cultural 
changes needed to be better understood because of Basutoland’s vital importance to 
regional water supplies.36  
Among the officials who responded to Du Toit’s written request for input 
were Frank Verney and Laurie Wacher, Basutoland’s principal veterinary surgeon 
and agricultural officer respectively. Both men agreed that kraaling and extensive 
grazing were standard practices in Lesotho, and that soil erosion was a serious 
problem. Verney opined that there was “no part of South Africa where the 
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commission could observe the true lessons of erosion better than in Basutoland.”37 
It is unclear on what basis he made such claims, but by 1920 Verney had traveled 
widely in rural Basutoland, especially while building up the sheep-dip 
infrastructure. For Verney, planting poplar and willow trees was the only effective 
method. Wacher seconded Verney’s emphasis on trees, elaborating that certain 
trees thrived on the donga bottoms (willows and poplars), while others did well on 
drier banks (wild cherry and American aloe). Wacher also indicated that preserving 
local vegetation, and experimenting with new grasses was useful as animal forage 
and to protect soil. Both men, however, doubted state-led programs and agreed with 
the commission that governments ought to prioritize educative approaches.38 
The Drought Commission Report portrayed a regional context that was at 
once localized and enmeshed in transnational discourses about erosion and 
conservation. Outside of southern Africa and the United States, the Colonial Office in 
London took interest in soil erosion and conservation in colonial areas. In the first 
three decades of the 1900s the British had prioritized agricultural commodity 
production in their territories, but an important shift occurred in the 1930s.39 
Fueled by perceptions of ecological decline and population growth, especially in 
East Africa, and underpinned by new research into African agricultural systems and 
ecology, the Colonial Office turned more attention towards addressing 
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environmental and socioeconomic problems.40 New farming and livestock policies 
aimed at creating sustainable farming communities as a way to slow urbanization in 
cities like Nairobi, Kenya and Kampala, Uganda. This political motive for reforming 
agricultural policy had been a driving force in South Africa and Lesotho since the 
1910s, as evidenced by the native agricultural colleges and demonstration 
programs. Although these policy shifts took various shapes, addressing soil erosion 
was a common item that linked the official conservation agendas in east and 
southern Africa to developments elsewhere in the British Empire.41  
Individuals often helped create these links. Frank Stockdale, as a prominent 
example, began his career with the colonial agricultural service in Ceylon before 
becoming the leading authority on soil erosion in the British Empire. From 1916 to 
1929 Stockdale and the agricultural department in Ceylon worked to prevent soil 
erosion in the island’s tropical hills where the creation of tea and rubber estates had 
caused deforestation and consequent soil erosion. They experimented with contour 
walls, drains, and pits. In 1931 Stockdale toured East Africa to see the erosion there, 
continuing on to South Africa to observe the nascent conservation programs 
underway. Like others in his cohort of soil experts, he also visited the United States 
in 1937. He marveled at the achievements of the US Soil Conservation Service: the 
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prolific scientific research, the deployment of trained experts, and the scale of the 
state-led interventions.42  
In 1935 Stockdale and other members of the Colonial Advisory Council on 
Agriculture and Animal Health (CAC) had called for full-time soil erosion officers in 
each East and Central African territory. While East Africa was noted as the most 
eroded area, the CAC also referenced Ceylon, Nigeria, Jamaica, Palestine, and among 
other places, Basutoland. The CAC insisted that, from then on, colonial 
administrations in the territories treat soil erosion as a “major question of policy.” 
Stockdale, like Bennett in the US, knew that more localized research on the natural 
and cultural processes behind erosion was needed to carry out conservation 
schemes successfully, but he still felt they knew enough to move forward.43 
G.V. Jacks and R.O. Whyte of the Imperial Bureau of Soil Science published 
The Rape of the Earth: A World Survey of Soil Erosion in 1939 to convince the public 
of the urgency to act on soil erosion on a global scale. The book popularized erosion 
as an environmental problem with political and social dimensions. Readers, 
especially policy makers, could browse photos that depicted dust storms on the 
Great Plains, rice terraces in Java, drainage furrows in Texas, and gullies in 
Basutoland. The authors acknowledged Basutoland for its seemingly successful in-
progress conservation schemes. Perhaps more importantly, they alerted readers of 
possible political consequences of erosion. Because the headwaters of the Orange 
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River were in Basutoland’s mountains, Jacks explained that “the occupiers of 
Basutoland could … hold South Africa to ransom.”44 This statement speaks to the 
alarmist tone of Rape of the Earth, but it also articulated the importance of regional 
and local politics, culture, and geography in conservation planning. The 
transnational currents of knowledge affected each of the many cases that Jacks and 
Whyte reviewed in 1939. Yet each place also had their own experience with erosion 
and state-led conservation schemes. 
 
5.3 - Soil and Erosion in Early-Twentieth Century Basutoland  
 Soil mattered to the Basotho who selected settlement sites in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. It mattered, too, for where erosion occurred, to what 
extent, and how conservation measures proceeded from place to place. Lesotho is 
part of a tectonic formation called the Karoo Basin, which covers much of South 
Africa. Within the Karoo, the Lesotho Formation covers most of Basutoland with the 
exception of the northern and western lowland parts of the country and some parts 
of the Senqu Valley. These areas, generally under 7000 feet are part of the Clarens 
formation.45 Soil formations have specific geological characteristics, namely the type 
of parent material. Most soils in the lowlands and foothills came from sedimentary 
rocks in the Clarens formation. By contrast, places at elevations above 3000m 
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contain soils formed from igneous basalt. Apart from the nature of parent material, 
the amount of organic matter in particular soil types depended on various factors 
such as slope, sun exposure, elevation, average temperatures, and vegetative 
cover.46  
The authors of a 1987 soil survey of Lesotho drew on earlier soil studies 
when they identified eleven distinct soil series by specific names, which they then 
classified under broader scientific categories. For instance, the Fusi series had 
formed from basaltic alluvium in mountain valleys under dense grass cover, and had 
subsequently been covered with topsoil washed from surrounding slopes. Along 
with four other local types, the Fusi series fell under the mollisol classification, a soil 
group characterized by a dark humus surface layer. Other categories, defined by 
their parent material and formation processes were inceptisols, vertisols, and 
entisols.47  
When Staples and Hudson conducted their ecological survey in 1936 they 
recorded only basic characteristics of soil horizons: color, depth, and permeability. 
From the agronomic perspective, Staples and Hudson also analyzed levels of 
nitrogen, potash, and phosphorus in samples from mountain locations. As a primary 
source of knowledge that would inform government soil conservationists, the 
survey’s findings were helpful yet did not account for the important micro-
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environmental characteristics so prevalent in the Maloti. But the survey team did 
raise key issues of ecological diversity such as soil’s chemical content, and 
vegetation and precipitation patterns.48 Lesotho, for its small size, contained a wide 
variety of soils, each with its own advantages and disadvantages to farmers, 
builders, and livestock owners. Soil erosion, as a mesh of natural and cultural 
processes occurred unevenly across Lesotho, as did the schemes to mitigate it.49  
Just as surveyors and soil scientists have classified Lesotho’s soils, Basotho 
land managers had also developed a terminology for soils. According to M. 
Molelekoa Mohapi, a Mosotho author who wrote a Sesotho text called Temo ea 
Boholo-holo Lesotho (Traditional Agriculture in Lesotho) in 1956, Basotho farmers 
distinguished between two main types of soil.50 On the one hand was selokoe (wet 
soil) and on the other was lehlabathe (sand). Farmers separated selokoe into three 
sub-classifications of soil based on its color and capacity to hold water. Each type of 
wet soil could be found in specific places and could support specific crops. Selokoe se 
sesootho (brown soil) drained water well, and was also the most widespread type in 
Basutoland. In it, farmers grew sorghum, sweet reed, melons, and beans. People 
sought selokoe se setšo (black soil) in or near reed beds, where they sowed wheat, 
pumpkins, peas, and lentils. They also collected black soil to dry and make a kind of 
brick used in building. A final type of wet earth, blue soil (selokoe se seputsoa) was 
                                                          
48 Staples and Hudson, Ecological Survey, 10-11; Showers, Imperial Gullies, 46-47; Driver, “Theory and 
Politics,” 105-10. 
49 James McCann, “Soil Matters: Erosion and Empire in Greater Lesotho, 1830-1990," in McCann, 
Green Land, Brown Land, Black Land, 141-45. 
50 This discussion draws mostly on Mohapi, Temo ea Boholo, 22-24. I confirmed some terms during 
my field research through working and discussing these concepts with farmers in Qacha’s Nek. 
 282 
 
less desirable, but Mohapi claims that farmers usually sowed crops based on 
immediate food needs rather than according to ideal soil types.51  
Basotho classified lehlabathe (sand) in two sub-types according to color: red 
and yellow. Maize and potatoes could grow in the sandy soils with adequate rain, 
but the brown and black soils worked better during drier times. A final earthen type, 
letsopa (clay) provided an important building material. People dug letsopa from 
designated pits in or around villages, adding cattle and horse dung, to make molilo 
(dung plaster).52 Basotho soil classifications reflected utility, but these 
classifications also show a systematic understanding of agro-ecology and the central 
place of soil in that ecology.  
Basotho land managers, like their European counterparts in South Africa, 
noticed changes in this ecology. Most written evidence that we have showing 
Basotho concerns of erosion comes from members of the Basutoland National 
Council, and to some extent, from Sesotho language newspapers too. The minutes of 
BNC proceedings cannot fully explain what people knew and did not know about 
soil erosion. These voices, however, do provide texture to this story by giving us a 
sense of how Basotho and Europeans discussed erosion, where erosion was 
happening and where it was not.  As chiefs and other prominent Basotho, most BNC 
members managed land across the territory, and interacted with commoners at 
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public meetings, especially local grazing supervisors, farmers, stockowners, and 
builders.  
In the BNC, matters of land use, labor, and finance intertwined with 
knowledge of soil erosion and possible approaches to conservation. In his opening 
address to the first session of the BNC in July 1903, resident commissioner Herbert 
Sloley said that “the dongas in the country are a serious evil, and you should speak 
of means for checking them.” Drawing on Willcocks’ recommendations from the 
1901 irrigation report, Sloley reiterated that “the planting of trees will improve the 
country.” A chief from Maseru district agreed, but issues of law and migrant passes 
dominated the agenda at that first meeting.53 But that same year, the veterinary 
department under Frank Verney built stone walls across gullies in Mafeteng district 
as an experimental project.54  
Five years later the department took steps in all districts to begin similar 
experiments, establishing four tree nurseries.55 In 1910 the assistant commissioner 
in Qacha’s Nek requested seeds for black and silver wattle, explaining that many 
chiefs were requesting seedlings. Chiefs in Qacha’s Nek sought support for planting 
trees even at this early stage when soil erosion was a relatively minor problem 
there. Undoubtedly, the chiefs’ desire for fuel wood, and for building material for 
bigger architectural styles also drove their desire for trees.56 
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When the Basutoland government created the new Department of 
Agriculture in 1911 with Laurie Wacher at the helm, many Basotho and other 
observers believed soil erosion to be a problem in the lowland and foothill areas.57 
The Maloti, as Verney reported to the Drought Commission in 1921, had thus far 
“escaped this persecution.” But Verney also speculated that severe erosion would 
accelerate in the mountains where the ecological impact of more people, more 
cultivated fields, and more animals would be accentuated by the “more violent 
agencies of snow, greater extremes of heat and cold and thunder storms.”58 From his 
new position, Wacher led efforts to prevent and reclaim dongas, starting in Maseru 
district. With the cooperation of local chiefs and Basotho laborers, the conservation 
crews fenced-in dongas in which they built stone dams and planted willow, pine, 
cherry, aloe, and prickly pear.59  
Meanwhile, near the town of Teyateyaneng, a crew created an experimental 
enclosure on “a piece of land very badly cut into by dongas” where they planted 
some 30,000 poplar and willow trees.60 The department carried out these initial 
efforts on a shoestring budget and the schemes were limited in scale, but this work 
still demonstrated a belief in afforestation as the primary way to conserve soil in the 
1910s. Although some chiefs supported afforestation, Wacher complained of an 
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“apathy and indifference of the natives to the evils of soil erosion and to the 
question of afforestation generally.”61  
What Wacher saw as apathy was not simply laziness. The ways in which the 
schemes unfolded from 1912 suggest that motivating people to plant and maintain 
trees involved a cultural change about which chiefs and commoners alike were 
uneasy, though not necessarily resistant to. During WW I the schemes slowed when 
several thousand Basotho and Wacher too, served the British war effort in Europe. 
Government expenditures remained fairly constant through the war years because 
the entire Basutoland budget for agriculture, education, public works etc. came from 
locally generated revenues, especially a hut tax on all married men and a customs 
duty. Erosion persisted during the war and so too did public discourse on the 
problem.62 
Phillip Molise, a counselor from Maseru, spoke to the BNC about erosion in 
1916. Molise said that Basotho lose much through “the washing away of our land” 
and that the “difficulty had always been money.” He continued, “I am speaking of the 
government money because the dongas have increased…it is a pity that the matter 
was not brought forward earlier, now the country is full of them.” Molise argued that 
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the matter had become too important for Basotho alone to manage and that “we 
must now cry to the government for help.” Trees, he believed, were important for 
the soil and as fuel, but he added that the problem was goats because they ate the 
trees once they were planted.63  
The matter of goats represented a larger interplay of local culture and 
economy with conservation science. Molise had presumably singled out goats and 
not cattle or sheep because the former tended to grazed more indiscriminately, 
leaving no stubble behind. One counselor suggested that all goats be removed to the 
mountains so that trees could thrive in the eroded lowlands. Another man 
disagreed, insisting that “we prefer goats to trees” because many people live from 
milking them, especially poorer people. RC Sloley concurred, saying that people 
used goats to feed children. The consensus was that both trees and goats (and other 
livestock) could coexist in new conservation systems. But the question of how to 
integrate afforestation with the Sesotho leboella system (See Chap. 1), in which local 
chiefs regulated access to certain spaces around villages, was less clear. Leboella 
spaces included areas in between cultivated fields and around paths and roads 
where erosion was most acute, but did not extend to open commonage.64 
So where could people raise trees to stabilize soil and provide fuel wood? 
Sloley proposed that villages establish tree plantations on rocky grounds that were 
used for neither grazing nor cultivation, and also in dongas. He suggested that the 
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government might partially pay for fencing material for those that wanted to protect 
young trees. The paramount chief responded that even gardens and trees planted in 
rocky areas technically belonged to chiefs; a point which raised important issues 
about potentially new types of property and new forms of labor. If a person planted 
and maintained trees in a common area, did that make them his to use or sell? 
Would chiefs have the right to call on letsema labor for conservation work? Molise 
and others had also asked for the government to provide expertise on donga 
prevention and reclamation. James MacGregor, an author, translator, and colonial 
official with thirty years’ experience in the administration, told the BNC that the 
government had meant for initial afforestation projects to pass knowledge on to 
Basotho about which species to put where and how to plant and maintain the 
various species. Advocates hoped that common Basotho could then do the work by 
planting seedlings obtained from government nurseries.65  
Conservation workers earned small wages for their efforts at first, but now, 
Sloley insisted that chiefs needed to lead the way by calling out letsema to plant 
trees. Some chiefs agreed that people would oblige this use of letsema, while others 
protested. A chief from Maseru district said bluntly: “the dongas are deep and the 
government should be responsible for the work…people may respond to one work 
order from the chiefs but otherwise they won’t do it.” He reminded the council that 
building walls and planting trees was arduous work. People had to “quarry stone 
and carry it to the sloot [gully] on sledges.” Repeatedly digging holes for seedlings 
                                                          
65 Ibid.  
 288 
 
made for a long day’s work too. This demand on commoners’ labor, alongside the 
anti-burweed campaigns that were happening concurrently, seemed unreasonable 
to most Basotho. This was likely not only because they wanted cash for certain types 
of labor, but it was probably unclear to many people how their work would protect 
soil, let alone foster broader prosperity. At the close of the 1916 BNC proceedings, 
the relationship between property, labor, and conservation remained uncertain.66 
Following the South African Drought Commission’s recommendations in 
1923, Basutoland’s Department of Agriculture expanded its reach, but soil 
conservation remained part of a broader effort to change land-use practices rather 
than one of state-led engineering schemes. The government launched the 
agricultural demonstration program in 1924 for this purpose. Basotho 
demonstrators showed people about trees, manuring, gardening, and contour 
plowing. For instance, demonstrators showed people that by using animal manure 
in fields and gardens, instead of drying and burning it as fuel, farmers could sustain 
soil fertility and improve harvests. Conservation experts in the transnational sphere 
stressed the importance of adopting this practice. But for Basotho, especially 
mountain dwellers, dried manure (lisu) was often the only available fuel, or at least 
the easiest fuel to obtain.67  
For conservationists, trees were the obvious answer to this problem. In some 
places, tree planting did accelerate, especially where people appropriated certain 
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cultivars for their own purposes. For instance, under Chief Makhaola of Qacha’s Nek 
who generally supported afforestation, many people cultivated American aloe 
(Agave americana) to create enclosures for their livestock (See Figure 5.1). 
 
 
 
 
Arranged in various patterns, these giant aloe plants mark the landscape through 
much of Lesotho.68 But like in the 1920s of the United States, the Basutoland 
government devoted relatively few financial and human resources towards soil 
conservation. Still, there were those Basotho who continued efforts by planting 
trees and organizing work parties. Others wrote in Leselinyana to publicize the 
problem and to urge action, complementing what Wacher wrote in propaganda 
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Figure 5.1 
Leseling Village, Qacha’s Nek 
Note: the aloe enclosures cultivated behind the 
village and between homesteads. 
Photo by author, May 2015 
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pamphlets that were translated into Sesotho and distributed to farmers. But 
knowledge of erosion on the national scale was still limited. No comprehensive 
surveys of Lesotho’s ecological base had yet been done in 1930.69 
In May 1931 Russell Thornton, then the Director of Native Agriculture in 
South Africa, conducted the first such survey of Basutoland at the request of the 
British High Commission. He toured the lowlands and a sliver of the mountain areas 
in order to assess the feasibility of establishing a pasture experiment station and a 
reclamation service “as a means of improving the natural pasture, checking pasture 
denudation, and consequent soil erosion.” He believed that Lesotho’s soil was some 
of the most fertile and well-watered in South Africa. He concluded, however, that 
sheet and gully erosion were “rife throughout the lowlands,” much of the best soil 
having already “found its way to the sea.” Unless checked, the rest of the soil was 
sure to follow.70  
As for the highlands, Thornton reported that erosion was minor compared to 
the lowlands. But he also wrote that people were plowing steep slopes as they 
abandoned other fields that had been overcome by weeds. He never traveled to 
Qacha’s Nek, but to see a similar highland environment he did visit the area around 
Maletsunyane Falls. Bitter-karoo bush (Chrysocoma tenuifolia), according to 
Thornton, had displaced native grasses in over grazed areas, but the plant still 
helped anchor soil to steep mountain slopes, if less so than grass. He recommended 
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that the Department of Agriculture in Basutoland continue its demonstration work, 
donga reclamation, and stock improvement programs, but he also suggested more 
legal proclamations to overhaul Basotho land use practices. He argued that if the 
Scab Act of 1923 had led to the elimination of sheep scab through compulsory 
dipping, then new proclamations could effectively force people to build fences and 
rotate grazing between paddocks, limit the number of stock a man could own, and 
prevent farmers from plowing steep slopes. Thornton asserted that overhauling the 
system of "communal farming which is recognized as the worst system in the world, 
as it stifles all individual effort whether for the betterment of stock, grazing, or 
agricultural practice….would largely solve these difficulties.”71 
Thornton’s report provides a historical snapshot of only a few places in 
Basutoland. Yet more importantly, his misconceptions draw attention to several 
important realities. First, he drew his conclusions by observing a seasonal landscape 
in late May, a time when herders began returning most livestock to the villages for 
the cold winter months, leaving the heavily grazed high pastures behind to 
regenerate for the following year. Typically people awaited the harvest during this 
time, leaving little activity in the fields for him to observe. Second, the land tenure 
system was not communal in the strict sense. Chiefs were supposed to regulate 
residential spaces, who plowed which fields, and what animals grazed which 
pastures around the village, and at what time of year. Pastures in the higher cattle 
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post country was another matter entirely, as will be shown.72 Though he agreed 
with Thornton in theory, the resident commissioner at that time, J.C. Sturrock 
counter argued that pushing for freehold tenure without broad support from the 
Basotho would do more harm than good. Not only would it outrage the chiefs, but it 
would leave many people without land and thus, without an incentive to learn about 
or participate in soil conservation activities.73  
Lastly, Thornton failed to recognize that plowing new fields on steep slopes 
had little to do with laziness and everything to do demography and economy. 
Despite population growth, there was a shortage of motivated labor. The population 
of Qacha’s Nek, including the area that became Mokhotlong district, had nearly 
tripled between 1911 and 1936, from 36,000 residents to near 95,000. Some of the 
increase came from people migrating from the lowlands and from South Africa to 
seek new residences along with field allocations and access to cattle posts.74 
Oscillating labor migration to South Africa, as a percentage of total population, had 
increased by 10% between 1911 and 1936. Absentee men were not present at home 
to perform the tasks that Thornton believed were essential to improved farming, 
especially plowing several times per year and planting cover crops to control weeds 
and fix nitrogen. Instead, many fields sat fallow in the winter after being grazed 
down to stubble, allowing weeds to flourish. Before the plow revolution and when 
arable lands were more abundant, people did abandon old fields to plow new ones. 
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But by 1930, deep plowing with draft power, especially on the steep slopes of the 
Maloti, had amplified the ecological impact of the practice.75 
Sturrock claimed that the current budget could not support a new 
experiment station, but he still believed that Basotho leaders should consider 
Thornton’s recommendations. Some chiefs agreed with him. Chief Makhaola, 
according to Sturrock, “was very fully alive to the danger, and to the extent to which 
the loss of pasture had already occurred.” Sturrock suggested that Makhaola, among 
others, wanted to modify existing grazing practices to improve vegetation and soil 
stability. While considering the limited historical material for precisely documenting 
ecological change, there seems little doubt that officials as well as a diverse group of 
land users in Lesotho and South Africa believed that erosion posed an obstacle to 
their agrarian aspirations. Although there was support for some aspects of a 
conservation program, the Basutoland government lacked the financial and human 
resources to begin an extensive anti-erosion effort before 1935.76 
 
 
5.4 - Crisis, Collecting Data, and Conservation Planning, 1932-1936  
  As Christmas of 1933 approached, Basotho looked forward to 1934. As one 
Mosotho wrote, “we wave our delightful farewell to the passing year… a year of 
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hardships, distress, and misery.”77 Wool and mohair prices had plunged after 1929, 
shrinking Lesotho’s main export industry. For other families, the slump in gold, coal, 
or other commodity prices meant less work and remittances from men working in 
South Africa.78 Then, the worst drought in living memory began in Basutoland in 
1932. Farmers had sown crops in a dry spring in 1932. After a sprinkling of mid-
summer rains, the drought continued. In autumn 1933 some farmers reaped barely 
enough grain to last the winter. Others reaped nothing at all. The winter came and 
the winds blew the desiccated soil from pastures and fields, swirling dust 
everywhere.79 
 People scrambled to survive. Women scoured the countryside in vain for any 
edible greens and roots. Many Basotho fled to towns, or into South Africa to search 
for work or assistance from relatives. Government officials planned relief efforts to 
feed the hungry. In government sponsored food-for-work programs, able-bodied 
people built small dams, repaired roads, and stabilized dongas in exchange for 
maize meal rations. Men and women who could not work received rations too. 
People who had sheep and goats to spare slaughtered them for food and shared the 
meat within village social networks.80  
According to official reports, the Famine Relief Department assisted people 
in all districts except Qacha’s Nek, where officials believed people were better off.  
This lesser impact owed, in part, to a fair wheat harvest in 1933 and the 
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slaughtering of small stock, which were more numerous in the mountains. Still, 
some highlanders complained that they too deserved assistance. When heavy rains 
arrived in November and December 1933, the government loaned 30 lbs. of maize 
seed to each farmer to insure a good harvest for the following year.81 But few people 
sowed the seed. The hungriest people ate it, while others reported that their draft 
oxen had died in the drought or were simply too weak to plow. Some people argued 
that the government could do more.82 
 The experience of drought and famine in 1933 had profound impact on how 
Basutoland’s anti-erosion programs unfolded with respect to culture, politics, and 
ecology. Ecological changes had occurred. Small stock declined by over 500,000 
animals because people had eaten so many sheep and goats. In Qacha’s Nek of 1934,  
stockowners possessed only 33% of the small stock that they had in 1931. Cattle 
struggled to subsist on parched pastures and dried-up watering holes. Officials 
estimated that 120,000 cattle died during 1933 and owners sold another 30,000 to 
buyers in the Union.83 Although people lamented the loss of animals, officials 
pointed out that the destocking had a “beneficial effect on the pasturage, and areas 
that looked like permanent deserts were now one waving mass of grass.”84 
 The drought also helped shift conversations about government interventions 
into rural lives. While some critics scorned the government for its inept relief 
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efforts, other people thanked it for the food-for-work, or just for the food. In terms 
of stimulating public interest and government initiative, this drought was for 
Basutoland what the 1919 drought was for South Africa. Members of the BNC 
argued that the government should strengthen agricultural education initiatives, 
improve livestock and pastures, and prevent soil erosion.85 In addition to national 
political discourse, Christian missions became more involved in farming and erosion 
control than in the past. Especially in Qacha’s Nek, Lerole created an opportunity for 
Catholics to expand into areas where the government had devoted few resources for 
famine relief. It was in this period that the Catholics accelerated their program for 
social action by espousing the virtues of agriculture and self-help. After 1933, anti-
erosion featured in this program too.86  
But Catholic leaders and political groups too, believed that the government 
should invest more to improve rural lives. Basutoland Progressive Association 
(BPA) members echoed calls by government and mission leaders for agricultural 
improvement to protect against future shocks. They also advocated for overhauls of 
the political system in which they believed that chiefs obstructed development by 
abusing letsema, neglecting their land regulatory duties, and collecting excessive 
taxes.87 Lekhotla la Bafo (council of the commoners) took a more political economic 
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approach, arguing that the drought and famine was first and foremost, a 
consequence of imperial (British and South African) exploitation of Basotho people, 
sheep, and pastures. Although LLB members were skeptical of financial assistance 
from London, they believed that the Basutoland government could use tax revenues, 
including proceeds from the wool export duty, to improve rural lives.88  
   Despite political differences, evidence suggests that many secular and 
church leaders believed that the government should lead anti-erosion efforts, which 
meant developing agriculture and livestock in ways that would foster both economic 
prosperity and ecological stability.89 How to achieve these ends was less clear. After 
the drought the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs in London commissioned the 
economist Alan Pim to report on the financial and economic position of Basutoland. 
In October 1934 Pim embarked on a fact-finding mission with Mr. S. Milligan, the 
representative in South Africa of the Empire Cotton Growing Corporation. Pim 
toured Basutoland’s populated lowlands and the highlands too, also traveling to the 
Transkei to see the agricultural colleges at Tsolo and Fort Cox. He reviewed 
Basutoland’s revenues, expenditures, and industries, especially agriculture and 
wool, to present possibilities for development.90  
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Pim claimed that Basutoland faced two main obstacles to improving 
agriculture and livestock which he saw as two parts of the one viable path for 
economic development. First, he argued that soil erosion must be dealt with on a 
large scale. Second, if livestock theft continued unchecked it would prevent 
stockowners from improving their stock. In contrast to the South African Drought 
Commission’s findings about the link between jackals, kraaling, and erosion, Pim 
made no such ecological connection between theft, kraaling, and erosion in 
Basutoland, although he did propose a livestock registration system for this reason. 
By the 1930s, especially following Lerole, stock theft seemed to be on the rise in the 
mountains, and kraaling was the common response to secure animals from 
thieves.91 Although Pim disagreed with Milligan on some points of the erosion 
problem, its extent and causes, he reproduced Milligan’s report verbatim.92  
Milligan believed that historically soil conservation, such as terracing, had 
been done “by the pick of the world’s agriculturalists, hardworking and industrious 
peoples possessed of a sound hereditary knowledge of hill cultivation.” By contrast, 
Milligan believed that the Basotho “were an ignorant population who have no 
knowledge of how to deal with such questions.”93 That Basotho had developed few 
soil conservation techniques in arable agriculture, at least in terms of physical 
structures, seems accurate enough. But Milligan ignored the political-economic 
reality in which Basotho lived, farmed and reared animals in the past and present. 
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Cultivating steep slopes above 6000 feet was new for Basotho in the late 1800s. 
Basotho had only recently taken up ox-drawn plows to break up more grassland. 
This technological change occurred while farmers simultaneously worked smaller, 
fixed plots as the population grew within the constrained political boundaries. Full-
time farming for migrant workers, moreover, was near impossible. But migrants 
made what they believed to be the best of limited choices in order to pay taxes, 
purchase consumer goods, and invest in cattle. Milligan’s assumptions obscured a 
broader context that might have offered planners a better understanding of erosion 
and how to mitigate it, even within the racist and segregationist political landscape 
of southern Africa. Still, Milligan’s conclusions, more or less, corroborate what 
Basotho and others indicated earlier: erosion posed a serious problem that required 
attention if Basotho wanted to farm for subsistence and market purposes.94 
 The authors reported that erosion in the lowlands and highlands resulted 
from different causes and should thus be handled differently. In the populated 
lowlands, sheet and donga erosion progressed around places where animals 
gathered or traversed on a regular basis such as at missions, traders, dipping 
stations, and along roads and paths, stripping away the vegetation. Water collected 
from slopes above these places and when heavy rains fell, run-off rushed over the 
exposed ground and carried soil away. Erosion had damaged arable fields much less 
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so, but Milligan, without measuring scientifically, estimated that 10% of arable fields 
needed rehabilitation.95  
Pim and Milligan agreed with Thornton and other earlier observers that the 
mountains were less eroded. They still insisted that the slopes were losing soil, 
especially in steep valleys and along bridle paths. Herders typically took animals to 
the valleys and slopes with the sweetest fodder, where animals grazed and trampled 
the grass, exposing the soil.  Bitter Karoo bush grew in the disturbed soil. Although 
unpalatable to animals, this shrub that Basotho called sehalahala served “a useful 
purpose in arresting soil erosion.” Plowing steep slopes, a practice well established 
in Qacha’s Nek by 1935, exposed loose soils to, among other forces, gravity.96  
For rehabilitating the lowlands, Pim recommended that the Basutoland 
government invest in large scale conservation works. He cited two models to follow. 
One was the work of Mr. H. Hobson, a South African farmer who had improved his 
land by building a system of contour ridges and blocking up dongas; measures 
which distributed water across wider areas while encouraging new vegetation. The 
second model was in the Herschel district, where Thornton and his colleagues were 
building a network of earthen structures that were supposedly helping to prevent 
erosion and revegetate a badly denuded landscape.97 
Conservation plans for the mountains were different. Pim saw vegetation 
change and erosion in the mountains as a “complex issue” linking Basotho stocking 
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practices, grazing regulations, chiefs, and the ecology of specific plants. Pim said that 
to plan conservation schemes for the mountains in 1935, given officials’ limited 
understanding of ecology and culture there, would "amount to working in the dark.” 
In addition to encouraging more demonstration activities, he asked the Dominions 
Office to commission an ecological survey to better understand these relationships. 
The following year Staples and Hudson conducted their Ecological Survey (See 
Chaps. 1 & 3). It is puzzling that Pim did not see the same “complex issues” at work 
in the lowlands. Pim’s report, including detailed budgets for anti-erosion work in the 
lowlands, provided the Basutoland government with knowledge that was 
transferable within colonial policy-making networks, to draw up financial and 
logistical plans to begin a new phase of soil conservation.98  
Not surprisingly, Basutoland’s funding needs attracted regional interest. To 
support Basutoland’s conservation plans while asserting its regional political 
ambitions, the Union of South Africa proposed partial funding in cooperation with 
the Dominions Office’s contribution. In a late 1935 memorandum, the Secretary for 
Native Affairs proposed financial support to Bechuanaland and Swaziland, the other 
two high commission territories, to drill boreholes and build irrigation dams. 
Basutoland would receive support for its anti-erosion plans.99 The secretary said the 
grants would help prepare the territories for transfer to the Union. As the new 
director of agriculture in Basutoland, Thornton believed it was folly to use the 
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conservation works as a “political lever” to incorporate the territory into South 
Africa. Although Thornton believed that transfer was in the best interest of the 
Basotho, and an eventual inevitability, he argued that the Union funding would 
make his job tougher by squandering the support of the people for the anti-erosion 
schemes which he had “fought hard to gain trust in.” The RC agreed with Thornton, 
and assured Basotho leaders that transfer would never happen without a full 
national discussion.100  
Paramount Chief Griffith Lerotholi discussed this proposal with the BNC 
before declaring that although Basotho wanted technical assistance with anti-
erosion projects, the nation wanted no financial support from the Union. On this 
point, Showers and Malehleha seem to be mistaken when they argue that Chief 
Griffith opposed any soil conservation measures until a last minute deal. Evidence 
suggests that although some chiefs and commoners disputed aspects of 
conservation through the 1950s, such as contour banks, rotational grazing, and 
funding sources, there was little opposition to the idea of government-led anti-
erosion schemes on the whole.101  
By the mid-1930s, knowledge and fear about soil erosion ran deep for many 
Basotho, especially with Lerole in recent memory; but so too, did fear about 
incorporation into the Union. Local newspapers translated and published parts of 
the memorandum, as they did the actual Pim Report. Several contributors wrote 
                                                          
100 TNA, FCO 141/872, Thornton to E.O. Richards (RC), 20 November 1935; Richards to William Clark 
(HC), 20 November 1935. 
101 Showers and Malahleha, “Oral Evidence;” See also, Driver, “Theory and Politics,” 170-71. 
 303 
 
strongly against this proposal, explaining that Basotho knew about the bad 
treatment that Africans received in the Union, and would refuse incorporation. 
These sentiments were widely shared amongst Basotho, be they chiefs or 
commoners, BPA or LLB members. This demonstrates a firm resistance against 
territorial threats and Union meddling in Lesotho’s affairs. This was hardly the end 
of Union meddling. But this dialog also demonstrates that many, if not most, Basotho 
wanted the conservation works, including the science that underlay it. Conceding 
that the Basotho were in need of securing food and protecting their soil, Griffith 
even suggested that Basotho inquire into selling mineral rights to pay for the 
program. Or, he claimed, Basotho would do the work for free.102  
Neither approach was necessary at that time. In 1936 the Colonial 
Development Fund approved several loans for Basutoland.  The overwhelming bulk 
of it, £160,000, went towards “large scale anti-erosion works,” while smaller 
allocations went to fund the ecological survey, build wool sheds, and erect bull 
camps for stock improvement.103 Thornton stayed at the department's helm but the 
engineer L. H. Collett took over the new wing created for anti-erosion work. Collett 
had worked with Thornton on the conservation scheme in Herschel. Beginning in 
1933, Collett employed 500 men and 300 women to build contour banks and 
reclaim dongas in Herschel, paying them small daily wages.104  
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Anti-erosion in Herschel seemed successful at first, but by 1937 the schemes 
encountered problems that foreshadowed failures to come in Lesotho’s own 
schemes. Rain water pooled up behind contour banks, breaching the structures 
which were especially vulnerable before vegetation grew on them, which served to 
strengthen the integrity of earthworks. Often, crews hastily built the banks. 
Breaches enabled water to rush across fields, carrying away soil and carving gullies 
in the process. Many farmers, encouraged by political leaders, deliberately plowed 
up contour banks. In other cases the banks were poorly placed to withstand local 
rains. As William Beinart concluded, “contour banks were vulnerable in Herschel for 
both environmental and social reasons.”105 Nonetheless, Collett began work in 
Basutoland while the impact of the Hershel schemes remained uncertain. After 
nearly three years on the Basutoland schemes, Collett toured the US with the 
support of a Carnegie Grant, returning to Basutoland in December 1938, ready to 
ramp up anti-erosion work.106 
 
5.5 - New Conservation Work Begins, 1935-1941  
The ways planners organized people to perform conservation work and the 
nature of the work performed, speaks to how knowledge of erosion as a cultural and 
ecological process circulated amongst engineers, foremen, and workers. Primary 
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sources that would document the experiences of the men and women who worked 
on these projects are scarce, but we can infer some things about how people 
understood these projects by recreating local context. Thomas Andrews has shown 
for the case of coal mining in late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century Colorado 
that understanding the workscape as “a place shaped by the interplay of human 
labor and natural processes,” can reveal “how nature shaped the lived experience, 
identity, and politics” of those performing the labor. For those Basotho involved 
directly in anti-erosion work, what they knew about their environment, and the 
things they learned through the work, occurred within a particular workscape.107  
Beginning in late 1935, Collett supervised several projects in Morija, 
Matsieng, and Roma, where plow cultivation had the longest history. Being centers 
of missionary influence (Roma and Morija) and the royal village (Matsieng), these 
places seemed obvious starting points for both environmental and political reasons. 
In December 1935, for example, seventy-five Basotho laborers, including fifteen 
women, worked under a European foreman on the “Matsieng Gang.” Men quarried 
stone and hauled it to gullied areas where others erected retaining walls on the 
banks of dongas, and built weirs across donga floors. For draught power, the 
Matsieng Gang harnessed more than three dozen oxen to transport stone by sledge. 
To build contour banks, they guided ox-drawn plows along contours, using picks, 
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shovels, and harrows to smooth out the structures. Women planted grass on the 
freshly constructed contours and planted willow and acacia trees in dongas and 
beside stream beds. Indeed, these were all laborious and poorly paid tasks, but they 
also required skill. Excavating, shaping, and repositioning earth and rock, and 
planting trees were not new tasks for Basotho in 1935. But performing these 
specific tasks for wages in a concerted effort under a non-chief authority to build a 
system for controlling water and conserving soil was new work.108  
Earnings on this early labor force varied and reflected a colonial and 
gendered division of labor. The European foreman, often a local trader who had 
received training “in the practical side of conservation work,” earned £25 for a 25-
day work month. Basotho were paid by the day. “Head boys,” who were Basotho 
men that supervised smaller crews and presumably had some training, earned two 
shillings per day. The bulk of male laborers earned less than nine pence per day. 
Women earned just four pence per day.109 Dwarfed by the European supervisors’ 
pay rates, these wages were less than what people could earn on farms or mines, or 
in cities in South Africa, but the anti-erosion work offered some money for work 
near home (See Figure 5.2). Agricultural officers, with the cooperation of local 
chiefs, assembled conservation crews of people who, quite often, were too old or 
unfit to work in the mines.110 
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The government extended these anti-erosion projects over the next few 
years. With each passing year Basotho men and women knew more about the 
technical, ecological, and social aspects of these schemes. When a crew showed up 
with its foreman to build contours in village fields, it is likely that many people knew 
about the schemes ahead of time. BNC members had discussed Pim’s report, and 
newspaper editors published several of its main findings.111 Meanwhile, agricultural 
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Figure 5.2 
Constructing a contour bank using a 
ditcher and oxen, 1936 
Source: TNA, CO 1069-211 
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demonstrators had continued their work in all districts, promoting cultural and 
biological approaches to soil conservation: terraced gardening, manuring, tree 
planting, crop rotation, and livestock improvement. As a prominent example, Edwin 
Ntsasa, one of the first demonstrators in Lesotho, continued rural outreach in 
several districts since starting work in 1924. Ntsasa also addressed farmers by 
writing in several publications from the 1920s into the 1950s. He wrote to explain 
the merits of soil conservation systems, linking the physical engineering aspects of it 
to cultural changes, such as vegetable gardening. Ntsasa brought his experience and 
knowledge to the BNC where he served as a special agricultural department 
representative in the late 1940s.112  
Collett, too, demonstrated how conservation structures worked and how to 
maintain them. Beginning in late 1935, he addressed audiences in Morija, Roma, and 
elsewhere in the lowlands, explaining that conservation was more than just building 
and maintaining structures; it required the very cultural changes that had been 
pushed by demonstrators like Ntsasa.113 Laurie Wacher, whose career as an 
agricultural officer in Basutoland spanned three decades, was another important 
part of the network for circulating knowledge. He did so by lecturing about 
manuring, contour plowing, and stock improvement as cultural methods for 
maintaining soil. Perhaps more than any other European official, Wacher embodied 
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the cultural and biological approach; also taking interest in the mountains, touring 
the region regularly to evaluate demonstrators there.114  
It was during the 1930s, too, that the Catholic Church expanded its network 
of outstations. The Catholic program of social action, advocated by Bernard Huss 
and his colleagues in the Lesotho diocese, promoted agriculture as one of its main 
activities, which included soil conservation.115 Huss spoke to numerous audiences in 
Lesotho. Additionally, the Morija Press published his Sesotho language textbook on 
agriculture in 1923. In the book, Huss discussed various soil types, rain patterns, 
erosion, and river flows, drawing on his experiences at a mission on the Kei River 
for comparison. The book's circulation is difficult to know, but BPA member Labane 
Chokobane had wanted every farmer to have a copy and the fact that the Morija 
Press published it suggests a significant circulation.116  
The Catholic message of ntlafatso (improvement) resonated with many 
Basotho, especially following the 1933 crisis. Catholics learned about soil 
conservation in primary and secondary schools, and by working on church fields. 
Indeed, the Catholic Church and the Basutoland government were hardly one in the 
same, but knowledge about soil erosion and conservation circulated between these 
institutions. By the mid-1930s, mission stations were important centers of activity 
for Basotho across social groups. Apart from the government experts and 
missionary influences, those Basotho who had worked on conservation crews, of 
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course, would have spoken to other men about the work when they returned home. 
Men talked about work, whether on the mines, in the fields, or on anti-erosion 
projects. The point is not that everyone knew of these schemes, but this evidence 
strongly suggests that knowledge of soil conservation circulated widely.117 
To put the 1936 grant to use, the Department of Agriculture purchased new 
tractors, bulldozers, and large plows for speeding up anti-soil erosion work. These 
mechanical upgrades never entirely displaced manual labor, but did shrink the 
importance of crews like the Matsieng Gang. Chiefs, too, still called out letsema 
labor, especially for planting trees and digging burweed.118 By 1940 conservation 
crews had built 6.7 million yards of terraces, constructed eighty-three livestock 
dams, and planted half a million trees.  Additionally, workers sowed 420,000 yards 
of terrace bank with grass. Officials in 1940 claimed that the more important 
accomplishment was that “the confidence and support of the bulk of the people have 
been obtained.”119 These official statistics and comments were published primarily 
for administrative fiscal purposes to account for the colonial grant from London. 
The statistics, however, also indicate substantial changes in the landscape as well a 
sense that many Basotho worked to make these changes. But the official reports tell 
us precious little about the local contexts –social, political, economic, and ecological 
– in which Basotho engaged with these schemes.  
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Historical evidence of the scheme’s challenges helps to illustrate these local 
experiences. Some farmers, especially those with small lands, protested that they 
could not afford to lose any acreage to grass strips. It was not clear to all that the 
initial sacrifice of space might preserve productive acreage in the long run as 
agricultural officials had tried to explain. If grass strips and terraces were to follow 
the natural topographic contours, then these structures would also cut through 
existing field boundaries. Field owners contested the terraces and strips when they 
believed the structures upset what had been property boundaries between field 
neighbors, designated so by the local chief. Farmers had commonly solved 
subsequent boundary disputes in the chief’s court (lekhotla), but the new issue of 
Figure 5.3 
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Photo by author, December 2014 
 312 
 
structures raised questions about how much authority the Department of 
Agriculture had to meddle in land affairs.120  
In a politically constrained territory where land was at a premium, labor 
shortage also presented a problem. Collett explained in May 1937 that maintenance 
“would be a very difficult question as we go on” for social and ecological reasons as 
had been the case in Herschel.121 Heavy summer rains created powerful runoff that 
often found its way to the weak spots of terraces or contour ridges where high 
grasses could obscure minor breaches. In November 1936 several storms including 
hail, typical weather for late spring, sent torrents down the slopes of Matsieng, 
destroying contours and tree saplings.122  
Who, exactly, would bear responsibility for maintenance during various 
times of year when field ownership differed? The realities of oscillating migrant 
labor in the political economy of southern Africa complicated this matter further. 
For instance, during a rainy January in 1937 in Maseru district, apart from miners 
away on contract, many men were working in South Africa harvesting wheat and 
shearing sheep, leaving anti-erosion crews wanting for labor. Maintenance, too, was 
non-existent.123 Given the plunge in commodity prices after 1929, and the frequent 
drought within recent memory, many farmers probably lacked confidence that their 
                                                          
120 RDA 1942, pp. 15-16; Interview with Tseliso Ramakhula, 14 November 1014; Showers, Imperial 
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labor on anti-erosion maintenance would be rewarded with grain to eat or sell, and 
so, they sought other opportunities. Collett did learn that constructing banks and 
terraces during the crop season angered many farmers, so he focused work in the 
winter months. The problem then was that fallow winter fields belonged to the 
community, leaving maintenance up to the chiefs, for which they called matsema, 
which commoners increasingly refused to do, depending on the responsible chief’s 
relationship with the government and with his people.124    
Issues of property, labor, and soil conservation featured in the political 
reforms in late 1930s, which set the parameters within which people experienced 
anti-erosion activities in the mountains. Discussions in the BNC following Pim’s 
report showed some consensus about erosion, but by 1938 colonial officials and 
many Basotho too, had grown frustrated with the lack of cooperation by chiefs in 
carrying out policy at the local level. After the Conference of Colonial Directors of 
Agriculture in July 1938, which Wacher attended, the Dominions Office said that soil 
conservation “merited special attention” throughout the Empire.125 Closer to home, 
the resident commissioner Sir Edmund Richards, with support from the BPA and 
some progressive chiefs, believed that the parallel administration needed changes.  
                                                          
124 Lekhotla la Bafo developed a critique of letsema, linking the chiefs to an imperial system in which 
commoners’ labor was exploited. See John Marks, “Misery of the People of Basutoland,” Umsebenzi, 
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As the main instrument of authority, the chieftaincy on the whole had failed 
to enforce laws and proved stubborn on agricultural initiatives. For instance, some 
chiefs opened leboella out of season to strengthen their own herds, while others 
refused to call matsema to eradicate noxious weeds.126 The BPA urged government 
reforms that would pave the way for a national constitution that would ultimately 
give more rights to commoners. In response to the BPA, the Basutoland government 
moved to weaken the power of ward and local chiefs while, in theory, granting the 
paramount chief greater powers to legislate.127 This shift in government stance 
complimented Thornton’s position as the Director of Agriculture by delegating more 
authority to his department. Thornton likened the agricultural changes promoted by 
the department to a spiked wheel, whose spikes will “stab through native 
agricultural practice…until the whole wheel with all of its points revolves freely.” 
Creating new laws, so Thornton believed, was the only way to move the wheel 
forward.128 
The Native Administration Proclamation No. 61 of December 1938 gave the 
Paramount Chief of Basutoland the power to issue rules and orders providing for 
the “peace, good order, and welfare of his people.” It also gave the high 
commissioner powers to change the structures of the chieftainship. As L.B.B.J. 
Machobane has explained, “chiefs were brought fully under the machinery of the 
colonial administration and their numbers were cut from about 2500 to 1340.” 
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Many areas covered under the PC’s new delegated powers, which were closely 
tethered to the progressive agendas of the BPA and the colonial administration, 
related to agricultural development and soil conservation.129  
Paramount Chief Griffith Lerotholi died in early 1939 and was soon replaced 
by a female regent, ‘Mantsebo Seeiso. With little consultation in the BNC, ‘Mantsebo 
signed Order 1/26 in March 1941, which established a legal framework for anti-
erosion measures. The order included twelve laws that were eventually adopted 
into the existing Laws of Lerotholi. Each law bestowed more authority on the 
Department of Agriculture, but still required consultation with local chiefs to build 
contours wherever officers deemed appropriate in both arable and pastoral areas. 
Rights to build these works excluded specific months to accommodate the standard 
growing seasons. As a response to cases of sabotage or simple carelessness, the 
order also prohibited plowing into contours and terraces. Provision was made, too, 
for maintaining the structures. In arable fields, the owners bore full responsibility, 
while the community was responsible for maintenance in the commonage.130 With 
new laws in place, conservation schemes moved into the highlands. 
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5.6 - Conservation Reforms in the Highlands, 1942-1956 
Residents of Qacha’s Nek saw no engineering component to government 
agricultural and anti-erosion programs until 1942. Staples and Hudson’s Ecological 
Survey reiterated earlier observations that the mountains were primarily pastoral 
lands where vegetation changes and soil erosion had accelerated since 1880.131 
Rough or non-existent roads had prevented the Department of Agriculture from 
hauling machinery into mountain areas to build anti-erosion structures. Beginning 
in 1942, when more funds allowed, the department built a system of grass strips 
and diversion furrows, rather than terraces. Instead of using paid crews, 
independent contractors performed the work for a set rate, at least until 1946 when 
local groups were paid directly for building structures under the supervision of 
European, and some Basotho foremen. Physical structures played an important part 
in mountain conservation, but the cultural approaches, namely regulating grazing 
lands and regrouping villages, had the greatest impact in Qacha’s Nek and in the 
newly designated Mokhotlong district.132  
To carry out these policies, chiefs continued to play important roles. Chief 
Makhaola Lerotholi had died in 1932, leaving the ward leadership to his eldest son 
Theko Makhaola. Along with many highlanders by the late 1930s, Theko was a 
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Catholic and had been educated in Catholic schools. In stark contrast to his father 
who had eighteen wives, Theko had only one. Makhaola the younger added a potent 
voice to the BNC beginning in 1932. He extended many of his father’s positions by 
endorsing progressive political and agricultural reforms, yet he shrewdly guarded 
the powers of chieftainship. Commoners in Qacha’s Nek knew him as monna khomo, 
man cow, for his practice of fining people one cow for being late to courts and 
meetings. This nickname, it seems probable, also developed from his collecting 
excessive fines from those stock owners violating grazing regulations in the 1950s. 
Like his father before him, as chief of the melele Theko brokered agricultural and 
pastoral knowledge between the government and commoners by enacting and 
enforcing anti-erosion policy in the 1940s and 50s. The ways in which he did so tell 
us much about people and conservation knowledge during these years.133  
The Basutoland government formed its mountain conservation policy by 
drawing on discourses amongst an international cast of experts, Basotho chiefs and 
agriculturalists, South African conservationists, and British colonial officials. In 
August and September of 1944, the American soil scientist Hugh Bennett toured 
South Africa to see anti-erosion schemes. As he was a towering figure in soil 
conservation, the public took interest in Bennett’s visit. As Belinda Dodson has 
shown, the places he visited and did not visit highlighted the political and social 
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fissures in South Africa, which widened further after 1948 when the newly elected 
National Party inaugurated apartheid.134  
Under the auspices of the Department of Agriculture, Bennett visited white 
areas mostly, while spending just one day in the Transkei where soil conservation 
programs, by contrast, were implemented by the Department of Native Affairs. He 
spent two days in Basutoland, where he is said to have stood on a new contour bank 
admiring the site of “natives unloading manure onto their lands from a cart.” 
Bennett hardly commented on what he – having had extensive experience in the Jim 
Crow south – surely recognized as racial tension and political inequality. But his 
visit attracted public attention to soil conservation in the region.135  
Much of this attention pointed towards the highlands. Reflecting on anti-
erosion schemes to date, conservationists in the early 1940s echoed Francis 
Kanthack from a generation earlier by arguing that uplands deserved greater 
priority as the place where erosion began. In this view, water draining from 
denuded slopes gained velocity as it rushed into valley fields, overwhelming anti-
erosion works.136 In June 1945, E.M. Palmer helped push this sentiment into public 
view. As the spokesperson for the newly formed Veld Conservation Trust in South 
                                                          
134 Belinda Dodson, “A Soil Conservation Safari: Hugh Bennett’s 1944 Visit to South Africa,” 
Environment and History 11, no. 1 (2005): 35-54; See for example, “Conserving the Soil in 
Basutoland,” The Star, 16 October 1944; “The Fight for the Soil,” The Friend of the Free State, 30 
November 1945. 
135 Hugh Bennett, Soil Erosion and Land Use in the Union of South Africa (Pretoria: Department of 
Agriculture and Forestry, 1945); “Basutoland’s Lesson in Soil Saving: Work of Ten Years Not Halted 
by War,” The Star, 23 October 1944; Dodson, “Soil Conservation Safari,” 36, 42-43. 
136 H. A. Tempany et al, “Soil Erosion and Soil Conservation in the Colonial Empire,” The Empire 
Journal of Experimental Agriculture XII, no. 47 (1944): 121-53;  TNA, DO 35/916/16, Thornton, “A 
Review of 7 Years’ Work,” 23 February 1942; DO 35/1180, Y950/4, Frank Stockdale to Creech Jones, 
27 October 1945. 
 319 
 
Africa, Palmer published an article that articulated mountain conservation to 
political shifts in the Union towards intensified racial segregation. Paralleling this 
shift, postwar conservation discourse in southern Africa demonized African 
practices as particularly destructive, more so than did the Drought Commission in 
1923.137  
Palmer’s chosen title spoke volumes about the transnational political-ecology 
at work: “Basutoland – Heart of the Union.” The piece provoked comments from 
colonial officials in Basutoland, and made its way into BNC policy discussions. 
Palmer based the article on the observations of C.J. van Rensburg, a government 
botanist who had traveled in the Maloti. In short, Palmer argued that the situation 
was dire because Basotho grazed their animals randomly, plowed steep slopes, and 
burned grass indiscriminately. In her view, Basotho were destroying not only the 
vital watershed of the Orange (Senqu) River system, but altering other rivers that 
spilled east of the Drakensberg into Natal, especially the Tugela. Unless the 
Basutoland government intervened authoritatively to conserve highland vegetation 
and soils, the “sponge of South Africa” could dry up. In other words, if African land-
use practices were not modified immediately then the desiccation of the so-called 
sponge, consisting of montane wetlands and reedbeds would destroy whole river 
systems and threaten the very existence of the Union.138  
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Not everyone agreed with this assessment. Some observers, Bennett among 
them, praised the Basutoland soil conservation schemes. But as the government 
secretary in Maseru confessed, these praises were made “in order to condemn the 
absence of any large scale projects in the Union.”139 A contributor to a South African 
newspaper acknowledged the trials and tribulations of promoting cultural change: 
“It was not easy to persuade the Basotho to adopt anti-erosion methods of farming, 
or to put manure to its proper use.” Where land was closed off to grazing 
temporarily without fencing, according to this writer, it was “rare for man or 
animals to trespass.”140  
The British high commissioner in southern Africa, Sir Evelyn Baring, took a 
stronger stance against Palmer’s arguments, and traveled for three weeks in the 
Maloti to assess the situation himself. Baring also undertook his journey in order to 
respond to concerns by Jan Smuts, the Union prime minister, who had urged Baring 
to force more anti-erosion schemes in Basutoland. Baring gathered information 
from agricultural officials and chiefs, but he also brought two publications for 
comparative reading: Palmer’s article and Staples and Hudson’s Ecological Survey.141   
After his journey, Baring wrote straight to the Dominions Office in London to 
set the record straight. He said that Palmer’s article contained “inaccurate and many 
exaggerated statements,” and was written as “sensational journalism.” Grazing had 
altered vegetation on some slopes, but not on others. Damage to pastures was 
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“serious but not quite as appalling” as Palmer had claimed. He followed Staples and 
Hudson’s distinctions of grasses and ecological zones, adding that in the highest 
areas around the sources of the Orange River, grey grass (Festuca rubra) was 
undamaged. Baring conceded that erosion in the mountains could affect the flow of 
the Orange; but he said the Tugela source was too remote for grazing, adding that it 
ran in Basutoland for only a 100 meters before crossing into the Union. He 
recommended that the Department of Agriculture continue building grass strips and 
diversion furrows in the cultivated areas. As for land above the cultivated fields in 
the cattle post areas, he urged authorities to prohibit plowing and rest each slope 
once every three years. “All progress in the mountain area,” Baring conceded, 
“depended on improvement in transport.”142    
Highland farmers, chiefs, and policy makers wanted a new road linking the 
mountain areas to the lowlands. Demands were especially firm in a drought year 
like 1946 when many people struggled to produce adequate food.143 The debates on 
the conditions of the project tell us about how people understood the cultural and 
physical aspects of anti-erosion schemes in relation to their needs and aspirations. 
Fresh back from WW II service in the Middle East, Chief Theko Makhaola and his 
colleagues in the BNC debated a memorandum on a ten-year development plan for 
Basutoland in October 1946. Drawing on Baring’s latest recommendations and on 
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British conservation priorities elsewhere, the memorandum stressed soil 
conservation as a foundation for economic development.144  
Few Basotho farmers would have disagreed with the resident commissioner 
when he said, “without its soil, its principal asset, Basutoland will die.”145 But the 
RC’s comment highlighted the ecological reality of the time as well as the narrow 
colonial assumption that Basutoland could only be a nation of farmers and herders; 
this despite its long relationship with industrial centers in South Africa. 
Nonetheless, under provisions of the British Colonial Development and Welfare Act, 
the colonial office appropriated £830,000 for Basutoland to be allocated evenly 
across three parts: public works, social services (eg. health and education), and 
agriculture, especially soil erosion.146  
Highland councilors spoke loud about the road. Mahlabe Mokhachane of 
Qacha’s Nek wanted the project expedited to facilitate the flow of “medicine, food 
supplies during drought, and building materials for schools and hospitals.” He spoke 
to the maldistribution of resources in the territory, adding that “it would appear as if 
the government and the paramount chief do not look upon the mountain areas as 
part of Basutoland.” Using similar terms, Felix Sekonyela of Mokhotlong pushed for 
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the road too, which, if built, would go from Maseru through to Mokhotlong, bisecting 
Basutoland between north and south.147  
The RC supported the road as a way to facilitate the flow of machinery for 
conservation works as well as for other development projects in the mountains. He 
stressed, however, that the government was also concerned that the road would 
lure more people to the mountains, which would contribute to ecological 
deterioration. From this perspective, more settlers meant more erosion, whereas 
technology meant development. The bigger obstacle for Basotho was that the 
Dominions Office would only fund the project on the condition that twenty-mile 
wide Agricultural Improvement Areas (AIAs) buffer the road on each side.148  
The Department of Agriculture had originally proposed AIAs in 1945. Under 
the plan, the department would take over rights to allocate and regulate land from 
local chiefs in areas designated as severely damaged. Department officials would 
classify areas as agricultural land, grazing land, or tree plantations based on agro-
ecological potential.149 Plans for AIAs fit squarely within the post-war “second 
colonial occupation,” in which local administrations sought to develop territories 
through increased interventions, which included technical, political, cultural, and 
ecological components (See Chap. 6). Research from the 1930s, such as Staples and 
Hudson’s Ecological Survey in Basutoland and Lord Hailey’s African Survey more 
broadly, informed and misinformed many of these interventions on the continent. In 
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the regional context, the AIAs were modeled, in part, on South African Betterment 
programs and Southern Rhodesian centralization schemes.150  
Chiefs firmly rejected the AIAs in 1945, refusing to give up their greatest 
power: the right to allocate land. The provisions of the road proposal, however, 
offered the Department of Agriculture a new opportunity to push the AIAs through 
the BNC.151 Viewed through a political lens, department officials and chiefs too, 
worked within a larger network of colonial and South African conservationists and 
politicians who sought to incorporate Basutoland, especially its precious 
watersheds, into the Union. In this framework, reforming the Sesotho land tenure 
system to institute freehold tenure, which meant removing land from chiefs’ control, 
formed the sine qua non of the AIAs. That the larger political project shaped policy 
and practice seems accurate enough, but a closer look at the mountain context 
shows a more nuanced engagement with scientific ideas about soil conservation.152  
Edwin Ntsasa, the veteran agricultural demonstrator and special agricultural 
representative to the BNC, opposed the chiefs' view on AIAs. He argued that “our 
grandfather’s have almost killed the country…it is full of dongas and we are 
continuing to murder it.” The fault, he continued, “lies with us and with His Majesty 
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the King [George VI], as the government looks on.” Ntsasa, like many commoner 
Basotho, wanted the technical and financial resources of the government, even if it 
meant adopting certain cultural changes. For Ntsasa, the government was 
responsible for using funds derived from Basotho taxes and British grants to 
improve farming through technical, educational, and legal interventions. Other 
councilors, like Bereng Lerotholi saw it as a government takeover of already scarce 
land resources. Bereng asked, “where will we plow if not within twenty miles of the 
road?” Another councilor blamed the government for doing too much building of 
terraces and contours and not enough “explaining these things to us.” In this way, 
Ntsasa and other councilors found common ground in believing that although 
Basotho wanted to understand new types of knowledge, most people became 
skeptical when not informed of new developments. As one councilor from Qacha’s 
Nek put it, “a Mosotho understands things quickly when he handles them with his 
own hands and not from theory.” Apart from demonstrators, other farmers, and 
agricultural officers, chiefs played a key role in this regard.153  
As the acting paramount chief at the 1946 BNC proceedings, Theko 
Makhaola’s job was to explain that under the provisions of the AIAs, agricultural and 
pastoral activities would require “consultation” with department officials. The 
paramount chief, as Theko assured the council, would still have the ultimate say 
over these matters. Instead of consulting chiefs alone, farmers would ask 
agricultural demonstrators and officers about what fields could and could not be 
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plowed. A proposed arable field’s suitability was based mainly on the specific 
calculation of its slope. Farmers would now be required to seek advice on where to 
place contour strips, and where and when to close pastures. Many chiefs claimed 
that they were already doing these things. Perhaps to placate the resident 
commissioner, the BNC agreed to institute reforms similar to those of the AIAs, but 
the specific width of a buffer zone around the road was to be omitted from the 
agreement. Forty-four council members voted for the amended measure and none 
against. The BNC also voted that the PC and chiefs, not the Department of 
Agriculture, retained responsibilities for enforcing anti-erosion regulations as 
outlined in 1942. In the end, the department implemented only one experimental 
AIA in the Quthing district, which had mixed results at best.154 
Despite the BNC’s tepid response to formal AIAs, the government pushed 
ahead with plans for rotational grazing in the mountains by working through 
Paramount Chief ‘Mantsebo, but more especially, through two ward chiefs: Matlere 
Lerotholi of Mokhotlong and Theko Makhaola of Qacha’s Nek. Under the schemes, 
ward chiefs used funds from the newly established national treasury to hire Basotho 
caretakers to travel around on horseback to enforce closures beginning in mid-
1947. By the end of 1948, 1050 square miles had been destocked for a period of 
between one and two years. This figure was out of a total of 4350 square miles that 
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were marked for closure. The objective was to “get our grass back,” as the resident 
commissioner explained to the BNC in 1947.155  
Local knowledge informed science in the plans for rotational grazing. The 
plan designated time periods for closure according to how much erosion had 
occurred, and how much bitter karoo bush had spread within the area in question. 
Conservationists in the Department of Agriculture claimed that the system merely 
extended the leboella system from village areas to the cattle posts, just as Staples 
and Hudson had recommended in 1938.156 The policies acknowledged the Basotho 
disdain for fences and the prohibitive costs involved in fencing. No fences were used 
to demarcate pasture; only geographic boundaries such as ridges and rivers, and 
some stone beacons would mark these spaces. A chief’s representative would 
publicly announce which pastures were open and which were closed. Some pastures 
were closed for two years, while others just one. The idea was to close lands based 
on the “points of the compass:” western and southern facing slopes one year, and 
eastern and northern facing slopes the next.157  
Thackwray Driver has argued that these closures were never actually 
enforced in Mokhotlong district, which accounts for the lack of resistance on the 
part of common Basotho.158 Despite the political and logistical difficulties involved 
in such closures, I believe Driver is mistaken. At Sani Pass in Mokhotlong (see Map 
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#4) and in several places in Qacha’s Nek, the chiefs and their caretakers successfully 
enforced rotational grazing in the late 1940s and 50s. P.A. Bowmaker, the 
Basutoland director for agriculture and livestock services toured several closed 
areas in late-1949. He traveled through the Senqu Valley around Sehonghong, 
proceeding south to Sehlabathebe and the upper Tsoelike Valley, where he 
remarked that destocked areas showed “very marked recovery.” Bowmaker also 
noted that the “whole of the Mashai basin, in the broader sense had been destocked, 
and a wonderful cover of Aristida sp. is coming in generally as a pioneer [grass].”159  
Being relatively new to Basutoland, Bowmaker probably used Staples and 
Hudson’s survey and other reports as ecological benchmarks. But he had the benefit 
of local knowledge too. A local senior agricultural demonstrator named Ntahanyana 
guided Bowmaker from Mashai to Sehlabathebe. Ntahanyana would have had 
extensive knowledge of the area, including where cattle posts had been located and 
who owned them. They traversed the formidable Matebeng Pass, hardly a well-
traveled track then or now, which would have afforded the pair a commanding view 
of the grazing country in eastern Qacha’s Nek.160  
Paramount Chief ‘Mantsebo attempted to strengthen the 1941 anti-erosion 
laws by issuing several new orders, drawing on reports by Bowmaker and others. In 
November 1947 she told all chiefs in Order No. 1/32 that “small stock should not be 
kept in the villages, but that they should be kept at cattle posts,” even in the winter. 
                                                          
159 LNA, S/349, 2476 I, Bowmaker, “Cattle Post Trek,” 26 November 1949. 
160 Ibid. 
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‘Mantsebo’s order contradicted older seasonal transhumance patterns where all 
animals sheltered near villages during the harsh winters. This was especially true 
for people and animals living at higher elevations. In addition to sheep and goats, 
‘Mantsebo’s order included horses and donkeys, but cattle were allowed to come 
down in the cold months.161  
Some chiefs disagreed on this issue, but for the most part, their biggest 
investment, cattle, could still winter near the villages. As for the poorest commoners 
who owned perhaps a few goats and a donkey, they would suffer from not having 
access to meat, milk, and transport year round. Some BNC members spoke on behalf 
of the poor, pointing out that thieves had been stealing animals from cattle posts 
more since the 1933 drought, a phenomenon which exposed the meager property of 
poorer families. Qacha’s Nek councilors reported that during the winter of 1951 
nine herdboys had frozen to death at the cattle posts and 500 sheep and goats had 
died in a snowstorm. In 1952, at the insistence of a Chief Sekake from Qacha’s Nek, 
‘Mantsebo amended the order to allow some small stock to shelter near the villages 
in the winter and during lambing season.162   
It must be said, too, that the late 1940s and early 50s in Lesotho were times 
of political crisis. After Proclamation No. 61 of 1938 eliminated nearly half of the 
officially gazetted chiefs and headmen, chiefs sought leverage to preserve what they 
believed was an attack on the chieftaincy, not only by the colonial administration, 
                                                          
161 LNA, S/349, 2476 I, PC ‘Mantsebo Seeiso, Circular No. 1/32, 20 November 1947. 
162 BNC, 42nd Session, 1946, Vol. 3, 423-27; BNC, 48th Session, 1952, 517-22. See also, Driver, “Theory 
and Politics,” 182. 
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but also by the BPA and Lekhotla la Bafo. In this context, murderers killed dozens of 
people across the territory, leaving mutilated bodies as evidence of medicine 
murder. Medicine murder was a practice whereby a chief or his/her assistants killed 
someone in order to obtain liretlo: human flesh kept as medicine to endow its 
beholder with special powers. In the end, the government tried and hanged several 
high level chiefs for involvement in medicine murders.163  
Scholars have covered this subject at length. But for this study, it is enough to 
say that, like the campaigns to fight rinderpest, anti-erosion schemes unfolded 
within tense local political context as well as within the larger political-economy of 
colonial capitalism. Powerful chiefs like Theko Makhaola, who was himself 
implicated in medicine murders in 1953, exercised great authority over 
environmental regulations and the circulation of knowledge that underlay those 
regulations. The extent to which intimidation was a key tool used by Theko to assert 
his influence amongst his people, and to enforce conservation regulations, remain 
questions to be explored in further research.164  
The varied responses to the rotational schemes highlighted the limits of 
specific chiefs’ powers while raising the question of who controlled the high cattle 
post country. When Evelyn Baring toured the Maloti in 1949, he learned from Chief 
Matlere Lerotholi that, in fact, most chiefs had little control over cattle posts. Rather, 
                                                          
163 For example, G.I. Jones, A Report on the recent outbreak of “Diretlo” murders in Basutoland 
(London: Office of Commonwealth Relations, 1951); Peter Sanders and Colin Murray, Medicine 
Murder in Colonial Lesotho: The Anatomy of a Moral Crisis (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2005). 
164 Ibid., TNA, FCO 141/445, Notes of a Meeting Re: Theko Makhaola, 17 August 1954. 
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what colonial officials had long believed were traditional communal grazing 
resources, actually operated based on semi-private property rights.165 When a 
stockowner or his shepherd built a cattle post, they secured exclusive rights to the 
stone huts which they had built as well as to the grass around the post. The owners 
of the post had the right to use it continuously unless it went unused for a year or 
more. In theory, chiefs controlled which stockowners established posts in their 
wards. Implementing closures as discussed in the BNC, meant removing cattle posts, 
at least temporarily. A chief’s order to remove posts from an area all together 
represented a rupture from older regulatory relationships between chiefs, 
commoners, animals, and pastures. Many chiefs, who themselves usually had large 
herds, refused to close pastures against their own interests; or, they simply believed 
this to be a contravention of customary property rights, to which chiefs were 
supposed to protect.166  
Regulatory responsibilities and politics intersected too. As the eldest son of 
the original molele, Theko Makhaola commanded a great deal of respect in Qacha’s 
Nek. Evidence suggests that he successfully closed some grazing areas. But other 
areas, perhaps those administered by political foes, required more diligence. In 
1952, several chiefs in eastern parts of his ward complained to the district 
commissioner that Theko’s grazing caretakers had taken fines directly from people 
found grazing animals in closed pastures. The plaintiffs insisted that they alone had 
                                                          
165 LNA, S/349, 2476 I, Bowmaker, “Cattle Post Trek,” 26 November 1949. 
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rights to collect these fines in their local areas. Theko replied that they had not been 
doing their jobs, and so as the ward chief, he had the right to step in. PC ‘Mantsebo 
sent her representatives out to Qacha’s Nek several times over the next three years 
to investigate. In August 1954, the Basotho investigators found in the original case, 
and in several other cases too, that “the ways in which fines were being collected 
were not consistent with any laws whatsoever.” Despite these allegations, Theko 
maintained that he was simply carrying out the PC’s grazing orders. The case had 
not been pursued further when the file ended in 1955.167  
Was Theko an ardent supporter of government anti-erosion schemes or had 
he become a local strong man, prioritizing his own ambitions? The answer, 
undoubtedly, lies in between. Theko Makhaola, like his father before him, navigated 
a political space that linked the BNC and the British colonial administration to rural 
highlanders. He at once championed his people’s aspirations for roads, agricultural 
resources, schools, and dispensaries, while pleasing the British, and perhaps 
enriching himself along the way. Like his father, he collected a hefty government 
salary for his work within the BNC, yet he still amassed substantial debt at local 
shops and in South Africa too.168 From this political disposition, Theko embraced his 
roles as both agrarian modernizer and benevolent chief of Qacha’s Nek.  
In conjunction with rotational grazing measures, Theko had begun 
regrouping villages. Beginning in 1931, the paramount chief had called for people 
                                                          
167 TNA, FCO 141/445, Report of the Paramount Chief’s Messengers, August 1954; Police Report, 
Maseru, 21 January 1955. 
168 Ibid. 
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living in small hamlets to relocate to established villages further downslope. Few 
people moved in 1931, but after Proclamation No. 60 of 1938, PC ‘Mantsebo 
theoretically had authority to carry out such schemes, although she never did issue 
an explicit order. Bowmaker reported in 1949 that the “grouping of villages in 
Qacha’s Nek [was] very satisfactory.” The archives contain little about specific 
village groupings, but I have learned of several consolidations through my 
fieldwork. For example, people at Senatla’s village, located on a bluff overlooking the 
Senqu, dismantled their houses and moved to Ha Makhaola, just a mile away. A stroll 
through the site today reveals ruins of perhaps a dozen homesteads, now 
overgrown with aloe, wattle, and grass (See Figure 5.4). This policy echoed village 
regrouping schemes elsewhere in colonial Africa, but for many Basotho chiefs, and 
for educated and non-educated commoners too, the scheme was also based on 
sound ecological and demographic realities.169  
Since the late 1800s, migrant families had settled higher areas, which 
decreased the acreage available for grazing. It was near the highest settlements, too, 
that people plowed the steepest slopes. Clement Shata, a retired miner and 
dedicated farmer whose family relocated to Ha Makhaola from Senatla’s village in 
the late 1940s, recalled that it made sense to free up grazing space near the village. 
Shata now frequently hunts for hares in the overgrown site of his ancestors’ former 
village: a vivid example of how people remade places through everyday activities 
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and by imbuing those places with new meaning. The Shata family was among the 
first to settle at Senatla’s in the late 1800s, and after the move, they retained rights 
to their field allocations nearby. Moving from place to place in order to conserve 
resources, or to access new resources, as families living in the Maloti know, has been 
central to their history. Others claimed that small hamlets had become more 
vulnerable to stock thieves, and so, security in numbers made sense.170  
 
 
 
Regrouping villages and rotating pastures, then, called for some cultural 
changes while still being rooted in the past. As Grace Carswell has argued, one 
criterion for evaluating how rural Africans interacted with government anti-erosion 
                                                          
170 Interview with Clement Shata, 13 December 2014; Interview with Mokhafisi Kena, 7 January 
2015; Interview with Mochinti Jane, 18 May 2015; See also, TNA, WO 33/501, Dobson, Military 
Report, Vol. II, 118. 
Figure 5.4 
Site of Senatla’s Village, Qacha’s Nek 
Note: vegetation on former house sites 
Photo by author, January 2015 
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schemes is to examine the extent to which interventions departed from past 
practices. Carswell’s point about terraces in Kigezi, Uganda, where farmers had built 
similar structures in the past, instructs our understanding of both village regrouping 
and rotational grazing in Basutoland. In contrast to Southern Rhodesia or the South 
African Bantustans, few instances of resistance turn up in either oral or written 
sources, but several issues did surface that tell us about how various groups 
grappled with these policies.171  
In 1947, BNC member Theko Bereng from Qacha’s Nek raised a motion that 
“the government be asked to compensate the owners of huts to be removed in 
controlled grazing areas.” Bereng said that although the people of Qacha’s Nek 
agreed “that grazing control is a very good thing,” people with children and widows 
especially were afraid that they could not carry out orders “because of poverty.” A 
councilor from Butha-Buthe supported the motion, requesting that chiefs supply 
thatch grass and wooden poles to newcomers for building. Alas, it was not to be. 
Matlere Lerotholi from Mokhotlong joined a chorus of councilors and chiefs from 
the lowlands in arguing that these “people in the mountains” have had plenty of time 
to move, and should not have been there in the first place. The motion was crushed 
by a vote of 70 to 1.172  
Chieftainess ‘Mantsebo formalized an anti-erosion policy in 1955 that 
seemed to corroborate the view that the mountain dwellers needed to make way for 
                                                          
171 Carswell, Cultivating Success, 60-62; Hodge, Triumph of the Expert, 208-10. 
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the nation’s flocks and herds. Her policy blended the political and ecological 
concerns of the Union and Basutoland governments, while making it more difficult 
for mountain chiefs to monopolize the territory’s most verdant pastures. As of 
November 1955, local and ward chiefs held the ultimate responsibility for pasture 
management, but had no right to deny livestock from outside their ward. They could 
only do so if the animals in question exceeded an established carrying capacity for a 
given area. Supposedly, cattle posts would be allowed on valley bottoms and not on 
mountain slopes.173  
This was an effort to entrench what colonial authorities believed to be 
traditional forms of grazing control. It left much in the hands of the chiefs, who by 
1955 had come under increasing political fire not only from groups like the BPA, but 
from their very own constituents. For the poorer people who were forced to move 
to new village sites, or to keep their few animals at remote cattle posts the entire 
year, the policies made little economic sense even if they could grasp the underlying 
environmental knowledge. For wealthier stock owners, especially chiefs, from 
lowland areas and some from the mountains too, the latest round of conservation 
policies served to establish a notion of the commons that was at once conservative 
and modern. It was conservative in the imagined sense that it sought to de-settle 
places that had once been cattle posts only. It was modern in the sense that it sought 
to formalize grazing regulations through bureaucratic control and by deploying the 
                                                          
173 RDA 1955, pp. 65-66. 
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latest in scientific stock management as a way to develop the mountains for 
progressive farming and livestock production.174 
 
5.7 - Conclusion 
 Despite the political failure of the agricultural improvement areas in the 
mountains, the government still built the road, or, at least part of it. By 1956, at the 
close of the ten-year development plan, the road extended to the right bank of the 
Senqunyane River via an impressive bridge.175 AIAs, in the strict sense, may have 
been a failure, but several of the constituent policies such as contour plowing, 
regulations against plowing steep slopes, and not least, rotational grazing and 
village regrouping were implemented. Furthermore, it is in the problems of 
implementing these policies, as in the anti-erosion schemes as a whole, that we see 
the different ways that people engaged with new environmental knowledge.  
The so-called hard facts of soil conservation science, including pasture 
management, circulated through disparate networks. International experts on soil 
and irrigation like Hugh Bennett, William Willcocks, and Russell Thornton 
contributed to policies through their observations, experiments, and reports that 
drew on examples from India and East Africa to southern Africa and the American 
South. On the ground in Basutoland, it was various government officials like Laurie 
Wacher, Edwin Ntsasa, and Chief Theko Makhaola in addition to countless unnamed 
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Basotho who guided the likes of Staples and Hudson on their ecological survey, who 
produced these facts. Perhaps more importantly, these local actors, named and 
unnamed, inserted local knowledge into these facts. In varied ways, they circulated 
these ideas across the Basotho social spectrum, filtering the knowledge through the 
dense prism of local politics and culture. 
 While the work of building physical structures like contours was important, 
this chapter has shown that by analyzing the cultural approaches to soil and pasture 
conservation, which were most prevalent in Lesotho’s mountains, we gain a fuller 
appreciation of how these schemes unfolded. Viewed one way, these policies were 
aimed at making Basotho into sedentary capitalist producers by consolidating 
people into larger villages where they could farm full-time, cultivate gardens of 
perennial plants (eg. fruit trees), and rear improved livestock in carefully regulated 
spaces. From a different view, the increasing power of the government to intervene 
into rural lives posed a threat to the chieftaincy as the core political and cultural 
institution that, in part, defined what it meant to be a Mosotho. These views, to the 
extent that they were accurate, both conflicted and overlapped with one another 
during the conservation schemes from 1935 to 1956. For Basotho, the questions of 
what farming and livestock rearing meant for their cultural identity and what 
possibilities these activities presented for personal and national futures took center 
stage in the late 1950s and early 1960s.  
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6. MAKING A LIVING FROM THE LAND: THE POSSIBILITIES OF PLACE, C. 1950-
1965 
 
6.1 - Introduction  
Mochinti Jane completed his education at Eagle’s Peak High School in Qacha’s 
Nek in 1955 at age twenty-two. Like most Basotho men in his position, then and 
now, he faced a difficult and limited set of choices for how to pursue a livelihood. He 
had recently married a woman with whom he hoped to raise a family. The young 
couple had grown from modest roots. He hailed from a village called Leseling, 
situated about a six-hour trek north of Qacha’s Nek town (See Map #4). Leseling was 
“overseas” as local Basotho say, referring to its location on the right side of the 
Senqu River. Here, the river separates the more populated communities along the 
main road from the more rural parts of the district, most of which today are 
connected only by bridle paths and faint cell phone service. Mochinti’s father made 
his living at Leseling from farming maize and several hundred sheep whose wool he 
sold to the trader at the Tsoelike store.1  
Although a fellow molele from Qacha’s Nek, Mochinti’s bride grew up in a 
different type of place. Tebellong was a cluster of villages also located “overseas,” 
but it was much closer to the main road and thus, generally more connected to town, 
markets, education, and communication networks. Her father worked as a clerk in a 
European-owned shop nearby. Upon marriage she had moved to her husband’s 
village while he finished school near town at Eagle’s Peak. Speaking about his wife’s 
                                                          
1 Interview with Mochinti Jane, Motalaneng, 18 May 2015.  
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adjustment to her new home, Ntate Jane recalled that “she was not living like my 
people there at Leseling, she didn’t know how to grind grain on a stone and so, she 
had to learn.”2 
Ntate Jane’s options and choices at this juncture in his life provide important 
texture to the situation in which many Basotho found themselves in the mid-1950s. 
After sixty years of colonial government interventions into agriculture and 
pastoralism, Basutoland relied more heavily on imported grain than ever before. In 
1955, the territory imported 185,000 bags of maize to feed its 560,000 people. The 
African population had grown 14% between 1936 and 1956, while maize imports 
had nearly tripled between 1932 and 1955.3 Rainfall variation and market 
fluctuations for Basutoland’s main exports of wool, mohair, and wheat played 
important roles, but the overall trend towards food insecurity on the national level 
was clear. Earnings from Basotho migrant workers, especially miners, helped 
circulate money in Basutoland to purchase grain. But to some extent, the system of 
labor migration within which so many Basotho families were embedded, also 
contributed to low productivity on the small farms throughout Basutoland. Absent 
working age men meant less labor through much of the agricultural cycle.4  
                                                          
2 Ibid. 
3 RDA 1955, p. 64. Each bag held 200 lbs. of grain; See also, Pim, Financial and Economic, 193; The 
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4 CAR 1955, p. 27. In 1955, roughly 75% of the 59,000 Basotho employed in South Africa worked on 
gold, coal, and diamond mines; On the adverse effects of labor migration on intensive farming in 
Lesotho, see Murray, Families Divided, 16-19. See also, Berry, No Condition, 138.  
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But the import-export cash nexus and the colonial political economy that 
underpinned it formed only part of the story. The food, fuel, building materials, 
medicine, and clothing that Basotho drew directly from the mountains were far less 
calculable. Even less countable than the material uses of natural resources were the 
human relationships to the Maloti as a place. Since the 1880s, Basotho highlanders 
from diverse clan lineages had imbued the landscape with meaning by building 
homes and cattle posts, herding livestock, cultivating fields and gardens, working for 
wages, and naming locations and physical features.5  
Like many other melele in his age set, Mochinti was a third generation 
highlander. His grandfather had migrated from Ketane in western Lesotho to find 
new pastures for his livestock. Ntate Jane’s father was born and raised at Leseling, 
where he lived and worked nearly all of his life, going to the mines only once. 
“Leseling” translates as the place of light. The village was named for the way the 
afternoon sun cast a ray back on the village through a notch in the mountains to the 
west; or was it because of its unhindered eastern exposure to the morning sun? 
Explanations seemed to differ here. Living at Leseling, Mochinti’s father would have 
felt the sharp sting of poverty after drought, failed harvest, or a drop in wool prices. 
This was likely the case during Lerole of 1933, the very year that his second wife 
gave birth to their youngest son, Mochinti. Like most highlanders, the elder Jane 
                                                          
5 My incorporation of place as a key part of environmental knowledge along with material aspects 
draws especially on Basso, Wisdom Sits in Places. 
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made do; building up what was then a medium sized flock of sheep. But 
undoubtedly, he worried about what lay in store for his sons.6 
Mochinti’s father had been skeptical of the Catholic missionaries who had 
established a small outstation with a primary school at Leseling around the time 
that Mochinti was born. Despite his misgivings that the Catholics might “make his 
son a priest,” he insisted that Mochinti go to school. In part, this was because the 
family fields would pass on to Mochinti’s older brother, leaving none for him. New 
field allocations were increasingly rare by 1955, and so, agricultural prospects for a 
landless young man were dim. As for the sheep, thieves had stolen them and the 
elder Jane had used his few cattle to pay bohali for his two sons to marry in the 
customary Sesotho way. He had nothing in terms of material capital to bequeath to 
Mochinti, nor the money to send his son to school.7       
Mochinti credits Father Jean-Baptiste Rousseau for taking him in at the St. 
Francis mission and then loaning him the tuition to complete high school at Eagle’s 
Peak. “But if it was for myself,” Mochinti says, “I wanted to be in farming.” Unlike 
most melele men at the time, however, Mochinti became neither a full-time farmer, 
nor a miner during his working prime. Instead, he taught for many years at the St. 
Francis primary school where he had pursued his own education, and he later 
worked as an education administrator around the district. Apart from the bleak 
prospects in farming and livestock with no land or animals in 1955, he says it was 
                                                          
6 Mochinti Jane, 18 May 2015. 
7 Ibid., On land holdings and shortages, see C.M.H. Morojele, 1960 Agricultural Census of Basutoland: 
Part 3, Agricultural Holdings (Maseru: Agricultural Department, 1963), 10-14; See also, Sheddick, 
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Rousseau who steered him towards the work of teaching. In the rondavel where I 
interviewed Mochinti, a black and white photograph of Rousseau hung prominently 
on the wall as evidence of Ntate Jane’s reverence for the Quebecois priest.8  
Now retired from teaching, Mochinti lives in a compound just behind the St. 
Francis mission where he carefully maintains his garden that includes a tree nursery 
where he cultivates pine, peach, and poplar (See Figure 6.1). He proudly showed me 
his recent certificates from Lesotho’s Ministry of Forestry and Land Reclamation 
that recognize his knowledge and work in propagating trees and harvesting rain 
water. He does not regret his career in education. But his pride reveals something 
 
 
 
else that many elder Basotho seem to feel: that the work of farming and animal 
husbandry can provide economic sustenance while connecting people to the cultural 
                                                          
8 Mochinti Jane, 18 May 2015. 
Figure 6.1 
Mochinti Jane, Motalaneng, Qacha’s Nek 
Photo by author, May 18, 2015 
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landscape that their forebears built. To be sure, Mochinti’s sentiment draws on a 
host of factors ranging from disillusionment with post-colonial governments to his 
relative comfort as a retired educator with a pension.9  
But there is an important history to this sentiment, one that is grounded in 
both tangible changes as well as the cultural and ecological characteristics of 
specific places.  The decade between 1955 and 1965 marks an important part of this 
history. In that decade, the South African government refined its apartheid policies 
which had implications for Basutoland in terms of agriculture, politics, and 
employment. Colonial governments attempted similarly ill-conceived programs in 
Rhodesia among other places.10 Continuing its political pressure to incorporate 
Basutoland, South Africa’s betterment programs influenced how its Department of 
Agriculture formed and implemented development schemes.11 The British, too, 
sought to modernize their colonies to prepare them for further integration into the 
global capitalist economy as producers of primary products.12 In terms of 
agriculture and livestock in Basutoland, African and non-African experts encouraged 
                                                          
9 Mochinti Jane, 18 May 2015; Interview with Mpolokeng Putsoane, 20 January 2015; Interview with 
Maletepata Makhaola, 8 December 2014.  
10 See De Wet and McAllister, “Rural Communities in Transition: A study of the socio-economic and 
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Review 106, no. 2 (2001): 485-507; Jocelyn Alexander, “Technical development and the human 
factor: sciences of development in Rhodesia’s Native Affairs Department,” in Dubow, ed., Science and 
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11 Mekenye, “Re-Examination of the Lekhotla la Bafo,” 86. 
12 Hodge, Triumph of the Expert, 248-53. 
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new methods for developing its natural resources. These methods intersected and 
often conflicted with the nationalist politics that were then emerging.13  
But these factors can only be understood in conjunction with the social and 
cultural changes that were specific to places. In terms of changes for common 
Basotho, a growing number of people from diverse backgrounds attended schools 
and churches, participated in various cooperative groups, read newspapers, and 
sought new consumer goods. Stemming from these developments, shifting 
perspectives on work, land, and time shaped how people contemplated the 
possibilities of place. To understand how these perspectives changed, and to 
highlight the distinctiveness of the mountain context, I will first examine the Pilot 
Project at Tebetebeng in the lowlands (1953-1958). Planners attempted to 
transform the Tebetebeng River watershed into “a miniature Tennessee Valley 
Authority (TVA).” The idea was for farmers to adopt new technology and techniques 
to conserve resources and produce for market. The scheme was intended as a model 
to be used for developing Basutoland as a nation of yeomen farmers; a principal that 
planners believed underlay a critical stage of growth for all nation-states.14   
Second, an important counter philosophy to the Pilot Scheme’s technical-
heavy approach to agricultural development emerged just as the scheme was falling 
apart. James Jacob Machobane created an innovative mixed-cropping system 
designed for poor Basotho to harvest food year-round using minimal technology. By 
                                                          
13 See Basutoland Census for 1946, 13-14; Census for 1956, 99; Epprecht, This Matter, 121-24, 141-45.  
14 RDA 1951, p. 12; See also, Hillbom and Svensson, Agricultural Transformation, 1-7.  
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understanding the story of Machobane and his work during these years we gain a 
deeper sense of Basotho perspectives on agricultural pursuits from both cultural 
and ecological standpoints.15  
Finally, the comparisons between the Pilot Scheme and the Machobane 
system illuminate what occurred, and what did not occur in the Maloti in terms of 
agricultural and pastoral development. Highlanders in this period saw no tractors, 
much less any large schemes to improve farming. Instead, the meager government 
expenditures in the mountains went towards establishing a wool and mohair 
infrastructure by building wool sheds, enumerating livestock, and improving 
animals for maximum production.16 By analyzing how different people experienced 
these programs, we gain a better understanding of the ways people have compiled 
environmental knowledge as a single historical process with both cultural and 
material dimensions. 
 
6.2 - The Pilot Project 
In 1951, the Department of Agriculture claimed that the proposed Pilot 
Project would move Basutoland into a “second phase of agricultural development.” 
In the first phase, which supposedly began with the original grant from the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Fund (CDWF) in 1936, the department had focused on 
stabilizing soils and conserving grazing lands. According to officials, the first phase 
                                                          
15 James Machobane and Robert Berold, Drive Out Hunger: The Story of J.J. Machobane of Lesotho 
(Johannesburg: Jacana, 2003). 
16 RDA 1959, p. 15. 
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was near complete and it was now time to move on to the “more difficult second 
phase by which there must be a general improvement in farming systems used to 
ensure larger yields than are obtained at present.” From the planners’ perspective, a 
preliminary large-scale experiment involving a cross-section of the population, 
would demonstrate the appropriate path for all Basotho. Residents from other 
districts, it was hoped, would come to observe the project in action, while others 
would read about it, or at least see photographs, in newspapers and government 
publications. Still others would hear about it by word of mouth.17 
The plans drew on transnational ideas about rural development. Prior to 
launching the Pilot Project, Paramount Chief ‘Mantsebo Seeiso and other chiefs had 
traveled to England in 1951. The chiefs toured English agricultural experiment 
stations and training facilities. Another group that included Theko Makhaola from 
Qacha’s Nek, toured Northern Rhodesia, Uganda, Kenya, and Tanganyika. They were 
impressed at what they saw.18 When they returned they shared these experiences 
with their colleagues in the BNC and advocated for more local research on crop 
varieties, livestock breeds, and fertilizers. They agreed, too, with the agricultural 
department’s initiative to implement concentrated schemes in order to apply 
research findings in Lesotho’s diverse agro-ecological communities. BNC members 
discussed the proposed Pilot Project and eventually applied for another CDWF grant 
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to fund the project. In September 1952, the Dominions Office (DO) in London 
provided £86,000, along with additional funds for a research station, the 
agricultural college, and some smaller mechanized farming schemes.19  
J.M. King, the director of livestock and agricultural Services (DLAS) in 1952, 
seemed aware of the possible pitfalls of social and ecological planning. The 
department, he wrote, had “no intention of laying down in advance a rigid and 
detailed program, unrelated to the physical, social, and human difficulties – 
expected and unexpected – which will be encountered in the next few years.” The 
course of the project, he claimed, would distinguish “between the reclamation and 
demonstration aspect of the scheme, and its more advanced, partly investigational 
aspect.” The former part would embrace systems already known to the Basotho land 
users, such as soil and water conservation, tree planting and grazing control, timely 
cultivation, and use of manure. The second part would include “systems and 
practices as yet untried in Basutoland, e.g. mechanized cultivation and mixed 
farming.” Farmers living in the project area would not be compelled to participate. 
Interested farmers were encouraged to work in cooperative groups.20  
Answering questions about how and why the project ended in failure just five 
years after it began conveys much about administrative ignorance. Scholars have 
pointed out that the farmers in the project areas lacked the mechanisms for 
discussing their agricultural problems with the government. From this perspective, 
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the poor communication within the colonial social and political order, above all, 
accounted for the failure of the project.21 But this explanation obscures how it was 
that some people, and not others, compiled environmental knowledge and 
benefitted from the scheme. The reasons for failure were as much about local 
differences amongst the project’s intended beneficiaries. Planners overlooked these 
differences, and to some extent, accentuated them. J.M. King lacked the experience 
and local knowledge of previous agricultural officials like Laurie Wacher, who had, 
to some extent, come to understand these realities. If the soil conservation schemes 
in the late 1930s and 40s marked a departure from the low-modernist approaches 
to agrarian development, the Pilot Project signaled a sharper turn towards 
modernist planning.22  
From the outset, implementing the Pilot Project proved difficult.  Planners 
had to select a suitable project site first. Department of Agriculture representatives 
worked with the ward chiefs of Leribe, Berea, and Maseru districts to find an 
appropriate site. Mountain districts, perhaps for political as much as geographic 
reasons, were never considered.23 PC ‘Mantsebo, in cooperation with the ward chief 
of Berea, eventually selected the Tebetebeng Valley in March 1953 to be 
Basutoland’s miniature TVA. Tebetebeng was located near the busy town of 
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Teyateyeneng (TY) and offered an appropriate setting in that it encompassed 
lowland, foothill, and mountain ecological zones. Plowed fields and soil conservation 
works, in various states of repair, covered the valley floors and gradual slopes. The 
steeper uplands supported numerous cattle posts. It was socially diverse too. 
Migrant workers headed many families, while progressive farmers and 
comparatively poorer women and men, worked the valley’s farms.24    
If Tebetebeng was an appropriate site, the selection process and the project 
as a whole were still highly politicized. This reality reflected the current situation 
while foreshadowing the contentious politics that has marked nearly every large 
and small rural development project in Lesotho since then.25 Who had what powers 
in the BNC as well as who had authority over local natural resources in the mid-
1950s, at the district and village levels, had changed since the 1940s. Beginning in 
1938, the paramount chief had exercised broad powers by issuing national 
proclamations, especially in regards to soil conservation, grazing, and agricultural 
improvement. By the mid-1950s, the BNC had become more decentralized. Although 
senior chiefs had argued that the BNC be able to legislate since its founding, it was 
Theko Makhaola who finally pushed reforms to the foreground in 1942.26  
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In a historic speech, the chief of Qacha’s Nek urged BNC members to adopt 
reforms that would weaken the power of chiefs, while giving commoners a new 
voice. Theko asked the Council: “If we do not satisfy our people, what are we ruling 
for?” Theko wanted each district to have a certain number of elected 
representatives to form district councils (DCs), each of which would send a 
delegation to the annual BNC proceedings in Maseru to air grievances and present 
motions for discussion. His logic was clear: “We have our people who are not chiefs 
but agriculturalists; they want to be protected and ask that they should be given a 
voice in the Council.” Chief Theko also acknowledged the widespread public 
complaints that chiefs favored their friends for jobs and in granting access to 
resources such as choice fields and reserved grazing. He included himself in their 
ranks: “we select from those who are on our side.” Theko advocated for a BNC 
composed of half hereditary chiefs, with the other half consisting of officials elected 
by taxpayers from the districts. In short, he sought a bicameral legislature with an 
upper house of chiefs and a lower chamber of elected commoners.27  
Not surprisingly, Chief Theko’s proposed reforms moved slowly. Discussing 
the proposal the following year, the resident commissioner urged the members of 
the council, in typical paternalist terms, “not to try to go too fast or too far at once.”28 
He made it clear that in 1943, there would be no bicameral, partially-elected 
legislative council in Basutoland as there was in other British territories such as 
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Nigeria and Uganda. Not to be defeated so quickly, a committee of chiefs formed a 
resolution that proposed three key alterations to the BNC governing framework: to 
enable people to make their wishes better known to councilors; to make the council 
more representative; and lastly, to provide means whereby commoners could 
consult the council when it was not in session. As a key feature in these proposed 
reforms, district councils in each of the nine districts would work with their 
respective district commissioners and principal chiefs to hold lipitso, public 
meetings where people could air their concerns. In addition to the principal chief 
and his chosen delegates, one representative per district council would attend BNC 
proceedings. In 1950, the number was increased to four reps from each district 
council to attend the BNC in Maseru.29  
By 1958 the composition of the BNC and the DCs had evolved in both 
structure and ability. The resident commissioner still served as president and 
maintained substantial latitude to appoint people to the DCs whom he, for instance, 
knew supported government agricultural policies. The RC also retained the 
authority to appoint five national members however he saw fit. The paramount chief 
remained the lead advisor in the council. Of the ninety-four members technically 
nominated by the paramount, however, thirty-six were to be indirectly elected by 
the district councils. In the districts, every 1000 Basotho taxpayers elected a single 
representative to their respective DC. For example, sparsely populated Mokhotlong 
district (formerly part of Qacha’s Nek) had the smallest DC with just nine members 
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while Maseru counted thirty-nine in its council. The district commissioner, as the 
head colonial official, served as chairman of these councils while a Mosotho 
councilor typically chaired the meetings.30  
In addition to progressive chiefs, new political parties drove these structural 
changes. The Basutoland African Congress (BAC) had formed in 1952, which became 
the BCP (Basutoland Congress Party) in 1958.  A teacher and activist, Ntsu Mokhehle 
and several BCP co-founders were frustrated with the slow pace of reforms in 
Basutoland. Founders also rallied to fight against the indignities of the apartheid 
government in South Africa. To this end they forged links with the African National 
Congress (ANC), and later with the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). The BCP quickly 
attracted support from batsoelopele (progressives), many of whom had been 
affiliated with the Basutoland Progressive Association (BPA). Mokhehle himself had 
been a member of Lekhotla la Bafo since the 1930s. Like their forebears LLB and the 
BPA, the BCP criticized the chieftainship for its role in sustaining colonialism and 
advocated a constitutional government.31  
The BCP’s ranks included teachers, nurses, WW II veterans, and civil 
servants. Protestants joined more than did Catholics. The BCP’s demands included 
an end to the unofficial color bar, equal pay for equal work, and an end to the white 
trader monopoly, among other things. They were progressive in that they supported 
a national, secular education system and constitutional reforms. They upheld older 
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values too, for example, in keeping women from voting. Generally speaking, they 
advocated for reforms that moved them towards being a modern state, one modeled 
in part on Kwame Nkrumah’s vision of scientific socialism for independent Ghana. 
The BCP enjoyed sweeping victories in 1960 when the first open elections for the 
district councils took place, and when the national council (BNC) had finally gained 
legislative powers. But the BCP had still not gained deep support in the mountains, 
and by then, an opposition party had emerged.32  
A second party, the Basotho National Party (BNP) was founded in 1959 by a 
national council member named Chief Leabua Jonathan.  Jonathan and other party 
founders believed that the BCP’s hostility towards chiefs, Catholics, and white ex-
patriates undermined their vision for Lesotho’s future. Like the BCP, the BNP 
insisted on the Africanization of public and private employment, and a rapid move 
towards self-government. But the BNP feared that the BCP was too closely tied to 
international communism, a path which Leabua Jonathan believed would harm 
international relationships with western powers; and furthermore, would exclude 
chiefs, Christians, and capitalist enterprise, including in farming. The Catholic 
Church actively supported the BNP while the Protestant Church supported the BCP, 
prying open a political rift that has continued ever since.33  
But before the BNP formed, the BCP was already pushing the national council 
to Africanize the Department of Agriculture. To this end, the government 
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established a liaison position to broker information between the paramount chief 
and the department. Ntseke Molapo, a Mosotho who had previously worked as a 
demonstrator, filled this positon. Molapo traveled around to monitor and report on 
the Pilot Project, soil conservation, and weed eradication among other things. 
European agricultural and livestock officers along with some demonstrators worked 
with local chiefs to manage the day-to-day operations of the project. This regulatory 
community, clumsy, top-heavy, fragmented, and clearly in transition during the life 
of the Pilot Project (1953-58), struggled to administer at the local level. But this 
perspective does not account for important on-the-ground problems such as 
people’s access to factor endowments like land, animals and equipment, and not 
least, people’s access to specialized knowledge.34  
 The Pilot Project officially began in April 1953. It attempted to bring together 
everything that the agricultural department had tried in its forty years and to 
showcase it all in one place. A project bulletin for 1956, designed primarily for the 
literate public, reported on the program’s first three years. In an effort to illustrate 
the project to all Basotho, the bulletin also included photographs of the people of 
Tebetebeng performing a variety of tasks: from women and children planting trees 
to men plowing with tractors (See Figure 6.2). Its authors acknowledged that there 
had been “some failures and disappointments, and where there had been progress it 
had often been slow.” In continuing earlier government initiatives, soil conservation 
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 356 
 
crews built and repaired grass strips, contour furrows, and dams. Others planted 
thousands of poplar, pine, and peach trees.35   
 
By 1956 it was clear to officials that few people wanted to plant trees “in 
their own interest.” Reluctantly, planners implemented a system in which chiefs, 
instead of calling customary matsema, reported the number of trees planted each 
month to an official. Chiefs then received cash from the national treasury with which 
they paid the individuals who had planted trees.36 The people who planted most of 
the trees, typically women, elderly men, and children, were the same people called 
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Figure 6.2 
Pilot Project Bulletin, 
December 1956 
Source: Morija Museum & 
Archives, General Collection 
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on to dig burweed to support the wool industry.37 The fact that these people refused 
to mobilize for matsema, demanding cash instead, speaks to how people understood 
their labor. Underappreciated by Basotho and colonial officials alike and poorly 
documented compared to the adventures of migrants, these commoners sought 
modest compensation for their labor that planners had believed ought to serve the 
common good.38 Motivation, a force that moves people to act, proved to be a 
misunderstood concept on the part of department officials and project planners.  
As for the children who planted trees and maintained vegetable gardens in 
the Pilot Project, they did so under the auspices of their primary schools. Agriculture 
and nature study in Lesotho’s primary schools was nothing new in the 1950s. But 
the effort to encourage scientific agricultural knowledge of a certain type, as a set of 
relationships linking ecology and nutrition with the skilled application of labor, took 
on new forms. The Mokhatlane’s Village Young Farmers Club testified to this 
intensification. From 1956 to 1958, M.E. Makhetha, an education officer on the Pilot 
Project extension team, organized this club which included nine primary schools. In 
addition to school children, unenrolled herd boys participated too. The idea was for 
boys and girls to establish and monitor plots at their schools using stones and aloe 
plants to divide the spaces into vegetable gardens, orchards, and plots for crops. 39  
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In practice, few children participated until Makhetha and other extension 
officers went from home to home to explain the club’s activities to parents.40 Viewed 
in terms of a larger political project, and in conjunction with agricultural 
demonstration and the South African agricultural colleges where the demonstrators 
had trained, the motivations for intensifying African farming were clear. 
Scientifically trained yeomen farmers with the help of some off-farm income, so the 
logic went, would develop in their respective homelands, or in Lesotho. For colonial 
administrators and Basotho leaders too, children who learned the new methods and 
time tables associated with progressive agriculture in Basutoland were key agents 
in creating this Basotho yeomanry.41  
 Agricultural education for children was an important, yet single part, of the 
Pilot Project’s broader objective for promoting cultural changes which had both 
ecological and political-economic dimensions. As in Theko Makhaola’s Qacha’s Nek 
district, regrouping villages also featured in the Pilot Project’s aim to reform land 
use practices. The rationale was to remove small hamlets that were typically located 
further upslope. Planners believed that this would foster revegetation of overgrazed 
pastures, allow previously plowed fields on steep slopes to grow fresh grass, and 
control erosion in the river catchments. According to the project bulletin in 1956, 
many chiefs had given orders and people were moving into new villages or into 
extensions of larger existing villages. As the author of the bulletin claimed in rather 
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simplistic terms, “the population is increasing all the time. The area available for 
ploughing and grazing is not. Therefore it must not be wasted.”42  
But the regulatory community responsible for monitoring agricultural 
practices, within which chiefs were central, responded in various ways. As a set of 
issues, land shortage and land tenure framed many challenges for the project. 
Village regrouping posed less of a problem, however, than did regulating which 
fields could be plowed. During the second half of the 1950s, farmers throughout 
Basutoland plowed thite (virgin fields) more so than in the past. According to the 
1960 agricultural census, the demand for new fields was so acute that “many people 
make continuous requests for the cultivation of virgin land, while others extend 
their existing parcels by cultivating the adjacent grazing areas.”43   
Under the Laws of Lerotholi, before a farmer could plow a new land, an 
agricultural officer or demonstrator, in cooperation with the local chief, had to 
assess the plot based on its slope, soil, and proximity to roads and watercourses. 
Despite the laws prohibiting unauthorized plowing being widely publicized via 
Sesotho government circulars and public meetings, many chiefs inside and outside 
the project area either refused to enforce the laws or did not fully understand the 
regulations. In Leribe, for example, agricultural officers reported that chiefs would 
not acknowledge cases where people had been reported for plowing thite. Often, 
farmers who had already tilled slopes that were deemed too steep by officials 
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refused to remove them from production. In November 1955, the district 
commissioner of Leribe toured the district and concluded that “the courts are very 
ignorant of the PC’s orders regarding ploughing of lands [and] grazing.” So, the 
commissioner requested more Sesotho copies of the PC’s orders to distribute.44  
Did these chiefs in Leribe not understand, or even not know, the laws against 
plowing thite? Or, were they resisting the colonial regulators by “playing dumb” as 
one Mosotho scholar and friend has suggested?45 The truth, I believe, lies 
somewhere in between. The regulatory framework could not encompass all villages. 
Chiefs in remote areas had less contact with the district councils or senior chiefs 
who knew the regulations well. This information flowed slowly or not at all. In some 
cases it was a matter of chiefs carrying out their duties to allocate fields no matter 
what, while other chiefs were more committed to department policies. The latter 
was the case in 1954 when two representatives from a mountain village in Leribe 
complained to the district chief Letsie Motšoene that several farmers had unjustly 
been forced to remove fields from production, leaving them no fields with which to 
support their families. Motšoene reminded the petitioners that three years earlier, 
all of the sloping fields had been closed when the villages in the area were 
regrouped. He echoed colonial explanations that put ignorance above all else, adding 
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that the “people of the Maloti find it difficult to understand the importance of this 
scheme of preserving and saving this country from the danger of soil erosion.”46  
In another case, local politics and competing claims to land motivated Chief 
Motšoene’s actions for regulating plowing. In mid-1955 a group of thirty farmers 
complained to the district agricultural officer that Motšoene had unilaterally 
declared that all of their fields were unfit for production. The chief ordered this 
while farmers on the other side of the valley, on a similar slope, continued to 
cultivate their fields. The district officer, for his part, had no good answer for the 
petitioners as to why this was so. Just as Chief Makhaola had explained to the BNC 
that chiefs typically favored their friends, it may have been that Motšoene acted in 
favor of patrons rather than based on ecological realities or agricultural policy.47  
It seems clear, too, that the exigencies of migrant labor played an important 
role in what knowledge was applied to plowing and how. Although land owners 
were ultimately responsible for their fields, in the late 1950s these owners were 
often away working in South Africa. An officer in Leribe responded to reports of 
some people plowing out contour strips by emphasizing that “many people hire 
others to plough for them, little boys usually doing the ploughing.” For this officer, 
young boys had neither the necessary knowledge nor the strength to plough 
consistently on the contours, and so, carelessly ploughed into grass strips and other 
structures. To be sure, as Showers has pointed out for Basutoland and others have 
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shown in various African contexts, some farmers destroyed conservation works as 
resistance not simply to the colonial state, but to what they viewed as an oppressive 
and misguided policy.48  
Although regulating thite and plowing practices posed challenges in the Pilot 
Project and for state-led conservation more broadly, the problems with the 
cooperative tractor groups reveal the most about how social inequality in terms of 
factor endowments and knowledge shaped the outcomes of agricultural 
development programs.49 The tractor schemes relied, to a great extent, on so-called 
progressive farmers, who were designated so by demonstrators and other officals 
based on their knowledge, techniques, and their access to capital. Those people who 
demonstrated “the potential to be progressive farmers” were also central to the 
Pilot Project, and to the modernizing project that it exemplified.50  
 
6.3 – Progressive Farmers in Lesotho  
To understand progressive farmers as a social category within Basotho 
society, and within the larger British colonial development frameworks, is to 
evaluate the promises and problems of agricultural policies in this period. Progress 
was a term deeply embedded in colonial assumptions of Africans as an inferior 
civilization (See Chap. 4). Governments and their partners expressed this 
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assumption through various agricultural policies across the colonial world as well as 
in South Africa and the American South. In this view, Africans, natives, and black 
people were problems to be solved by instilling in them prescribed ideas about 
knowledge, reason, science, technology, and culture.51 European authorities, 
missionaries, and educated Basotho used the term progress frequently in discourses 
about education, market participation, marriage practices, and architectural styles.52 
Agricultural demonstrators, too, had been using terms from these discourses as 
criteria to select farmers to participate in district shows and to help facilitate their 
educative work since the 1920s. But references to progressive farmers as an official 
group only appear in agricultural reports from 1958.53  
To build a progressive farmer’s scheme, the agricultural department outlined 
some profiles to provide criteria for demonstrators to use when identifying 
potential progressive farmers. There was, for example, “an ex-school teacher at 
Morija who incubates large numbers of eggs in a home-made incubator and supplies 
poultry and eggs to a large number of local residents.” Progressive farmers did not 
necessarily have to be men, as shown in the case of “a woman at Teyateyeneng who 
for some years now has grown and harvested a good crop of groundnuts (peanuts).” 
Nor did they have to be commoners. One progressive chief, for instance, grew cotton 
and tobacco. Progressive farming, as these profiles show, meant breeding specific 
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animals, cultivating new crops for market, and organizing space and time in certain 
ways.54  
Perspectives about these cultivators varied. In line with the official point of 
view, progressive farmers saw themselves as batsoelopele, the progressive or 
enlightened ones: people who could teach other Basotho to farm, raise animals, and 
feed their families in ways that were better than in the past. Progressive farmers 
sought to improve their standards of living by increasing earned income, educating 
their children, acquiring consumer items like furniture and gas stoves, and perhaps 
most importantly, by diversifying their family food supply to improve nutrition.55 
With respect to nutrition, progressive farming ideas were linked to the gardening 
campaigns begun in the 1920s and the Basutoland Homemakers Association (BHA) 
begun in 1945 to build women’s skills in food production, storage, and preparation. 
Both the BHA and the gardening programs had aimed to address nutritional 
diseases such as pellagra. Pellagra was a potentially deadly disease resulting from a 
niacin deficiency; a deficiency which had been common amongst rural poor who ate 
processed maize meal with little protein or vegetables to supplement it.56  
Progressive farmers, according to official records, were few in the late 1950s, 
but their ranks grew, especially in the lowland districts. In Butha-Buthe the number 
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rose from thirty to sixty between 1958 and 1960. In Berea, the host district of the 
Pilot Project, they increased from forty-four to eighty-two during the same period. 
The numbers were lower in the mountains. According to the 1960 agricultural 
census progressive farmers represented just 0.4% of all farmers in the territory.57 
Claims that progressive farmers generally produced higher yields and a greater 
variety of food than the average Mosotho farmer seem true enough, but these 
comparisons need to be understood in context. The progressives, to varying degrees 
and due to various circumstances, had access to adequate and appropriate land, 
labor, draft power, and equipment.58  
Knowledge and social relations mattered too. Progressive farmers used 
improved seed, animal manure, and commercial fertilizer to produce their goods. To 
use these inputs, progressive farmers deployed sophisticated knowledge that 
incorporated local ecology, animals, and scientific agriculture along with an 
understanding of the institutional framework that governed commercial 
agricultural production in post-WW II Basutoland. They knew the local traders.59 
They read, and sometimes wrote agricultural columns in the newspapers that told of 
farming methods, planting schedules, and commodity prices. Farmers criticized the 
political economic order too, especially as the Congress Party (BCP) gained 
momentum. One writer, for instance, did so in an editorial in Leselinyana, asking: 
“when will Basotho farmers be protected” from the white trader monopolies in 
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Basutoland and from the competition of larger producers in South Africa.60 
Progressives also worked closely with officials from the Department of Agriculture, 
for example, when they showcased their plots in rural demonstrations or displayed 
their produce at district agricultural shows. They understood, on some level, the 
laws governing land use and their local chiefs’ responsibilities for regulating 
pastures, arable fields, and other resources such as trees, reeds, and plants.61 
But with regards to knowledge circulation and cultural change in this period, 
the question of how progressive farmers, as a distinct group, interacted with other 
Basotho is perhaps more important. Most villagers, evidence suggests, respected 
progressive farmers for what they knew. The respect had a material dimension in 
the sense that progressives could share implements and inputs, and occasionally, 
offer wage work. People seem to have respected that progressives had compiled 
knowledge through experience and education, and that they knew how to connect 
the social and economic worlds of rural Lesotho to urban centers in Maseru and 
beyond. But along with respect, people also viewed these yeomen with some 
suspicion and envy. Some people perceived progressive farmers’ knowledge as a 
type of property (not unlike their often disproportionate land holdings), something 
that separated them from the rest of the community. These tensions affected the 
way people shared, or did not share, environmental knowledge.62  
                                                          
60 Letlametlu, “Balemi be tla sireletsoa neng?,” Leselinyana, 9 September 1961.  
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Historical data about individual progressive farmers in Lesotho is scarce, but 
scraps of evidence provide some insight. I also draw on my fieldwork and oral 
interviews, which although they address later periods, provide a sense of the social 
dynamism of such relationships. Makalo Mokhotsoa farmed at his home in 
Mesapela, a village within the Tebetebeng Pilot Project area. According to a series of 
agricultural department photographs and captions from 1960, he grew peanuts and 
potatoes in fenced-in plots (See Figure 6.3). His wife was integral to the family  
 
 
 
enterprise, whether cultivating the fields or sorting through the sugar beans that 
they harvested from their fields. Makalo’s children, when not in school, helped their 
parents in harvesting, sorting, bagging, and transporting the best produce for sale at 
nearby traders. They stored the rest for family consumption. Ntate Mokhotsoa 
Figure 6.3 
Makalo Mokhotsoa with an agricultural 
officer in a plot of groundnuts, August 1960 
Source: TNA, INF 10/179 
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probably owned between four and eight cattle, which would have included plow 
oxen and milking cows. Under official requirements, he would have owned at least 
six arable acres. Like his progressive colleagues, Makalo did not work in the mines. 
Instead, he and his wife worked their fields and gardens year round in a tightly 
coordinated agricultural calendar to produce a variety of crops and maintain soils 
through conservation, manuring, and cover cropping.63  
Based on this profile, the Mokhotsoa’s exemplified a model family farm 
operation that might have fit well in England, New England, or the American South. 
The department photographed Mokhotsoa and his family while they performed 
tasks, likely staging some of them, and used the images in propaganda and in official 
reports to London.64 While considering that the government selected its subjects for 
these images and used them to support its own aims, the photos still convey a sense 
of how some Basotho aspired to strengthen their farming capacities according to the 
tenets of progressive farming. The progressive family farm, as TVA planners in the 
USA believed too, was a core institution for economic growth. An important goal of 
the TVA, as one of its board members had argued, was to give rural people “the tools 
for fulfilling their Jeffersonian rights.” In other words, with access to knowledge, 
land, capital, and markets, Basotho farmers at Tebetebeng and elsewhere, could take 
the lead as the economically and morally progressive vanguard in building an 
agrarian state.65  
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To be sure, the comparison has limits. There was no hydroelectric 
component at Tebetebeng, let alone any electrification or industrial cities as there 
were in the TVA. But planners and progressive farmers still linked moral and 
cultural health to enlightened farming. To make this link, planners drew on 
imagined pasts and assumptions about rural people as much as on any empirical 
evidence. As this photographic evidence of this enlightened class suggests, Makalo 
Mokhotsoa seems to have made a fair living as did many of his counterparts in the 
0.4% of Basotho farmers. To validate and publicize this model further, the 
agricultural department offered certificates to progressive farmers in formal 
proceedings in the villages in 1960, a clear precedent to the certificates that 
Mochinti Jane displayed fifty years later. The proceedings in 1960 appear to have 
been well attended. And judged by how the attendees donned their best blankets for 
the occasion, people respected the ceremonies and the farmers who received the 
certificates (See Figure 6.4).66 But who these people were, and what factor 
endowments they had before being designated progressive farmers begs another 
set of questions.   
As in other British territories and in the TVA, progressive farmer schemes in 
Basutoland failed to benefit the poorest people. Basotho widows, landless families, 
and those with no livestock or implements gained little from the schemes, at least in 
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the material sense. Mountain farmers, who faced a different set of ecological 
challenges than their lowland counterparts, also saw few benefits.67 As Erik Green 
 
 
 
 
 
has argued for similar schemes in colonial Nyasaland (Malawi), there were two main 
problems. First, factor endowments such as access to land and livestock were too 
uneven in rural communities. According to the 1960 agricultural census of 
Basutoland, 55% of land holders had less than the six acres required for progressive 
farmer status. Another 31% of people that owned at least some land had no 
livestock at all. The schemes had accentuated these inequalities by heaping new 
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Figure 6.4 
A district commissioner and an agricultural officer 
present a certificate to a progressive farmer.  
August, 1960 
Source: TNA, INF 10/179  
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intellectual and material resources such as extension services, access to credit, 
different types of seed, improved breeding animals, and commercial fertilizer on top 
of a relatively privileged class.68 Second, partial integration, an economic process 
whereby rural household heads farmed in conjunction with wage employment, 
prevented a greater commitment to full-time farming. This was as true in 
Basutoland as it was in Malawi, especially with respect to working in South Africa.69  
We cannot, however, adequately define rural social differentiation and its 
role in agrarian transformation in materialist terms. In his work on master farmers 
in colonial India, Benjamin Siegel affirms Green’s argument, but he adds that the 
transfer of technology and techniques formed only part of a deeper cultural change. 
These schemes also sought to shatter what colonials had long seen as the stagnant 
and passive qualities of pre-modern peasants. Becoming a progressive capitalist 
farmer, Siegel argues, required new mentalités.70 For Makalo Mokhotsoa and his 
fellow progressive farmers in Lesotho, they demonstrated these new mentalités by 
producing edible and marketable crops such as potatoes and peanuts, raising 
improved breeds of animals like brown-Swiss cattle, and participating in 
agricultural shows where they could showcase their success. Success, for these 
farmers, meant working with one’s hands on the land in Lesotho as a way to attain 
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material aspirations and to make claims to a Basotho agrarian identity. 
Furthermore, progressive farmers adapted a new sense of time, a carefully 
coordinated agricultural calendar by which they engaged a set of ecological and 
economic opportunities.71    
Basotho in various social positions viewed progressive farmers and their 
claims to a particular agrarian identity in mixed ways. For commoners with little or 
no land and few animals, progressive farmers had accumulated more property than 
they needed. Many had accumulated fields across generations (See Chap. 4), 
whereas newly arrived immigrant families and many newlywed men had residential 
plots only. Basotho had historically recognized the social importance of the morui 
(pl. barui), a wealthy man in village life, as measured mostly in livestock ownership. 
Traditionally, barui dispersed patronage as mafisa or by compensating workers in 
cash or kind for assisting with harvesting and other tasks. King Moshoeshoe and 
chiefs more broadly, were barui. But since the mining centers opened and 
commercial agriculture dawned in the nineteenth century, and the transition to a 
cash economy accelerated, many commoners fit this description too.72  
Some progressive farmers did, and still do, balance their own aspirations to 
profit with serving the greater good of the community in an older Sesotho sense of 
reciprocity.73 Two male interviewees have shown this balancing act, if imperfectly. 
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At Ha Makhaola, many people without land or animals harvested sorghum in 
Mokhafisi Kena’s fields for wages in 2015. While participating in one such harvest 
outing, I spoke with people who joked about how “the old man” had managed to 
farm some of the village’s best fields for so long. They complained about the low 
wages while simultaneously expressing gratitude for the work. At Ha Thifa, near 
Qacha’s Nek town, Joseph Hlapi manages people and lands in a similar way. Hlapi 
studied agriculture at Utah State University, a credential which affords him 
credibility with local farmers and agricultural officials alike. But his prestigious 
formal education and worldly experience, like Kena’s, also separates him from most 
neighbors.74   
Hlapi and Kena are aware of their privilege. Like progressive farmers in the 
1950s and 60s, they believe that knowledge and hard work, perhaps as much as 
material factor endowments, are the keys to more productive farming. They 
acknowledge the constraints of mountain soils and climate, and the problem of 
restricted markets and cheap South African imports too. Both men serve as leaders 
of the recently formed Qacha’s Nek Farmers’ Association, whose members seek to 
improve agriculture in the district by training young farmers and sharing resources 
amongst its membership. If local Basotho view these men with some suspicion and 
envy, they still knock on their doors frequently to ask for things. Consistent with 
barui of an earlier era, Hlapi and Kena loan or give people animals, seed, food, and 
implements. But these local visitors also seek knowledge from these progressive 
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farmers. For instance, during my many visits with Kena men and women frequently 
stop in to ask him when and how to plant this or that crop, how to apply for 
agricultural credit from the government, what the price of beans is, or how to 
eliminate pests.75   
Historically, the balance between personal aspirations and duty to the local 
sechaba (community) was uneasy, especially when it came to practices in arable 
fields. Most progressives cultivated fields year round, in wheat or peas for instance, 
which interfered with the Sesotho tenure system because it prevented animals from 
grazing the stubbles during the winter.76 Maintaining one’s soil conservation 
structures, too, became contentious. Most progressive farmers attended to this task 
while owners of adjacent fields who were often away at the mines may have 
neglected maintenance which could threaten the integrity of the whole system of 
engineering works when one contour strip breached, concentrating water behind a 
structure downslope.77  
Socially, progressives sometimes talked down at migrant workers for not 
knowing how to perform certain tasks. In a hypothetical conversation published in 
the Basutoland Farmer’s Journal in 1955, an older miner named Malefetsane had 
recently learned that school children at Tebetebeng were learning about soil 
conservation. Setho, the younger progressive farmer, said yes, it is the children who 
can teach older Basotho now. He teased the proud migrant worker Malefetsane: 
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“You call yourself a man because you have been to Gauteng (Johannesburg), but it 
seems you are still a baby because you know nothing about these things I have been 
explaining to you.” Malefetsane waved his molamu (staff) at Setho and replied: “But I 
know how to use my stick, so be careful how you speak to me!” Although 
hypothetical, this would have been a common Sesotho exchange; one that highlights 
the generational, occupational, and educational differences that existed amongst the 
rural commoner population.78 
Chiefs, too, both respected and resented progressive farmers in their 
communities. Progressive farmers, many of whom were members of the Basutoland 
Progressive Association (BPA), had criticized the chieftainship for abusing letsema, 
which took people away from work in their own fields. As an opportunity cost in 
time, this obligation to perform tribute labor cut into the new progressive farmer 
mentalité where time was of paramount importance. Chiefs worried that these 
farmers posed a threat to the Sesotho land tenure system, within which chiefs 
retained their powers to distribute land and to tax people by way of fines and 
tribute labor. Many progressive farmers advocated for land tenure reform where 
they would receive formal title to their lands.79 Their rationale was that if they 
improved their fields by applying their own labor and knowledge – by manuring, 
fertilizing, rotating with legumes to fix nitrogen, and maintaining conservation 
structures – then they ought to have secure title to the land. This title, proponents 
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argued, would prevent an unscrupulous or jealous chief from reallocating part of a 
man’s fields. Of course, this position on private title to land had roots in colonial 
agricultural policies. Viewed another way, under the Laws of Lerotholi, chiefs were 
required to reallocate when they deemed that one man had accumulated too many 
fields while another married man was denied his rightful allocation. In practice, this 
reallocation rarely occurred, which upheld the concentration of quality fields in the 
hands of the few.80 
These tensions set the tractor schemes at Tebetebeng, and at other locations, 
on course for failure. Basotho farmers, to varying degrees, had always been 
interested in technology and tractors were no exception.81 But the structure of these 
mechanized group farming schemes necessitated that participants radically redefine 
their agricultural mentalités. Many progressive farmers, who possessed the 
adequate capital and specialized knowledge required for participation, reoriented 
themselves well enough. Their less endowed neighbors, however, struggled to adapt 
for several reasons that speak to the cultural, ecological, and political dimensions of 
rural modernization initiatives.  
Farming with tractors economically meant establishing large plots. In theory, 
the tractor operator, who was usually a trained member of the group, could plow 
continuously without having to turn the tractor constantly, thus conserving fuel and 
time. Given the rough topography and the historical patterns of population growth 
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in villages, Basotho often owned one field in one area and another in a different 
area. Ntate Kena, as an example of a larger field owner in Qacha’s Nek, cultivated 
two main plots that were 1000 meters apart. More recent arrivals to a village had 
fields scattered even further apart. According to the 1950 agricultural report, on 
average, Basotho farmers lived one mile from their fields.82  
Participants in the Pilot Project formed four tractor groups. Each group 
consisted of land owners who had fields in the same area. While maintaining their 
customary rights, each farmer contributed dues towards the expense of the 
government-owned tractor. Each farmer, with his family or other labor, still 
maintained the contour ridges and grass strips that separated their fields from one 
another, while the tractor operator plowed all the fields continuously by simply 
lifting the implement when crossing field boundaries.83  
Because of the typical patchwork of field ownership, however, in many cases 
there were several fields that interrupted the otherwise continuous layout. For 
instance, many men who worked in the mines did not participate in the tractor 
groups, and sometimes left their fields unattended for extended periods.84 Under the 
Laws of Lerotholi, owners could leave a field fallow for two years before a chief 
could rightfully reallocate it to someone in need. Chiefs were reluctant to reallocate 
fields that had been fallow for many years despite pressure from the tractor groups 
                                                          
82 MMA, “Pilot Project,” 6, Sheddick, Land Tenure, 89-91; Kena, 22 January 2015; Interview with 
Marapeli Raselepe, 25 December 2014; RDA 1950, p. 23. 
83 MMA, “Pilot Project,” 6; Douglas, “The Pilot Project, Part II,” Basutoland Farmers Journal 1 (Fall 
1956): 47. 
84 Wallman, Take Out Hunger, 106-08; Douglas, “The Pilot Project,” 29-30; Sheddick, Land Tenure, 92-
97.  
 378 
 
to intervene.85 Other field owners lived at home and farmed, but refused to 
participate; perhaps preferring to plow with their own oxen and reap their own 
harvest. Several interviewees have explained that Basotho farmers take pride in 
cultivating their fields with minimal assistance from outside their immediate social 
networks, especially when the fields have been in their family for generations.86  
In a bulletin that compared average crop yields for the tractor groups versus 
non-group fields, the mechanized fields showed positive results. The comparison, as 
measured in bags of grain reaped, ranged from a modest advantage for the 
mechanized plots to more than double the harvest of those farmed with oxen.87 
These figures undoubtedly reflected many variables such as the use of fertilizers 
and micro-environmental factors such as soil quality. But it seems clear that the 
mechanized units, at least in the areas measured, produced more grain on average. 
Based on the sporadic participation of farmers in the schemes, it also seems clear 
that when it came to agriculture, Basotho were a varied lot with different ideas 
about land, money, time, and social organization.   
People invested money in different ways. As scholars of agrarian southern 
Africa have shown, Africans had sought economic and social security by acquiring 
livestock, especially cattle, rather than cash.88 Considering this, we can see how 
some people would have believed that paying tractor dues was irrational, 
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particularly if they already had access to draft animals and equipment. Still, there 
were others who did believe that by earning cash, they could shape their families’ 
future by investing in their children’s education, commercial livestock breeds, and 
agricultural inputs like fertilizer, seed, and implements. These cultural shifts, of 
course, occurred within a political-economy where African producers with tiny plots 
could only hope to compete with subsidized commercial farmers in South Africa. 
The architects of betterment programs in South Africa and the Pilot Project believed, 
if disingenuously, that small-holder farmers in Lesotho and in the reserves could 
profit through cooperation.89  
Cooperation meant different things to different people. Basotho farmers had 
adapted to the acute shortages of labor and capital that had been shaped by the 
migrant labor system.90 They did so by creating social technologies for sharing 
labor, equipment, land, and expertise amongst community relations. Known as 
seahlolo (sharecropping) or ho lemisana (to plow with one another), these 
arrangements, according to one chieftainess, “are what Sesotho farming is all about.” 
But these arrangements were not communal in any pure sense. All participants 
earned something from the deal whether food, cash, or reciprocal labor. Colonial 
planners misunderstood the nature of these production arrangements, much as they 
had misunderstood letsema labor and grazing rights in the cattle post country.91  
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Few interviewees responded affirmative when I asked if they had 
participated in a mokhatlo oa temo (an agricultural association) in the past. Yet 
nearly all respondents spoke of their respective seahlolo arrangements over the 
years.92 So when the planners at Tebetebeng complained that people would not join 
cooperatives, they were both wrong and right in their assessment. They were right 
in thinking that Basotho farmers pursued self-interests which conflicted with those 
of their neighbors. They were wrong in reducing the problem to the “tyranny of 
tradition,” as one agricultural officer put it, which he believed ruled the lives of rural 
people of all races.93 Rather, the inconsistent participation in the tractor schemes 
shows that Basotho across the social spectrum were engaged in a long term process 
of cultural change, of which the social relations of production were a part.  
In February 1958, members of a special BNC committee on the Pilot Project 
discussed its failures with special attention to the mechanized group farming. The 
chairman Edwin Ntsasa admitted that “we found the place [Tebetebeng] very bad, 
but we learned many things.” He believed that the harvest reports proved the 
advantages of mechanized farming. Ntsasa argued that this model of mechanization 
be made compulsory in select places, despite knowing how Basotho generally 
reviled the term “compulsory” in any agricultural initiative. In those places, Basotho 
tractor operators from the department would plow people’s fields for a fee.94  
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Other committee members disagreed. Representatives from lowland districts 
conceded that tractors were important, but they also insisted that farmers needed to 
retain the authority to make farm-level decisions. A councilor from Maseru, pointed 
out that in many areas “tractors will sink in the marshy fields, and so, people should 
have the choice.” George Bereng of Qacha’s Nek articulated a set of problems with 
modernization schemes: “We have not got lands situated together on a plain…we 
plough along slopes where there is some soil…we in the mountains would only be 
putting ourselves in financial difficulty.” He continued, “some say that it [tractors] 
ruins the soil because the heavy wheels crush the soil” and by bringing up the sub-
soil which, when “mixed with the top soil it spoils the soil all together….leave it to 
those with suitable lands to use tractors.”95 Bereng was not against technology, but 
he understood that there were important ecological and social considerations. 
Similar to schemes in India and Malawi, when the colonial grant for the Pilot Project 
ran out in 1958, the authorities blamed the project’s shortcomings on the people’s 
ignorance and laziness, neglecting any hint of the dynamism discussed above.96 
To be sure, the Tebetebeng was a rivulet compared to the Tennessee. The 
scale of the technical, financial, and land inputs were no comparison. Still, the 
underlying ideas were rooted in the TVA model, in what James Scott calls high 
modernism in social and environmental engineering.97 Following Timothy Mitchell’s 
theoretical framework, we can also see that Tebetebeng represented a focused, yet 
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bold attempt to implement a techno-political experiment in Basutoland, which 
aimed to integrate Basotho peasants into a modern capitalist fold; albeit, in a 
subordinate role.98 But as the actions of farmers, chiefs, and councilors demonstrate, 
there was not the level of state control in Basutoland as there was in Mitchell’s case 
study of Egypt. Furthermore, narratives of the high modern miss the historical 
texture of how people of all social strata remade their landscapes and conceptions of 
work as they compiled and reconfigured knowledge, even as they struggled at the 
margins of a colonial political economy.  
 
6.4 - An alternative path for Basotho farmers?  
 An analysis of the visionary Mosotho farmer James Jacob Machobane offers a 
bridge between the modernization schemes in Lesotho’s lowlands and the pastoral 
development initiatives in Qacha’s Nek. A remarkable figure by any account, 
Machobane developed an innovative farming system and a college for promoting it 
in the mid-late 1950s. His movement was known as Mants’a Tlala, Drive Out Hunger. 
Machobane’s theories and practices emerged from his knowledge of Sesotho culture 
and local environments as well as his personal experiences with poverty and 
hunger.99 But his system’s agricultural practices, its assumptions about work, and its 
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methods for teaching, were also linked to a progressive and scientific ideology that 
overlapped in important ways with those of the Catholic and Protestant missions in 
Basutoland and the Department of Agriculture. Disentangling the relationship 
between innovation, local knowledge, and transnational ideas about agriculture and 
education, affords a fuller sense of historical possibilities that will help put Mochinti 
Jane’s situation in the mountains in 1955 in sharper relief.      
J.J. Machobane was born in 1914 in Frankfort, Orange Free State, just to the 
north of Lesotho. In Frankfort, his father farmed maize as a sharecropper on white-
owned land, which is where Machobane first learned about farming and the 
injustices of the region. In his co-authored autobiography, he recalls pulling teams of 
plow oxen “in the fields until 11 o’clock at night” as an eight year old boy.100 The 
Machobane family moved to Lesotho in 1924, settling in Leribe district. James grew 
up herding his father’s animals in the summer, assisting with plowing in the spring, 
and harvesting crops in the late autumn. Around age seventeen, Machobane began 
primary school at a Catholic mission and later continued at the Protestant school at 
Morija, where he became interested in literature.101 Following in a Basotho literary 
tradition, he published several Sesotho novels in the 1940s. According to one 
scholar of Sesotho literature, Machobane’s “novels deal with complex moral issues, 
showing how the culture of a people has to be dynamic while at the same time 
retaining the best features of tradition.”102 
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Machobane’s literary perspective on culture echoed his approach to his life’s 
work. His experiences and his aspirations to empower poor Basotho led him away 
from writing and back to agriculture. After marrying he returned to his father’s 
place in Leribe where he experimented with different combinations of crops over 
the next twelve years.103 Thinking carefully about time, seasonality, soils, and plant 
characteristics, Machobane planted and harvested crops at different times, and 
cultivated them with few inputs and on small plots. Through exhaustive trial and 
error, he honed his system, which he summarizes here:  
I could see what to put and when, so as not to leave any space uncultivated. I 
lifted the potatoes in January. I planted the maize, beans, and sorghum in 
January. By March or April the beans were ready to be harvested. Then I 
planted wheat where the beans were. The wheat was ready for harvesting 
around November or December. At the same time I had to think of the maize 
which would be harvested by winter time, June or July. The pumpkin and 
watermelon would be planted then. The wheat was ready by November or 
December and what remained was the potatoes. Then the whole thing began 
again. This was the beginning of the Machobane Farming System.104 
 
In December 1955, an agricultural officer named I.L. Chard, accompanied by 
three district councilors, went to inspect Machobane’s work at Nqechane, Leribe. 
Chard reported on Machobane’s intercropping system, noting the Mosotho’s 
innovative use of donkeys to pull a cultivator, which had “the front and side tines 
removed,” between rows to loosen soil for the next planting.105 His use of the more 
affordable and less culturally revered donkeys, instead of the customary and 
exclusively male-owned oxen, reflected Machobane’s concern for widows and other 
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people who owned few or no animals. Chard noted the excess weeds, and the 
weakness of the sorghum. He also believed that because the system entailed 
“continual work and personal supervision,” it would “be difficult to propagate 
amongst the local farmers who generally prefer the easy way.” But overall, he was 
impressed with the system. He had “no doubt that Mr. Machobane is [sic] producing 
several times more foodstuffs on his plot than any Basuto with the same size plots 
or with larger plots.” Furthermore, and particularly germane with regards to the 
government focus on soil conservation in the 1950s, Chard concluded that “one big 
advantage of this system would be [that] soil erosion would be reduced 
considerably.” With that, he urged the director of agriculture to examine the system 
more closely.106 
By November 1957, Basotho living outside Leribe were learning about 
Machobane’s system via the pages of Leselinyana, and no doubt, by word of mouth. 
In a letter to Leselinyana, a Mosotho contributor informed readers about 
Machobane’s life and the details of his system, advising “the nation and Lesotho’s 
chiefs to follow this wise method of agriculture.” He appealed to people’s sense of 
food insecurity at certain times of the year by stressing that Machobane’s system 
enabled year-round sowing and harvesting according to a new agricultural 
calendar.107 In the following years, other newspaper contributors praised 
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Machobane, covering the progress of his movement and underscoring its variety of 
crops, which Machobane believed was essential for nutritional health.108  
Following Chard’s original assessment, the colonial government, especially 
the resident commissioner at the time, A.G. Chaplin, showed interest. At 
Machobane’s request, Chaplin arranged for a comparison of the Machobane system 
with the conventional crop farming being promoted by the agricultural department: 
a deeply plowed, monocropped field with liberal applications of phosphate 
fertilizer.109 Machobane later recalled that at Roma (one of two competition sites) 
the government plot yielded thirty-six bags of potatoes versus his eighty-seven. He 
attracted international attention for these impressive returns. In 1959, Machobane 
earned a travel grant from the Ford Foundation, with which he visited the US, 
Canada, the UK, and Germany among other countries. He returned to Lesotho more 
convinced of his intercropping system than before. “These countries had big crops 
and rich farmers,” he observed, “but all were following the same road of chemical 
fertilisers [sic] and tractors and contour banks.”110   
Although government officials and agriculturalists showed early interest in 
Machobane’s system, many became concerned about his ability to mobilize people, 
suspecting political ambitions. Machobane and Mants’a Tlala emerged as the Pilot 
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Project was falling apart. Despite some low-tech aspects of the Pilot Project, such as 
vegetable gardening, the new direction was towards large scale mechanized 
farming. Machobane’s movement, for many agriculturalists and politicians both 
European and Basotho, posed a direct threat to this modern development paradigm. 
He gained some financial support following his trip to the US, with which he 
developed the Machobane Mass Agricultural College that he had initially launched 
with personal funds in 1957. He had trained twelve teachers, who in turn trained 
others to spread the knowledge through intensive extension work in the villages. 
Some 200 men and women had earned the rigorous certification, and these teachers 
drew new trainees from a waiting list that numbered 15,000 by 1960.111  
Many agricultural officials, including seasoned Basotho demonstrators, came 
to see the Machobane College as undermining their own extension efforts. 
Professional pride undoubtedly played a part. For example, Edwin Ntsasa, the 
longtime demonstrator and agricultural representative to the BNC in 1958, merely 
shrugged when another councilor inquired about Machobane, saying that “we were 
never told that there was a man like him.” Furthermore, if there were people who 
knew or worked with Machobane, he said, “I do not think that is official.” Chard had 
evaluated the system three years earlier, and with the newspaper publicity too, it is 
improbable that Ntsasa was unaware of Machobane’s work. Ntsasa, for all of his 
experience with teaching low-tech husbandry methods in the past, was clearly 
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dedicated to mechanized farming by the late 1950s. As Machobane came to know 
well, his low-tech methods fit uneasily within this official policy position.112  
Proponents of the progressive farmers’ scheme felt that Mants’a Tlala, with 
its emphasis on low-input, intensive labor mixed cropping, posed a threat to their 
initiative.113 According to Machobane, harassment began after he returned from 
abroad when police demanded to see his registration certificate for the college. In 
1962, he says he received threats of violence if he did not cease his work with the 
college. Who exactly harassed him is not entirely clear. Machobane appears little in 
official reports between 1963 and Lesotho’s independence in 1966. This omission 
owes to some combination of neglect and repression by government and other 
actors, and to some disinterest on the part of farmers. Although Machobane 
continued his efforts, repression increased in the decades following independence 
when the Lesotho government and its development partners pursued large-scale 
mechanization, actively (and sadly) eliminating the political and cultural space for 
Mants’a Tlala.114 It was somewhat recently, with fresh interest in local knowledge 
and a new government, that Machobane’s system has received renewed attention.115 
There are several ways to view Machobane and Mants’a Tlala in historical 
perspective. First, for those seeking local solutions to the problems that Basotho 
(and others) face today in farming small plots in an increasingly dry climate, 
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Machobane’s work represents the best of African farming: an indigenous prophet of 
today’s movements for sustainable agriculture. In this view, Machobane’s theories 
and practices stand in rebellious opposition to agricultural modernization schemes 
which relied on commercial fertilizers and seeds, expensive implements, access to 
credit, large monocultural plots, and stable commodity prices. As has been the case 
in post-colonial contexts in much of the global south, these larger schemes, in 
various forms and with even more varied sponsors, have dominated the mainstream 
of agricultural development in Lesotho ever since the Pilot Project of the 1950s. 
Proponents of these schemes, for both political and practical reasons, squash people 
like Machobane, or at least deprive them of official support.116 It is tempting to view 
Machobane’s relationship to this modernization paradigm in such polarizing, yet 
grossly oversimplified ways.  
 To be sure, Machobane’s system diverged sharply from the mechanized and 
planned approach of the Pilot Project. He also felt that cultural approaches to soil 
conservation (eg. crop rotation, mixed cropping, manuring), rather than grass strips 
and contour ridges, would better stabilize soils. His philosophy also departed from 
the progressive farmers’ scheme, which was predicated on specific factor 
endowments. As I have shown, few Basotho could afford to adopt the techniques 
and technologies of so-called progressive farming in the 1950s and 60s. 
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Furthermore, Machobane recognized the stark inequalities of gender, education, and 
socio-economic status in Basutoland. He strived to provide people with knowledge 
that could improve their lives through food production, regardless of how much 
land, equipment, or livestock they had.117 He railed against the obsession with 
tractor farming and fertilizers, citing Lesotho’s mountainous terrain, drought-prone 
climate, and fragile soils as barriers to these applications.118 As A.F. Robertson has 
pointed out, Machobane “now seems to have been ahead of his time, anticipating a 
variety of fashionable interests” from small-scale, intensive farming techniques to 
his “recognition of the particular victimization of women in African agriculture.”119  
It is also important, however, to understand how Machobane’s ideas evolved 
in a historical context where diverse actors were shaping and reshaping people’s 
mentalités about farming, work, social relationships, and time. Putting him in 
conversation with these ideas, and with the proponents of these ideas, sheds light 
on how Basotho sized up the possibilities for making a living on the land in the 
1950s. Several technical components of the farming system will illustrate this point. 
First, when I.L. Chard inspected Machobane’s four-acre experimental plot in 1955 he 
found it “completely fenced in.” For many Basotho, fencing continued to be 
unpopular as it had been in the past.120 Machobane advanced the trend of cultivating 
plants during all four-seasons, which conflicted with the historical preeminence of 
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livestock and Sesotho grazing patterns. Protecting vegetable gardens and young tree 
plantations by enclosing certain areas had been part of a broader effort by the 
agricultural department, with mixed Basotho support, to reorganize productive 
spaces.121 For Machobane, many Basotho, especially widows, had little access to 
animals and so could benefit more from plants. Gardens, along with trees for fruit 
and fuel wood purposes, if protected from livestock, could provide nutritious food 
and free up manure to replenish the soil.122  
Animal manures, crop residues, and ash all featured prominently in 
Machobane’s mixed cropping system to maintain soil structure and fertility. In order 
to cultivate year round, he encouraged farmers to work crop residues back into the 
soil rather than allow animals to graze them down to the roots.123 This practice was 
neither new nor was it drawn from timeless Basotho farming practices. Historically, 
the animals that grazed recently harvested fields deposited some manure there, but 
I have found no evidence that Basotho applied animal manure to their fields or 
gardens prior to the twentieth century.124  Government tree planting schemes began 
slowly around 1910 as a way to stabilize soil and free up manure for use as 
fertilizer. In fact, at the new Maseru agricultural school which had opened in 1955, 
instructors were giving public composting demonstrations in 1959. In 1958, the 
BNC debated whether or not to make manuring compulsory. The motion was 
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defeated easily because councilors felt that the practice had already been spreading 
for many years.125 
Additionally, the Department of Agriculture and Machobane promoted the 
use of ash as fertilizer, but both parties expressed frustration when people said that 
digging in household ash heaps would disturb the ancestors.126 It is unclear how 
Machobane first came to learn about manure and ash. But by repackaging the 
concept, especially at a time when the agricultural department stepped up their 
promotion of commercial fertilizers and more farmers began using them, 
Machobane sought a new progressive path.127 To ease the labor burden of 
manuring, the department had funded (albeit poorly), a campaign to subsidize 
scotch carts. Despite good intentions, the department and Machobane both failed to 
fully appreciate how people’s views of agricultural labor were changing; labor being 
crucial in collecting and applying manure, or indeed, in all farming tasks.128  
 Machobane’s system required an intense dedication to progress and to a 
strict work ethic. In Machobane’s words, “the Mants’a Tlala College motto was – 
First develop man, man will develop the land.”129 He believed that too many Basotho 
“had good education purely and highly academic.” These educated people, he wrote 
in 1961, “were men and women devoid therefore of physical power for work.” He 
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committed himself to teaching self-reliance. For Basotho and rural people more 
broadly, he insisted that working the soil was the only means for self-sufficiency.130 
In some ways, this philosophy accommodated the colonial and segregationist 
political projects which sought to develop Africans as farmers or tradesmen. But as I 
have argued, compiling the specialized knowledge for self-reliant, intensive farming 
and deploying it through one’s own labor could also serve political ends whether in 
Lesotho, South Africa, or for that matter, the American South (See Chap. 4). At its 
foundations this idea echoed Chief Lerotholi’s industrial school in Maseru which had 
opened in 1906. It echoed, too, the ideology behind the Catholic social action 
initiatives as well as Basutoland’s agricultural demonstration programs. Machobane 
saw a moral component in agricultural labor, and he joined a chorus of African and 
non-African voices in the 1950s in articulating the importance of work and 
knowledge in this respect.131  
 Intensive agricultural systems like Machobane’s, then and now, are only as 
good as people’s motivation to dedicate year-round labor to them.132 That is, soil, 
grass, plants, and animals only become resources through specific applications of 
knowledge and labor. The prevalence of absenteeism on Lesotho’s farms from 
migrant labor played a role here, but so too did people’s changing cultural 
aspirations in the mid-twentieth century. J.G. Mantlaka, a Mosotho school teacher, 
expressed this bluntly when he argued for better agricultural education in 
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Basutoland in an article for the Catholic newspaper Moeletsi oa Basotho. “It is 
amazing how our African people have become anti-agriculture.” He continued, 
“today agriculture is looked upon as a low and unbecoming occupation by our 
people, though it cannot be disputed that the whole of the human living is from the 
soil…the soil is really our mother.”133 Mantlaka, like Machobane and their 
contemporaries in the Department of Agriculture, although they disagreed on 
technical aspects, felt that Basotho could remake themselves as modern farmers to 
achieve personal, community, and national aspirations by working the home place, 
instead of digging and drilling in the mines of South Africa for wages. However 
quixotic this may seem given the structural constraints of the time, it was an 
important goal nonetheless.134 
 Finally, the Machobane farming system required its adherents to establish 
and maintain faith in the idea that individuals and communities could improve 
themselves, and each other, through a progressive relationship with their landscape. 
Machobane was not ignorant of the political and economic injustices around him. 
Nor was he unaware of the growth in nationalist party politics of his time, especially 
the BCP.135 But by choice, which might seem puzzling in hindsight, he disarticulated 
Lesotho’s poverty from the larger political structures of colonialism and apartheid. 
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He believed that hunger, in and of itself, led to social disharmony, to theft, and to 
murder. He saw himself and his system as an apolitical toolkit, a savior of sorts, to 
address these problems.136 
 Writing about his own motivations, he explained that “I was first moved 
deep into my heart by the starving, diseased, cold and ignorant masses of my 
country.” It was then, he says, that “I moved into the masses, into the wilderness…to 
share with them in their misery and while making several experiments, researches 
and finally, demonstrations in the attempt to try and bring about a solution to their 
misery.” His mission, as he saw it, “was to help my parents with absolute truth and 
sincerity so that I should best serve my wife and children, with sincere preparation 
to best serve my neighbor as a step towards best serving my people and country 
with my untiring sincerity and love.”137  
His sentiments drew on key Sesotho concepts that he believed had fallen out 
of favor, especially hlonepho (respect) and sechaba (community/nation).138 
Furthermore, he expressed a moral view of Lesotho, its environment, and people 
that also had clear links to the Protestant and Catholic presence there. His view was 
progressive, yet it fit uneasily with many Basotho in the 1950s who sought 
opportunities outside of agriculture; or at least they sought other opportunities as a 
way to supplement, or to make agriculture viable. Some sought wage work in the 
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mines or locally. Others sought higher education, or work as politicians, 
demonstrators, clerks, and not least, teachers.139 This was the environmental, social, 
and cultural paradox facing Mochinti Jane in Qacha’s Nek.   
   
6.5 - People, Place, and Development Prospects in the Maloti 
Although just 150 km as the crow flies from Machobane’s Mass Agricultural 
College in Leribe and the Pilot Project in Berea, Qacha’s Nek was a very different 
place. Mochinti Jane had no tractor schemes to participate in. Few melele knew 
anything about Machobane or his farming system in the late 1950s, much less 
practiced it.140 This was true because of the limits of communication and political 
repression, but also because of ecological factors. In most years, there were too 
many days of frost in the Maloti and the temperatures were too cold in the winter to 
reliably cultivate year round. If residents needed reminding of these constraints, 
Sehlabathebe, on the eastern edge of Qacha’s Nek, received snow, rain, and frost that 
destroyed crops in mid-summer 1959.141 Machobane farming, at least in its original 
orthodoxy, was for lowland environments. With regards to mechanization 
prospects, tractors did not work for mountain farmers, as George Bereng had 
explained to the BNC in 1958.142 Reinforcing the long held view of the Maloti as a 
refuge, as a place apart from Lesotho proper, Eagle’s Peak High School advertised an 
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educational experience where the “mountain life is greatly beneficial to boys and 
girls physically, intellectually, and morally.”143  
Despite what some people saw as a rugged if peaceful place, Mochinti lived in 
a Qacha’s Nek that was undergoing its own process of economic rationalization and 
cultural transformation. Residents living in or near the Senqu River Valley still grew 
the array of lowland crops on good years, but the government had designated the 
Maloti as essentially pastoral country.144 Indeed, the Jane family and other highland 
pioneers had only built this frontier into more than seasonal grazing when they 
settled it permanently from 1880. Building the Maloti into a cultural landscape was 
a dynamic process. Settlement coincided with, for example, the expansion of the 
dipping infrastructure in the 1920s, Staples and Hudson’s ecological survey in the 
1930s, and the rotational grazing schemes of the 1940s, all of which remade the 
Maloti as a place. In this process people reshaped the environment physically and 
imagined it in new ways.  
From the government’s perspective, making maps, creating vegetation and 
agro-ecological classifications, and enacting new regulations served as technologies 
of control, which made the Maloti more legible for governing and for producing 
commodities, especially wool and mohair.145 To some extent, as Arun Agrawal has 
argued in the context of India, colonized people became “environmental subjects” 
through this process. Environmental subjects were subordinate to various 
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authorities like the Department of Agriculture, livestock inspectors, and the chiefs 
that regulated natural resources. Agrawal argues that as subjects, people also used 
the environment as a conceptual category or domain, within which they framed 
their thoughts and practices with plants, animals, and soils. Highland Basotho, then, 
incorporated these technologies of control into their stock of knowledge and into 
their mentalités, by pursuing opportunities and imbuing the Maloti landscape with 
new meaning, often through seemingly mundane activities.146  
As a rational, productive space, at least from an agricultural planning 
perspective, the government made the Maloti even more legible when it carried out 
the first comprehensive agricultural survey of Basutoland in 1949-1950. The survey 
served as Basutoland’s contribution to the World Census of Agriculture, which was 
initiated by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to compile data on less-
known countries, i.e. the so-called third world. Its resulting data also provided 
statistical knowledge for government plans for agricultural development in 
Basutoland.147  
In 1950, the government was in the middle of their ten-year development 
plans. Funded by the CWDF grant from 1946, the ten-year plan aimed to check soil 
erosion and to improve pastures. Despite the fact that the mountains were central to 
this larger scheme, the census, in the interest of saving time and money, focused on 
agriculture. This point illustrates how the Maloti, its inhabitants and their activities, 
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received scant government resources. Census takers, who were mostly Basotho 
teachers trained specifically for the census, collected data on agricultural holdings 
and practices, equipment, crop yields, trees, and home gardens. While setting the 
bar for the more comprehensive 1960 census, the 1950 project also included the 
first set of aerial photos of Lesotho’s landscape, taken from 14,000 feet.148  
As the surveyors completed their work, the Department of Agriculture had 
already been developing the wool and mohair infrastructure in the Maloti. In 
addition to the dipping stations from a generation before, the department built a 
new system of corrugated iron shearing sheds in rural locations (See Figure 6.5).149 
They also implemented a system for tattooing livestock. Seen one way, tattooing and 
enumeration policies emerged from discourses about carrying capacity, pasture 
degradation, watershed conservation, and not least, stock reduction. We know that 
these discourses were rooted as much in racial politics as they were in ecological 
sciences. But for people like Mochinti’s Jane’s father who had had his sheep stolen, 
tattooing had other purposes and meanings too. On the softer side of this 
infrastructure, Basotho trained as wool classers to sort the wool for marketing 
purposes. Not least, the effort to breed merino sheep and angora goats for wool and 
mohair production respectively accelerated in these years. This breeding initiative 
began slowly around 1900 (See Chap. 3), and by 1960 it highlighted the gulf 
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between policy makers, regulators, and wealthy stock owners on the one hand, and 
the poorest Basotho on the other.150   
 
 
 
In 1953, BNC members and the director of livestock and agricultural services 
(DLAS) agreed that the wool and mohair industry needed to address quality 
problems if the country was to prosper. At the time, the official position was that the 
industry offered the best hope for export earnings: a hope that was supposed to 
benefit the nation as a whole.151 The paramount chief passed the High 
Commissioner’s Notice No. 150 in 1953, which established regulations to formalize 
the system in which Basotho produced, processed, and marketed wool and mohair. 
A slight increase in the wool export duty funded the new developments. First, wool 
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Figure 6.5 
Wool Shed, Sehlabathebe, Qacha’s Nek 
Photo by author, December 2014 
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and mohair growers would have to bring their sheep and goats to “government 
approved premises” for shearing so that the department officials could oversee the 
work.152 Previously, as Ntate Jane recalled from his childhood, stock owners and 
their caretakers sheared small stock at grazing posts in the absence of sheds. They 
trekked the unsorted and unwashed wool to trading stations where an attendant 
simply marked the bales “Basutoland.” Traders sold the bales to South African 
buyers at low rates. From the perspective of wool producers and traders, it was 
clear that Basutoland wool could do better. Better for who, exactly, was less clear.153  
Construction of wool sheds began in 1936 following Allan Pim’s development 
recommendations. By 1953 there were still only a few sheds located mostly in the 
foothills and near roads. From 1953 to 1963, the agricultural department built 
dozens of new sheds in remote pastures near the territory’s largest flocks. Although 
this coincided with the slow construction of the new mountain road, the remote 
sheds required substantial human and animal muscle. During this time, the 
government built several air strips in the Maloti too, but these were of little use for 
the construction projects. Instead, a specially trained team of forty-six mules and 
fifteen horses transported all wood, iron, nuts, bolts, and tools to remote grassland 
sites for twenty-five new sheds in 1954 alone. Each structure required eight tons of 
materials, yet few local resources were used.154  
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Although official records are silent on the details of human labor, each job 
had only one European development supervisor, meaning that Basotho did the 
hauling and building. Apart from a few larger churches and traders, these were 
some of the biggest buildings in the district, making for distinctive landmarks. 
Known in Sesotho as sekiri (pl. likiri) and taken from the Afrikaans word for shed 
(skuur), wool sheds were located just upslope from the dips. With scab no longer a 
major concern people washed their sheep and goats in the dips before driving them 
to the sheds for shearing. Bringing the animals to the sheds once, and sometimes 
twice per year marked a new annual migration for both livestock and herders. 
Summer was the time for shearing when the ovines needed their fleeces the least.155 
Still a conspicuous presence in Lesotho today, the likiri housed a carefully 
coordinated process. Being a member of the South African Wool Board, production 
and processing in Basutoland were modeled on methods used in South Africa. Inside 
the shed, shearers clipped animals while an attendant gathered the wool to give to 
the classers.156 Shearing is hard work, especially when using manual (non-electric) 
shears. In Australia a distinct subculture of shearer’s labor and lore thrives. Archival 
records for this occupation in Basutoland, however, are quiet and interviewees 
merely shrugged when asked about shearing. Herders and stock owners did their 
own shearing. Certified classers received the wool at tables where they sorted it into 
sixteen different types and grades, thirteen types for mohair, and then deposited it 
                                                          
155 Ibid.; RDA 1954, pp. 14-15; Mabille and Dieterlen, Southern Sotho, 346.  
156 Uys, Lesotho Mohair Industry, 55-60; MMA, R. Thornton, “Advice to Basuto Sheep Farmers on How 
to Shear and Prepare their Wool for Market,” No Date. 
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into bins that were marked with letter codes (See Figure 6.6). Wool and mohair 
could be dirty, stained with bodily fluids, long, short, black, and all combinations of 
these. For example, classers placed “matty seedy mohair” in the BSDY bin, while 
BGREY signified “genuine grey and black-grey mohair.”157 This was new work in the 
1950s. In 1961 women, for the first time, became classers through the government 
training. Classing under the government roofs and regulations professionalized this 
stage of processing, incorporating those people and animals with official sanction 
while pushing others to the margins.158 
 
 
 
                                                          
157 Uys, Lesotho Mohair Industry, 60; RDA 1959, p. 15; Seleso Tsoako, 19 January 2015. These 
comments also draw on my conversations with workers at the Sehlabathebe wool shed on 18 
December 2014 and on my own experiences working with sheep. 
158 Uys, Lesotho Mohair Industry, 68-69. 
Figure 6.6 
Wool Classers, Sehlabathebe, Qacha’s Nek 
Photo by author, December 2014 
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Like classing, a tattooing policy also aimed to standardize production. To 
identify livestock beyond simply knowing your own, Basotho had clipped the ears or 
noses of animals in coded ways for many years, especially sheep and goats.159 But in 
the 1950s, the agricultural department established an official code that all stock 
owners were obliged to use on all livestock. The codes signified which ward the 
animal belonged to, and under which chief or headman the owners lived. For 
example, AGE indicated that an animal was from Qacha’s Nek (A) at Letete’s village 
(GE). This way, if stock strayed or were stolen and recovered by police, it would be 
clear which chief had the right to retrieve the animals on behalf of the owners.160  
Perhaps not surprisingly, many stock owners feared that this would 
incentivize chiefs to impound stock that had supposedly strayed, in order to collect 
impoundment fees. By the late 1950s, for example, numerous cases had been leveled 
against Chief Theko Makhaola in Qacha’s Nek for his inconsistent enforcement and 
often excessive fining.161 As the case of Mochinti Jane’s father attests, however, 
concerns about theft were widespread amongst stock owners and Theko often 
defended his actions on the basis of protecting his people’s property. Along with the 
continued policing and other regulatory activities, tattooing became part of the 
order for legitimizing certain relationships between people, animals, and mountains, 
while delegitimizing others.162   
                                                          
159 Sayce, “Ethno-Geographic Essay,” 276. 
160 RDA 1952, p. 25; Tattooing and Registration 1955; RDA 1961, p. 30. 
161 TNA, FCO 141/445, Complaints against Theko Makhaola. 
162 Mochinti Jane, 18 May 2015; Sayce, “Ethno-Geographic Essay,” 276; CAR 1956, p. 87. 
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The market prices for Basutoland wool strengthened steadily, and so the 
Department of Agriculture doubled down on its effort to ‘improve’ sheep and goats. 
To do this, the department, with paramount chief Mantsebo’s endorsement, 
effectively criminalized bastard sheep rams and billy goats to stop the 
interbreeding.163 Notice No. 150 also forbade imports of strictly mutton-producing 
rams and subjected all bastard rams to castration by department officials. In 1959, 
livestock officers and demonstrators held meetings in villages to explain the 
objective of the campaign, which they believed “should not be relaxed until every 
bastard merino ram or boer goat ram has been eliminated from the scene.” In the 
department’s view, those responsible were “certain individuals who are keeping 
these rams for their selfish ends.” Furthermore, the tragedy was that these people 
also “harmed other people’s flocks as well which come in contact with these rams at 
the communal grazing areas.”164 Not all stockowners saw it that way, and the 
enforcement mechanisms were never entirely effective because of short staff and in 
fact, some chiefs refused to cooperate with these measures. Smaller stockowners 
were producing sheep for sale and slaughter, while “more influential sheep owners 
pinned their faith” on pure merino wool. “Production of mutton,” officials claimed, 
was only “attractive to the uninitiated.”165 
This tension demonstrates the varied mentalités emerging at this time. The 
“uninitiated” may not have understood the complexities of wool production or 
                                                          
163 RDA 1959, p. 15; CAR 1953, p. 57. 
164 RDA 1961, pp. 17-18. 
165 Ibid., Kena, 22 January 2015; Email interview with Peter Millin, 18 September 2015. 
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markets in the same ways, but it seems they did understand the limits of the 
ecological, economic, and cultural opportunities that lay before them. For Mochinti 
Jane, despite having no sheep to participate as a professional farmer as he may have 
wished, his options became available to him through his education and his social 
relationships, especially with Father Rousseau. For others, their different 
endowments and knowledge led to different choices. Wool classers for example, 
especially women, might have invested in non-merino animals for food to stretch 
their modest income. People did use these animals for ritual purposes too, but they 
kept them for their superior food value and because they required less care than 
merino, a fact that mattered to an owner who had no one to watch them constantly 
as she attended to other tasks.166  
Perhaps not coincidentally, in 1963 reports of pellagra and malnutrition had 
increased, resulting, at least in the physiological sense, from too little protein and 
vegetables. Echoing the dominant demographic perspectives of the time, one 
observer, Robert Germond, framed the problem in terms of population growth, 
claiming that “in the spacious days there was no malnutrition,” that is, “before the 
plough invaded the Maloti.” Germond believed, too, that the government promotion 
of wool had changed not only the breeding stock, but also the way some people 
thought about small stock as commodities rather than as food.167  
                                                          
166 Mochiniti Jane, 18 May 2015; Interview with Manti Sekoala, Ha Makhaola, 28 May 2015; Sheddick, 
Land Tenure, 101.   
167 R.C. Germond, “The Fight against Malnutrition in Basutoland,” Basutoland Times, 26 April and 3 
May 1963. 
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As I have shown, policy makers overstated population growth, and rarely did 
they seriously consider the relationships between farming, population density, and 
migrant labor; problems which had by then, been documented in official 
publications.168 In addition to the obvious historical and political injustice of land 
dispossession in the nineteenth century, the problem also lay in policies that 
favored market production, and market producers, over food. By the late 1950s 
people who sought to integrate subsistence and market agriculture in creative ways, 
like J.J. Machobane, were pushed far outside of official circles.  
 These official circles widened in the early 1960s, as evidenced by the 1960 
Agricultural Census. A joint effort between the Basutoland Department of 
Agriculture and the FAO, the census revealed deep social inequality in Basutoland. 
For this census, agricultural demonstrators were chosen to gather the data both 
because of their expertise and to save money by not hiring additional personnel. 
Read one way, the census and its elaborate framework for calculating the country by 
dip tank areas, villages, and households represented the latest in a long-term 
colonial simplification project (See Figure 6.7).169 But apart from the material 
inequalities of who owned what tools and how much land, and who grew what 
crops, we also see glimpses of who the so-called uninitiated were, and how they 
engaged the world in which they lived.  
                                                          
168 See, for example, Ashton, The Basuto; Sheddick, Land Tenure, 75; RDA 1952, pp. 15-16. 
169 Morojele, 1960 Agricultural Census, Part I, 52-53, 121. 
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Many men, of course, worked in South Africa. Miners who owned little or no 
land, as several interviewees explained, bought animals with their wages not so 
much to produce wool, although some did, but as a way to sustain their presence in 
a place while they were away, and to invest in a rural retirement.170 There were 
those who had animals, equipment, and skill, yet no land who contracted from farm 
to farm as enterprising capitalists.171 There were the wool classers, herders, and 
others who worked in the wool industry. There was Mochinti Jane and many more 
                                                          
170 Murray, Families Divided. 
171 Morojele, 1960 Agricultural Census, Part V, 58-59; Mochinti Jane, 18 May 2015. 
Figure 6.7 
Dip Tank Areas and Ecological Zones 
Source: Morojele, 1960 Basutoland 
Agricultural Census, Part I, 121. 
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like him, who, by his hard earned knowledge and perhaps more importantly, by 
chance, took a different path, though no less separated from the place where he 
came from. Not least, the demonstrators, through their work of collecting census 
data, displayed a blend of local knowledge with a belief in the new path of scientific 
planning and modernist development.172 
But how can we understand the people at the margins of the margin, the 
highest of the highlanders, such as those who stole livestock? Motlatsi Thabane has 
examined the liphakojoe (jackals) as they were known, a group of Basotho who lived 
clandestinely in the mountains around a foreign-owned diamond mine in the 1960s-
70s. By night, jackals descended to the mines to collect ore to sift through on their 
own. Peering through a political lens, as Hobsbawm has done to explain banditry, 
Thabane explains how these men’s actions articulated to the political and economic 
shifts of the time, especially, by making claims to Sesotho practices of property 
rights while protesting the government’s legitimizing of industrial extraction.173  
But the diggers, like stock thieves, also demonstrated a profound knowledge 
of the place in which they worked, and furthermore, how that place fit into wider 
economic webs. From the time mixed farmers settled the Maloti to my fieldwork in 
2015, stock theft has been a serious concern of the people who live there, yet it has 
changed in subtle ways. Perhaps not surprisingly, people always seem to point their 
                                                          
172 Ibid., Part I, 62-65. 
173 Motlatsi Thabane, “Liphokojoe of Kao: A Study of a Diamond Digger Rebel Group in the Lesotho 
Highlands,” Journal of Southern African Studies 26, no. 1 (2000): 105-21; See also, E.J. Hobsbawm, 
Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movements in the 19th and 20th Centuries 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959), 26. 
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fingers at others. For many years it was the Xhosa-speaking immigrants who were 
the thieves (See Chap. 3). Or, it was people from South Africa who came at night and 
then rustled the stock back across the border to sell. More locally, some people point 
to the villages further into the mountains, saying “it is them, up there.”174 This topic 
remains for further research to answer some questions while raising new ones 
about the micro-politics of environmental knowledge, and about identity and 
belonging. Masholu (thieves) may offer another social category for understanding 
how, over these 90 years, people have compiled, reconfigured, and applied 
knowledge for different purposes.  
 
6.6 - Conclusion   
Energized by its vibrant national politics and the changes sweeping the 
continent, Basutoland moved closer to independence in 1965. Political fissures 
developed and widened between the BNP and BCP. Cracks formed along Catholic 
and Protestant lines. The parties disagreed, too, about what role chiefs would play in 
independent Lesotho and about how to engage, or disengage, with the South African 
apartheid state. But few disagreed that rural development meant improving the 
landscape as a system of natural resources where humans, animals, and technology 
would work together in calculated ways to serve the good of the nation. Young men 
and women enrolled at the Maseru Agricultural School in high numbers while the 
                                                          
174 Interview with Lebamang Mohapi, 5 January 2015; Interview with Mokete Lephaeana, Ha 
Makhaola, 6 January 2015; Interview with Manti Sekoala, 28 May 2015.  
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newly formed agricultural information service (AIS) designed and mass produced 
posters, pamphlets, and films. The AIS began a farmer’s radio broadcast too. Now 
composed mostly of Basotho, the Department of Agriculture prioritized farmers’ 
training and information dissemination. But if the department had become more 
decentralized, it still continued the model where market production and technical 
improvement trumped small potatoes like J.J. Machobane.175   
In 1965, national elections took place, but so too, did the worst drought since 
1933. With international assistance, the government launched another food relief 
program as it had in 1933. This drought and subsequent food insecurity, perhaps 
not coincidentally, followed closely after the renewed effort to eliminate the hearty, 
drought tolerant fat-tail sheep and Boer goats.176 The Basotho have a succinct, yet 
potent proverb for times of dearth: Naha e jele boea, the country has eaten wool. In 
other words, times are bad. Official livestock and agricultural policy continued on 
this track yet regulators at all levels struggled to bring all Basotho into the capitalist 
fold, especially highlanders and those less materially endowed.  
                                                          
175 CAR 1965, pp. 24-27. 
176 Ibid., 6, 25. 
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EPILOGUE 
Lesotho celebrated fifty years of independence on October 4, 2016. On that 
day my friend Lebuajoang, the beekeeper and gardener from the introduction to this 
dissertation, sent me a message via Facebook, which he has recently begun using on 
his cell phone. The message read: “Ntate Chris, we are celebrating 50 years 
independence, but we are still poor, as you know, is this the [way] life should be? 
Educated but not creative, what’s wrong with us?” After thinking about his heavy 
words, I eventually wrote to remind him, as we have spoken about many times 
before, to bear in mind the important constraints of global capitalism, drought, and 
political disarray in Lesotho. I assured him, too, that he is both educated and 
creative, and that he is an inspiration to more people than he realized. My liberal 
words, no doubt, provided little comfort to my friend. 
For many if not most Basotho, it has been a difficult and frustrating fifty 
years since Lesotho gained its independence from Great Britain on October 4, 1966. 
After just four years of independence, Chief Leabua Jonathan and the Basotho 
National Party refused to accept defeat in the 1970 elections. They suspended the 
constitution, jailed political opponents, sent others into exile, and ushered in sixteen 
years of authoritarian rule that was only broken by a military coup in 1986. 
Jonathan and the BNP pursued an aggressive modernization policy, drawing in 
numerous international development agencies to assist with building up its physical 
infrastructure and agricultural sector among other things. These agencies included 
heavy hitters like the World Bank, USAID, OXFAM, and CIDA (Canadian).  
 413 
 
The development projects in the 1970s and 80s were similar to those in the 
1950s and 60s. The transfer of technology model, rather than more explicit efforts 
to circulate knowledge, dominated the agendas. One scheme in the early 1970s 
attempted irrigated farming along the Senqu River in Quthing district. In another 
program, OXFAM helped establish farmer’s training centers in the district capitals. 
Like the Pilot Project in the 1950s, these schemes met formidable challenges. By the 
later 1970s, development agencies and their partners in the Government of Lesotho 
had moved towards integrated rural development schemes. In these schemes, 
planners sought a similar approach as the Pilot Project although there was an added 
emphasis on improving roads and communications which could facilitate better 
market connectivity. It was hoped, too, that better access to schools and medical 
facilities would follow. Few material benefits accrued to the poorest people.1   
Writing about the Thaba-Tseka Rural Development Scheme of the 1970s, 
James Ferguson has examined how the international development apparatus, 
represented here by CIDA and the World Bank, not only failed to alleviate poverty, 
but perpetuated the cycle of poverty by interfering in the political relationships 
between people and their government. To some extent, the project validated the 
authoritarian regimes in both Lesotho and apartheid South Africa. In this 
development model, technical, rather than political solutions were standard.2 Still, 
important questions remain about how various people interacted with the different 
                                                          
1 Aerni-Flessner, “Development, Politics, and Centralization,” 402-05. 
2 Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine, 11-21. 
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types of knowledge involved with this project such as land reform, agricultural 
marketing, and livestock breeding.    
In 1986 the governments of Lesotho and South Africa, under military and 
apartheid rule respectively, signed a treaty that launched the Lesotho Highlands 
Water Project (LHWP). Implementing this multi-phase mega-project has involved a 
slew of international loans and construction firms as well as local skilled and 
unskilled labor. So far, two major dams, one hydro-power station, and a series of 
transfer tunnels have been built to store and transport precious Maloti water to the 
Johannesburg area. A third dam is in the early stages of construction as I write. 
Many communities were forced to relocate, while other people lost their arable 
fields and grazing space but not their residences. Ecological impact assessments 
suggest that biodiversity, soil erosion, and perhaps rainfall have all been adversely 
affected by the trauma of the construction activities and by the altered upstream 
and downstream flows in the Senqu River system.3  
Although the government earns substantial royalties from selling the water 
to South Africa, the benefits from LHWP for common Basotho have been uneven. For 
one bulldozer operator whom I spoke with, the LHWP had offered him temporary 
employment and training, endowing him with skills that have enabled him to find 
work ever since, usually building roads. There are many people who can see the 
glimmer of the reservoirs from their villages. Yet many of these same people have 
                                                          
3 See for example, Motlatsi Thabane, “Shifts from Old to New Social and Ecological Environments in 
the Lesotho Highlands Water Scheme; Relocating Residents of the Mohale Dam Area,” Journal of 
Southern African Studies 26, no.4 (2000): 634-35; Femi Akindele and Relebohile Senyane, eds., The 
Irony of the White Gold (Maseru: The Transformation Resource Center, 2004). 
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no reliable access to water supplies, especially during times of drought which seem 
to be more frequent and more severe in recent years.4 Perhaps not coincidentally, 
the era of LHWP has paralleled the rise of HIV/AIDS in Lesotho. Along with its 
neighbors in South Africa and Swaziland, Lesotho is among the most affected 
countries in the global pandemic. Other people say that despite all of the problems 
with the LHWP, which have ranged from corruption at all levels of administration to 
undelivered compensation payments to the social problems associated with 
temporary worker communities (at construction sites), the network of new roads 
has made life easier.5  
For most residents of Qacha’s Nek the LHWP seems far away despite the fact 
that the fourth of five originally planned phases was to be the Tsoelike Dam. This 
dam would have been built just 1000 meters from the center of Ha Makhaola.6 As 
LHWP plans have been reconfigured many times in the last sixteen years, for better 
or worse, it now seems unlikely that the Tsoelike Dam will ever materialize. Apart 
from LHWP, the government and its international partners have implemented 
smaller integrated schemes in Qacha’s Nek. In 1983, for instance, a Canadian NGO 
funded the Seforong Women’s Integrated Rural Development Project in the western 
part of the district. The project, which focused on women as the primary household 
                                                          
4 Pascalinah Kabi, “Lesotho Caught Napping,” Lesotho Times, 16 April 2016. 
5 Akindele and Senyane, The Irony of the White Gold. 
6 Lesotho Highlands Water Project Feasibility Studies, Supporting Report C: Environmental and Social 
Impact in Lesotho (Maseru: Ministry of Water, Energy, and Mining, 1986). 
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managers, had nearly collapsed after six years due to administrative problems.7 But 
the story in Qacha’s Nek has been more about small projects. For example, in a 
1970s local water supply project, villagers at Ha Makhaola and surrounding 
communities collectively contributed cash, supplies, and labor to build a new 
spring-fed system which still serves these villages today.     
In 1970, the Government of Lesotho formed the Sehlabathebe National Park 
on the eastern edge of Qacha’s Nek district. The park encompasses part of an 
Afromontane grassland zone, a well-watered and very green area situated on the 
edge of the Drakensberg Escarpment. The park protects the vegetation and wildlife 
therein, in theory, from the people who have relied on the rich grasses for sustaining 
their herds and producing wool and mohair since settling the area in the 1880s. To 
be sure, it is a spectacular place to visit. Yet like so many histories of protected areas 
in Africa and elsewhere, the promised benefits from tourism have amounted to little 
for the majority of local residents.8  
Investment in Qacha’s Nek as in other mountain areas, it is fair to say, has 
been minimal. This has been generally true even since 1998 when a local molele, 
Pakalitha Mosisili, was elected Prime Minister; a position which he still held as of 
April 2017. Mosisili’s relationship to mountain communities, from whom he derives 
his most loyal political support, is undoubtedly linked to a past in which highlanders 
                                                          
7 ‘Malejara Mothebang and David Hall, Report on an Evaluation of the Seforong Women’s Integrated 
Rural Development Project (Maseru: Unitarian Service Committee of Canada, 1989). 
8 Ambrose et al., Biological Diversity, 78-79; See also Roderick Neumann, Imposing Wilderness: 
Struggles over Livelihood and Nature Preservation in Africa (Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1998); Karl Jacoby, Crimes Against Nature: Squatters, Poachers, Thieves, and the Hidden History 
of American Conservation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). 
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have felt marginalized by the centers of power in Maseru and Matsieng (the royal 
village). Situating these political circumstances in longer-term historical trajectories 
awaits further research.  
As for farmers in Qacha’s Nek, even those with significant off-farm income, 
confidence in agriculture is cautious at best. With fewer jobs in the mines and 
tightened immigration restrictions at the South African border, many men and 
women are reconsidering their options in the rural areas. Few people produce the 
grain needed to sustain their families, and with the array of cash expenses, be it for 
school fees or a new television, cash is more necessary than ever. There have been 
assorted government programs to encourage specialized market production of, 
among other products, asparagus, apples, peaches, and grapes. Several friends of 
mine have built greenhouses where they hope to raise tomatoes, peppers, and 
spinach to sell locally. Ntate Lebuajoang and others now produce honey in addition 
to vegetables. There has also been renewed interest in sustainable farming 
techniques, including the Machobane system. The government promotes a system 
known as conservation agriculture, by which cultivators dig small holes for each 
plant instead of plowing to minimize soil disturbance and preserve moisture.9  
But it seems few people want to work so hard to produce mere sustenance. 
For one former student of mine, there is a different path. Thabiso (pseudonym) 
wants to marry a local woman in the Sesotho way by paying a negotiated bohali in 
                                                          
9 Sustainable Land Management Tool Kit (Maseru: Ministry of Forestry and Land Reclamation, 
Government of Lesotho, 2014). 
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cattle, and to raise his family in Qacha’s Nek. He was a mediocre, yet energetic 
student in my English classes and later trained to be a carpenter at a tertiary school. 
He loves rural life. He tends his grandfather’s livestock, participates in building 
projects and agricultural tasks, plays football, sings and dances, and drinks beer 
with the guys. He likes farming but says the market prospects for producing grain, 
beans, or vegetables are futile, especially given the recent droughts that destroyed 
crops in 2016. “It’s not worth the work,” he says. But he has a plan, which he 
explains to me as we participate in butchering a black ox at a funeral in the village.10  
 I do not approve of his plan and his expectations seem unrealistic. However 
illegal, Thabiso’s plan derives from the environmental knowledge that he has 
compiled through his experiences and education in his young life. He will produce 
matokoane (marijuana) for market. He has negotiated with a relative for some space 
near a village some fifteen miles from his home. Growing and consuming marijuana 
in Lesotho is not new. In fact, Basotho were cultivating and smoking it when they 
moved into the mountains in the nineteenth century as were the Baroa before them. 
Through the 1900s, marijuana from Lesotho was a hot commodity in South Africa. 
Although this is difficult to document, it needs more research.  
Thabiso has collected the seeds and has arranged for donkeys to transport 
the produce. He explains various methods for cultivation. To complete the plan, he 
has a buyer lined up. “I will do this,” he says, “on my own.” I nod my head, cautioning 
him as any teacher would his student. But thinking of his plan in the longer 
                                                          
10 This information, and what follows, is drawn from my field notes for 24 May 2015. 
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trajectory of history, I see now that it makes perfect sense. Although I question his 
judgement on this, I respect where the plan comes from. The risks, he believes, are 
worth it to live well in the mountains, which for him means having money to spend. 
Lesotho’s paper currency itself speaks to the non-linear, socially uneven 
historical process which I have examined in this dissertation. The currency is called 
the Loti, or Maloti in the plural. The Maloti, or at least the idea of the mountains that 
give the currency its name, has played a central role in how people compile 
environmental knowledge. The mountains remain a core feature, too, in shaping 
Basotho identity more broadly. The 100-Maloti note, a common bill nowadays, 
depicts a young herder with a small flock of goats. The goats appear to be angoras. A 
close look reveals a lone black billy goat in the corner of the image.11 The lone black 
goat, long revered by Basotho for its ritual and supernatural purposes, serves as a 
reminder that amid the overwhelming forces that drive governments to modernize, 
monetize, and rationalize the natural world in specific ways, environmental 
knowledge cannot be constricted by any single set of ideas.
  
                                                          
11 This is a 2010 version of this note. 
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